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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

A Quarterly of Christian Thought

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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

A Quarterly of Christian Thought

Contents, Volume VI (1960)

ARTICLES AND EDITORIALS

Canadian Journal of Theology: Retrospect and Prospect, The	E.R.F.	1
Clio Observed: A Survey of Recent Literature in Ecclesiastical History	John Gordon Rowe	262
Easter and Theology	E.S.M.	79
Evangelism, Mythology, and Bultmann	J. F. Peter	42
From Classroom to Pulpit	D.K.A.	157
Gospel According to Thomas: A Gnostic Manual, The	F. W. Beare	102
Human Population Pressures and Birth Control	David J. McCallion	170
Incarnation and Hindu Thought, The	V. E. Devadutt	81
Minister's Self-Discipline, The	Neil Gregor Smith	284
Nels Ferré and Reinhold Niebuhr Discuss War	Wallace Gray	237
New Light on the Church of the Second Century: Gnosticism and the Coptic Papyri of Nag-Hammadi	F. W. Beare	211
New Testament Today, The	John B. Corston	191
Old Testament and Some Aspects of New Testament Christology, The	A. J. B. Higgins	200
One Foundation of Christian Ethics, The	J. Arthur Boorman	159
Opportunity for the Preacher, An	J.L.	235
Pastoral Theology Today	Greer W. Boyce	31
Psalm 139: An Exposition	S. B. Frost	113
Religious Opinion in the Prose Letters of John Donne	Ian Sowton	179
Resurgent Religion	R. M. Bennett	123
Soul Care in the Ministry of Jesus (II)	George Johnston	25
Symposium on *Life and Death: A Study of the Christian Hope*, A	F. W. Beare, Emlyn Davies, Joseph C. McLelland, James S. Thomson	3
Tractarian Patriarch: John Medley of Fredericton, A	Eugene R. Fairweather	15
Trends in Old Testament Theology	T. A. M. Barnett	91
Virgin Mary in a Reformation Theology, The	James A. Shuel	275

BOOKS REVIEWED

Ames, Van Meter (ed.): *Beyond Theology: The Autobiography of Edward Scribner Ames* (Pidgeon) 230
Baillie, D. M.: *Out of Nazareth* (Snell) 228
Barth, K.: *Dogmatics in Outline* (Wevers) 57
Barth, K.: *The Word of God and the Word of Man* (Wevers) 54
Beare, F. W.: *The Epistle to the Philippians* (Hibbitts) 298
Berdyaev, N.: *The Beginning and the End* (Wevers) 54
Berry, W. G.: *This Incredible Thing, Evangelism* (Judd) 226
Bevan, R. J. W. (ed.): *Steps to Christian Understanding* (Hamilton) 64
Breasted, J. H.: *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt* (Wevers) 57
Brightman, F. E.: *What Objections have been made to English Orders?* (Fairweather) 222
Buber, M.: *Moses: The Revelation and the Covenant* (Wevers) 55
Burckhardt, J.: *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (Wevers) 56
Chalmers, R. C., and Irving, J. A. (eds.): *Challenge and Response: Modern Ideas and Religion* (Landon) 303
Conze, E.: *Buddhism: Its Essence and Development* (Wevers) 57
Dru, A. (ed.): *The Journals of Kierkegaard* (Wevers) 56
Dugmore, C. W.: *The Mass and the English Reformers* (Rowe) 141
Ebbutt, A. J.: *The Bible and Christian Education* (Guthrie) 225
Eddy, R. L. (ed.): *Pastoral Prayers through the Year* (Reeve) 153
Elizabethan Bishops and the Civil Power, The (Fairweather) 222
Enslin, M. S.: *The Literature of the Christian Movement* (Wevers) 53
Farrer, A.: *The Freedom of the Will* (McRae) 147
Ferguson, J.: *Moral Values in the Ancient World* (Thomson) 140
Gilmour, G. P.: *The Memoirs Called Gospels* (Wood) 295
Gottwald, N. K.: *A Light to the Nations: An Introduction to the Old Testament* (McCullough) 292
Harrison, P. M.: *Authority and Power in the Free Church Tradition: A Social Case Study of the American Baptist Convention* (Albaugh) 300
Hatch, E.: *The Influence of Greek Ideas on Christianity* (Wevers) 54
Hendry, G. S.: *The Gospel of the Incarnation* (Line) 65
Hill, N., and Lund, D. A.: *If the Churches want World Peace* (Davies) 231
Hooke, S. H. (ed.): *Myth, Ritual and Kingship* (Lambert) 134
Hooker, M. D.: *Jesus and the Servant: The Influence of the Servant Concept of Deutero-Isaiah in the New Testament* (Frost) 296
Huizinga, J.: *Erasmus and the Age of Reformation* (Wevers) 55
Hyatt, J. P.: *Jeremiah: Prophet of Courage and Hope* (de Catanzaro) 58
Kelly, J. N. D.: *Early Christian Doctrines* (Hay) 217
Kidd, B. J.: *The Later Medieval Doctrine of the Eucharistic Sacrifice* (Fairweather) 222
Leaney, A. R. C.: *A Commentary on the Gospel according to St. Luke* (Wood) 62
LeFevre, P.: *The Christian Teacher: His faith and his responsibilities in higher education* (Clarke) 150

Lewis, C. S.: *Reflections on the Psalms* (Wagner) 59
Liturgical Renewal of the Church, The (Carrington) 227
MacGregor, G.: *Introduction to Religious Philosophy* (Owen) 307
Maritain, J.: *The Degrees of Knowledge* (Webb) 304
Mascall, E. L.: *The Importance of Being Human: Some Aspects of the Christian Doctrine of Man* (Chalmers) 218
Moule, C. F. D.: *An Idiom-Book of New Testament Greek* (J.W.W.) 74
Muncey, R. W.: *The New Testament Text of St. Ambrose* (Johnston) 138
Niebuhr, H. R.: *Christ and Culture* (Wevers) 53
Orchard, R. K. (ed.): *The Ghana Assembly of the International Missionary Council* (Albright) 148
Pelikan, J.: *Human Culture and the Holy: Essays on the True, the Good and the Beautiful* (Jay) 144
Phillips, J. B. (trans.): *The New Testament in Modern English* (Andrews) 60
Pollard, A., and Hennell, M. (eds.): *Charles Simeon (1759–1836)* (Millman) 224
Schubert, K.: *The Dead Sea Community: Its Origin and Teachings* (J.W.W.) 73
Shaw, J. M.: *The Wonder of the Christian Gospel* (Briggs) 308
Sissons, C. B.: *Church and State in Canadian Education: An Historical Study* (Kirkconnell) 220
Throckmorton, B. H.: *The New Testament and Mythology* (Johnston) 293
Tylor, E. B.: *Primitive Culture* (Wevers) 56
Verkuyl, G. (ed.): *The Holy Bible; The Berkeley Version in Modern English* (J.W.W.) 73
Ward, R. A.: *Royal Sacrament: The Preacher and His Message* (Bell) 151
Welch, C.: *The Reality of the Church* (Aldwinckle) 67
Westminster Introduction to the Books of the Bible (Schnell) 137
Wilson, J.: *Language and Christian Belief* (Owen) 146
Winnett, A. R.: *Divorce and Re-Marriage in Anglicanism* (Carrington) 71

AUTHORS

Barnett, T. A. M., 91
Beare, F. W., 3, 102, 211
Bennett, R. M., 123
Boorman, J. Arthur, 159
Boyce, Greer W., 31
Corston, John B., 191
Davies, Emlyn, 6
Devadutt, V. E., 81
Fairweather, Eugene R., 15
Frost, S. B., 113
Gray, Wallace, 237
Higgins, A. J. B., 200
Johnston, George, 25
McCallion, David J., 170
McLelland, Joseph C., 9
Peter, J. F., 42
Rowe, J. G., 262
Shuel, James A., 275
Smith, N. G., 284
Sowton, Ian, 179
Thomson, James S., 11

Editorial

THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

JUST under five years ago, in April, 1955, Vol. I, No. 1 of the *Canadian Journal of Theology* made its appearance. Since that hopeful moment, we, its editors, have learned a good deal about readers, more about authors, and still more about the labour and the risks of publishing "A Quarterly of Christian Thought" with our limited resources. Now that five volumes have been completed, it may not be inappropriate to examine our achievements and our failures in the light of the *Journal*'s aims, and to attempt to sketch the shape of things to come.

When we planned the first issues of the *Journal*, we had at least three aims in view. In the first place, we were concerned with *theology*. We were and are convinced that one of the crying needs of our time and place is the recovery and deepening of the sense of divine truth as the ultimate standard for thought and action. In seeking to serve the Church and its many members, we knew that our primary task must be to focus attention on the truth of God's revelation, apart from which there can be no true Church and no true Christians. We have not presented elaborate technical studies, whether historical or philosophical, but we have not been ashamed of solid theology, built on a firm technical foundation, because we have believed that theological responsibility is an essential mark of the sincere pastor and the mature disciple.

Secondly, we have sought to help theology speak to the particular problems of *the Church in the modern world*. We have seen in this effort an integral part of our service of that Word which must be at once believed and obeyed. Believing that without vision the people perish, we have tried to help the pastor see what God means him to be in relation to his flock, to point to the theological standards which must control the quest for Christian unity, and to bring Christian truth to bear on the great moral and social issues of our day.

Thirdly, we have aimed at being a *Canadian* journal. We do not think that Canada possesses any peculiar theological truth, but we do believe that theology must speak to Canada, and that Canadians in their turn must take their part in the great theological conversation of our age. We have therefore brought the work of theologians of other lands to Canadian readers, and we have provided a forum in which Canadians themselves could discuss the great issues of God's Word and God's world. In addition, we have presented a number of studies of Canadian Church history, as a contribution to the understanding of our present life and problems.

We have published over 110 articles. Counted and divided rather roughly, 34 can be called theological or philosophical, 34 belong to biblical studies and general Church history, 14 are immediately concerned with Canadian life and history, and 29 bear directly on pastoral work, preaching, social questions and the ecumenical movement. We have presented the work of at least 65 Canadian authors, and of such distinguished "guests" as Bultmann, Tillich, Torrance, Alan Richardson, Cyril Richardson, Paul Ramsey, Stephen Neill, Casserley and Pittenger. We have reviewed over 170 books—at least 33 of them by Canadian writers.

Our most glaring deficiency has been on the pastoral and social side, where serious theological work is badly needed. A second deficiency has been in the area of Canadian Church history, where we have managed to publish surprisingly little. In both cases, however, our problem has been lack of material, not unwillingness to consider it. It might be added that even in the theological field itself we have not had sufficiently varied material at our disposal.

In this issue we are experimenting with a symposium on a topic of current interest, and we hope to follow this up with other symposia on ecumenical and social issues. In our April issue we expect to present the first of four survey articles, designed to bring our readers up-to-date on important work being done in four major areas of theological scholarship. In these and other ways we hope to heighten both the *Journal*'s interest and its usefulness.

We need help from our friends, however, if our work is to go on. In the first place, we need well-written *contributions* within our broad field of interest, and suggestions of specific topics for future symposia or articles. Secondly, we need *subscriptions*—both renewals and subscriptions from new readers. Finally, if we are to work on our present scale, we urgently need *donations*, which might come from theological schools, church bodies, congregations or individual benefactors. We confidently appeal for all these things, because we believe that we have begun to do something really worthwhile, and that with the co-operation of our constituency we can do much more to meet a real and serious need of our Canadian churches.

E.R.F.

A SYMPOSIUM ON

Life and Death: A Study of the Christian Hope

THE Committee on Christian Faith of the United Church of Canada has recently published a study booklet on the ultimate issues of human destiny, under the title *Life and Death: a Study of the Christian Hope.* This booklet has received a good deal of publicity, much of it misleading, and a good deal of criticism, much of it uninformed. Our Editorial Committee is glad to offer our readers a symposium by distinguished representatives of four Canadian churches, as a contribution to a balanced assessment of a significant document.

E.R.F.

I

Professor E. R. Dodds, in his Sather Lectures on *The Greeks and the Irrational*, remarks that "there is no domain where clear thinking encounters stronger resistance than when we try to think about death." Inherited notions, the traditional ideas of the society in which we live, are discarded or modified only with the greatest reluctance. Wishful thinking, of course, plays a great part in inhibiting clear and honest thinking. Even more, the mind is all too often paralyzed by the terror of the unknown, intensified by feelings of guilt, partly conscious, partly unconscious, sometimes reasonable, but all the more powerful in proportion as they are unreasonable—

> "the dread of something after death,
> The undiscovered country from whose bourn
> No traveller returns, puzzles the will;
> . . . . . .
> Thus conscience does make cowards of us all" (*Hamlet*, Act III, Scene I).

In this pamphlet, the Committee on Christian Faith of the United Church of Canada has tried to help us to do some clear thinking on this subject. There is no attempt here to lay down definitions of official doctrine, nor yet to survey contemporary opinion among members of the United Church. We have before us the attempt of a group of serious and competent ministers and scholars to give sensible answers, in terms of fundamental Christianity, if not always in terms of a literal interpretation of Holy Scripture, to the questions that people ask about death and the life after death. "What happens when we die?" "Is there a Purgatory?" "What do we mean by Heaven?" "What do we mean by Hell?" "What is the Last Judgment?" "Will Christ come again?" "How are we to interpret the thought of Christ's

reign on earth?" These are a few of the thirty-odd questions which the Committee has formulated, and used as the framework for the presentation of its contributions to our thinking.

The answers will not seem radical except to those who still cling to the fallacy that Scripture alone gives unequivocal and final answers to all these questions, and those who imagine that the Christian religion stands or falls with the doctrine of eternal punishment in hell. The notion of hell as a region where sinners suffer eternal punishment for the sins which they have committed on earth is not in fact a Biblical doctrine, except that it has left a few traces in the New Testament (not in the Old Testament). "Hell is undoubtedly a Greek invention," says Professor Martin Nilsson, the venerable Swedish scholar who is our leading authority in the field of Greek religion. It would be very strange indeed if in the New Testament, a collection of twenty-seven Greek books written between 50 and 150 A.D., there were not occasional traces of this Greek notion of the after life. The most vivid pictures of hell, however, are found, not in the canonical books of the New Testament, but (leaving pagan writings out of account) in apocryphal writings such as the Apocalypse of Peter; and the ghastly mediaeval descriptions of hell, which find their most magnificent expression in Dante's *Inferno*, are not drawn from the New Testament at all, but from apocryphal writings and pagan sources, with a rich accretion from the torture-chambers of mediaeval prison-houses. Those who have taken most offence at the Committee's modest efforts to offer a reasonable interpretation of the essential ideas underlying the hell-symbol appear to base their objections on a naively material conception of existence in the life to come. We have here a striking example of the capacity of people to avoid clear thinking about death and the life after death. What has a body which has been eaten by worms to fear from the fire? Is the "body" in which the dead rise to be conceived spatially, and the hell or heaven to which it goes to be conceived as located in a specific quarter of the created universe? If flesh and blood do not inherit the Kingdom of God, as St. Paul says (I Cor. 15:50), it is equally true that flesh and blood do not enter into a place of punishment; yet these naive ideas of hell presuppose punishments which are only appropriate to a body of flesh and blood.

Now it must be kept in mind that while St. Paul makes a noble effort to suggest what the "spiritual body" of the resurrection will be like (though even this is expressed rather in terms of its *unlikeness* to the "natural" body of flesh and blood), neither he nor any other New Testament writer makes any effort to teach anything about the mode of existence of the impenitent. "They shall suffer the punishment of eternal destruction and exclusion from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his might," says St. Paul (II Thess. 1:9). "If any one's name was not found written in the book of life, he was thrown into the lake of fire," we read in the Apocalypse of John (Rev. 20:15). But the thought here is clearly of final destruction, not of continuance in another kind of body which will be capable of suffering

punishment everlastingly. We cannot even imagine a Christian writer speculating about the kind of "body" in which the impenitent would be housed, in a way at all comparable to that in which St. Paul unfolds his thoughts about the "spiritual body" of "those who have fallen asleep in Christ" (I Cor. 15:12ff.).

To this reader, the discussion of the question: "Is there a Purgatory?" seemed less satisfactory than most of the book. If we are to embark on controversy with the Roman Catholics, we ought to formulate more clearly the doctrines to which we take exception. It is not indicated here that the Roman doctrine of Purgatory is integrally connected with the penitential system of the Church, and it seems to be implied that any notion of penal (as distinct from disciplinary and cleansing) sufferings after death is incompatible with the doctrine that salvation is the gift of God and "contradicts the truth of justification (or forgiveness) by grace through faith" (p. 38). This seems to dismiss the doctrine of Purgatory altogether too easily. Without desiring in the least to defend the Roman doctrine, we might recall that forgiveness does not carry with it exemption from the penalties of sin in this life (cf. II Sam. 12:13–23), and if this be granted, we can hardly argue that the freeness of God's forgiveness is impaired by the exaction of penalties from the forgiven after death. It is not enough to say that "the Roman Catholic conception of Purgatory is not Biblical," since the Committee is itself going beyond the bare confines of that which is strictly Biblical; and if it is claimed that "it is contrary to Biblical teaching *and the Christian revelation*," the charge should be more amply substantiated.

But the further thought of the same chapter (c. VIII), once the Roman doctrine of Purgatory has been dismissed, raises "the possibility of discipline, cleansing and renewal after death" (p. 41). For some reason, which is not quite clear, there seems to be some objection to speaking of an "intermediate state." Yet it is said on another page (p. 39), that "the Christian . . . will not receive fulness of eternal life until the consummation of all things at the end of history"; and that "we are concerned here with the possibility of repentance, discipline and spiritual growth *between death and the End*" (p. 41; my italics). Such words as these seem to involve the notion of an "intermediate state" of the Christian believer between his death and his reception of "fulness of eternal life . . . at the end of history"; and we may be inclined to wonder that the authors of the booklet should boggle at the words when they lend countenance to the idea. In fact, it is only by a kind of *tour de force* that they can argue "that we should not think of this growth of the Christian as taking place in some temporary state or place, but as the continuation of the eternal life he enjoys on earth." For though it be in some sense a continuation of the same life, it is certainly a continuation *under different conditions*, and yet not under conditions which are to hold throughout eternity. The general thought is well expressed by Father Lionel Thornton. He points out that St. Paul, in Philippians 1:21, 23, makes "a classic statement of faith with regard to the Christian attitude towards death. It

consists of two sentences, in each of which death seems to be regarded as the gateway into a fuller form of the life in Christ. . . . It would appear, then, that death is not the end of our pilgrimage, but rather the gateway into a more advanced stage of that pilgrimage wherein some grave hindrances which at present hamper us have been removed." And he draws one further conclusion from St. Paul's statement. "If it places the departed souls in a position of advantage over those Christians who are still living the earthly life, it also, and with equal emphasis, indicates a continuity of pattern, in that both stages of the Christian pilgrimage are centred in Christ" (*Christ and the Church* [London: 1956], pp. 137–140).

Scripture alone does not give unequivocal and final answers to all our questions about death and the life after death and about the End of history and of time. Nor can we claim that Christian theology has developed a clear and consistent eschatology. The authors of this booklet are far from professing that they have succeeded in mapping all the uncharted territory. We may well feel grateful that they have approached the manifold questions reverently and thoughtfully, bringing to them a rich combination of theological competence and pastoral concern, and so have offered much wise and helpful guidance to us all.

F. W. Beare

Trinity College, Toronto

II

Two comments need to be made immediately. First of all, this is a study booklet. The intention is to summon the Church to study the matters raised because they are "worthy of study" by all Christians. Secondly, the central theme for this study is one to which Christian attention has not been called with anything like the urgency or the seriousness which it has plainly deserved.

Any study of the final destiny of man inevitably moves in two realms, the theological and the speculative. The questions raised by death, the life after death, heaven and hell, judgment, the "second coming," and the "coming of the kingdom of God" are of such a nature that they involve what we believe concerning God and our own ability to interpret our belief and relate it to our experience. We may have strongly cherished beliefs, but unless we can follow through their consequences with some measure of intellectual integrity, we shall not be able to test their validity or present their claim.

This is the task undertaken by the members of this theological committee. They have raised the question of the meaning of death, and the answers to this and to many related questions form the substance of their study outline.

There would seem to be three kinds of death, or, at least, three occasions when death takes place. There is the obvious and universal occasion when the physical organism, or the human body, ceases to function and the process of physical disintegration sets in. This is mortality, the end of physical

life. There is also the death which is "the symbol, the outward sign, of man's rebellion against God." This is the death of sin, "a death more radical than physical death." This, however, is not conterminous with mortality. Although many even die physically while in this condition of death, people can live in this "death."

There is yet a third kind of death of which the study speaks. On two occasions it is strongly emphasised that the essential death for the Christian is his Baptism. "From all this we can see that physical death determines nothing for the Christian except that he goes to 'be with Christ, which is far better.' His essential death is his Baptism, when he dies to self and sin. There he denies himself and declares for Christ. He gives himself up to Christ and his cause. He throws away his life for Christ. And then Christ gives it back, cleansed, renewed, transfigured and glorified!" (p. 27). Yet again, "in a sense death is already past for a Christian. His essential death is his death to sin. He dies at his baptism, at the time of his acceptance of Christ as Saviour and Lord and his renunciation of self and sin" (p. 39).

It is no exaggeration to say that for the vast majority of people the concepts of being dead in sin and of the essential death in baptism have little meaning or relevance. In their eyes death is what happens when a physical body permanently ceases to function and becomes a corpse. When they turn to the Church what they desire chiefly is an explanation, an appraisal of this experience which befalls all people, young and old, good and bad. Death is no respecter of age or of goodness, of intelligence or of stupidity. What does death mean? Does it involve anything more than can be seen—a permanent physical failure brought about by accident or sickness, disease or disaster, noble self-sacrifice or squalid self-indulgence?

In dealing with this enquiry the Commission does well to bring before its readers the other two deaths to which it refers, but what it says is singularly inadequate. It would seem as though the Commission were content to provide a Christian answer to the question of death in general, but it has not given anything like a full treatment of the fact that Jesus Christ died. This is the one fact which should have been examined more fully. The creed is explicit: "he was crucified, dead and buried." This is the authentic event. Moreover, when our Lord spoke to his own he affirmed again and again that the "Son of Man *must die*." It is not a question at the moment what he hoped to achieve through his death. It is the fact that he neither sought to evade death nor to make it out to be something which, in fact, it was not. Death was a cup which he would fain have dashed to the ground; but he did in fact die, and he was young and he was good. Does this death shed light upon every man's death? What can we say about death in the light of the death of Jesus Christ which could not be said had he not died?

It would appear as though this were the basic theological weakness of the whole study. Was death "a major crisis" in the life of Jesus Christ? Is this the meaning of "Eloi, eloi, lama sabachthani"? If we account for his death in some other way, then we must go on to say from what death he was raised.

There is conclusive evidence to show that in his resurrection death—his and ours—was overcome. The grave was robbed of its victory and that which makes death really tragic, namely sin, was taken away. Death, then, as it was understood by the prophet of old and by most people who speak or think of it, was "swallowed up in victory."

This is not to dismiss death as something unreal. There is a reality about the experience of death which no one can deny. But this Christian affirmation puts death in its true perspective. It belongs to the physical life of this world. Can we say that if man were not a "fallen creature" he would not be obliged to die? Would he enjoy deathless physical existence? Is it conceivable that the Incarnate Lord himself could have enjoyed in the flesh permanent, deathless existence? The answer is quite clear. We have no evidence that the physical structure of our body could continue in this world except within the bounds of death and decay. Under certain physical conditions of disease, sickness, disaster, hunger, storm and tempest, death is certain and unavoidable. This we know and this we have to recognise.

Into this world Jesus came. In this world he died, and the fact that he died was a true indication that God's coming in person and pitching his tent among us was no fiction. "The Word became flesh" and went the way of all flesh, even to death. Henceforth we know that death awaits us all. Nevertheless, because Christ died and was raised from the dead, we can now say that God has acted decisively and victoriously. He has not taken away death. He has exposed the hollowness of the claims put forward on behalf of death and has demonstrated that he is the Sovereign Lord of Life and Death. This is basic to any enquiry into the final destiny of man.

In very informal language, man has to reckon with God. Man may live as though God were not. He cannot so die. "This night thy soul shall be required of thee," and the hand that taps man on the shoulder is the hand of God. To know this is to cross the threshold into the mystery of death.

This then is where we begin. We do not begin with death as we normally speak of it. We do not even begin with our "death to sin" or with our essential death, even our baptism. (Incidentally, how United Churchmen can speak theologically of Baptism as they do in this Study Outline [pp. 27, 39], and practice ecclesiastically a baptism which makes impossible on the part of the baptised himself any of the deeds which they insist are involved in baptism is quite incomprehensible.) We do not proceed to discuss heaven and hell, purgatory and the possibility of growth in grace beyond the grave. We begin with Jesus Christ. No matter what we seek to illumine, our starting point as Christian apologists is with Jesus Christ.

What is the nature of the Christian hope? Christians are not Christians because they have a better version of the ancient Greek hope of the immortality of the soul or of the Marxist hope of the "classless society." They are not saying anything distinctively Christian when they say what Moslem and Jew can say, albeit differently, about heaven and hell, judgment and resurrection. These (and to them may be added a belief in purgatory and

prayers for the dead) are not distinctively Christian doctrines. The Christian gospel may have modified some of them and even enriched their meaning, but the exclusive Christian doctrine about the future is the simple phrase, "From thence he shall come." The Christian hope is centred in Jesus Christ. His presence in this world has "made all things new." We know, however dimly, what God sought to do at the beginning and what He will do at the end, because of what he wrought in Jesus Christ. That which distinguishes the New Testament shape of things to come from all other outlooks on the future, whether Jewish or Gentile, ancient or modern, is the *parousia of our Lord Jesus Christ*. In other words, Christians look for the "coming" of One who is present, not for one who is absent. This is the only unification of outlook granted to the Christian. Because of the parousia, he does not concentrate on what happens to the individual soul and ignore the whole cosmic process, especially human history. In the Christian hope there is fulfilment both for the individual person and for the whole cosmic historical process. The end is God's return to man more than man's return to God. This is the heart of the gospel of grace and of love.

This is the reason why all other doctrines pertaining to judgment, immortality, purgatory, the millenium and other kindred issues are peripheral. They belong to the circumference of the Christian hope, but they are not distinctive of the Christian hope itself. This is an event and a meeting, rather than a state or a vision. Beyond the event and the meeting are the still unknown and limitless possibilities which God has prepared for those who love him.

There is only one further comment to be made, namely, that there is a closer connection between the Christian hope and the life of prayer and worship than would appear from this *Study*. One person, at least, would have welcomed a closer examination of the life of prayer and worship in a study of the essential realities of life and death as the Christian knows them.

We are greatly indebted to the members of this Committee, and it is to be hoped that a fuller presentation of the theological issues will be forthcoming.

EMLYN DAVIES

Yorkminster Baptist Church
Toronto

III

The popular press has marked this booklet with an unfortunate misunderstanding. It is not simply a plea for prayers for the dead and for the doctrine of universal salvation. Some treatment of both subjects is to be expected in any work that concerns life and death! Perhaps it is also to be expected that a contemporary treatment should be more sympathetic to both than our fathers could be. For we live in the age after the researches of Schweitzer and Dodd, after the challenging theme of the Evanston Assembly —and after the enforced universalism of world wars and nuclear fission and space flight.

Moreover, this is a *study* booklet, given "general approval" by the United Church General Council in May, 1959, as "worthy of study in the church." As such, it offers greater scope for suggestive comment than a more formal theological statement, although the latter would have been a concise and definitive document calling for study and decision in a way that this may not be able to match. For here is an expansive style of writing that seeks to raise the proper questions and not to give the precise answers, to offer lines of future study and not to lay down limits of belief.

The cutting edge of the debate which this work should initiate is the problem of language. To speak about the future, about *eschata* or "last things," is to use language that can be only oblique, indirect. For if all language is symbolic, theological language possesses a peculiar dimension of mystery about its symbolism, and this is evident particularly in its "descriptions" of last things. An Appendix, "Symbolism in relation to the interpretation of the Bible," explores this area, sacred to Oxford philosophers but vitally relevant to all theology. "True symbolism, while it suggests meaning, suggests also mystery, which is not merely the 'unknown' but the meaning that lies hidden, the fulness of meaning that is being revealed."

Such serious grappling with certain implications of linguistic analysis is wholly commendable. Yet in the text we find that truth is simply "bigger than language," so that we must get behind outward forms (p. 53). Here and elsewhere (pp. 80ff.) the term "symbolic" seems to mean "merely symbolic." Is this the old "essence of religion" or perhaps the new "kernel within mythology"? Certainly it is not that which a Reformed Church ought to make clearly central—the distinctive Biblical category of "sign" as the divine-human instrument of the Holy Spirit.

This is illustrated by the teaching on death. Here too, most helpful and necessary correctives are stated—the soul-body unity of man, the reality of death, as over against natural immortality of the soul, death as an enemy. Yet once again a certain ambiguity appears. Do we believe in life after death because of what heart and conscience say, along with science's evidence of orderliness and creative purpose (a moot point indeed!), as in chapter 3—or because of the resurrection of our Lord, as in chapter 4? Surely the latter is the only positive ground of this doctrine especially? But is it adequate to the reality of His new humanity to say simply that His presence to us now is "non-physical" (p. 82)? If Christ's own resurrection was not in some sense "physical," of what was the tomb "empty"?

Again, the apocalyptic doctrine of the Two Ages is treated in several places, without helping us to see their *overlapping* in Christ, who is the beginning of the New Age. Consequently the mystery and connection of the ascension of our Lord and the descent of the Holy Spirit are not clarified in this context. Neither is the relation between eschatology and liturgy, nor the grounding of last things (postdestination) in first things (predestination). Perhaps more serious is a failure to close with the millennial errors which trouble our people, and to which this is hardly an antidote!

As to prayers for the dead, such intercession (p. 59) is not the crux, but is rather a consequence of chapters 8 and 9. The first of these rejects the Roman Catholic doctrine of purgatory, but suggests that "the life after death may be one of growth in grace and progress towards perfection" (p. 37). The difference is said to be that between "penal suffering" and mere "remedial discipline." What's the difference?—as editor Reynolds used to ask. Presumably the difference is only in the nature of the means by which the state of grace is augmented. Is "remedial discipline" any more compatible with justification by faith (p. 38) than "penal suffering"?

A parallel argument is advanced for the hope of conversion after death, of the heathen or abnormal, for instance, who have no real opportunity for "decision for Christ" in this life. Now no one would gainsay "the strain of universalism in the New Testament—the note of hope that at the last *all* shall be saved" (p. 47). But surely the question whether it is possible that some people are beyond redemption is more than "a speculative question which we do not need to ask." Is it not rather already answered in the decision to take universalism so seriously, to call other New Testament teaching only "apparently explicit" (p. 40) and to resort to rhetorical questions rather than exegetical ones? This is a decisive step beyond purgatory, beyond Aquinas towards Origen.

These criticisms are offered by way of debate; they presuppose the excellent work of the Committee, and the genuine service it has rendered to Canadian theology at least. We have been reminded of "the forward look of our faith" (p. 9), for "Mankind and the universe are on tiptoe with expectancy" (p. 78). Best of all, we have been shown that eschatology issues in ethics, as the closing chapter makes clear. For in this age of Christ's cosmic "count-down," what have we to do but to engage in our mission with all the urgency of God's own work?

Joseph C. McLelland

Presbyterian College
Montreal

IV

The appearance of *Life and Death* is both a general and a particular sign of our times. Theology is a work not only *of* the Church but equally *for* the Church. This two-fold relationship has not always been evident during these recent years. There has been something of a *hiatus* between the doctrines of the schools and the interests of the market-place, and some, at least, of the attempts to close the gap have hardly been notable for the lucidity of their interpretative power. Hence the demand for a study of gospel communication whereby theology will not be confined to the detached pursuit of professional scholars, but will fulfil its mission by bringing the Word of God to the people of the Church.

Life and Death is a worthy achievement in the teaching ministry of the Church. It derives from contemporary movements in theological thought,

but the winds of its doctrine are not cunning speculations that issue from any partisan school. In the light of the gospel, and in plain language, a serious attempt is made to state what a Christian may believe concerning the gravest of questions—human destiny in this world and, even more, in that world "where," as the old Scottish saying puts it, "we are langest to be."

As to the particularity of the sign, here, too, we must note the contemporary relevance of this little manual. It is always open season for the pale horse and its rider, but there are times when the clatter of its hoofs beats more insistently on the ear. For us today, the end of the world is an imminent possibility, and, in the biblical idiom, the end of the age is widely held to be a realized actuality. We are being projected into a new era of world history by movements that gather their force from the dynamic drives of political and social revolution. The horizon of the future is dark with threatenings of disaster. Contemporary philosophy is obsessed with the problem of meaning, and when it lifts its sights from puzzling problems of linguistic expression to more cosmic targets, meta-history rather than metaphysics is the field of battle. The existential thinker concentrates his fire on the lonely fate of the human individual, and propounds his questions face to face with the stark fact of inevitable death.

Such a time is always ripe for eschatological speculation, and no field has provided a more prolific germinating bed for religious cranks. In his *Journal of the Plague Year*, Daniel Defoe observes that "the apprehensions of the people were likewise strangely increased by the terror of the times; in which, I think, from what principles I cannot imagine, the people were more addicted to prophecies and astrological conjurations, dreams and old wives' tales, than ever they were before or since. Whether this unhappy temper was originally raised by the follies of some people who got money by it, that is to say, by printing predictions and prognostications, I know not; but certain it is, books frightened them terribly." Such is hardly likely to be the effect of *Life and Death* on its readers; certainly it is not the intention of its authors. Nor do they merit the further condemnation of Defoe who could not "acquit those ministers that, in their sermons, rather sank than lifted up the hearts of their hearers."

The compilers of *Life and Death* are to be commended as much for their silence as for their speech. At the same time, they do not lack courage in an honest and sincere endeavour to provide guidance in a realm where reverent agnosticism must modify the most confident of assertions. The attitude is similar to that of Augustine in speaking of the Godhead, when he maintained that the only reason for resorting to the expression of *tres personae* is to avoid saying nothing at all (*ne taceretur omnino*). The method adopted is strictly biblical, but it is recognized that the teaching of scripture requires exegetical fidelity and interpretative insight to issue in a hermeneutic wisdom. What it really means is that authority and reason must go forward hand in hand to arrive, if not at the finality of absolute revelation, at least at an assurance where the earnest inquirer may rest his confidence. This little

book is an excellent example of enlightened theological method at work on a difficult subject.

Life and Death is addressed to Christians rather than to the general reader. This is at once its strength and weakness. There is very proper recognition that the believer who reposes his confidence in Jesus Christ has an assurance about the life to come that is not available to other men. Indeed, when faith has accomplished its perfect work in a spiritual rebirth, the incidence of physical death is anticipated by a foretaste of heaven. Yet all, whether they profess and call themselves Christian or not, must die; and the presumption of the teaching here presented is that all will be raised up, if not now, certainly after death. Does then the distinction, frequently made in current theology and here emphasized, between resurrection and immortality warrant the stress laid upon it? In strict usage, immortality may be not only a wrong word but a false idea, but it is commonly understood to mean some kind of survival after physical death. So far as we know, its realization is not affected by our beliefs about it, and all men, apart from claims of natural right, are bound to be interested in it. Jesus never enunciated general truths about mankind, and so we search in vain for any teaching of His on the mere question of human survival. But it can be asserted that He assumed the reality of a life to come. Faith in Jesus means at least the acceptance of His authority, because He was at-one with the Mind and Will of the Father. Paul went so far as to maintain that "if there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ has not been raised." Nobody ever spoke sterner words about death and judgment than Jesus Himself, and, as our writers wisely remind us, "it is wrong . . . to sentimentalize Jesus and picture him as One whose chief mission in the world was to assure people that everything is going to turn out all right in the end." While there are elements in His teaching that suggest the life to come will be radically different from life here and now, He also laid emphasis on the quality of our present life as determining our ultimate fate. We can go all the way with the writers of *Life and Death* in rejecting belief in "Hell as a place of everlasting fiery torment." We can even share their universalistic hope that, in the end, all men will fulfil their Divine creation by their Divine salvation. But all the teaching of scripture surely dissuades us from a preoccupation with the problem of survival, and emphasizes the decisive character of this life. Mere survival beyond death could be a prescription for eternal weariness, darkening into the most absolute misery. This is not the Christian hope, but rather a continuing life of boundless possibility in the love of God. *Life and Death* says this to the Christian, but it might have said more to the "average man" about the general question of survival as he hastens to the universal encounter with death.

Of course, there is much more that could be said. *Life and Death* is a handbook and not a treatise on eschatology. The grand question of predestination is side-stepped with a glancing reference by the the assertion that "we are given no clues as to the form or manner of a resurrection of those not

destined for eternal life." No word is spoken to sorrowing parents, bereaved of little children. While we are warned against looking for a "Baedeker's guide to the next world," surely Heaven merited more discussion than it receives in the shortest of all the chapters—a page and a half compared with three devoted to Hell!

James S. Thomson

McGill University
Montreal

A Tractarian Patriarch: John Medley of Fredericton

EUGENE R. FAIRWEATHER

THE devotion of the Tractarians and their heirs to episcopal church order is notorious. It is true that this devotion has frequently been misinterpreted and its historical importance exaggerated. Many an annoyed bishop, for example, has complained of what he regarded as uncanonical disobedience on the part of those very churchmen whose principles he had most confidently expected to issue in complete submission to the episcopal will. More than one enthusiast for Church union has sought to discredit the hampering notion of apostolic succession as "unanglican" by labelling it "Tractarian," under the wishful impression that this traditional Anglican concept was invented, and not simply revivified, by the Oxford Movement. Too many Anglo-Catholic pamphleteers have fostered the idea that bishops with a due sense of their office and its responsibilities were totally absent from the Churches of England and Ireland for a century and more before 1833. And yet, when all such caricatures have been set aside, it remains undeniable that the Oxford Movement, both by its forceful proclamation of episcopal authority and by its substantial contribution to a new ideal of the episcopal office, has played a decisive role in the historical development of Anglican churchmanship.

In view of the obvious connexion between Tractarianism and the theory and practice of episcopacy, it seems strange that historians of the Oxford Movement should have paid relatively little attention to instances of the application of Tractarian principles to the shepherding of a diocese and the shaping of its life. No doubt two facts help to explain this omission. For one thing, in the heroic age of Anglo-Catholicism, when priests like Bennett, Lowder and Mackonochie were fighting their crucial battles and building up the great "Ritualistic" parishes, Tractarians were still largely excluded from the English episcopal bench. In the second place, the long-established and populous dioceses of the English Church offer little scope for conspicuous creativity on the part of an individual bishop. Outside England, however, these conditions do not hold to the same extent, and instructive examples of Tractarian bishops at work are available from the early years of the Catholic Revival. It is the work of one of these pioneers that I want to introduce in this article, as a small contribution to the study both of Tractarian and of Canadian history.

John Medley of Fredericton was the first active participant in the Oxford Movement to be entrusted with the pastoral care of a diocese,[1] and from

1. George Augustus Selwyn, Bishop of New Zealand from 1841 (cf. *Chambers's Encycl.*, 12, 408), and Edward Feild, Bishop of Newfoundland from 1844 (cf. *Encycl.*

the time of his contribution to the great Tractarian project of the *Library of the Fathers*[2] to the end of his life he was generally known as a capable and forthright spokesman for Tractarian views. Indeed, for many years the cause of the Oxford Movement can hardly have had a more highly placed advocate than Medley, and through him New Brunswick became the setting of an important chapter in the story of the Tractarian episcopate.

John Medley was born in London on December 19, 1804, and was carefully brought up, after the early loss of his father, by his able and devout mother, who from the beginning set out to prepare him for the Christian ministry.[3] After attending several schools and acquiring a knowledge of Latin, Greek and Hebrew (the last begun when he was twelve), he matriculated at Wadham College, Oxford, where he graduated in 1826.[4] From his ordination as deacon in 1828 until 1845 he served in the diocese of Exeter—for the last seven years as vicar of St. Thomas', Exeter, and for the last three as prebendary of Exeter Cathedral.[5] At the end of October, 1844, Archbishop Howley asked him to let his name stand for the new bishopric just being set up in New Brunswick. Appointed by Letters Patent on April 25, 1845, Medley was consecrated at Lambeth on May 4, and enthroned in the old parish church, Fredericton, on June 11. In January, 1879, he was elected to what was then the highest office in his church, that of Metropolitan of Canada. From July, 1881, he was assisted in the work of his own diocese by his chosen coadjutor, Tully Kingdon.[6] Medley died on September 9, 1892, and was buried outside the chancel of his cathedral.

In 1845, the new diocese of Fredericton was enough to intimidate any bishop. For one thing, its people had not been too well cared for. The diocese of Nova Scotia was founded in 1787, just four years after the first Loyalist settlers arrived at Saint John, but its first two bishops were handicapped by age and infirmity, with the result that episcopal ministrations were inevitably somewhat sporadic. When we also bear in mind the great difficulties of church extension in a new country, we shall not be surprised to learn

Canadiana, 4, 110), both came under the influence of the Oxford Movement, but were less intimately associated than Medley with its beginnings. Medley, then, has some claim to the title of "first Tractarian bishop." W. O. Raymond, "John Medley," in W. B. Heeney (ed.), *Leaders of the Canadian Church*, First Series (Toronto, 1918), p. 107f., notes Medley's interest in Selwyn's missionary work. The latter visited Fredericton in 1874; cf. Medley, *Visitation Charge, 1877* (Fredericton, 1877), p. 2. It may be of interest, in passing, to note Keble's criticism, in a letter of July 7, 1854, of Selwyn's "Protestantisms" (Sir J. T. Coleridge, *A Memoir of the Rev. John Keble, M.A.* [Oxford and London, 1869], p. 398).

2. Medley contributed largely to the translation of St. John Chrysostom's *Homilies* on 1 Cor. (1838).

3. For details of his early life, cf. W. Q. Ketchum, *The Life and Work of the Most Reverend John Medley, D.D.* (Saint John, 1893), pp. 43–46.

4. For outline of his career, cf. O. R. Rowley, *The Anglican Episcopate of Canada and Newfoundland* (Milwaukee, 1928), p. 27; C. H. Mockridge, *The Bishops of the Church of England in Canada and Newfoundland* (Toronto, 1896), pp. 112–122.

5. Medley's writings before his elevation include: *The Episcopal Form of Church Government* (1835); *Elementary Remarks on Church Architecture* (1841); *Sermons* (1845).

6. Cf. E. R. Fairweather, "A Milestone in Canadian Theology: Bishop Kingdon's *God Incarnate*," *CJT*, 4 (1958), 101–110; Mockridge, op. cit., p. 326f.

that in 1836, when the Diocesean Church Society was established, over two-thirds of the parishes of the New Brunswick archdeaconry lacked a resident priest, and that church buildings were grossly inadequate.[7] To make matters worse, the diocese was "full of dissension and strife."[8] Most of the Loyalist clergy had been of the definite, if conservative, "High Church" breed which had grown up in Connecticut and the neighbouring colonies during the eighteenth century, but the rising "Evangelical" school had taken possession of Trinity Church, Saint John, the most influential parish in the province, and a struggle for power had begun.[9] While the High Church party was helped by the Tractarian-style teaching given by George Coster after his appointment as Archdeacon of New Brunswick in 1829,[10] the Evangelical faction was able to exploit the widespread fears aroused by the development of pro-Roman tendencies in the Oxford Movement. Under the circumstances the timing of Medley's arrival, in the critical year of Newman's secession, could scarcely have been worse. It took him many years to allay the suspicions and win the co-operation of a large body of his priests and people, and throughout his episcopate his work was hampered to some extent by "antagonism to his High Church views."[11]

Even his sharpest critics, however, could not fail to appreciate the force of character with which Medley met his difficulties. "Although small in person," we are told, "there was a quiet, unconscious dignity about Bishop Medley, which at all times commanded respect." At times, indeed, respect must have struggled with exasperation, since the bishop was "not infrequently wanting in tact and discernment," and was "sometimes brusque to the point of rudeness." "Mr. R.," he replied to a layman who asked his opinion of a newly erected church, "when you build a church, build a church, and when you build a barn, build a barn."[12] Obviously he was not a gifted diplomat. But his sincerity of conviction, singleness of purpose, devotion to duty, fairmindedness and general soundness of judgment were not really open to question, and in the long run they won for his diocesan program the support of all but his most implacable opponents.

From the beginning of his episcopate Medley enthusiastically identified himself with his adopted country and his flock—he went so far as to praise the climate and roads of New Brunswick[13]—and laboured unceasingly to ensure the highest standard of pastoral care for his people. His *Primary Visitation Charge* (1847) contains a good many examples of the kind of practical advice he was to give his clergy through the next forty-five years. Urging the duty of regular "Public Prayer," he attacks both slovenliness and affectation in the reading of divine service, and insists on natural reverence.

7. Cf. Ketchum, p. 29.
8. Art. "Medley, John," *DNB*, 13, 205.
9. Cf. Ketchum, p. 26.
10. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 26f., 35; G. H. Lee, *An Historical Sketch of the First Fifty Years of the Church of England in the Province of New Brunswick* (Saint John, 1880), p. 49.
11. Art. "Medley, John," *Encycl. Canadiana*, 7, 15.
12. Raymond, pp. 129, 127, 121.
13. Cf. Ketchum, p. 99f.

Remarking that there is no wisdom "in depreciating or in neglecting an ordinance of God," in reaction against an over-emphasis on preaching, he advises varied and simple preaching, based on biblical models; in this connexion he stresses "Public Catechising, in which the elder portion of the congregation, "many of whom are too ill informed to profit by Sermons," may be instructed through the younger. He speaks sharply of the necessity of real pastoral visiting: "When the conversation goes no further that the weather or the crops, or is confined to observations upon persons, it is difficult to see that it is attended with permanent advantage to either party." The clergy are forcibly reminded of the basic importance and the essential conditions of their own spiritual growth: "If we are always on the move, what time is left for communing with God? If we are always reading letters, pamphlets, and newspapers, what opportunity remains for quiet thought, patient study, grave meditation, silent prayer?" To pastors he particularly recommends "the study of Casuistical Divinity," with Taylor and Sanderson as exemplars.[14] Later in the same charge he pleads for the study of church music and architecture and for care in the planning of even the plainest church building, and in an appended note he provides simple directions for church builders.[15] In his treatment of these and many other themes as the years pass, the reader of his charges and sermons cannot help being impressed by the rare combination of consistent adherence to fixed principles with robust common sense in their application, and by the farseeing pastoral vigilance which directed the thoughts and words and actions of half a century.

"The Church of England in the Diocese of Fredericton," wrote Archdeaon Raymond, "learned to know the spirit of the original Oxford Movement, better than any history could teach it, in one who reflected what was best in it." But the influence which Medley's ability and character won for him extended far beyond his own diocese. According to his obituary in the *Canadian Churchman*, which compared his reputation with that of Bishop Strachan, his name had "been among the household words of Canada for nearly half a century." In Gladstone's experienced eyes, "his was the wisest head that wore a mitre." From the United States, Bishop W. C. Doane of Albany wrote to Medley's biographer: "I feel that to no man on the continent of America more than to him is due the great advance in all things that tend to the upholding of the Catholic faith and order in America. He was Nestor and Patriarch really among us all. . . ."[16]

II

Quite obviously, the immediate inspiration for Medley's patient and devoted labours and broad sense of his responsibilities was the Tractarian

14. *Primary Visitation Charge* (Fredericton, 1847), pp. 13–20.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 30–32, 45f. Medley's hand can still be seen in many New Brunswick Churches.
16. Raymond, p. 102; *Canadian Churchman*, Sept. 22, 1892, p. 564; Ketchum, pp. 302, 319.

vision of the Anglican Church. It was not that he sought to exclude those who saw the Church in a different light from Anglican fellowship. "Whether a man be called Low Churchman, High Churchman, or Ritualist," he told his clergy, "there is comprehensiveness enough in our church to embrace him, and there ought to be charity enough to make use of his zeal and piety, though as to the means he makes use of to promote the glory of God and the salvation of souls, our conclusions may widely differ."[17] To the principle thus stated his administrative practice strictly conformed.[18] Nonetheless, he made no secret of his conviction that the standards to which the Oxford Movement was recalling Anglicans ought to win acceptance as normative, as conflicting parties found unity in the system of the Prayer Book.[19] If he criticized the "Romanizing" view of Anglican subscription, advanced by Newman in *Tract XC*, he added, with some asperity: "It seems, however, not to have occurred to many, who have been loudest in reprobation of this suggestion, that there is another thing to be condemned besides a non-natural sense of the Articles, and that is *a non-natural sense of the whole Prayer Book, and of all its services.*"[20] He might say, in language which Tractarianism was already making unfashionable, that the Church of England is "both *Protestant* and *Catholic*,"[21] but in what commonly passed for Protestantism he saw the chronic disease of Anglicanism. Churchmen must admit, he said, in some remarks on the ambiguities of the English Reformation, "that the loose and unscriptural principles which were then and shortly afterwards imported from abroad, as inconsistent with Scripture as with antiquity, are to this day extensively prevailing; that the true notion of Church unity has never to this day properly penetrated the great body of our Church; that the great question of the bounds and limits of private judgment then opened has never been settled; and that, though the doctrines of the Church itself are sound and Catholic, a totally different theology, as false in principle as it is vicious in taste, pervades and leavens the religion of whole masses of our people."[22] The Tractarian diagnosis of the Church's ills could not be more incisively stated.

As the remedy for these ills, Medley wholeheartedly welcomed the Oxford Movement. "The Church," he told the Provincial Synod of Canada, "has (by God's blessing) achieved a second reformation."[23] With the leaders of this "reformation"—notably with Keble[24]—he kept in close contact. As we have seen, he was not in sympathy with that wing of the party which looked

17. *Eighth Visitation Charge* (Fredericton, 1868), p. 8.
18. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 19.
19. Cf. sermon, *The Reformation, its Nature, its Necessity and its Benefits* (Fredericton, 1847), p. 21.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
22. Sermon, *How Are the Mighty Fallen!* (Exeter, 1840), p. 17.
23. *A Sermon Preached before the Provincial Synod of Canada* (Montreal, 1877), p. 6.
24. Note Keble's practical interest in "dear Medley" (cf. Coleridge, op. cit., p. 363f.), and Medley's reference to a paten made for his cathedral from silver spoons given by "three dear little boys at Hursley" (Ketchum, p. 115).

to Rome for its ideal of Catholicism, but to the Tractarianism of the *Via Media* he gave both full allegiance and forceful expression. "Unlike Rome," he would say, "we are never, for the attainment of unity, to sacrifice truth; unlike Geneva, we are never to seek for truth to the neglect of unity; lest, as she has done, we let go both.'[25] Medley recognizes that to many the notion of the *Via Media* seems "trimming and indecisive," and he knows how it can be corrupted into a rationalization of smug indifference and inaction. "Our position," he warns, "in the middle way between Rome and Geneva, though as regards truth, a strong intellectual and moral position, has its peculiar perils."[26] To Medley, however, with his clear perception of the weakness as well as the strength of Anglicanism, this position is an invitation, not to self-satisfaction, but to greater effort. He tries constantly to rouse his people to effective action, that the Church may "shew herself an active energising body, united and powerful for good, convinced of the reality of her Divine system and of her Divine commission."[27] He makes a point of commenting frequently on the embarrassing efficiency of Roman Catholics and Protestant Dissenters, on either side of the *Via Media*. "*To the zeal of such bodies*," he says of the latter group, "*too much praise cannot be given. It is the great lesson for us to copy.*"[28]

His appreciation of hard work helped to make Medley a strong defender of the "Ritualists," who were meeting such violent opposition to their translation of Tractarianism into liturgical and pastoral practice. He recognized that the leaders of the Oxford Movement did not share his interest in church architecture and decoration, and in the furnishing of his new cathedral he was himself content simply to follow the accepted use of the great English churches.[29] He had already shown his sympathy with Ritualism, however, by his close association with the "advanced" Church of the Advent, Boston.[30] Twenty-five years later, he was to create a sensation in the Lambeth Conference of 1878 by pleading the cause of the Ritualists and attacking the repressive Public Worship Regulation Act.[31] Still later, in the face of determined resistance, he was to promote the establishment of a centre of Ritualism in Saint John itself.[32] The pastoral concern underlying this consistent policy was vigorously expressed by Medley:

If those who call themselves Evangelical—a title I should refuse to accord to them in such a way as to exclude others from faithfully preaching the gospel of Christ—if those who are called, or call themselves High Churchmen, and those who suppose themselves to be men of broader sympathies than their brethren,

25. Sermon, *The Union of the Members in Christ's Body* (Exeter, 1839), p. 19. Like other Tractarians, Medley was impressed by the liberal "apostasy" of Protestantism; cf. *How Are the Mighty Fallen!*, p. 13.
26. *Reformation Sermon*, p. 25.
27. *Second Visitation Charge* (Saint John, 1850), p. 25.
28. *Reformation Sermon*, p. 24.
29. Cf. *Provincial Synod Sermon*, p. 5; *Third Visitation Charge* (Fredericton, 1853), p. 4.
30. Cf. Ketchum, p. 183.
31. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 221, 334f.
32. Cf. *History of the Mission Church of S. John Baptist* (Saint John, 1932), pp. 13–15, 24, 30, 33.

can work together in the same church for the common weal, . . . why should the Ritualist be excluded? Why should he have a special scourge invented for his peculiar benefit, called by one of the many ironies of life fatherly correction? I do not undertake to justify any rude and uncharitable expressions used in haste and anger towards those whose age, station and authority in the church command respect, but I make great allowance for the feelings of men, who, thoroughly in earnest themselves, devoted to hard and often ill-paid work, seek to attract and to christianize rude and half-heathen populations, and having succeeded in this arduous task, and made up congregations of most unpromising materials, who are devoutly attached to their pastors, and delight in a service in which they can all join, find themselves prosecuted by people who send hired spies to watch, not to worship, in their churches, and are brought under the lash of a law which scarcely any of the bishops themselves perfectly obey, and notoriously, those bishops who put the law in operation obey it the least. . . . This one Body which numbers in its ranks some of the most holy and self-denying of our priests, some of the most learned of our liturgists, some of the most liberal, loyal and spiritual of our laymen, is denounced. The law . . . only seems framed to crush them, or to drive them . . . into the arms of another Communion to which they most properly refuse to go.[33]

This was unusual language for an eminent Victorian prelate, but Medley had to bear witness to a movement which was giving such striking embodiment to his own principles.

III

The heart of Medley's Tractarian outlook and policy was, of course, the idea of the Church as a supernatural society, essentially independent of the State, calling men to a transcendent holiness, proclaiming a divine message in its doctrine and ministering divine grace in its sacraments, acting by the authority of Christ himself, visibly mediated to its ministers through the apostolic succession of its bishops. Much of this appears in two passages of a sermon to the Exeter clergy (on Ephes. 4:16). "The argument of the apostle," Medley says, "leads us . . . to this conclusion, that the doctrine of Church-union is interwoven with the whole body of revealed truth, and is as much a part of that revelation, as the atonement and resurrection of Christ, the remission of sins, and the life everlasting. . . . To teach the truths of the Gospel so as to exclude Church-union, the fellowship of the members in that union, and the 'one baptism for the remission of sins,' is to teach it maimedly and ineffectually, and so far to turn aside from apostolic teaching." And later on: "By a high view of the privileges of our Apostolical commission, and of the tremendous responsibility of our office, by a burning zeal for the salvation of souls, an intense devotion to the Church as Christ's spouse, a willing obedience to them that are set over us in the Lord, and a sacrifice of our private views on the altar of unity; by such means alone we shall be 'fitly framed together, and compacted by that which every joint supplieth,' in the Lord's temple."[34] The primary concerns of the Oxford Movement could hardly be better stated.

33. *Provincial Synod Sermon*, p. 12f.
34. *The Union of the Members in Christ's Body*, pp. 8, 25.

Medley is fully aware of the significance of the Church-and-State problem as the immediate context of the Tractarian reaffirmation of the Church's supernatural authority and the English Church's Catholic heritage. The Tractarians asked, he says, "whether Establishment was the real foundation on which she rested? Had her Prayer-book no link with the past? Were her orders traceable to apostolic times? Had her bishops and clergy any authority independent of what the State could confer?"[35] The Tractarian answers to these questions, he adds, gave great offence, by their unexpected challenge to secularist assumptions. "The notion of any powers wholly spiritual, and independent of the state, appeared so novel and so foreign to men's minds, that men lashed themselves into fury at the thought." Medley is convinced, nonetheless, that this infuriating notion is the true basis of the Church's "*everlasting* claim" on men's devotion. "Strip the Church of England of what is so well calculated to attract the man of taste, to command the respect of the wealthy, and the love of the poor, divest it of those hallowed and endearing associations which give it a place in the affections of the great majority of intelligent and sober minds, and it will not lose its claim on the community as a Church of Christ, holding fast the apostolic 'doctrine and fellowship, with breaking of bread and prayers,' and adhering to the ancient discipline of bishops, priests, and deacons."[36]

The Tractarian declaration of independence, linked to a frank appraisal of local conditions, had a decisive effect on Medley's diocesan policy. Both in word and in action he expressed his conviction that the very survival of his diocese depended on the repudiation of every "pleasant fiction" of establishment, lingering on from the early days of the colony, and the assertion of the Church's inherent authority and responsibility. "Unfortunately," he observed in 1847, "the ancient notion clings to the mind when the reality is gone, and therefore, instead of helping themselves, many of us are trying to linger on in the dreamy security of an Establishment." "Old parchments," he remarked in 1853, "are very useful when they convey an inheritance, or secure peaceable possession; but where there is nothing but parchment, it is apt to grow a little musty."[37] As time goes on, he speaks more sharply. "To talk of an established Church in this Province at this time," he says in 1868, "is one of the idlest dreams that could enter into the mind of man." His people must learn to live in the real world. "It would be better to be a real honest church, of somewhat smaller dimensions, doing our own work, and paying our own way, than to have the mere shadow of an establishment, and to be clinging to a real pauperism, with the affectation of a respectability that does not belong to us."[38] For this reason, among others, he urges the adoption of synodical government in the diocese. In 1853, commenting on

35 *Provincial Synod Sermon*, p. 5.

36. *The Episcopal Form of Church Government*, 2nd. ed. (Saint John, 1845), p. 42f. Cf. *Eighth Visitation Charge*, p. 15: "Whilst I would not willingly move a stone of the present establishment. I should be sorry to risk the progress of the christian faith on what formed no part of our Lord's original foundation of his Church."

37. *Reformation Sermon*, p. 26; *Third Visitation Charge*, p. 18.

38. *Eighth Visitation Charge*, p. 9f.

the revival of Canterbury Convocation, he had claimed that "the calling of Church-Assemblies is an inalienable right of the body which our Lord founded, and to which we belong," and in 1856 he had fully canvassed "the somewhat vexed question of a Synod or Convention" which would shape rules of discipline and regulate the Church's temporal affairs.[39] Now, rejecting a futile dependence on the English Establishment and noting American and Canadian precedents, and with enabling legislation behind him, he appeals for the general acceptance of synodical authority: "The question is whether you will have the decision of the whole church represented by her communicants, lay as well as clerical, or whether you will submit to the dictation of a few irresponsible persons, assuming powers which the Church has not given them, and denouncing every one who dares to differ from them."[40] In the end this alliance of Tractarian theology with political realism proved irresistible.

There is no real conflict between this demand for corporate action and responsibility and the insistence on the "Apostolical commission" of the clergy. As Medley sees it, bishops and Church are one body. He is not a man of one idea, offering "a skeleton outline of Apostolic succession, unaccompanied by the proportions of Apostolic doctrine and practice"[41]; if he exalts the unique authority of the bishop, it is in order to affirm the unique significance of the whole Church, of which the bishops are the earthly centre. This conception of the episcopate in the Church is clearly stated in a sermon of 1851 (in which, incidentally, he also explains his not unrelated determination to build a cathedral at the outset of his episcopate). "Wherever there is a Bishop," Medley says, "there is not only a centre of unity, but a rallying point for action. The Bishop, by God's ordinance, stands not alone. He has in himself the power to send, to increase, to multiply. By these few loaves and fishes, these fragments of his saving mercy, the Great Bishop of souls still feeds his scattered flock, and everywhere augments his fold. Where there is a Bishop, there is a Cathedral Church, the mother-Church of the diocese, Jerusalem and her daughters."[42] Bishop and cathedral together are as it were a visible token of the living presence of Christ himself in the midst of his Church.

In Medley's eyes, we must quickly add, lest he be suspected of an obsession with mitres and Gothic arches, the whole visible order and worship and organization of the Church exist for one purpose—to form a holy people. The Oxford Movement's serious call to holiness and its accent on austerity are faithfully echoed in his preaching. "Want of holiness," he insists, is the

39. *Third Visitation Charge*, p. 15; *Fourth Visitation Charge* (Fredericton, 1856), p. 16f.

40. *Eighth Visitation Charge*, p. 19. Relevant legislation in *Declaration of Principles, Constitution, Canons, Order of Proceedings, Rules of Order, &c., of the Diocesan Synod of Fredericton, together with the Acts of the Legislatures Connected therewith* (Saint John, 1876).

41. *Second Visitation Charge*, p. 8.

42. *Two Discourses Preached in the Church of the Advent, Boston* (Boston, 1851), p.11f.

worst danger to which the Church is exposed. "Do we busy ourselves chiefly," he asks, "with the fussy, superficial activities of the religious world, as if committee meetings, and the formation of new societies would atone for the absence of that holy heart without which no man shall see the Lord?"[43] Again and again he recalls his clergy to the real purpose of their ministry. "O how sad a sight it is," he exclaims, "to behold the once fervent and loving Pastor, who consecrated his whole soul to the service of God, who reaped his highest reward from the love of God, and the affection of his flock, become a worldly, careless, time-serving Priest, striving to be popular by base arts and sinful compliances with the infidel or latitudinarian notions around him, ridiculing the directions of his Prayer Book, despising the admonitions of his Bishop, and only desirous for more and more of the things that pertain to this life!"[44] More than once he comments on the "exceeding selfishness, enormous waste and needless luxury" of contemporary society.[45] Pointing to the day of judgment, he asks if it will "be well then to say, I gave my five or ten pounds for an expensive dress, I laid out my fortune to keep up a handsome appearance, I was noticed as being more handsomely attired than my neighbours, when the word of God said so plainly, 'Why take ye thought for raiment?' "[46] Here, as so often when Medley speaks on moral issues, we might well be listening to Pusey or Newman or Keble.

A great episcopate of forty-seven years is not easily summed up, but Medley himself gives us some help. At his Primary Visitation in 1847, he told his clergy plainly what they ought to be about: "Our great business seems to me to be, to teach men, not to study controversy, but to study holiness: to manifest their christianity and their churchmanship, not by hollow-sounding words, but by solid and fruitful actions: and to confute or convince their real or supposed antagonists by a more virtuous and practical kind of religion, and by a humbler walk with God." Thirty years later, before the Provincial Synod of Canada, he put the principle of his churchmanship into one sentence: "Hand down to coming ages your great Catholic heritage whole, undefiled, unmutilated, unimpaired, for it is Jesus the Saviour who has commanded you to keep the bulwarks of His Church for Him."[47] It would be hard to find more succinct expressions either of the spirit which animated Medley's work or of the aims of the great religious movement which did so much to make him what he was.

43. *Provincial Synod Sermon*, p. 7.
44. *Third Visitation Charge*, p. 12.
45. *Visitation Charge, 1877*, p. 6.
46. *Sermons*, 2nd ed. (London, 1845), p. 84.
47. *Primary Visitation Charge*, p. 5; *Provincial Synod Sermon*, p. 6f.

Soul Care in the Ministry of Jesus (II)

GEORGE JOHNSTON

IN a former article (*C.J.T.*, October, 1959) it was said that Jesus is the true exemplar of the pastoral ministry, and his work as a teaching preacher was considered. The present article will deal with *his healing activity* and with *his proclamation of the forgiveness of sins.*

It is remarkable that in the Marcan account healings take place in the Galilean ministry, with the exception of one exorcism after the Transfiguration (9:14ff.) and the cure of Bartimaeus (10:46–52). This may be due to the fact that Mark reproduces in the main the traditions of *northern* Palestine or the Galilean churches. Matthew adds nothing of significance other than the Jerusalem reference in 21:14 ("And the blind and the lame came to him in the temple, and he healed them"). Luke adds no exorcisms, but contributes the stories of five additional healings, none of which need be later than the Galilean period, although the incident of ten lepers cleansed belongs to the very end of the time when he was "on the way to Jerusalem . . . passing along between Samaria and Galilee" (Luke 17:11). The balance in this, as in other aspects of the mission of Jesus, may be provided by the Fourth Gospel where we read that "many believed in his name when they saw his signs which he did" in Jerusalem at the Passover season (John 2:23). Three healings are recorded of Jerusalem, or of Bethany which is not far distant: the paralytic of Bethzatha (or Bethesda), the blind man who was sent to Siloam, and the raising of Lazarus (John 5:2ff.; 9:1ff.; 11:1ff.). Again this may be due to the fact that John reproduces in the main the traditions of *southern* Palestine or the Judean churches (cf. Gal. 1:22). One important difference, however, is that the arrest of Jesus in John's Gospel was precipitated by the resurrection of Lazarus, rather than by the Temple Cleansing as in Mark. It is extremely difficult to accept the Lazarus story as historical.

It would seem that Jesus performed most of the healings and exorcisms, then, in the earlier part of his ministry, and this may mean that they were not in themselves of the first priority for his work. He shrank from magic of any sort, whether as food-dispenser or physician. According to Mark he refused to go out of his way to do miracles. John rather shows the miracles as "signs of his glory," the glory of the incarnate *Logos*, in keeping with the theological interpretation that governs his entire book. But Mark is probably to be preferred to John at this point. On the other hand, it would be unjustified scepticism if one were to reject the historicity of the healings and exorcisms. For the earliest traditions, preserved in Acts, tell a consistent story: Jesus was a man attested by mighty works and wonders and signs

(2:22); he went about doing good and healing all that were oppressed by the Devil (10:38; cf. Hebs. 2:14f.). Acts records similar stories about Peter and Paul also, who healed "in the Name of Jesus"; and Paul authenticates his own apostolic office by the "signs and wonders and mighty works" he had performed at Corinth (2 Cor. 12:12). Thus was fulfilled the word of John 14:12: "He who believes in me will also do the works that I do; and greater works than these will he do, because I go to the Father." The apostolic church had been commissioned to heal.

Before the relevance of this for the modern ministry is further explored, something more should be said about the exorcisms and healings performed by Jesus.

Quite general reference to the driving out of demons and to healing is found in Mark 1:32–34; 6:5; Matt. 4:23f.; 9:35; 14:35f.; 15:30f.; Luke 7:21–23; 8:2 (and cf. 11:24–26). Sometimes an exorcism is linked with a healing: Matt. 9:32; 12:22, blindness and dumbness. It is not known what evil spirit afflicted the Syrophoenician's daughter (Mark 7:24–30), but for a miracle done at a distance one may compare the centurion's slave (Luke 7:2–10) and the nobleman's son (John 4:46–54, which may be a doublet of the preceding). No definition is given of "unclean spirits" (Mark 1:23ff.), though it may be conjectured that they included temper tantrums, emotion-charged obscenities, blasphemy, sexual exhibitionism, and the like. The word "spirit" can be used in Hebrew as a psychological term to denote characteristics of the personality (frequently so in the Qumran Scrolls, for example). Invasion of the self by a demon was the current "explanation," but not necessarily the correct one. Jesus, however, appears to have accepted the usual interpretation.

Two interesting cases remain: the Gerasene or Gadarene demoniac called Legion, and the epileptic (?) boy (Mark 5:2ff.; 9:14ff.). The convulsions and shouting of the stories can be paralleled from modern hospital cases. Legion may be, as Leslie Weatherhead has suggested, an example of "multiple personality" or some form of schizophrenia; and the name "Legion" may have derived from some dreadful traumatic experience connected with the soldiers of a Roman legion. In this way psychology sheds light on these very interesting accounts. To say this does not mean, of course, that the actuality of the cures is called into question nor that their dependence on quite remarkable and divine powers in Jesus is denied.

On the contrary, it becomes evident that there is need for "exorcism" still, although the methods of today will largely be dependent on psychological advances and on medicine, as well as on religious faith in God the Healer. The pastor may or may not have the equipment to deal with difficult cases of personality maladjustment and forms of insanity; indeed he must be protected from practising what he has no special skill to do. In many congregations, no doubt, there are people who suffer mental sicknesses, some of which can be recognised and helped by the minister or by the minister working in a team with a doctor and a psychotherapist. Others may be

noted by the minister (for example, the beginnings of schizophrenia), but the proper treatment has to be given in a mental hospital by specialists. Opinions differ concerning the value of ceremonies of exorcism performed in the ritual of the Church; they should be treated with the utmost circumspection.

The healings of Jesus have been carefully examined also and modern parallels suggested. Peter's mother-in-law may have had a "fever" due to excitement or a minor upset. "Leprosy" was probably a form of skin disease, dermatitis, eczema or psoriasis, which is sometimes psychosomatic in origin. Paralysis can be caused by a deep-rooted conflict and cures by suggestion are possible. It is not necessary in this paper to offer explanations for them all, and certainly not to "rationalise" the cures away. The Gospels regard the healing miracles as proof of God's Kingdom of love exercising its powers through the Messiah to bless people, and the promise of this was found in Isa. 29:18f.; 35:5f.; 61:1; cf. Luke 7:21–23. As time passed, legends naturally accumulated around Jesus, but there is a minimum of this in the canonical Gospels. It may be left an open question whether Jesus ever raised quite dead people to life; nevertheless there can be no doubt that Jesus did perform cures, did restore greatly disturbed men and women to sanity, did cast out "evil spirits." As to the existence of demons or the Prince of demons Miss Graham Ikin has written that "*some perversion on a spiritual plane with a cosmic repercussion* may require corporate activity to break through. The individual alone cannot counteract it." Thus more than human evil may be involved.[1]

More germane to our present purpose is the method employed by Jesus in the cure of disease.

Pity or compassion dominated his approach to sufferers (Mark 1:41; Luke 7:13), and this quality is surely a *sine qua non* for the minister as pastor. On the side of the patient or the patient's friends there had to be faith, confidence in Jesus (Mark 2:5; Luke 17:13); and this was almost certainly required in every case of genuine healing.

The touch of Jesus in the stories of the deaf mute and the blind man (Mark 7:32–37; 8: 22–26) has been interpreted as a magical action, but it is better to take it as a necessary expression of Jesus' immediate personal contact with the sick.

In John's Gospel the initiative of Jesus and the need for the patient's desire to be cured are given considerable stress. To the paralytic of Bethzatha Jesus said, "Do you want to be healed?" It was Jesus who saw the man blind from birth and proceeded to cure him, partly at least by requiring obedience from him: "Go, wash in the pool of Siloam" (9:7). This is not quite the impression that Mark gives. Jesus there seems to avoid the wonder-working method on principle, presumably because it was wide open to misunderstanding. Still, it must be remembered that the people of the time who looked for the coming of the Kingdom of God with power expected the

1. *New Concepts of Healing*, p. 17.

healing of disease, fertility in the land, and paradise restored with all its blessings (cf. 1 Enoch 10:7; 67:8; 95:4; Test. of Dan 5:12; Test. of Levi 18:10f.). Sometimes the healings are connected with the power of the Spirit; and it is to be noted that the Evangelists always connect the messianic work of Jesus with his endowment with the Holy Spirit. We ought to regard the healings, therefore, as the overcoming of lesser spirits by the divine which was uniquely present in Jesus and was promised to his disciples. In Mark 6:7 Jesus sent out the Twelve "and gave them authority over the unclean spirits." This can mean only that he made them partners in a gift of the Holy Spirit by whose power they were to drive out the unholy spirits (cf. Mark 3:21–30 for this same power at work in Jesus himself).

From these examples one should deduce that pastors who seek to perform healings in the service of God must humbly seek from on high the graces and power and wisdom of the Holy Spirit.

Dr. Leslie Weatherhead, in his valuable study of the healing ministry in relation to psychology and religion, pays special attention to Jesus' use of suggestion; and doubtless this is at bottom an application of the healer's faith to the patient's need. (On the other hand, cures do not always follow nor endure, even if confidence is present in both parties to a healing act.) The discussion by Weatherhead of the Gadarene demoniac is particularly deserving of study. He underlines the patience of Jesus and his readiness to try more than one method. We have to notice that Jesus asks the man his name, implying perhaps an unspoken request that he should trust Jesus. Is this also an example of the magical use of the "name"? Probably not; Jesus was personally interested in the man, and the early Fathers (for example, Ignatius of Antioch) rightly drew from the usage a pastoral principle: "Know the people of your congregation by name."

The healing ministry illustrates the basic purpose of Jesus. He had come to seek and to save the lost, the troubled, and the spiritually listless (Mark 2:17; 10:45; Luke 19:10; John 10:10). Sinful men are described as "sick" souls, without implying that ill-health is due to sin (cf. John 9:3). Apparently Jesus never wasted time on theoretical arguments about the origin of sickness when there was healing work to be done—a fact that conceals lessons for those who would rather analyse and construct theories than enter the fray and get things done. "Today we overrate the rational values and behave as if thinking were a substitute for living. We have forgotten that thought and intuition that feeds it only become whole if the deed grows out of it as fruit grows from the pollen on a tree. So everywhere in our civilized world there tends to be a terrible cleavage between thinking and doing."[2] Jesus put his mind to accomplishing the work God had given him to do (John 4:34), and he expects similar obedience from his servants (Mark 9:35; 10:43f.; Luke 6:40).

One must also consider from this evidence the relation between health and salvation as Jesus understood it. Of late it has often been laid down as

2. Laurens van der Post, *The Lost World of the Kalahari*, p. 61.

an axiom that sickness is contrary to the will of God, and that its cure belongs essentially with redemption. A spirit set right with God should have a body made whole and well. It is difficult to substantiate this thesis in its entirety from the work of Jesus. One would have expected him to have directed an incessant campaign against ill-health as part of his programme, if he had really believed so. In fact, some healings happened almost incidentally; he was reluctant to perform a cure outside of the holy land of Israel; and soon he seems to have had no time at all for them. It is probably correct to say that good health is what men should enjoy who live according to the divine will; but we have to be cautious in concluding that bringing sinners into a redeemed relationship with God will also produce a healthy future. There have been many saints who were healthy neither in the physical nor in the psychological sense.

Ralph Morton makes the interesting suggestion that, once he took the road to the Cross, Jesus turned from individuals to national and political issues. "Previously, in Galilee, He had dealt with men and women in their personal needs and problems. Much of His time was given to the healing of the sick and to talking with individuals. Now . . . His time is given to public matters and men's questions on them. . . . In place of personal conversation there is public debate. . . . Jesus was taking a line that was as new as it was definite."[3] We may say that Jesus was adaptable to circumstance, not one whose programme was inflexible; or better, that in the midst of a changing situation he discerned the will of God and obeyed it.

A dramatic healing story will serve as the bridge that carries our discussion to the third and last element in the pastoral ministry of Jesus, namely the forgiveness of sins.

In Mark 2.3–12 a paralytic borne by four friends was lowered from a roof to the feet of Jesus, whose response to a great act of faith was to say, "My son (or, child), your sins are forgiven." The legalists in the crowd were horrified at such blasphemy. Yet this was surely the proper work of the Son: to invite sinners to return to God the Father, to narrate immortal parables like that of the sinful Prodigal and the still more sinful Elder Brother. And is it not equally reasonable that, as related in John 20, the victorious Lord should commission his Church, represented by the disciples of the Upper Room, to declare and to withhold the forgiveness of sins? James 5:13–16 connects sickness, confession of sin to one another, prayer, and pardon in a way that agrees with the teaching, method, and mandate of Jesus. One may compare also I John 5:14–17 where it is allowed that Christians (not just the clergy!) may intercede for the forgiveness of their brethren.

This has far-reaching implications. For one thing it gives a basis for the pastoral director acting as "priest" to absolve the troubled, guilty people who come to him in godly sorrow. He will act never in his own name but always in the Name of Christ, with the humility of one who is himself

3. *The Twelve Together*, p. 105.

a pardoned sinner and the authority of one consecrated to be the agent of the Holy Spirit. Christ is, naturally, the final authority, the Bishop of the ministers as well as the people (cf. 1 Peter 2:25; 5:4). Nothing in all this need arrogate from God his proper functions, since we believe that the commission to proclaim the Gospel of forgiveness and judgment comes graciously from God himself. 1 Cor. 5:3–5 and 2 Cor. 2:6–11 show this authority at work in the primitive Church. On the other hand, the lessons of the Middle Ages demonstrate how easily men may turn their ministry of absolution into a tyranny and a mockery, and it must always be subject to the corporate mind of the whole Church acting through congregational and similar assemblies. Every word that Jesus said about forgiving as we hope to be forgiven is relevant here.

Another matter of significance is that Jesus not only spoke with sinners; he ate and drank with them to the surprise of the self-righteous (Mark 2:15–17; John 4:7ff.). It may be that some pastors in highly organized churches today find it virtually impossible to go outside in order to mingle with those who do not "belong." If so, some re-examination of the priorities seems to be called for.

Again, we note that the disciples could not cure the epileptic boy (Mark 9:18), but Jesus proved his mastery. "This kind," he told his troubled men, "cannot be driven out by anything but prayer." To emulate Christ in his pastoral work demands emulation of his prayer life, his wise withdrawals from the busy world into solitude, his constant self-discipline. "No exponent of religion can help here if his own attitude is infantile or immature."[4]

To sum up: Jesus is the pattern of pastoral service who came to fulfil the Father's loving will, and in so doing he gave his very life. Ministers too are to be regarded as "expendable" in the work of the Kingdom, as the late Dean Tertius van Dyke of Hartford, Connecticut, once said to the writer. As the Master dealt gently with the Samaritans and other "outsiders," as God is no respecter of persons, so the followers must learn to avoid so far as possible prejudice and favouritism; though ministers well realize that human likes and dislikes too easily corrupt their dealings with the congregation. The allegory of the Good Shepherd suggests that the shepherd leads, the flock follows; but in our experience "leadership" comes to mean something incompatible with service, and the pastoral office always involves hard work. To provide for the people what they want may win a cheap popularity and a comfortable living, but this will not produce men and women with whom God can be well pleased. Only by letting God come first, by seeking first his Kingdom and its righteousness as Jesus himself did, is it possible to be sustained in the ministry; for everything needful will be added. And only so will the souls of men be cured as they mirror the perfections of Christ.

4. A. Graham Ikin, op. cit., p. 10.

Pastoral Theology Today

GREER W. BOYCE

I

WE cannot review here the whole history of pastoral theology as the Church has conceived of it through the centuries. We must confine ourselves to modern times and attempt to delineate some of those features which are particularly emphasized in modern pastoral theology and which represent a distinctive change from the pastoral theology of former years. As a beginning I shall make a general statement concerning pastoral theology today, and then proceed to examine it in detail.

Pastoral theology today is concerned with the pastor's distinctive role in his relationship to persons, particularly individual persons. While admittedly all the functions of a minister are part of his pastoral care of his people, not all of those functions involve the minister in a direct personal relationship with his people. Preaching may be done—though ineffectively done—without such direct personal encounter. Likewise teaching may be carried on—though again unsatisfactorily—without the same kind of direct relationship which is the very heart of the concern of pastoral theology. We shall discuss the relation of pastoral theology to these other disciplines later for they are all united in a vital pastoral ministry. For the present let us simply note the fact that pastoral theology regards itself as having to do primarily with those person-to-person encounters between the pastor and his people which make up so large a part of his ministry. These encounters are not limited to that specialized aspect of the ministry so popular today called personal counseling, but include the whole range of the pastor's relationships with his people—as a visitor in their homes, at their bedside in the hospital, in their offices and workshops, even at the church door on a Sunday morning. Wherever and whenever the pastor meets his people as a person in direct personal encounter the concern of pastoral theology comes to the fore. It seeks to understand and interpret what is happening in those relationships. It seeks to understand and define the pastor's role in them. Above all it recognizes that its task is to understand persons in all the complexity of their natures and circumstances, and through this understanding to relate the Christian faith to their experience in such a way that it becomes not merely truth assented to but truth structured into their very being and living. Pastoral theology today is centered upon persons, the understanding and meeting of their needs, and the role of the pastor in ministering to them.

II

It is obvious from this statement that pastoral theology today is marked by certain emphases. Let us examine these emphases more clearly and in some detail.

(i) There is first of all the emphasis upon the pastoral care of individuals. Formerly pastoral theology was regarded as a kind of omnibus course which included all the minister's functions in a congregation. It was, and in some places still is, called practical theology, and it gathered under one roof preaching, teaching, liturgics, and church administration, as well as the pastoral care of individuals and families. Its very name betrayed the fact that it was regarded largely as a kind of technological subject within the theological school, designed to give students practical advice in conducting the affairs of a congregation. Not infrequently the larger portion of the time was given to homiletics, for it was generally assumed that preaching was the primary if not the only mode of the minister's real spiritual ministry to his people. Other matters were not neglected, but it can be safely said that in most theological centres liturgics and Christian education, as well as pastoral work with individuals, suffered at the hands of this underlying conception of the ministry as a preaching ministry. To say this is not for one moment to question the importance of preaching. On the contrary, preaching will and should always remain first in the hierarchy of the minister's duties, and, as we shall see, it is of fundamental significance in the pastoral care of his people. But there is no doubt that pastoral theology as such, as well as other important matters, suffered because of the overemphasis upon this one of the earthen vessels in which the Lord's treasure is kept and administered to the church. In addition, all the practical disciplines, including homiletics, suffered from lack of recognition of their basic theological character and their potential as contributors to the theology of the church.

The change that has taken place is well illustrated by Charles Kemp in his book, *Physicians of the Soul.* He points out that in 1896 Ian McLaren published a book, *The Cure of Souls*, in which only one chapter was devoted to the pastor's personal ministry to individuals. In 1932 Charles Holman published a book bearing the same title which was entirely concerned with that personal ministry. Holman's book demonstrates the expansion of the concern for and knowledge of this important work of the minister, an expansion which has gone on at almost whirlwind pace in the intervening years. As a consequence pastoral theology, as the study of the pastor's ministry to persons, has become a subject in itself, not divorced from other disciplines, but having its own history, centres of interest and methods, and with its own theological problems and emphases.

(ii) Pastoral theology today is marked in the second place by the emphasis upon understanding persons in all the complexity of human nature and interpersonal relationships. As Seward Hiltner has pointed out, what is new in pastoral theology is not so much the concern for the care of souls, though

that has undoubtedly received fresh impetus in the church, but rather the attitude and methods by which such soul-care is understood and undertaken. The new attitude towards persons and the methods of ministering to them may be described as dynamic (in contrast to formal) in its conception.

In general the pastoral theology of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries came to be dominated by a formal conception of persons and of the pastor's role in ministering to them. This formal conception was shaped according to one's theological tradition. In the Reformed tradition, with which we are concerned, as Charles Kemp observes, "a common pattern and a common remedy were applied to all."[1] The diagnosis of all ills was sin, the need conversion, the goal salvation. Anton Boisen has described the older methods of pastoral care as relying on "a universal specific derived from traditional authority."[2] In short, people and their needs were interpreted according to a rigid theological dogmatic into whose mould they were thrust. Accordingly their "cure" was to be achieved by the verbal transmission of traditional religious judgments, ideals and beliefs. Sometimes the resulting religious formula was evangelistic in character, requiring the pastor in effect "to preach" from house to house. Sometimes it was even more rigidly formal, designating the pastor's role to be that of reading the scriptures and praying. In time, when neither of these roles seemed acceptable, pastoral care degenerated into mere homespun friendliness.

It is important to realize that today the same basic pattern of sin-salvation holds true in a fundamental way for the pastor's understanding of his role. But we can no longer conceive of either sin or salvation in as simple a manner as formerly seemed possible. Largely through the studies of the modern psychological sciences the complexity of human nature is understood as it has rarely been before. In particular the depth and deviousness of human motivation—that with which religion is especially concerned—has been relentlessly exposed. We cannot now ignore the fact that what was once laid easily at the door of common human depravity may have other roots in the personality, and likewise that what was once accepted as manifest virtue may hide a multitude of spiritual ills and evils. Pastoral theology today is forced to contend with the unconscious depths in human motivation. It recognizes that while the Gospel of Christ is the answer to men's needs, it confronts in men a bewildering variety of psychological, social, mental and spiritual patterns which must be understood if the Gospel is to be related to them relevantly. For pastoral theology the task is no longer one of easy transmission of a given faith to those who should receive it. It involves the harder, more complex effort to understand the persons to whom we minister in their unique individuality, and to relate the faith to them at the most profound spiritual and emotional levels of their being. As Seward Hiltner expresses it in his latest book, *The Christian*

1. *Physicians of the Soul*, p. 227.
2. *The Exploration of the Inner World*, p. 87.

Shepherd: "Testimony to Christian faith is always a compound of the eternal gospel and specific need. Any attempt to wrap the gospel in a cellophane package, as if it could be given in the same way on all occasions, betrays what is required."[3] That is to say, pastoral theology gathers into its concern what is more precisely called pastoral psychology. It is attempting to answer what troubled Dr. John McKenzie after his graduation from college, namely, that while he had received excellent training in understanding the Gospel he had to proclaim, he received little or no insight into that element to which he had to proclaim it—the element of human nature, of persons in all the variety of their troubles and needs. He recalls that in his day pastoral theology had been reduced to trivia, and all he could remember of the course he received in it was to be sure to send a thank-you note to his host and hostess of the week-end! Pastoral theology today, reinforced by both Christian anthropology and the results of scientific psychological research, stresses the knowledge of persons, and endeavours as far as possible to remove the pastor's dealing with them from the trial-and-error method of untrained experience.

Surely the basic principle involved here is not really new, but is merely the re-emphasis of something native to Christianity itself. Is it not best exemplified in the ministry of Jesus? How well he understood people in their individuality, and on the basis of that understanding how diverse was his response to them! It is his example that pastoral theology seeks to follow by urging us to centre attention on the person in order to discover his real being and need, and to respond to him in accordance with what we discover in him.

(iii) The third emphasis in pastoral theology today is upon the character of the relationship between pastor and persons. It is this relationship which above all pastoral theology tries to analyse and understand. Here the pastor's own nature and methods come under scrutiny. It is one of the fundamental principles of pastoral theology today that the quality of the relationship established between the pastor and people is the prime factor in pastoral care. The malignancies which warp the lives, not only of the abnormal but equally of normal people, have taken root in faulty personal relationships, if indeed they do not find their source there. In pastoral care it is supremely through the quality of the relationship offered by the pastor that his people discover a new understanding of their relationships to themselves, to others, and to God. It is the pastoral relationship through which healing is effected and persons are enabled to grow in faith and love. Consequently a great deal of stress is now being laid, not only upon the understanding of persons, but also upon the pastor's understanding of himself, and upon the methods by which he relates himself to persons under his care. Efforts are made to help the pastor face his own fears and to realize the depth of his own faith or lack of it. The principles by which he

3. Op. cit., p. 17f.

may relate himself to others are studied and, where clinical training is available, practised.

The principles governing the methods advocated in modern pastoral care are too numerous and varied for profitable discussion here, but a few of the major ones which appear in all writings on the subject may be mentioned by way of illustration. (a) The first may be described as "listening." Listening sensitively to the communications made by persons both provides catharsis—the release of unexpressed problems and conflicts—and enables the pastor to discover the real nature of the person with whom he is dealing. (b) The second principle is "acceptance." Only acceptance of the person as he is, without either condoning or condemning, can relieve the pastor of the legalistic role of the external moral judge and enable the person to face his real self in all its good and evil. The pastor is urged to *respond* rather than to *react* to persons. (c) The third principle is "clarification." People are to be helped to clarify the real issues of their lives and circumstances and to work towards a reorientation of their living. At its most profound level, this process may mean a radical transformation of character.

These principles are aimed at the establishment of a free permissive relationship through which persons may express their real attitudes and feelings, find understanding, be enabled to face their wrongs and needs and discover a new approach to living. The psychological sciences have contributed most of what A. C. Outler calls the "practical wisdom" which is embodied in the methods of modern pastoral care. While in the beginning this wisdom was applied particularly in the counseling of individuals who came to the pastor for help, it is now being expanded and adapted to provide the basic attitude and approach of the pastor in all person-to-person relationships. It endeavours to make the pastor sensitive in a deeper way to the reality of persons as he encounters them in home and hospital, and to guide him in relating to them in such a way that a potentially saving relationship is formed.

These then are the fundamental emphases and developments in modern pastoral theology. They may be described as emphases because, while new stress has been put upon them today, and while new methods have been developed by which to effect them in practice, it would be utterly untrue and grossly unfair even to seem to suggest that they were completely unknown to pastors of former generations. On the contrary the concern for persons, the understanding of them, and the establishment of effective healing relationship with them, have been the marks of the outstanding Protestant pastors down through the centuries. Richard Baxter, Ian McLaren, John Wesley, Phillips Brooks, to mention only a few of the stars in the galaxy of the church's pastoral ministry, prefigured in their persons and writings much that is stressed in pastoral theology today. What is different is that their intuitive insight and skill have now been structured and developed and made available to pastors in knowledge and training. But it

is Ian McLaren who expresses clearly and beautifully the fundamental concern and attitude of pastoral care when he writes of the pastor's role:

> It is a hard fight for everyone, and it is not his to judge or condemn; his is to understand, to help, to comfort—for these people are his children, his pupils, his patients; they are sheep Christ has given him, for whom Christ died.

III

The last quotation brings us to the fundamental question of the source of the theory and practice of pastoral theology today, its relation to traditional theology, the concept of the ministry which arises from it, and its relation to other functions of the working pastor. To a discussion of these matters we must now turn, because they are vital to the present content and future development of pastoral theology.

There is no doubt that for Ian McLaren his concept of the pastoral role was a direct expression of his theology. Pastoral theology today has gathered its theory and methods largely from another source. Its concept of pastoral care, its principles of technique, and to some degree its aims and objectives, have been derived from the psychological sciences, in particular from the psychology of personality and the various forms of psychotherapy. In its development this fact works both to the advantage and to the disadvantage of pastoral theology. The advantages are that the psychological sciences have brought a fund of practical wisdom to the aid of the pastor; even more than that, as A. C. Outler suggests, they have rebuked our indifference to the personal aspects of our ministry and our formal and unrealistic treatment of persons, and have awakened us to a whole new perspective on the possibilities of pastoral care. But these gains have not been without their accompanying perils. At least two serious threats should be noted. (a) There is a danger that pastoral theology will be reduced to pastoral psychology, the analyzing of personality according to accepted scientific theories and the training in the latest techniques of dealing with personality problems. (b) There is a still more profound danger that pastoral theology will adopt too unquestioningly the metaphysical assumptions underlying modern psychological science, assumptions which are at their worst naturalistic and at their best humanistic, but which are in any case far from, if not in direct contradiction to, fundamental Christian theology. A. C. Outler, in his book *Psychotherapy and the Christian Message*, has done us a noteworthy service in clarifying the issues between the modern psychological sciences and Christian theology. His work is the more valuable for his forthright recognition of the contribution which these sciences make to our work and his indication of the ways in which this contribution may be accepted without commitment to the unsatisfactory assumptions that go with it. If these assumptions were allowed to govern our thinking, the result would be the perversion of the specifically Christian understanding and aims which belong to a minister of Christ.

H. W. Buchner, in his review of Seward Hiltner's book, *Preface to Pas-*

toral Theology, in a recent number of the *Canadian Journal of Theology*, puts his finger on the issue. "The book," he writes, "stresses beginning with the person where he is. Traditional theology perhaps more often places the stress on God and His demands. Both are needed and I feel a lack here."[4] In fairness to Hiltner it should be added that he is one of those who are aware of the theological weakness in much modern thinking on pastoral care, and that he is attempting to overcome it. In this regard his book, *The Christian Shepherd*, is an improvement over his *Preface to Pastoral Theology.*

William E. Hulme, himself a trained and experienced counselor, puts the matter even more succinctly. "God, like theology," he declares, "can neither be separated from the dynamics of human experience nor reduced to symbols of psychological phenomena."[5] Pastoral theology today is striving to relate God and theology to the dynamics of human experience; its peril is that it can reduce both to the symbols of psychological phenomena. What is needed is that for which James Smart pleads in the same issue of the *Canadian Journal of Theology*: "It is surely clear that one of the drastic needs of the present is the recovery by the practical disciplines of their thoroughgoing theological character."[6] After all, the pastor is first and foremost a minister of Jesus Christ. His foundation is laid, not in the accumulated wisdom of men, but in the Revelation made to the world in Jesus Christ. Grounded on that Revelation he may draw into himself all the wisdom of the world, but there is no doubt as to the criterion to which it is to be brought and by which it is to be tested. The pastor must be above all else a theologian. On the one hand he must continually wrestle with that body of truth that is given to him in the vast depths of the Christian Faith. On the other hand, he must strive with that infinite variable, the person, to whom he is to communicate that faith. He begins with the assumption that at the root of all the malignancies in human life there is a malignant relationship with God. He is prepared to find that malignancy expressing itself in a thousand different forms. He is prepared to deal with the person's need as it presents itself to him. But he has but one aim—a restored relationship with God, fully realized and appropriated in the depths of that person's being, which alone brings wholeness, healing or salvation.

Fortunately theology today provides a basis for the work of unifying the best in traditional Christian theology and the insights drawn from the psychological sciences as applied to pastoral care. For theology today stresses the incarnate redemptive action of God in Christ. It emphasizes God's revelation, not as a deposit of new truths concerning God nor of new moral standards by which we fulfil his will, but as His giving of Himself in suffering love. In Christ God did not simply show His nature to us; He gave Himself

4. *C.J.T.*, 5 (1959), p. 210.
5. *Counseling and Theology*, p. 50.
6. *C.J.T.*, 5 (1959), p. 182.

to us. He entered our life, identified Himself with us in our need, accepted us as we are, and bore in His own pain the cost of our sin and failure. God established with us in Christ a relationship which broke the bonds of guilt and fear by accepting us as we are and by binding Himself to us with costly ties of love from which nothing can separate us.

In this essential message of the Gospel there is embodied a fundamental concept of the pastor which both provides a theological basis for the understanding of his role and incorporates within it the best in the theory and methods of modern pastoral care. It provides a truly pastoral theology. This concept has been called by a friend of mine, without conscious reference to Tillich, the "ministry of being." A number of important ideas are gathered up in this phrase. It means fundamentally that the pastor's role is the giving of himself to persons. He is called to a ministry of identification with another, of getting into where he really lives and sharing the hurt and shame and sin that are there. It is the ministry of discovering the real person, even at the cost of bearing the hostility and hatred he may heap upon you, and "reviling not again." It is the ministry of freedom, permitting the person to struggle to discover his true self even at the cost to himself and to you of the consequences of being wrong. It is a ministry, that is, which embodies the basic concern for persons and our relationship to them stressed in modern pastoral care. But it is more basically the expression of the ministry of God to us in Jesus Christ. It is the ministry, in and through the pastor's actual being, of the love which sought and claimed and accepted us in Christ. The role of pastor is to minister the Divine Grace to people not only by preaching, teaching, worship, but supremely through the quality of the pastor's relationship to them. He himself becomes a means of grace, the vessel of the Lord. His role in the pastoral relationship is not primarily what he has to say, nor what he can do, but what he is *to be*, by God's Grace, to the people he serves. This idea should not be confused with the legalistic concept of "setting a good example." It is rather that through the very nature of his relationship with his people the pastor communicates the Gospel to them, and that they in turn, through their relationship with him, come to realize, to understand, and in fact to experience the true character of the relationship which God offers them in Christ.

It is this theological concept of the ministry which, I believe, lies at the heart of pastoral theology today, and which must be fostered, enlarged, and given concrete expression there. It is such a concept that finds most abundant help towards its realization from all the modern theories and methods of pastoral care. But it places the roots of the pastorate where they belong—in the Gospel. It maintains as the all-inclusive role of the pastor the communication of the revealed Gospel, forbidding the substitution of purely psychological aims and techniques for that Gospel. It thereby ensures a firm ground from which to appropriate all that modern thought can teach us yet remain Christian pastors. Without this firm ground we shall find ourselves becoming nothing more than poor psychologists and therapists.

It is no mean task to which this concept calls us. There are much easier concepts of our ministry. It is much easier to regard ourselves only as proclaimers of a message and to meet others with little homilies on their problems. It is much easier to regard ourselves as the guardians of some sacred moral standard and to pass judgment upon the sins of men and put before them lofty ideals. It is easier still to regard ourselves as administrators of an institution or purveyors of religious rituals which we are able to enact in every situation. It is another matter to have to get down with persons, to find our way tenderly into their hearts, to bear their pain as our own, their sin as our own, to be, in Luther's bold phrase, "a Christ unto men." We shall feel, even as Christ did when the woman touched the hem of his garment, the energy go out of us. But there is little doubt as to which ministry belongs to the Christian pastor.

In discovering its own particular task and methods pastoral theology has become independent of other functions of the pastor. It has become independent but not severed from them. Rather its independence merely allows it to contribute its own particular knowledge and perspective to the total work of pastoral care. It would be a destructive conception of the ministry which attempted to isolate the functions of the pastor. Their relation must rather be one of fruitful interaction. Pastoral care is surely involved in preaching. Pastoral theology contributes to the content of preaching its knowledge of the real issues in the lives of men. It makes preaching no longer an isolated exercise in homiletical technique but an earnest striving to illuminate the life of man in the light of the Word of God. Pastoral theology insists that the preacher must mount the pulpit steps bearing not only the burden of the Word of God but also the burden of men's lives, and that thereby his preaching should become a sacrificial offering in which there is a living encounter between God and the souls of men. The concern of pastoral theology affects even the manner of the preacher's speaking. Given the pastoral sense, it is not possible for the preacher to stand in holy seclusion and to hurl denunciatory thunderbolts at his people's sins. Rather, bearing their burdens as his own, he learns how to stand with them, face with them the searing judgment of God and the boundless mercy which cleanses and gives freedom and new life. Yet preaching too must retain its independence. If it is subservient to the concerns of pastoral care it may, as it has in some quarters, become centered upon people and their problems rather than upon God and His Gospel. It may degenerate into mere psychologizing: "Without a problem spake he not unto them." Preaching too must have a theological understanding of its role and objectives. Pastoral theology, however, keeps it relevant, bringing as it does before the preacher the clear image of men in their sin and sorrow, to whom the Word must speak.

It is significant that the great preachers have been great pastors—Baxter, Wesley, Brooks, Fosdick, to mention but a few. These men readily confessed that it was their relationship with people that gave their preaching effect.

They preached the Gospel. But their preaching was no academic presentation of that Gospel. It was preaching which dealt with the realities of people's lives and which brought those realities into the light of the Faith. It united homiletics and pastoral theology in effective pastoral care.

In similar fashion we might consider the relation of pastoral theology to all the various functions of the minister. For the purpose of this study, however, it may be most useful to dwell briefly on one aspect of the pastor's work which is particularly illuminated by the concerns of pastoral theology as described above. That aspect is the organization and administration of the church. Pastoral theology, as we have seen, is centred upon individual persons and the pastor's relationship to them. But individual problems and needs are most often rooted in malignant interpersonal relationships. Moreover, persons are healed and persons grow only in the context of vital relationships with others. Therefore, pastoral theology today is deeply concerned with the quality of the life within the church. It seeks the establishment of the church as a true community, a family of persons within which the relationships are such that people find real fellowship with God and with one another. From the viewpoint of pastoral theology today the programme of the church must be centred upon the increase of the stature of persons—their increased understanding of the Gospel and appropriation of it in their experience. Pastoral theology aims toward the realization within the church of a group-life in which the acceptance of the love of God is made real and effective. God provides for us in Christ a reconciling saving relationship; but for most people the experience of this relationship is made real only through a relationship with others in which it is incarnate. It is such a relationship which the pastor seeks to provide in the encounter with his people which I have called the ministry of being. But the pastor is one person, limited in time and space. He needs the support and help of the whole church. More than that, should he be successful in bringing one person into a new experience of God and a new orientation of life, he is often hard put to find any place in the church where the new-born life may be nurtured and grow in grace. In its attention to persons, therefore, pastoral theology today gathers into its concern the aims of the organization of the church. On the wide level it includes in its concern the structures of society, as did the social gospel of a former generation, recognizing that these structures vitally affect the mental and spiritual well-being of men and women. One of the dangers inherent in the current emphasis upon personal religion and in the concentration upon individual feelings and psychic conditions is that it may become a way of escape from the momentous economic, political and military issues which terrorize our age. The emphasis upon personal individual needs and salvation can, and in some notable instances does, contribute to the widespread "failure of nerve" which we all feel in confronting those issues. The concern for persons, therefore, and the endeavour to release them from the various bonds that limit their lives must always be related to the larger aim of enabling them to

fulfil their moral responsibility towards others. In particular pastoral theology today must be concerned for the development of that responsibility in the realization of the truer and fuller community which our world so desperately seeks. The pastoral task includes, as we have suggested, the fitting of men and women for their wider responsibility in society, and in this way it is linked to the problems and concerns of Christian ethics. But more especially pastoral theology is called to contribute to the achievement of community among Christian people themselves. It has as its purpose the realization within the church of a true community where people may find the reconciling forgiving love of God in reality and power. From the perspective of pastoral theology, therefore, church administration which aims only at organizational efficiency, multiplicity of groups, or expansion of membership, simply misses the point of the church's existence. The Church exists as the mission of God on earth. Her role, no less than that of the pastor, is *to be* the fellowship of reconciling love in the world. She exists not only in order that the redeeming action of God may be proclaimed from the pulpit, taught in Christian education groups, and expressed in worship; she exists in order that God's redeeming action may be structured into the very living together of her people, into the quality of their relationships within the church. Very little thinking or work has been done on this aspect of pastoral theology today. Perhaps the modern idols of bigness and efficiency still hold too firm a grip on our minds. But the vision of a new order is there, providing a fresh horizon for the work of pastoral care.

Pastoral theology encompasses a wide field today. What matters most in the work of the pastor is the perspective which he has on his work. He must learn all he can, study all he can, of new theories and techniques. But his learning will be to no effect, may indeed be harmful, if it is not undergirded and directed by a fundamental attitude born of the Spirit of Christ—the readiness to give himself without reserve to his people, to identify himself with them by sharing the good and evil, joy and sorrow of their lives, to be by God's Grace a measure of what Christ in His ministry was to those who came to him and to whom He came.

Evangelism, Mythology, and Bultmann

J. F. PETER

DEMYTHOLOGISING[1] is with us as the topic of the day for New Testament scholars, theologians and apologists. And there can be no avoiding it by any whose work is that of evangelism, for the questions it raises relate to every attempt to preach the Gospel.

The term is practically synonymous with the name of Rudolf Bultmann, Professor Emeritus of Marburg, whose essay *Neues Testament und Mythologie* (New Testament and Mythology) in 1943[2] precipitated a discussion which has spread from Germany to all parts of the world where Christianity is taken seriously, and which is as yet far from concluded.[3]

That essay is in two parts, the first of which sets the problem by pointing to the unacceptability to modern man of much of the thought-form of the New Testament writers, and by contending that an existentialist interpretation of its mythology (that is, a grasping of the understanding of human existence which its myths are endeavouring to express) is the only solution which will preserve the essence of the kerygma. The second part of the essay gives the Christian interpretation of Being,[4] stating that the life of faith is one of radical self-commitment to God, and then goes on to assert the significance of God's act in Christ, which makes the decision to self-commitment possible, and which cannot be known apart from this decision.

Before we proceed further, we need to look at some of the terms which have arisen in this discussion.

There is, first, the term "Demythologising" itself. It is a translation of the German *Entmythologisierung*—a word which, so far as I can ascertain,

1. This is the usual translation of the German *Entmythologisierung*, though the no less cacophonous "demythologisation" and "demythicisation" are also found.

2. This was not Bultmann's first approach along this line. Julius Schniewind (*Kerygma and Myth*, p. 59) speaks of "Die Frage der natürlichen Offenbarung" as "Bultmann's first essay on the subject", while Helmut Thielicke (*Kerygma and Myth*, p. 138) and Oscar Cullmann (*Christ and Time*, p. 30) refer to the volume (*Offenbarung und Heilsgeschehen*) in which that essay appears. D. M. Baillie (*God Was in Christ*, second edition, p. 212) says that "as far back as 1927, Emil Brunner discussed Bultmann's attempt to interpret myth in existential terms."

3. At first, because of the circumstances which then prevailed, the discussion was restricted to Germany, but there it had reached quite large proportions by the end of the War, and five volumes of essays (all bearing the title *Kerygma und Mythos*), published in Hamburg by Herbert Reich and edited by H. W. Bartsch, appeared between 1948 and 1955. Much of the first volume of these (including Bultmann's initial essay) has been made available in an English translation (*Kerygma and Myth*, edited by H. W. Bartsch, translated by Reginald H. Fuller, London: S.P.C.K., 1953).

4. This word represents the German *Dasein* ("being-there") which is one of the many technical terms used by Martin Heidegger. It refers to the way of existence which is peculiar to man. It is translated variously as "Being," "human Being," and "human life." (See Translator's Preface to *Kerygma and Myth*, p. xi.)

Bultmann himself has coined, and which denotes the activity of removing mythology.[5] By "mythology" Bultmann means "the use of imagery to express the other worldly in terms of this world and the divine in terms of human life," as, for instance, when "divine transcendence is expressed as spatial distance."[6] His program of Demythologising is one of interpreting the mythological element in the message of the New Testament in such a way as will, without substracting from that message in any way, make it understandable by modern man; and it is Bultmann's conviction that this can only be done by an existentialist interpretation.

The term "existentialist" refers to a movement, expressing itself in various ways, which concentrates attention upon the existence of things as they are in themselves, and not just upon thought of them, and in particular upon the existence of men as individuals. What Bultmann wants to do in his existentialist interpretation of the New Testament is remove all in it that is not expressive, in terms understandable by men today, of an experience which can be repeated in their own lives.

We shall need to note also the distinction which has been made in some German scholarly writings between two words which both find translation in English as "history": the words *Historie* and the much more common *Geschichte*. *Historie* means the study of past events with a view to discovering, in an objective, detached manner, what actually happened. *Geschichte*, on the other hand, means the study of past events in such a way that the discovery of what actually happened calls for a decision on our part. Corresponding to this distinction there are two adjectives: *historisch*, meaning "that which can be established by the historian's criticism of the past," and *geschichtlich*, meaning "that which, although occurring in past history, has a vital, existential reference to our life to-day."[7] Macquarrie observes this distinction by translating *historisch* as "objective-historical" and *geschichtlich* as "existential-historical";[8] and this is the way in which we shall ourselves distinguish the concepts they denote.

With this small piece of clarification of language behind us, we are the better able to appreciate the importance for the work of evangelism of what Bultmann has to say. The discussion which he has initiated has helped us to see that the events of redemption, or the happenings in which they originate, can be spoken of in three ways.[9]

(i) They may be spoken of, first, in an objective-historical (*historisch*) way, as events which took place on our earth and within our time-series, and

5. One German scholar whom I consulted stated that an English equivalent would be "debunking"!

6. *Kerygma and Myth*, p. 10n.

7. Fuller, in the Translator's Preface to *Kerygma and Myth*, p. xii.

8. John Macquarrie, *An Existentialist Theology* (London: S.C.M., 1955) pp. 166, 171. Fuller translates them as, respectively, "historical" or "past historical" and "historic" (Translator's Preface to *Kerygma and Myth*, p. xii).

9. Ian Henderson notes these on pp. 18–19, 41–42, of *Myth in the New Testament* (London: S.C.M., 1952); and John Macquarrie on pp. 166–171 of *An Existentialist Theology*.

which can be subjected to investigation by the historian in the same way as can countless other events of the past. That Jesus was born in Bethlehem of Judaea and that he was crucified under Pontius Pilate are on the same level —so far as their status as events is concerned; we are not here discussing whether they enjoy the same degree of evidence to establish them—as, say, the birth of Alexander or the death of Nelson.

It is Bultmann's conviction that this objective-historical way of speaking is of little or no value in the preaching of the Gospel. For there is in this way of speaking no declaration of an event of redemption. As Gogarten puts it, the word *kerygma* means the proclamation or announcement of a herald, and a herald is not the same thing as a reporter. His proclamation is not, or at any rate not primarily, intended to be a kind of report about something that has happened; rather is it "a kind of declaration of the sender's will, addressed to and intended for the particular person to whom the herald is sent."[10] This factor is absent when the objective-historical way of speaking is employed.

(ii) The events of redemption, or the happenings in which they originate, may be spoken of, secondly, in what Bultmann calls a "mythological" (*mythologisch*) way, as events which did in fact take place on our earth and within our time-series, but which were marked by features showing them to be different from the countless other events of the past. That the birth of Jesus at Bethlehem was the Word becoming flesh and that angels appeared to tell shepherds of the unusual significance of this birth, that the death of Jesus on Calvary was the offering up of the Son of God for the sins of the world and that there was darkness over all the land from the sixth hour to the ninth hour: these have the status of objective-historical events, in the sense that there are documents which record that they took place, but the very manner of their recording shows that they are thought of as *not* on the same level as the birth of Alexander and the death of Nelson.

It is Bultmann's conviction that this mythological way of speaking is only a hindrance to the preaching of the Gospel. For what is then being demanded is acceptance of a cosmology which modern man knows to be obsolete, and of an imagery which he does not recognize as a faithful expression of what he experiences, or can experience.

(iii) In the third place, these things may be spoken of in an existential-historical (*geschichtlich*) way, as events which take place here and now in my experience. The Word becoming flesh and the Son of God offering Himself are recognized as events of redemption, not because Jesus was born at Bethlehem and was crucified on Calvary, nor because I am impressed by the unusual nature of these happenings, but because they enter into the situation in which I am here and now, and set before me a present possibility.

It is Bultmann's conviction that this existential-historical way of speaking

10. Friedrich Gogarten: *Demythologizing and History*, E. T. by Neville Horton Smith (London: S.C.M., 1955), pp. 68–9.

is the only one which does justice to the nature of the events of redemption, and that this is therefore the way in which the Gospel is to be preached.

Clearly it is important for the evangelist to know in which of these three ways he is to speak of the happenings recorded in the Bible; and we shall go on to deal with this question by noting what advantages follow if we adopt the point of view espoused by the Demythologisers.

(i) One advantage of this way of looking at things is that our preaching of the Gospel does not obscure the fact that the New Testament bears the marks of its own age and culture. Because it is the understanding of existence disclosed in the New Testament, and not its particular manner of describing it, which is our concern, we can say quite frankly in our preaching of the Gospel that the framework of thought used by the Biblical writers is different from ours, and that ours is demonstrably a more accurate one.[11] Thus to see the New Testament in its own age and culture enables us ourselves to see, and to have in mind when we are seeking to win others for Christ, just where lies the "offence" which properly is inseparable from the Gospel. When we appreciate that many things recorded in the New Testament are part of a framework of thought commonly accepted in the first century, we see that any difficulty which our contemporaries have in accepting these things cannot be the *skandalon* of which the New Testament speaks. The real *skandalon* of the Gospel, Bultmann says, is never the unintelligibility of any given concept; it lies in the revelation itself.[12]

(ii) A second point in favour of this way of looking at things is that it enables us to preach the Gospel without suffering any qualms concerning what scholarship says of the Bible. There is no boundary, self-determined or determined by ecclesiastical authority, beyond which one may not go. Investigation of the documents can proceed without any fear that radical conclusions concerning authorship or historicity will lead to a denial of important doctrines of the faith. For all such investigation, on this view, can touch only the objective-historical; it cannot affect the existential-historical, which is known only in my experience here and now.

(iii) It may be said in favour of the view espoused by the school of Demythologising, thirdly, that it justifies us in giving consistent expression to a practice in which we all engage to some extent. Who has not, in his preaching from the Book of Jonah, suggested that it is not absolutely

11. Part of this view's attraction at this point lies in the fact that, while pointing to the inaccuracies of the first-century framework of thought, and its inadequacy as a medium for the communication of the Gospel today, it does not insist upon our declaring that framework of thought to be entirely without value. This is one of the differences of this view from liberalism with which, at this particular point, it seems to have a good deal in common; the liberal theologians declared the mythological framework in which the New Testament sets the kerygma to be of no value at all, and indeed to have been from the beginning a factor leading to distortion of the Gospel message. The Demythologisers, on the other hand, say that, though no longer acceptable, it has had its value and (if it be rightly interpreted) it still has its value.

12. *Kerygma and Myth*, p. 91. He warns against "confounding the stumbling-block of mythological language with the real *skandalon* of the cross, the exegetical problem with that of faith" (*ibid.*, p. 109).

necessary to believe that a man did in fact spend three days in the belly of a great fish in order to apprehend the truth which the writer of the book wished to drive home? Who has not, in preaching on the Ascension, suggested that it is not absolutely necessary to believe that Jesus did in fact, by some species of levitation, move perpendicularly from the earth, in order to apprehend the truth that Christ now reigns with the Father? These and other things we have all said, and in saying them have been far from imagining that we were robbing the Bible of its message, or depriving the events of redemption of their historicity or their uniqueness. We have on the contrary been of the firm opinion that we were making the essential message of the Bible more intelligible. The view of Bultmann and his fellows has the advantage of showing why we may remove things from the Bible in this way without detracting from its message. Where it may differ from what we have been doing is that, whereas we have more readily applied such a method to the Old Testament than to the New, and have been led to it largely by factors external to the Bible, we are now called upon to apply it to every aspect of the New Testament, and to do so because of demands within the Christian faith itself.

(iv) It is a fourth commendable feature of this view, and another factor which should incline those engaged in the work of evangelism to embrace it, that its concern with existence demands that the Gospel be preached to modern man in his own situation, and in a way which shows it to be relevant to the things which concern him every day of his life. Probably we preachers are more to blame than we commonly realize for the incidence of "Sunday-only" religion, in that we have endeavoured to elicit from men and women an experience which we have expounded in an esoteric jargon, so that they are little to be blamed if they assume, either that such an experience is not and never can be theirs, or that it is an experience only to be enjoyed within the walls of a Church or when one is in a certain select company. If, however, we take to heart what the Demythologisers are striving to have us appreciate, we simply must proclaim the Gospel in a way that means something to men and women as they are now. Otherwise, Bultmann and his colleagues tell us, we are not really preaching the Gospel at all.

(v) What I have now said by way of commendation of this view has underlined the fact that it bears directly on a problem to which evangelists can hardly give too much attention, namely, the problem of communication —a problem which does not stop with the actual business, or technique, of communicating, but which involves the even more vital task of making plain what is to be communicated. And we may conclude this recital of things which commend the program of Demythologising to the evangelist by saying that it compels us to consider what things really are essential to the Gospel wherein we stand and which we seek to proclaim.

All this suggests that Bultmann and his colleagues have put before us something of great value, and that the acceptance of their point of view will enable the work of evangelism to proceed much less haltingly than it has of late. But before it is decided that we should speak of the events of

redemption only in an existential-historical way, I should like to draw attention to some factors which cause me to treat the proposal with caution.

(i) A first point at which Bultmann's proposal for Demythologising needs to be treated with caution is its failure to understand the nature of the existential-historical. I agree with the contention that the reciting of events in an objective-historical way is not a preaching of the Gospel. And I am also in agreement when it is said that argument on the mythological plane cannot suffice to bring a person to the point of appreciating the significance for his own existence of the events of redemption. My disagreement is with the implication that the existential-historical is somehow independent of these other two, because it seems to me that our apprehension of the existential-historical involves some acceptance of both the objective-historical and the mythological. And I consider that the work of evangelism demands recognition of this fact. An attempt to expound this point would involve more space than is here available, and my criticism on historiographical grounds must be left thus baldly stated. Something of its implications will appear, however, in what follows.

(ii) A second weakness is the tendency to set up what the modern man will accept as a criterion for determining what is essential to the Gospel. Let me make it plain that what I am criticising is a "tendency." I have already expressed appreciation of the concern which Bultmann shows for the problem of communication and the insistence upon our speaking to modern man in his own situation. These things I regard as very good things, and I do not wish to detract from their virtue. What I find unsatisfactory in Bultmann's presentation is his too great readiness to remove, without any real consideration of the reasons which may be brought forward for its retention, anything which modern man would find it difficult to accept. Bultmann says that a man's view of the world is already determined for him by his place in history, and that it can only be changed "when he is faced by a new set of facts so compelling as to make his previous view of the world untenable."[13] The point of my criticism is that a changed view of the world may be just what is necessary before a man can appreciate what the Gospel is about. And it may be that this changed view of the world will have to find a place for what modern man rejects as mythological! It does not follow as readily as Bultmann seems to imagine that if modern man finds the Gospel unintelligible, those who are proclaiming it have confounded it with mythological elements that are not essential to it. John McIntyre points out that we should expect any statement of the truth concerning Jesus Christ to exhibit something of the same mystery as His Person. "Any demythologisation which goes on the assumption that the divine can be separated from the human in the kerygma or in our restatements of it for our generation is committed to a denial of the Incarnation." If, in its human-ness, the Word is crucified at the hands of logical positivism, or of any attitude of modern man, then that is the price of incarnation—and of relevance.[14]

13. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
14. *Canadian Journal of Theology*, 2 (1956), p. 89.

It is, I repeat, a tendency in the application of a principle that I find unsatisfactory rather than the principle itself. A truly existential approach does not tell man *how* he is to exist, it simply tells him to *exist*; and the soundness of regarding as essential in the Gospel only what is relevant to man's situation cannot be denied. The point is that modern man does not necessarily understand aright what his situation is.

(iii) A third point at which the proposal for Demythologising needs to be treated with caution is the understanding of modern man which it discloses. What we have put before us, as the norm of that to which our preaching of the Gospel should be directed, is something which it is difficult to recognise as representative of the men and women about us—except, perhaps, a small minority.[15] Allan Barr remarks pertinently that there is a lack of proportion when an existentialist like Bultmann places emphasis on the scientific *Weltanschauung* of the man who has a wireless set, while he says nothing about what the man listens to.[16] Certainly most of the programs available to him (the type of which is almost entirely determined by public demand) do not seem to be directed at the sort of person whom Bultmann is anxious to satisfy.

Is modern man so averse to myth? Apart from the place allowed still, in this twentieth century, to non-transcendent myths,[17] there appears to be a general readiness to allow a place for the "other worldly" to enter into "this world," as is evidenced by such varied activities as the publication of columns which profess to give advice on the basis of astrology, the conviction that certain lottery-ticket agents are "luckier" than others, the readiness of political leaders to ask that prayers for rain be offered, the visits of thousands to healing shrines and the contemporary interest (not peculiar to ministers) in the therapeutic value of religion, in the physical sphere as well as the mental. And is there much likelihood of the sort of thing which Bultmann would put in the place of mythology finding acceptance? "If the Bible is remote from the thinking of men today, an existential analytic is even more remote," writes John Macquarrie. "Heidegger's work is difficult enough for anyone with a training in philosophy, and to the man in the street it must seem like a book sealed with seven seals. Yet a demythologised Bible, in which everything was translated into existential statements, could scarcely be less difficult." "Compare," he goes on, "the two statements, that man in his being is compounded of possibility and facticity, and that man was formed of the dust of the ground and into his nostrils was breathed the breath of life. We could certainly agree that to the trained mind the first of these statements is more exact than the second. But to the ordinary man of

15. Austin Farrer suggests about one man in five thousand, and adds: "but these, no doubt, are the leaven that leavens the lump, and many or few, they ought to be catered for" (*Kerygma and Myth*, p. 24).

16. *Scottish Journal of Theology*, 8 (1955), p. 82.

17. For instance, the Nazi myths of blood and soil. Both Ian Henderson (*Myth in the New Testament*, p. 54) and John Macquarrie (*An Existentialist Theology*, p. 167) criticise Bultmann for not including this type in his definition of "mythology," but this sort of mythology is simply not his concern.

the twentieth century the first statement would be unintelligible. He might misunderstand the second statement by taking it literally, but there is a reasonable chance that its relatively simple symbolism would still convey to his mind the intended meaning, without his having to master existentialist terminology. It would certainly seem far easier to convey the meaning to him by explaining the symbolic language of the Bible than by replacing that language by a new and more difficult way of speaking."[18] It could perhaps be argued that, to express the existential significance of the Biblical message, there is no need to use exclusively the language of the existentialist philosophers, but it has not yet been shown what other terminology we could employ in the program of Demythologising; and it is still the case that the understanding of modern man which Bultmann discloses should lead us to treat his proposal with caution.

(iv) It will have been recognized by now, I think, that my criticisms of this program follow the line of suggesting that it displays the defects of its virtues; it carries things too far. It is this same fault, in respect of the very activity which has given the movement its name, to which I refer in my last two points of criticism. The elaboration of these will serve as the epitome of all that I have to say.

According to Bultmann's own statements, the Demythologising which he is anxious to have carried through must be a complete one. "We cannot save the kerygma by selecting some of its features and subtracting others, and thus reduce the amount of mythology in it."[19] "The mythical view of the world must be accepted or rejected in its entirety."[20] "The degree of elabora- in any given piece of mythology is irrelevant for its classification as mythology."[21]

We may here observe a distinction to which Ian Henderson draws attention. "There is the interpretation whose completion enables us to dispense with the text interpreted. Thus, once a code message has been accurately deciphered there is no need to keep the original text for any other than record purposes. On the other hand there is the kind of interpretation which, however successfully carried out, is no substitute for the original. A sermon or a commentary on one of Shakespeare's plays may be ever so good. But no one—least of all the preacher or the commentator—will maintain that from now on it is immaterial if all the copies of the Biblical text or the play are destroyed." Henderson goes on to say, and I think he is right, that all the indications are that Bultmann intends the first—that "every myth in the Bible must be interpreted *without remainder* into statements which describe the narrator's understanding of his own existence."[22] What I want

18. *An Existentialist Theology*, p. 176.
19. *Kerygma and Myth*, p. 9.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*, p. 102; see also p. 109.
22. *Myth in the New Testament*, p. 31. Cf. the distinction which Allan D. Galloway makes between "the derivative symbols in which an act of faith is expressed and the archetypal symbol to which an act of faith traces its origin" (*Scottish Journal of Theology*, 10 [1957], p. 364).

to point out now is that a complete removal of mythology is not possible. Then I shall suggest that it is not in any case desirable.

(*a*) It is doubtful that we can dispense altogether with mythological terms even in discussion on the purely human plane. It is interesting to remember that Heidegger, whose philosophy, including his terminology, underlies so much that Bultmann has to say, makes use of a classical myth to elucidate the concept of care (*Sorge*) as that which unifies the three fundamental characters of inauthentic existence (possibility, facticity and fallenness). John Macquarrie aptly asks: "Is it merely by accident that at this critical juncture of his work, when he is concerned to put forward a comprehensive concept that will interpret the meaning of man's everyday existence, Heidegger has resort to a myth? Or is this a tacit acknowledgement that in the communication of the kind of knowledge which we call existential, the myth has its own indispensable function?"[23]

(*b*) Certainly, as I see it, there can be no avoidance of mythological language when God is to be spoken about. Bultmann admits, in his reply to Schniewind,[24] that "there are certain concepts which are fundamentally mythological, and with which we shall never be able to dispense—e.g. the idea of transcendence."[25] I cannot agree with him that "in such cases, however, the original mythological meaning has been lost, and they have become mere metaphors or ciphers."[26] Even as "mere metaphors or ciphers," they relate to concepts which are an attempt by human minds to comprehend that which ultimately is beyond their comprehension; unless we are content to leave them as completely incomprehensible (and therefore irrelevant to the understanding of human existence) we must either recognise these concepts or terms as themselves mythological, or explain their meaning in other terms which even more obviously fall into the same category.

(*c*) We cannot, in our preaching of the Gospel, carry out the complete Demythologising for which Bultmann seems to be calling because we cannot ultimately distinguish the "mythological" and the "existential-historical." Bultmann's desire to separate the two arises from two things. One is his objection to the line of thinking which tries to use the mythological as a basis from which to argue to the existential-historical: the line which would contend that the unusual character of certain happenings proves that they may serve as the basis for, or are themselves, the events of redemption. The other is his conviction that, since the mythological does not prove the existential-historical, there is no point in retaining it.[27] Actually, those whom Bultmann is attacking at this point make the same mistake as Bultmann himself—that of trying to separate two things that cannot be separated. Bultmann wants to separate them because he thinks that the mythological is a hindrance to the existential-historical. Those whom he is attacking want

23. *An Existentialist Theology*, p. 113; see also p. 175.
24. For Schniewind's criticisms on this score, see *Kerygma and Myth*, pp. 48–54.
25. *Kerygma and Myth*, p. 103.
26. *Ibid.*
27. Cf. Ian Henderson, *Myth in the New Testament*, p. 48.

to separate them because they think that the mythological is understandable and convincing without the existential-historical. As against Bultmann my point is that any person's experience of the existential-historical involves him inevitably in acceptance of what is characterised by Bultmann as mythological; as against his opponents, it is that if a person is not enjoying experience of the existential-historical, no amount of arguing on the mythological plane can be sufficient to prove it. In each case, it is not appreciated that an ultimate separation of the mythological and the existential-historical is not possible.

(*d*) We must say, again, that a complete Demythologising is not possible because we lack any criterion which would enable us to do what this program asks us to do. What is assumed throughout the Demythologising view is that the New Testament's presentation of the Gospel is a mixture of the kerygmatic essential and the mythological non-essential, and that we are in a position to distinguish the two. In fact, we have no sure criterion for doing so, and Bultmann and his supporters have not done much to provide us with one. As one writer puts it: "At worst, their *regula fidei* is the *kerygma* minus what conflicts with the *Weltanschauung* of 'modern man'; at best, it is that within the *kerygma* which is patient of existentialist interpretation."[28] In the more homely language of another, they have thrown out the kerygmatic baby with the mythological bath water.[29]

(v) (*a*) A complete Demythologising of the New Testament is not desirable because, as we have already seen, the result of such a Demythologising, according to the program presented to us, is a Gospel no more intelligible to the modern man than the "mythological" presentation of the Bible itself. (*b*) It is not desirable, again, because of its suggestion that we arrive at revelation (or, an understanding of the events of redemption) as the result of our interpretation of a set of observable data, instead of being brought to it by an interpretation of the data which is given along with the observation of them. There is involved here what John McIntyre calls "the final challenge put to dogmatic theology by the demythologisation controversy: are we sufficiently sure ourselves of the 'givenness of Revelation', of its factuality over against the theoretical quality which some of its expositors would assign to it, to be able to defend it in face of all attempts to reduce it to something less than itself?"[30]

I have been showing, in these last criticisms of the Demythologising view, that a complete removal of mythology from the New Testament is neither possible nor desirable. Now I must point out that Bultmann himself does not regard a complete Demythologising as necessary or desirable either. There is a point beyond which he will not go, and Macquarrie aptly applies to Bultmann a remark which Tillich made about Barth: that his greatness shows itself in his steadfast refusal to follow out his own ideas to the bitter

28. John McIntyre, in *Canadian Journal of Theology*, 2 (1956), p. 87.

29. I am unable to trace this statement to its source. Compare a somewhat similar statement by John Macquarrie (*An Existentialist Theology*, p. 96).

30. *Canadian Journal of Theology*, vol. 2 (1956), p. 91.

end.[31] If, then, a complete Demythologising is not possible, and in any case not desirable, and if even Bultmann himself does not attempt it, we have to ask what the program of Demythologising does in fact achieve.

What that program tries to do is what the Church has been attempting to do all down the ages. There has been, at each point, the need to show how certain happenings in the past are relevant for people in the present. And at each point the Church has sought to do this in terms understandable by the people to whom it preached—recognising, as it did so, that it was itself a child of its own day, and not possessed of a wisdom sufficient for it to determine finally that its presentation of the Gospel was without any admixture of error. It is the chief virtue of Bultmann and his Demythologising, and of the resultant controversy, that it has made us face up anew to this same urgent and perennial task in the mid-twentieth century. In its bringing forward of certain questions—What is myth? What is existence? What is history? and so on—it compels us to ask whether we really know the Gospel we preach, and whether we are really doing all that we can to present what is absolutely essential in it.

Some words of Bultmann himself may be quoted: "If the challenge of Demythologising was first raised by the conflict between the mythological cosmology of the Bible and the modern scientific world view, it at once became evident that the restatement of mythology is a requirement of faith itself. . . . Starting as it does from the modern world view, and challenging the Biblical mythology and the traditional proclamation of the Church, this new kind of criticism is performing for faith the supreme service of recalling it to a radical consideration of its nature."[32] Whether or not we agree with the answers he gives, Bultmann and his supporters, together with his critics, are making us ask the right questions.

31. *An Existentialist Theology*, p. 243.
32. *Kerygma and Myth*, p. 210.

Book Reviews

HARPER TORCHBOOKS

Cloister Library. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956–1959

The Harper Torchbooks series constitutes one of the most substantial and exciting series of paperbacks that I have seen in the field of religion and philosophy. Sixty titles have already appeared; the first in the series was Goodspeed's *A Life of Jesus*, and the last was Aldous Huxley's *The Devils of Loudun*. Every title is a well-known one; in fact, almost every book would be worth owning and reading. Most of the volumes are priced below $1.50; only a few of the larger volumes go as high as $1.95.

The brief notes below can give only an imperfect and fleeting impression of the genuine enjoyment I experienced during the last two months of reading.

Christ and Culture. By H. Richard Niebuhr. (TB 3), 1956. Pp. x, 259. $1.25.

The relation of Christ to culture has always been a central problem of Christians of every age. Prof. Niebuhr analyzes the problem historically under five typical answers which are *rejection* (1 John, Tertullian, Tolstoy), *accommodation* (Gnosticism, Abelard, Ritschl), *synthesis* (Clement of Alexandria, Thomas Aquinas), *dualism* (Paul, Marcion, Luther), and *conversionism* (Gospel of John, Augustine, Calvin, F. D. Maurice). This book is one of the most penetrating studies of the Christian's constant problem that has been written for many years. Every theologian attempting to speak to his generation ought to ponder it.

The Literature of the Christian Movement. By M. S. Enslin. (TB 6; being Part III of *Christian Beginnings*, pp. 203–533), 1956. $1.50.

Enslin's book immediately won wide acclaim when it first appeared in 1938 as a scholarly and comprehensive N.T. Introduction. It has been widely used as textbook for Seminary students throughout the English speaking world. Enslin's own positions are fairly radical. On the other hand, he discusses the pros and cons of his own theories as well as those of others with complete candour. For a clear and detailed discussion of modern critical opinions of N.T. scholarship up to the Second World War Enslin's book is still one of the best.

The Word of God and the Word of Man. By KARL BARTH. Transl. from the German by DOUGLAS HORTON (TB 13), 1957. Pp. 327. $1.65.

It was this book which first introduced Karl Barth to the English speaking world in 1928. To a theological age nourished on Mathews and Rauschenbusch this book must have spoken a barbarous tongue. Horton in his foreword to this edition speaks of "the surprise, the joy, the refreshment which it brought to an age characterized by a kind of desiccated humanism, almost empty of other-worldly content."

Undoubtedly these early addresses of Barth (1916 to 1923) would be rewritten by the Barth of today, but I for one would have them changed not a whit. The passionate intensity of the Yes and No of the gospel and the believing proclamation of the God of the Scriptures are as compelling to the reader of today as they were to the liberal of the twenties. To the rare reader who has not yet become acquainted with Barth personally, this might well be the book.

The Beginning and the End. By NICOLAS BERDYAEV. Transl. from the Russian by R. M. FRENCH (TB 14), 1957. Pp. xii, 256. $1.35.

Most theologians will know Berdyaev as one of the most brilliant and representative of modern Russian Orthodox thinkers. This work was his last; it appeared posthumously in 1952. In a sense it was fitting that he should crown his life with this work, since it sets forth more or less systematically his "eschatological metaphysics." Berdyaev discusses four problems in his book: that of knowledge and objectification, of being and existence, of being and creativity, and finally, that of history and eschatology.

It is difficult to characterize Berdyaev's views briefly. Every page yields some flash of insight, and his style is aphoristic, leaping without stated connections from one idea to another. Possibly Berdyaev himself best summarizes his own position. He states: "I define my own philosophy as being of the subject, of spirit, of freedom; as being dualistically pluralist, creatively dynamic, personalist and eschatological" (p. 51).

The Influence of Greek Ideas on Christianity. By EDWIN HATCH (TB 18), 1957. Pp. xxxvi, 360. $1.45.

Frederick C. Grant in a foreword to this edition of Hatch's famous book describes the book as belonging "in a select group of classic works of pure learning . . . works which age cannot wither nor time decay, but are permanent contributions to knowledge. . . ." Though the modern student will want to correct and revise some of Hatch's conclusions—notably the lack of emphasis on Judaism as the fountain head of early Christianity, and the overemphasis on the influence of the Greek mysteries—it is still a classic

work which no N.T. student can afford to overlook. Greek literature, rhetoric and philosophy were part of the world in which the Christian church developed, and Hatch has with meticulous care shown the strong impact these made on the developing church.

These lectures were delivered as the Hibbert Lectures for 1888, and after his death the following year were edited and published by his friend and colleague, A. M. Fairbairn.

Erasmus and the Age of Reformation. By JOHAN HUIZINGA. Transl. from the Dutch by F. HOPMAN (TB 19), 1957. Pp. xvi, 266. $1.50.

When this sympathetic study of the great Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus first appeared in 1924 in English translation one reviewer aptly said, "It is fitting that one of the greatest Dutch scholars of the twentieth century should interpret for us the greatest Dutch scholar of the sixteenth." No better judgment could be made of either Huizinga or Erasmus. The reading of Huizinga's *The Waning of the Middle Ages* some years ago was for me a treasured experience. His *Homo Ludens* is almost equally well-known.

That Erasmus was the greatest Dutch scholar of the early 16th century no one could conceivably deny. Huizinga presents a picture of a genius passionately devoted to *bonae litterae*, a child of the Renaissance, yet superficial, self-centred, vacillating, a lover of compromise, and impatient of anything which might hamper his freedom. Included in this volume are a well-chosen selection of letters from his voluminous correspondence translated from the Latin by Barbara Flower.

Moses: The Revelation and the Covenant. By MARTIN BUBER (TB 27), 1958. Pp. 226. $1.25.

Martin Buber is the outstanding Jewish philosopher-theologian-mystic of our day. Together with the late Franz Rosenzweig he translated the O.T. into German, a version famous for its beauty of style. Many books have resulted from his restless mind: on the Kingdom of God, on the Prophets, on the Psalms, as well as on philosophic matters. His book on Moses approaches the Moses story quite differently from earlier studies (e.g. those of Gressmann, Volz, and Beer). Buber does not accept documentary source analysis but rather follows the school of Kaufmann. He approaches the text as a mixture of history and saga, using what seems to me a purely subjective aesthetic criterion to disentangle the historical from the legendary Moses. The result is a book difficult to assess. It contains brilliant exegetical and theological insights seen through the eyes of a mystico-dialectic philosopher, but fitted into a historical picture. The book tells us much more of Buber's faith than it does of Moses!

Primitive Culture. By Sir Edward Burnett Tylor. Part I: *The Origins of Culture* (TB 33), 1958. Pp. xvi, 431. $1.75.
Part II: *Religion in Primitive Culture* (TB 34), 1958. Pp. xviii, 555. $1.95.

Every science has its parent, and Tylor is undoubtedly the father of modern anthropology. His work of almost 1,000 pages on primitive culture still remains the monumental work it was when it first appeared. Though never as popular as the more famous works of Frazer and Lévy-Bruhl, Tylor's theses still remain far more influential than those of Frazer and Lévy-Bruhl.

It was Tylor who first defined the concept of culture as the central province of the ethnographer. For Tylor Animism, or belief in spiritual beings, lay at the root of primitive religion. Later historians of religion, Marrett, Van der Leeuw, Cassirer, de la Saussaye, and others, have accused Tylor of oversimplification. Particularly after Codrington's famous book on Melanesian culture, published 20 years after Tylor's, has it been fashionable to speak of a pre-animistic or *mana* stage. It is, however, by no means certain that a *mana* culture is earlier; in fact, it can only be evidenced as existing side by side with a belief in souls or spirits.

That Tylor was the product of mid-Victorian England with its belief in necessary evolutionary progress is everywhere apparent in his great work. His work nonetheless remains a *sine qua non* for the historian of religion, a model in comparative method.

The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy. By Jacob Burckhardt. Transl. from the German by L. Geiger and W. Goetz. 2 vols. (TB 40, 41). Pp. xxxv, xv, 516. $1.35, $1.35.

Jacob Burckhardt's famous work on the Italian Renaissance first appeared exactly one century ago (1860), and has remained the standard interpretation of that great period. No other work has had so decisive an influence on Renaissance scholars, and even today, 100 years later, it has no peer.

The work consists of six parts: The State as a Work of Art, The Development of the Individual, The Revival of Antiquity, The Discovery of the World and of Man, Society and Festivals, and Morality and Religion. The volumes are illustrated by 234 well-chosen illustrations. To anyone interested in the world of Dante, Petrarch, the Medicis, Pico della Mirandola, the Borgias, Savonarola, and their contemporaries, the reading of Burckhardt will be a formative experience.

The Journals of Kierkegaard. Ed. and with an Introd. by Alexander Dru. (TB 52), 1959. Pp. 254. $1.45.

The Journals of Kierkegaard ranks along with the Confessions of Augustine as among the world's greatest introspective autobiographies. But whereas Augustine was filled with a sense of guilt forgiven, SK was ridden with a

melancholy which verged on madness. In the Journals one sees the struggle which SK continually had with himself, and with the masses of nineteenth century Danish Christendom. Christendom, he maintains, elevated the masses, but Christ came to save the individual. Reading these Journals is a frightening experience; no one enjoys being confronted so directly with an individual who believes himself like Elijah to be the only true worshipper left in the land, and who is constantly concerned with himself and his own state of mind.

Dogmatics in Outline. By KARL BARTH. Transl. from the German by G. T. THOMPSON (TB 56), 1959. Pp. 155. $1.25.

In the summer of 1946 right after the War Karl Barth gave a course of lectures to a group of students in the ruins of the Kurfürsten Schloss in Bonn. These were delivered without notes, but taken down in shorthand and published almost exactly as they were delivered. The oral style is quite apparent even in translation, as is the dramatic *Sitz im Leben* in which they were given. The result is Barth's multivolumed *Dogmatik* in miniature.

In many ways this is a better introduction to Barth's faith than is the *Credo*. The *Credo* is a series of studied, polished University lectures given in 1935 at Utrecht. In 1946 Barth spoke to students of a defeated nation which had exiled him in the fury of Naziism. These are an eloquent confession of personal faith, an example of Barth's own dictum concerning "theology as witness."

Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt. By J. H. BREASTED (TB 57), 1959. Pp. xxvi, 379. $1.95.

James Breasted delivered these lectures at Union Theological Seminary in New York almost 50 years ago, and it is a tribute to his genius that much of his brilliant analysis of the Pyramid Texts of 4,500 years ago is still valid today. Breasted sees in these mortuary texts the reflection of a solar faith which only in its later stages showed the imprint of their Osirianization. Breasted's book is a book of beginnings, of man's search for a life in the hereafter, for social justice, for a life acceptable to the gods. It is a sketch of man's first questionings of the good, and of his first attempt at monotheism. It is a moving account by the most brilliant Egyptologist this continent has ever produced of the theme of the book's title, and if later scholars might question whether ancient Egypt's religious thought can be traced in terms of a progressive development as Breasted did or not, it is still a classic to be read and pondered.

Buddhism: Its Essence and Development. By EDWARD CONZE (TB 58), 1959. Pp. 231. $1.35.

Informative books on this subject sufficiently popular for non-Buddhists to read are extremely rare. Conze, himself a Buddhist as well as a Buddhologist,

has given an excellent survey of Buddhism in this work. It is a far better book than that of Humphreys in the Penguin Series; in fact, it is the best available. Mr. Conze gives a good indication of the various schools of Buddhism: Hinayana, Mahayana, Bhakti, the Yogacarins as well as magical or Tantric Buddhism. The only thing that mars an otherwise first-rate book is the occasional heavy-handed and prejudiced excursions into N.T. origins and comments on modern society.

JOHN WM. WEVERS

Dept. of Near Eastern Studies
University of Toronto

Jeremiah: Prophet of Courage and Hope. By J. P. HYATT. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1958. Pp. 128. $2.00.

THE AUTHOR, professor of Old Testament at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, comes to his task with special qualifications. He has written on Jeremiah in such works as the *Encyclopedia Americana* and *the Encyclopaedia Britannica*, besides being responsible for the Introduction and Exegesis of Jeremiah in *The Interpreter's Bible.*

In this book the author addresses himself to the non-specialist reader, whose ideas about the Old Testament, about the prophets, and not least Jeremiah, are likely to be vague and confused. Accordingly his book falls into three parts: a preliminary sketch of Old Testament prophecy and of the times in which Jeremiah lived, an outline of his career as a prophet, and an exposition of his message.

Professor Hyatt has, on the whole, admirably succeeded in keeping his prolegomena brief and to the point, and in devoting the major part of his book to the prophet's career and message. While the introduction is competently handled, certain points might profitably have been touched upon without unduly expanding it. The author ought to have made it clear that a not inconsiderable number of those, whom their contemporaries regarded as "prophets", were in reality charlatans, and that within the pages of the Old Testament there is an increasing opposition between those prophets whose utterances were canonized, and the general run of professional prophets. This, at least, would prepare the reader for the clash between Jeremiah and his competitors. It might further have been stated that for most practical purposes it was exceedingly difficult to tell the authentic messenger of Yahweh apart from the self-deceived dupe or even the conscious deceiver. Instead, on pp. 16–17 the author gives the impression that dramatic symbols were the mark of the true prophet, and were not employed equally by the charlatan. Besides, the role of the disciples of the canonical prophets might have been noted. It is to them that we owe the preservation of the prophet's words; their work of annotation and supplementation has created the problem of distinguishing between the utterances of the original prophets and those of their equally inspired successors.

It may be noted how the author, in his chapter on the historical background of Jeremiah, makes use of the recently discovered *Chronicles of the Chaldaean Kings* edited by D. J. Wiseman. Some of his statements, however, are open to question, and are liable to confuse the reader. Thus he states that Josiah "was put to death by the Pharaoh" (p. 26), a possible inference from our sources, but not the only one.

As for Jeremiah's career, the author dates its beginning as 609 B.C., rather later than most authors. This rules out the identification of the foe "from the north" in the early prophecies as the Scythians, a question which he seems to leave open on p. 36. He makes much of Jeremiah's dependence upon Hosea and others of his prophetic predecessors (see p. 32).

In his discussion of the prophet's message the author is at pains to stress its positive aspects, and to make it plain that Jeremiah was no mere defeatist and pessimist who counselled submission to Babylon, but one who held out hope for the future, particularly by the promise of the "new covenant" in 31:31–34. Thus he seeks to overcome the impression of Jeremiah as "the weeping prophet," due, perhaps, in part to the prophet's more pessimistic utterances, but probably even more to the conventional ascription to him of the authorship of *Lamentations*. We may note his stress on the leading idea of Yahweh's *ḥésed*, which Jeremiah has in common with his great predecessor Hosea. It is a pity that the author should have rendered its pronunciation "*chéh-sed*," in view of the radical difference between the pronunciation of the Hebrew letter *ḥeth* and the English letters *ch*.

A commendable feature of the book is the author's "Suggested Chronological Arrangement of the Book of Jeremiah" which forms his Appendix I. This should materially assist the reader in passing from this book to the actual text of the prophet.

Despite minor flaws, the author has succeeded in giving the general reader a useful introduction to the prophet and his message. The book should be found useful not only for church and Sunday School libraries, but also for students in religious knowledge courses at the University level, not to mention the prospective theological student who is seeking to remedy his deficient knowledge of the Scriptures!

C. J. DE CATANZARO

Seabury-Western Theological Seminary
Evanston, Illinois

Reflections on the Psalms. By C. S. LEWIS. London: Geoffrey Bles (Don Mills: Collins), 1958. Pp. vii, 151. $3.00.

IN THIS book we find a series of personal impressions received by the author in his devotional reading of the Psalter. The purpose of the author is not to present a scholarly work, but rather to compare notes with other non-specialists. The writer claims to be an amateur in this field and intends his book for others who are also in this class.

The method of presentation is simple and straightforward. Certain "problem" concepts in the Psalms, such as judgement, the cursings, death, etc., are treated from the standpoint of Christian experience, often with almost startling results. A few examples might better illustrate this. The so-called cursings are developed into a penetrating call to self-examination. The author uses death in the Psalms as an illustration of how it is possible for a Christian to long for heaven and eternal bliss to such an extent that God is forced into second place. With regard to self-righteous men in the Psalms, the writer discusses the Christian's attitude to and avoidance of evil, without becoming repulsive himself.

In dealing with the importance of religion permeating the entire life of man, the author writes, "The most valuable thing the Psalms do for me is to express that same delight in God which made David dance" (p. 45). He eloquently emphasizes the truth that there is no room for "Sunday religion" in a Christian's life. Lewis also discusses the age-old problem of the separation of form and content in worship, with the external form often becoming the more important.

The textual basis for the book is the Coverdale translation with occasional modifications based on Moffatt. Because this work is based upon an English translation it sometimes falls prey to dubious interpretations. For example, the author makes much of the distinction between "right" and "righteous" in the Psalms, even though this distinction is not explicit in Hebrew.

The last forty pages of the book contain a study of interpretation of the Psalms, and scripture in general, by means of allegory. Dr. Lewis is certainly at home in this branch of study, as his other books indicate, but in this book the final section gives the impression of being an almost unrelated addition. This fact does not, however, destroy the value of his remarks.

The book in its entirety is written in the colourful style which has made the author famous, and in many places is thorough entertaining. Certainly both pastor and layman will be attracted by the presentation. This book is well worth the few hours required to read it, despite the fact that it does not advance Psalmodic studies. Here is a group of helpful reflections, not necessarily based on the Psalms, but useful nonetheless.

Regina, Saskatchewan — NORMAN E. WAGNER

The New Testament in Modern English. A Translation by J. B. PHILLIPS. London: William Collins Son & Co. Ltd. (Toronto: Geoffrey Bles Ltd.). Pp. xvii, 537. $6.00.

SOME YEARS ago, in an interview over the BBC, Mr. Phillips explained how he became a translator of the New Testament. During the war, when in London, he attempted to read the Epistles of the New Testament to a group of young people, and found that the language of the King James Version made very little sense to them. He began to translate from the Greek him-

self, using language they could understand. Mr. C. S. Lewis, greatly pleased with a copy of *Colossians* which Phillips sent him, urged him to "do the lot." The result was *Letters to Young Churches*, published 1947, and soon in the best-sellers' list. Requests came from many quarters urging him to carry on with the Gospels. "I felt a little diffident about this," he said, "because, although people wouldn't much mind my paraphrasing Paul and James and John, they might very well object to my paraphrasing what might be the actual words of Christ Himself." He did, however, follow the suggestion and in 1952 *The Gospels Translated into Modern English* was published. Later came the *Acts of the Apostles* under the title *The Young Church in Action*, and *The Book of Revelation*. Now the enterprise has been completed in the publication of this single volume combining them all as a translation of the complete New Testament in modern English.

The great success which has accompanied Mr. Phillips' work would seem to indicate that he has given a very large public what it wanted. The principles with which he worked are set out in the Foreword of this book. He has sought to communicate the meaning of the New Testament "in the language of the people today" and, so far as possible, "to produce in the hearts and minds of his readers an effect equivalent to that produced by the author upon his original readers." While frankly acknowledging how difficult a task this is, Phillips has succeeded to a very remarkable degree. He has raised, however, the old questions about translation, as others have done before him. When is a translation really a translation? To what extent is paraphrase permissible? How far may a translator go in interpreting the text? Answers differ very widely. Phillips himself admits the use of paraphrase, even its necessity at times, particularly in the Gospels where there is "extraordinary economy of phrase." Indeed in many passages he exercises considerable license in adding words not in the text, and dropping words that are there. Manifestly this is a dangerous practice for any translator. And yet the risk must be taken, Phillips maintains, since this is the only way to avoid stiff and unfamiliar "translator's" English, and to produce a version of Scripture intelligible to a modern audience. As for "interpretation," he accepts the use of this too, if it means "transmitting meaning from one language to another." One wonders, however, whether he completely avoids, as he so vigorously affirms, the intrusion of a "point of view."

Because of constructive criticisms offered, this full translation of the New Testament carries some revisions of the previous separate works. In addition, information concerning author, date, destination, purpose, and content of the various documents, which Mr. Phillips had helpfully introduced in the separate translations, is dropped from this work altogether. This is to be regretted, since the average reader of the New Testament knows far too little about these matters. Assessing the translation as a whole, however, there is little doubt that an impression of the New Testament as a group of writings issuing from the life of a young and thoroughly active and enthusiastic Christian community is conveyed extremely well.

One would scarcely recommend this translation as a final court of appeal for the New Testament scholar. Phillips' method, it would seem, worked best in the Epistles, but with considerably less effectiveness in the rest of the New Testament, reaching its minimum of result, as one might expect, in the Apocalypse where he has not "done much beyond removing some of the obscurities of archaic language." Having said this, however, one must be fair to our translator and say further that he has put the average New Testament reader, with no pretension to scholarship, greatly in his debt. And quite often, with a turn of phrase, or a slight paraphrase, he conveys the meaning of a passage with remarkable accuracy where, in more formal translations, recourse to a commentary would be necessary. One cannot but praise this aspect of his work which so frequently illumines even the best of translations.

ELIAS ANDREWS

Queen's Theological College
Kingston, Ontario

A Commentary on the Gospel according to St. Luke. By A. R. C. LEANEY. London: A. & C. Black (Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada) and London: SPCK (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre), 1958. Pp. xii, 300. $5.00.

THIS THIRD volume in the series of Black New Testament Commentaries places Luke firmly in the ranks of the "theologians" as a self-conscious moulder of the tradition to his own ends. He is the last of the evangelists to be accorded this honour. In 1930 William Manson could still write: "Luke is less intellectual and less theological than Matthew"; and the most he would allow was that Luke was "not primarily an historian but an exponent of the 'gospel' in history." Intervening development has been swift. Mr. Leaney offers in his introduction a useful assessment of recent studies and contributes some solutions of his own for questions of detail and for a fuller understanding of the gospel as a whole.

The central and most stimulating contention of the commentary makes the gospel's theme "the reign of Christ, how it is established, how it must be maintained" (p. 34). The author holds that just as Acts constitutes an apologia for the aims and methods of the infant Church so the gospel seeks to expound the nature of our Lord's universal kingship. He presents an impressive case for Luke's preoccupation with the royal, not to say imperial, stature of Jesus from the birth narratives straight through to the Passion and its sequels. Most important is the connection which is argued between this theme and the Lucan eschatology. The Ascension represents a full assumption of kingly glory which outshines the coming in glory of the Son of Man in the other synoptics.

If space had permitted, attention might have been drawn to the parallelism here with the Fourth Gospel. Luke comes very close, as Mr.

Leaney seems to realize, to equating crucifixion with glorification. Similarly the eschatology of the two gospels could be shown to be strongly alike despite obvious differences in setting and diction. And indeed our Lord's reply to the disciples' question about the restoration of the kingdom to Israel in Acts 1:6–8 virtually summarizes the language as well as the doctrine of the Johannine farewell discourses. In a relatively short commentary there may not be scope for this kind of discussion. But it is regrettable that the impression is given that Luke was acting gratuitously when it is said that he "has stamped his own form of eschatology" on existing material (p. 70). Since Luke and the Fourth Evangelist both modify, or clarify, the apocalyptic tradition with a substantial amount of agreement, is it not at least possible that both had access to firmer ground?

In this same connection Mr. Leaney has written a provocative long note on "The Days of the Son of Man." The plural "days" is not to be regarded, he thinks, as a mistake in translation but a significant alteration of the traditional conception in keeping with the evangelist's eschatology and with his theme of Christ as king. Not one "day" but a series of manifestations of glory—Transfiguration, Resurrection, Ascension, the appearances to Stephen and Paul, leading to a final consummation—is the Lucan eschatological pattern. Here again the similarity to the recurring "hour" of St. John might be urged. It is curious that Mr. Leaney does not include the outpouring of the Spirit among the "days". Earlier he has stated that "although Luke does not equate Pentecost with Parousia, . . . the coming of the Spirit to the Apostles is an essential stage for the coming of the kingdom" (p. 61).

The latter observation stands in a fairly full and highly illuminating examination of the Lucan text of the Lord's Prayer. Mr. Leaney thinks that the reading "May thy Holy Spirit come upon us and cleanse us" is what Luke actually wrote and that it may, though a variant, be dominical. The interesting conclusion reached is that "the Lord's Prayer was one of the influences which formed Luke's conception of the Holy Spirit rather than that his form of the Lord's Prayer has been formed by that conception" (p. 62).

Among the stimulating short studies in the introduction, the one on the rejection at Nazareth deserves mention. An examination of the motives which may have led Luke to substitute his version of the incident for Mark's reveals the consistency of the viewpoint which the writer of Luke-Acts held with regard to the Gospel's promulgation. He comprehends the mutual rejection by the Lord and the old Israel, a motif which receives an equivalent emphasis elsewhere only in the Fourth Gospel. This review has called attention to several parallels of this sort. They seem to go deeper than can be accounted for by independent access to common material of a narrative kind. Mr. Leaney acknowledges agreement with Mr. J. N. Sanders' hypothesis regarding a tradition shared by the two evangelists. The possible doctrinal content of this source would be equally worth attention.

The commentary proper is fully as valuable as the introductory matter,

and a model of clarity with compression. The literal translation of the text is precise and provides a strong adjunct to the exposition.

Blake Wood

St. John's College
Winnipeg

Steps to Christian Understanding. Edited by R. J. W. Bevan. London. Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1958. Pp. xii, 212. $3.00.

The editor of this book of essays teaches Scripture in a Technical High School in Britain, and he aims to offer an intelligent and intelligible introduction to the Christian faith for laymen whose training has not prepared them to grapple with theological problems. To this end he has obtained contributions from twelve notable Christian scholars: W. R. Matthews, Henry Balmforth, S. H. Hooke, C. A. Coulson, Norman Snaith, David Cairns, Herbert Butterfield, S. P. T. Prideaux, F. W. Dillistone, Percy Hartill, J. E. Fison, and Nathaniel Micklem.

The aim is admirable. The plan of the book (*God and the World—God and Man—Doctrines of the Christian Faith*) is sensible. The eminent names rightly inspire confidence. Yet the final result is not altogether satisfactory.

To begin with, some of the contributors are visibly fretting at their narrow room and finding no solace in their scanty plot of ground. Phrases such as, "We have no space to discuss . . ." or "I cannot here survey . . ." chime too often for the reader's comfort. A guide who is always saying that he has to hurry on is not the kind of person who best holds interest and quickens curiosity. But what really stands out disturbingly is the want of harmony between the different essays. This extends even to style. At one time we are offered the academic stolidity of, "The inquiry into the nature of faith and its relation with reason would take us into a wide field and we must limit ourselves to a brief statement of certain theses, which may at least direct reflection to the salient points." At another time, however, we meet the at-all-costs-don't-be-dull chattiness of, "They made no bones about it: the popular idea of the 'day of the Lord,' the Day of Yahweh, was absolute rubbish." Perhaps the intention is to meet all tastes. All the same, a policy of attack at various levels ("one sure, if another fails") runs counter to the editor's declared ideal of providing enlightenment by means of logical steps. And the essays are not merely various in dress; they share no common apologetic ground. Thus Dr. Micklem, coming in at the end to sum up, is plainly at a loss to find any community of purpose in what has gone before and is forced to introduce what is, in effect, a new justification of Christian truth.

On occasion the essays even pull against one another. For instance, in the section dealing with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit it is stated that, "the Spirit who moved upon the waters at creation was the same Spirit who descended upon Jesus in the waters of baptism." Now the reader of this

sentence has been told earlier in the book how the movement on the waters in the Biblical account of creation can very easily be interpreted as an ordinary wind having nothing divine about it at all. His confidence in Christian theology as a dependable science can hardly be increased if he tries to accept both statements at their face value.

Taken separately, most of the essays possess sober merit. There is plenty of sound scholarship—that goes almost without saying—and some skilful outlining of complex issues. In this small volume there is so much that is admirable and so little that we would wish away. Yet there is also a lack of salt in the pot. The contributors present their convictions but hardly their enthusiasms. An exception is Professor Coulson who writes with unlimited zest (though with some theological fogginess) on "God the Creator." And Dr. Snaith, expounding "The Idea of Revelation in Religion," links revelation with personal conviction in a refreshingly straightforward way. In contrast, Canon Prideaux's account of "The Person of Jesus Christ," with its *a priori* argument for the Incarnation, is strongly reminiscent of the eighteenth century. "True, the intervention involved some departure from the natural order, but some departure was needed and this was the best possible"; as we read we can almost imagine that a Christianized Pangloss is instructing a latter-day Candide. The same essay also states, with no qualification whatever, that, "it is a fact of history that wherever the Church has been established it has progressively reduced social evils and purged society, lessened war and oppression, helped races and groups to live in peace and mutual help." Even a Candide would find this fact a little hard to digest; and there are few Candides around today.

KENNETH HAMILTON

United College
Winnipeg

The Gospel of the Incarnation. By GEORGE S. HENDRY. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press (Toronto: The Ryerson Press), 1958. Pp. 174. $3.75

THIS BOOK attempts to analyze and combat the "fragmentations of the Gospel" that historically have dogged the steps of theology from alternating or oscillating views of the being and work of Christ. Positively it offers the principle which its writer believes can restore to the Gospel its pristine unity. The fragmentation known to history is the one that divides the Athanasian form of Christology, seen by Harnack as having erased most of what recalls the historical Jesus, and the eighteenth and nineteenth century historical research which centred all in the "Jesus of history" and relegated to theological exile the "Christ of faith" of the Catholic Creeds. Our author finds this division superseded from a truer understanding of the Jesus of history, and he makes his own special concern the separation of Incarnation and Atonement by the several emphases of Eastern and Western Churches, his

great thesis being that unification of these is to be had through what lay between Bethlehem and Calvary, the historical life of the incarnate Christ. It is here that "the task of theological integration must be taken up" (p. 31).

It is a clue to our author's distinctive thought that he does not regard the Chalcedonian consubstantiality of Christ with man as the medium for safeguarding or establishing the actuality of Christ's historical life with the meaningfulness his theory would attach to it. Consubstantiality connotes the manhood of Jesus but without indicating His human existence in the concreteness of personal relations. "The Gospel of the Incarnation is to be seen, not in Christ's consubstantiality with us, but in His co-existence with us . . . He saves us, not merely by the constitution of His person, but by the life He lived among us" (pp. 166, 7).

This does not mean that we are again given the choice of the Divine Author of Salvation who accomplished His mission through death and resurrection, and the sublime Prophet and Teacher whose excellence it was to have patterned His own life on the maxims He taught. The "life lived among us" was the *incarnate* Life, which cancels any such alternative; the failure of the "Jesus of history" movement lay in that it missed this character in the Life it helped to rediscover. The incarnate Life has the meaning for God's redemptive action that has often been attributed exclusively to the sacrifice of the Cross. Our author's expression of it is that Jesus as God incarnate was "the man for other men" who came into personal relations with them to bear and bestow God's forgiveness. Forgiveness as God's appointment for men can have reality only in a personal relationship (p. 142). In Christ, God assumed this relationship; whence the Incarnation is Gospel, the Gospel of forgiveness—Incarnation, however, not as formal *assumptio carnis*, but in its cohesion with all consequent upon it in God's presence with men to counter and annul their sin through reconciling them to Him.

One question this will incite is whether this identifying of Atonement with the incarnate Life incurs the danger of taking from the Death of Christ some of the decisiveness the New Testament seems generally to ascribe to it. Many will find our author at this point not wholly convincing. He stresses the necessity of the Death and that it was undertaken freely by Christ as the self-oblation required of Him; but he does so on this ground: "The encounter of divine grace and human sin has the nature of a collision, and as such it necessarily involves suffering. The Cross marks the climax of this suffering. . . .The death of Christ is of truly decisive significance, not because He wrought salvation for us by it alone, but because it was the end and fulfilment of His life. In His death He finished the work it was the mission of His incarnate life to perform" (pp. 142, 3).

This thought is repeated in the book: the death of Christ as "culmination" or "consummation" of the life. But is not this a little aside from the way the New Testament sees the Death as momentous of itself? The New Testament certainly links Christ's life and death; His sinless life: He knew,

and did no sin; His death: He was made sin for us, Himself bare our sins (II Cor. 5:21; I Peter 2:22, 24). But this makes the life and death of Christ appositional or coördinate rather than the second being relative as "climax" of the other. The death was efficacious in being the death of Him whose life was divinely perfect; yet its efficacy was to a real degree its own. Our author's zeal for integration or the total fact of Christ is highly commendable and timely; the "fragmentations" have been as mischievous as he holds. Yet the mystery of the being of Christ as lying in our perspective permits a direct or even stark reality to His death that is not quite comprehended in the thought of the life as also having its fulness of meaning in it; so that crave unity as we may, it still may be that through polarity of truth we come closest to this mystery.

There is more in this book to reward the reader than can be compassed in a short review. The author writes illuminatingly on the Holy Spirit and the Church in portraying *their* necessity to the ends of the Incarnation. He examines traditional theories of the Atonement to the reader's profit; though we may comment again that the notion of "Sacrifice," so important for these theories, does not seem to us to have quite the place in his own work that belongs to it, not in these theories but what is more essential, in New Testament teaching. Some might regard this lack of stress on Sacrifice as chiefly verbal under the terms of the author's special emphasis. One of the rich features of this book comes out of the way in which its writer applies his very thorough historical knowledge. His insights into the true and the inadequate in those who have laboured in the field before him, Anselm, McLeod Campbell, Moberly and many others, issue in judgments that are sometimes startling and always enlightening. A likeness in his own doctrine to the classical soteriology detracts nothing from his originality. If to speak of an author's effort as "breaking new ground" has not become too trite, the phrase is as apt in this instance as any that comes to mind.

J. Line

Emmanuel College
Toronto, Ont.

The Reality of the Church. By C. Welch. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons (Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders & Co. Ltd.), 1958. Pp. 254. $4.75.

Those who have read this author's notable study of the doctrine of the Trinity in contemporary theology will already have been impressed by the theological competence therein displayed. This same quality is abundantly evident in this volume. Indeed, the reviewer is tempted to indulge in superlatives. In the long and somewhat wearisome debate concerning the nature of the church in recent years, he has longed to hear certain things said clearly and unambiguously. Here they are said. Many of the current clichés about the church as the continuation of the Incarnation and certain deductions

from such phrases as "the body of Christ" are here subjected to careful and in some cases thoroughgoing criticism. However, it would be a mistake to give the impression that this book is good simply because the reviewer likes certain things in it. It is by any standards a remarkable piece of theological writing.

The first major point made by the author is that our thinking about the church must include the fact that it is the people of God, the colony of heaven, the royal priesthood, God's planting, the body of Christ and at the same time a community involved in social and historical process. These sociological factors are not a mark of failure. They belong inevitably to any community which takes its rise from an act of God in history to which actual men and women respond in faith and love. This duality must always belong to the church as long as it exists in space and time. It has been said, for example at Lund in 1952, that the way to a fuller realization of our unity in Christ is not by considering our ecclesiastical divisions and differences but by returning to Christ. On this point the author gives us the timely warning that Christ, the living Lord, is indeed the source of real unity. Christology, if by that is meant the doctrine of Christ's Person, may prove as divisive as ecclesiology, a fact to which church history bears abundant witness.

The author then goes on to reject two current answers to the problem of the church's reality. One is that the church is a voluntaristic association of individual believers for the mutual assistance of members in their private religious lives (p. 31). God first calls the individuals to faith, and then they organize the church. This does not do justice to the fact that the church not only ought to be but is the true Israel and the new Humanity (see chapter II on *The People of God*). The opposite error is the divinization of the historical faith, form and structures of the church. The church is not beyond the ambiguities and imperfections of human existence. Equally unsatisfactory is the view that the church is a purely "spiritual community," with the implication that it can have no institutional forms at all and remain the true church. On this point, Brunner comes in for some penetrating criticism. Welch calls this point of view a "docetism of the church" (p. 34); the church is not seen to have a proper human form at all. The often invoked distinction between the holy "invisible church" and the corrupt "visible church" is also turned down because it cannot be reconciled with the New Testament emphasis on the oneness and solidarity of the visible community as at once the body of Christ and a community of sinful men. Karl Barth is acquitted of making a distinction between the apparent and the actual church in terms of a Platonic essence and its image. For Barth, the "apparent" church becomes the real or actual church only through the work of the Holy Spirit. The author, however, evidently feels that this dynamism of Barth does not wholly do justice to the continuity of the church's existence in and through its historical forms.

What, then, is the church? Whatever else it is, it is a community of men

responding to the gracious act of God. Whether we emphasize that the church is a people called of God or an answering people, we have to do with concrete, earthly people who are responding (p. 44). Therefore, the church stands unequivocally on our side of the Creator-creature distinction (p. 43). The implications of this are worked out in a compelling manner to which a brief review cannot do justice. The conclusions reached are of decisive importance.

(1) The church is not Christ, or another Christ; it is not the Incarnation. Because the church is fully dependent on God's act, it is not simply God acting. It is a believing, worshipping, obeying and witnessing people (p. 48). In the author's language, the church's being as *congregatio* is meaningless apart from God's *convocatio*, yet the former must not be swallowed up wholly in the latter (p. 65). The humanness of the believing community belongs to the ontology of the church, its very being as such.

(2) It follows from this that such statements as "'the church is the continuation of the Incarnation" are open to serious objection. This objection is sustained in chapter III on the Form of the Servant by a brilliant discussion of traditional Christology which deserves a separate review in itself. The note on the historical Jesus is a balanced comment on recent tendencies. Though admitting that to call Jesus Lord is not the product of biblical research as such, what we mean by the Incarnation can only be indicated intelligibly if historical research can give us reliable knowledge of what Jesus said or did. This is relevant to all those who think that an orthodox Christology can be built on radical historical scepticism. The reviewer himself was pleased by the criticism of the doctrine of *anhypostasia* and *enhypostasia* (pp. 104ff.), even in their modern version in Dr. E. L. Mascall. Professor Welch is certain that "to be human means inescapably to be a finite subject of experience." Jesus was not only representative manhood. He was also a man, and no Christology is adequate which denies this. The difficulty in all the *anhypostasia* theories is a doctrine of transcendence of a spatial kind. This implies that the ontological presence of God somehow requires the absence of finite being. If God cannot be truly present, ontologically, in a concrete historical man, then equally He cannot be present in a church as a congregation of concrete, individual men without destroying their reality as persons in the divine community. The link here between the most subtle points of traditional Christology and the way we think of the church is clearly brought out and constitutes an extremely valuable contribution.

Yet we cannot draw a simple analogy between the divine-human Christ and the church. In Christ, the perfection is that of human life lived wholly in God. This is not the case with the church, which is not the Incarnation in the same sense. The polarity in the church between grace and sin is quite different from the divine-human unity in the one person of Christ. The servant-form of the church is not identical with the new humanity in Christ (p. 122). The church's holiness is not the same as the sinlessness of Christ. The church can never be properly called divine and it is nonsense to speak

of the members of the church as being involved in sin and yet to deny the church's involvement in it. Not only individuals, but churches fail. Very germane to this discussion is the treatment of the phrase "the body of Christ" in chapter V. A brief yet meaningful summary of the chapter is very difficult, if not impossible in a sentence or two. The key ideas are incorporation-participation. Welch refuses to admit that the term "body" must be taken literally when applied to the church. The phrase after all is a metaphor, just as building, vine, nation, bride. It may be an illuminating, perhaps an indispensable, metaphor but it is still a metaphor, or if you prefer, an analogy. This means that we are not justified in deducing conclusions from notions of physical organic unity. In the organism, its parts are not persons. In the "body of Christ," the individual parts are persons. The church is not, *pace* J. A. T. Robinson and E. L. Mascall, "the risen organism of Christ's person in all its concrete reality." (p. 181). Participation in Christ does not mean the loss of full personality by the members. The many are not swallowed up in the one. Grace is not a "thing" but the new structure in which we exist and this is thoroughly personal. We must also beware of interpreting the figure of the body in terms of "corporate personality."

Welch believes that the fixing of the precise bounds of the church is no longer of ultimate interest (p. 199). Christ is Lord of the world, not only of the church. His Lordship is not simply to be equated with the Headship of the church. The church is best described, not as the realm of redemption but as the sphere where reconciliation is acknowledged and Christ's Lordship accepted. This means that the Kingdom is present in the church but the church is not the Kingdom. Christ works both inside and outside the church and the boundaries of the church can never be drawn with finality. This does not mean that the church must not have order and discipline. It means that its discipline is not God's final judgment.

The last chapter on Christ, the Spirit and the Church shows two conclusions of far-reaching importance:

(1) The Holy Spirit remains Lord over the church. He is not domesticated by the church and His authority is not given over to the church. All doctrines that the Spirit is the "soul" of the church endanger that truth. Nor does the Holy Spirit replace or coerce the human spirit.

(2) What, then, of Word, sacrament and ministry? They are the concretely visible, historical means by which Christ gives Himself to be present to his church. "The ministry exercised in the whole life of the church and symbolized in a special function of ministering within the church is grounded in Christ's own ministering and determined by the form of his ministry" (p. 234). Participation in Christ is not simply a "vertical" and immediate or non-historical sharing in the new life in Christ. It is also an inseparable relation to Christ through historical process. On the other hand, any attempt to concentrate exclusively on the efficacy of sacramental act or the doctrinally correct word or the form of the ministry as "in themselves" means of grace justifies the "spiritualist" protest, i.e., the protest against all forms in favour of the direct working of the Spirit.

This chapter is full of searching comments on matters of great controversy. The continuity of the church is in the whole body, not in the ministry as such. The peculiar authority and office of the apostle is not transferable because he is uniquely related to historical event by being a witness of the resurrection. The authority of the ordered ministry is only functional and relative. The "marks" of the church are not only Word, sacraments and ministry but the special gifts of individuals and groups and the *agape* which is manifest in the whole. Certain distinctive features of the church's reality can be given a permanent structure (i.e., institutionalized) but they can never be made absolute. The Spirit remains Lord of the church, and the distinction between *esse* and *bene esse* is unscriptural and dangerous, for it suggests that the Spirit has wrought in the church a finite form no longer subject to the corruption of sin and therefore irreformable (p. 244). The Kingdom is indeed announced in the church and present in the church but the church is not the Kingdom. This means that the church must ever be open to new ways of form and freedom in which the Spirit will move to bring the whole creation into subjection to Christ.

That this book is a very considerable contribution to the modern discussion concerning the nature and reality of the church is evident. It is refreshing to find such a clear grasp of the church, not only as "institutionalized" (though there is no tendency to deprecate the reality and importance of the historical forms), but as a responding and witnessing community over which the Spirit is still Lord and freely active.

R. F. Aldwinckle

McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario

Divorce and Re-Marriage in Anglicanism. By A. R. Winnett. London, Toronto: The Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. xii, 284. $5.75.

This book provides an introduction to a difficult subject based on an objective historical survey which will be of great value to students. It presents a picture of what actually has been thought and said and done in reference to re-marriage after divorce from the Reformation period. An introductory chapter on the medieval background shows how the Anglican Church of that period inherited the doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage, though many reformers were prepared to find scripture authority for the occasional dissolution of marriage for serious cause.

The case of Henry VIII is taken under consideration, and it is pointed out that this was what we would call today an annulment, not a divorce. "Divorces," as they were then called, were given by the church courts, and are allowed for in the Canons of 1604; but they were in the nature of a separation from bed and board, not including permission to marry a second time. In the meantime other opinions were expressed, and anomalous cases did occur.

Dr. Winnett then plunges into the seventeenth century, and shows how what he calls a "non-indissolubilist" position existed alongside of the traditional "indissolubilist" position, the parties on both sides deriving their arguments mainly from scripture. Particularly interesting is the chapter entitled "The Wavering Position of William Laud," which is followed by a chapter on Bishop Cosin and the Roos case, in which this famous Bishop of Durham argued that remarriage is permissible after divorce for adultery, a position which is defended of course by reference to Matthew 5:32 and 19:9. In 1670 a bill was brought before parliament to enable Lord Roos to marry again after the divorce of his wife on the grounds of adultery; all the bishops but two opposed this bill, which, however, was passed.

During the eighteenth and early nineteenth century the obtaining of such permission to re-marry after divorce for adultery, by means of a special Act of Parliament, became the regular procedure, in the face of continued protests, the principle still being to allow re-marriage to the "innocent party."

A new period began with the passing of the Divorce Bill of 1857, which set up a regular Divorce Court. At the same time the strictly "indissolubilist" position (which had always been represented in the church) gathered strength. The Tractarian Movement had become an influential force, and its spokesmen were widely supported in the church on this point.

The chapters which bring down the story to the present day will be studied with great interest. These include the opinions expressed by successive Lambeth Conferences, as well as the positions taken up by leading scholars, bishops, and churchmen. At the beginning of the twentieth century we begin to find the new discipline of biblical criticism taken into consideration, and it becomes possible for a theologian of the catholic type, like Bishop Gore, to take the view that the exceptive clause in Matthew represents a serious modification of Christ's own teaching.

The whole matter is a serious one for the Anglican Communion, and Dr. Winnett carries on his study down to the time of writing. No attempt at a summary could be made in this review; but the book can be recommended to all those who are interested in the present position of Anglicanism on the subject throughout the world. Two principal points of view present themselves. In England it is strongly felt that no second marriage can be celebrated in a church; on the other hand the custom has grown up of holding a service of blessing in church, in some cases, for those who have entered into a second marriage before a civil authority. On the other hand the Church in the United States has a canon under which a bishop is enabled to investigate such cases as are referred to him, and to authorize a second marriage in church, where he is satisfied that no marriage bond as recognized by the church exists; that is to say, it is a procedure which resembles that of annulment, though it admits to consideration factors which appear in the marital union after the marriage has been solemnized. The text of these American canons is supplied.

The book is well equipped with bibliography, references, and footnotes, so that it is possible for the student to carry his researches further. In the Anglican Church of Canada, any second marriage is specifically forbidden so long as the previous partner is still living. It seems likely that Canadian Anglicans will want to make a new study of the whole question in the light of the practice in England and the United States and elsewhere; and this book can be recommended to serious students as an invaluable introduction. The study also deals with the question of the admission to communion, and to other ministrations of the church, of such persons as have remarried after divorce, and are sincerely anxious to establish a Christian home.

PHILIP CARRINGTON

Bishopthorpe
Quebec

BOOK NOTES

The HOLY BIBLE; *The Berkeley Version in Modern English*, under the general editorship of G. VERKUYL. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan Publishing House (Toronto: Evangelical Publishers), 1959. Pp. viii, 944, 289. $6.95.

MANY READERS will be familiar with the Berkeley version of the New Testament which first appeared in 1945. The version of the Old Testament which now appears together with it was the joint product of a company of scholars mainly from various theological seminaries in the U.S.A. Explanatory notes are added in footnotes, many of which are literal renderings of the Hebrew, though many of them are exegetical, or even homiletical, observations. Numbers are throughout shown in Arabic numerals. The KJV and RSV usage with respect to the tetragrammaton is usually followed (i.e. LORD in small caps). It is rather surprising then to find in Ps. 8:1,9 (EVV) the words *yhwh 'dnynw* rendered by "Jehovah, our LORD." Surely the word *'dny* should not be emended to *yhwh*!

The Dead Sea Community: Its Origin and Teachings. By K. SCHUBERT. Transl. by J. W. DOBERSTEIN. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. Pp. xii, 178. $3.75.

ANOTHER BOOK on the Qumran Scrolls is hardly headline news today. Almost everyone in the Old Testament field—and in the New Testament field as well for that matter—has authored at least one article or book on some aspect of Scroll study. A book by Schubert on the subject is news

however. He has been one of the most serious and competent European students of the documents from the time of their discovery. This book of his is certainly worth reading for its concise and clear discussion of the teachings and practices of the Qumranis and of the relations between their writings and those of the New Testament and of Rabbinic Judaism.

An Idiom-Book of New Testament Greek. By C. F. D. MOULE, 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd.), 1959. Pp. xii, 246. $3.15.

MOULE'S extremely useful book of grammatical notes (the term "idiom-book" is a most unfortunate misnomer) on New Testament Greek first appeared in 1952 and immediately won wide recognition. The second edition is really not a fully revised edition but rather a reprint with a number of pages of "Notes and Corrections" gleaned from reviewers and critics added at the end of the text. A few corrections have been incorporated into the main text as well.

J.W.W.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Inclusion of title in this list neither ensures nor precludes subsequent review in this journal.)

BAILLIE, D. M. *Out of Nazareth: A Selection of Sermons and Lectures*, ed. by J. BAILLIE. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons (Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders & Co. Ltd.), 1959. Pp. 211. $4.00

BEARE, F. W. *The Epistle to the Philippians (Black's New Testament Commentaries)*. London: Adam and Charles Black (Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Can., Ltd.), 1959. Pp. xii, 182. $3.25

BERRY, W. G. *This Incredible Thing—Evangelism.* Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1959. Pp. x, 32. $1.00

BOSC, J. *The Kingly Office of the Lord Jesus Christ*, transl. by J. K. S. REID. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co., Ltd.), 1959. Pp. 166. $3.50

CHADWICK, H., ed. *The Sentences of Sextus: A Contribution to the History of Early Christian Ethics (Texts and Studies: Contributions to Biblical and Patristic Literature.* N.S. V). Cambridge: University Press (Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Can. Ltd.), 1959. Pp. xii, 194. $5.00

CHALMERS, R. C. AND IRVING, J. A. (eds.). *Challenge and Response: Modern Ideas and Religion.* Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1959. Pp. x, 130. $3.50

COME, A. B. *Human Spirit and Holy Spirit.* Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1959. Pp. 208. $4.00

DIEM, H. *Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence*, transl. by H. KNIGHT. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co. Ltd.), 1959. Pp. viii, 218. $4.75

EDDY, R. L. (ed.). *Pastoral Prayers through the Year: An Anthology by Contemporary Leaders and Teachers of American Protestantism.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons (Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders & Co. Ltd.), 1959. Pp. 191. $4.00

FERRIS, F. H. *The Perpetual Miracle: Studies in the Teaching of Jesus.* Indianapolis & New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd.), 1959. Pp. 192. $3.50

FROST, E. G. *This Jesus: Towards a Clearer Understanding of the Significance of Jesus Christ.* London: The Epworth Press, 1959. Pp. 132. 10s. 6d.

GILMOUR, G. P. *The Memoirs Called Gospels.* Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co. Ltd., 1959. Pp. xii, 299. $4.00

GOODING, D. W. *The Account of the Tabernacle: Translation and Textual Problems of the Greek Exodus* (*Text & Studies: Contributions to Biblical and Patristic Literature.* N.S. VI). Cambridge: University Press (Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd.), 1959. Pp. xi, 115. $3.85

GOTTWALD, N. K. *A Light to the Nations: An Introduction to the Old Testament.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. xxiv, 613. $6.50

GRIFFITH, A. L. *The Roman Letter Today* (*Saddlebag Books*). Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1959. Pp. 66. $1.00

HARRIS, E. *God's Image and Man's Imagination.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons (Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders & Co. Ltd.), 1959. Pp. xvi, 236. $4.00

HARRISON, P. M. *Authority and Power in the Free Church Tradition: A Social Case Study of the American Baptist Convention.* Princeton: University Press, 1959. Pp. xx, 248. $5.00

HEIM, K. *Jesus the Lord: The Sovereign Authority of Jesus and God's Revelation in Christ,* transl. by D. H. VANDAALEN. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co. Ltd.), 1959. Pp. x, 192. $4.00

The HOLY BIBLE: The Berkeley Version in Modern English. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House (Toronto: Evangelical Publishers), 1959. Pp. viii, 944, 289. $6.95

HOMRIGHAUSEN, E. G. *I Believe in the Church.* New York, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1959. Pp. 108. $1.50

HOOKER, M. D. *Jesus and the Servant: The Influence of the Servant Concept of Deutero-Isaiah in the New Testament.* London: SPCK (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre), 1959. Pp. xiii, 230. $5.50

JOSE, M. B. *Meditations at the Lord's Table.* Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1959. Pp. vi, 66. $1.50

KNOX, J. *Philemon Among the Letters of Paul: A New View of its Place and Importance.* Rev. ed. New York, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1959. Pp. 110. $2.00

MACGREGOR, G. *Introduction to Religious Philosophy.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959. Pp. xviii, 366. $2.95 (Paper bound).

MARITAIN, J. *The Degrees of Knowledge,* transl. under supervision of G. B. PHELAN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons (Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders & Co. Ltd.), 1959. Pp. xix, 476. $7.50

MASCALL, E. L. *The Importance of Being Human: Some Aspects of the Christian Doctrine of Man.* New York: Columbia University Press (Toronto: Oxford University Press), 1958. Pp. x, 118. $3.50

MICHALSON, C. *The Hinge of History: An Existential Approach to the Christian Faith.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons (Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders & Co. Ltd.), 1959. Pp. 256. $4.75

MOIR, J. S. *Church and State in Canada West: Three Studies in the Relation of Denominationalism and Nationalism, 1841–1867* (*Canadian Studies in History and Government* I). Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959. Pp. xv, 223. $4.75

MOULE, C. F. D. *An Idiom-Book of New Testament Greek,* 2nd ed. Cambridge: University Press (Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd.), 1959. Pp. xii, 246. $3.15

MOWINCKEL, S. *The Old Testament as Word of God,* transl. by R. B. BJORNARD. New York, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1959. Pp. 144. $2.75

MUDGE, L. S. *In His Service: The Servant Lord and his Servant People.* Philadelphia: The Westminster Press (Toronto: The Ryerson Press), 1959. Pp. 176. $3.00

MUELDER, W. G. *Foundations of the Responsible Society.* New York, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1959. Pp. 304. $6.00

MUNCEY, R. W. *The New Testament Text of St. Ambrose* (*Text and Studies: Contributions to Biblical and Patristic Literature.* N.S. IV). Cambridge: University Press (Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd.), 1959. Pp. lxxviii, 119. $5.50

OATES, W. E. *The Revelation of God in Human Suffering.* Philadelphia: The Westminster Press (Toronto: The Ryerson Press), 1959. Pp. 143. $2.75

PAYNE, R. *The Holy Sword: The Story of Islam from Muhammad to the Present.* New York: Harper and Bros., 1959. Pp. xvi, 335. $6.00

PELIKAN, J. *The Riddle of Roman Catholicism.* New York, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1959. Pp. 272. $4.00

PEROWNE, S. *The Later Herods: The Political Background of the New Testament.* New York, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1958. Pp. xvi, 216. $6.50

PEROWNE, S. *The Life and Times of Herod the Great.* New York, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1956. Pp. 187. $5.50

POLLARD, A. AND HENNELL, M. (eds.). *Charles Simeon (1759–1836): Essays Written in Commemoration of his Bi-Centenary by Members of the Evangelical Fellowship for Theological Literature.* London: SPCK (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre), 1959. Pp. 190. $4.20

ROBINSON, J. M. *A New Quest of the Historical Jesus* (*Studies in Biblical Theology* no. 25). London: SCM Press (Toronto: The Ryerson Press), 1959. Pp. 128. $2.00

RUSHDOONY, R. J. *By What Standard? An Analysis of the Philosophy of Cornelius Van Til.* Philadelphia: The Presb. and Reformed Publishing Co., 1959. Pp. ix, 209. $3.95

SCHOFIELD, G. *The Purple and the Scarlet: A.D. 39–115, the Historical Sequel to the New Testament.* London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd. (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co. Ltd.), 1959. Pp. 222. $3.25

SCHUBERT, K. *The Dead Sea Community: Its Origin and Teachings*, transl. by J. W. DOBERSTEIN. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. Pp. xii, 178. $3.75

SCHUTZ, R. *Vivre l'Aujourd'hui de Dieu.* Taizé: Les Presses de Taizé, 1959. Pp. 144

SHAW, I. P. *Nationality and the Western Church Before the Reformation.* London: SPCK (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre), 1959. Pp. vi, 64. $1.50

SHAW, J. M. *The Wonder of the Christian Gospel.* Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1959. Pp. 143. $3.95

SHEPHERD, M. H. JR., compiler. *Holy Communion: An Anthology of Christian Devotion.* Greenwich: The Seabury Press (Toronto: Oxford University Press), 1959. Pp. x, 162. $3.00

SIMCOX, C. E. *Is Death the End? The Christian Answer.* Greenwich: The Seabury Press (Toronto: Oxford University Press), 1959. Pp. 96. $2.25

SINGER, C. *A Short History of Scientific Ideas to 1900.* Oxford: Clarendon Press (Toronto: Oxford University Press), 1959. Pp. xx, 525. $5.25

SISSONS, C. B. *Church and State in Canadian Education: A Historical Study.* Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1959. Pp. x, 414. $6.50

This One Thing: A Tribute to Henry Burton Sherman. By a group of friends. Toronto: SCM of Canada, 1959. Pp. 96.

THOMSON, J. S. *The Word of God.* Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1959. Pp. viii, 45. $1.00

THROCKMORTON, B. H. JR. *The New Testament and Mythology.* Philadelphia: The Westminster Press (Toronto: The Ryerson Press), 1959. Pp. 255. $4.50

THURIAN, M. *L'Eucharistie: Mémorial du Seigneur. Sacrifice d'action de grâce et d'intercession.* Neuchatel: Delachaux et Niestlé S.A., 1959. Pp. 286. Sw. fr. 8.50

VON LOEWENICH, W. *Modern Catholicism*, transl. by R. H. FULLER. London, Toronto: Macmillan & Co., 1959. Pp. viii, 379. $10.00

WACH, J. *The Comparative Study of Religions.* Ed. with an Introd. by J. M. KITAGAWA. New York: Columbia University Press (Toronto: Oxford University Press), 1958. Pp. xlviii, 231. $5.25

WALLACE, R. S. *Calvin's Doctrine of the Christian Life.* Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co. Ltd.), 1959. Pp. xvi, 349. $6.00

WINGREN, G. *Man and the Incarnation: A Study in the Biblical Theology of Irenaeus*, transl. by R. MACKENZIE. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co. Ltd.), 1959. Pp. xxii, 233. $4.75

Editorial

EASTER AND THEOLOGY

IT IS a common complaint that the enthusiasm evident in the annual celebration of the Easter festival all too soon subsides into a dull normalcy in the church's life and work. This criticism is usually directed against the people who fill the pews on Easter Sunday but are lax in their attendance and indifferent in their interest and support at other times. Perhaps the time has come to suggest that judgment should begin in the pulpit and the study and that preachers and theologians should do some self-evaluating in this connection. It is probably true enough that churches crowded at Easter are not necessarily a reliable indication of the vitality of people's faith. It may also be true, however, that many who throng the sanctuary at such times absent themselves thereafter because they realize, through past experience, that the great affirmations of the faith made at this season will somehow be put away for another year with the Easter lilies and the special music.

In other words, the question which this editorial would like to raise concerns the extent to which the theologizing and preaching of the church in Canada today is a significant and appropriate presentation of the everlasting gospel of God which becomes "gospel" because of the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. Assuming that preachers should be theologians and, in principle at least, theologians should be preachers, does Canadian theology as it is taught in classrooms, written in books and spoken in pulpits have in it something of the sound of trumpets proclaiming Christ's triumph and the relevance which it has for all of life? Or must the ancient words be repeated, though in a much different spirit, in reaction to so much contemporary theologizing, "*He* is not here, *He* is risen"? On this basis the evangelical validity of our theology can most surely be judged.

No estimate of the present situation will be attempted here. The state of a nation's spiritual health cannot be finally assessed by any human diagnosis and generalizations are never fair in any case. It would appear, however, that for many people today the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead is simply the comforting vindication and assurance of immortality. If this is the case, then a serious question has to be raised regarding the kind of preaching to which they have been exposed. It is quite true, of course, that ministers cannot be held entirely responsible for the views of their people. Many a wrong idea has been carried away after listening to a good sermon. On the other hand it should be safe to assume that the Christian thinking of people is moulded by the preaching they hear Sunday by Sunday. While misunderstandings can arise even in the best of circumstances, the fault

must sometimes lie in the minister's failure to make clear what he means and not always in the listener's inability to comprehend what he says. If erroneous notions are current today to any considerable degree, the fact should have a humbling and challenging effect on all who preach and teach.

It is surely beyond question that the resurrection of Christ is both the reality which influences and illumines everything we say in preaching and the reason why we preach at all. Without the resurrection there would be no gospel to preach in any New Testament sense of the term. Could it be that many sermons today are simply moralistic homilies, or ill-tempered attacks on the errors of contemporary man and society, or touching invitations to find peace of mind in the midst of the many cares and uncertainties of modern life, because some preachers have forgotten what the gospel really is? Could it be that much preaching today leaves people without hope and without God in the world and without any commanding, liberating purpose for their lives, because it is more a pious exhortation to do better and be better than a proclamation of the good news of what God has done for us men and for our salvation in Jesus Christ? Do modern worshippers leave the sanctuary with the realization that here in the midst of all the vicissitudes and frustrations of existence there is a present kingdom of life and joy and peace and the assurance of a final triumph at the end of time? Do they go forth girded for courageous and creative action in our world today because they have been told clearly that every vexing problem and situation of our time can be a locus of resurrection through the power and purpose of the risen Lord even within the limited possibilities of human history, which can expect perfection only at the end of time? Are these the notes sounding through contemporary preaching, or is it sometimes found necessary to put the ancient question to many wistful searchers of our age who might think of wending their way to church hoping to find Him for whom all men are really seeking, "Why seek ye the living among the dead?"

Surely one important purpose of a theological journal is to be an intellectual stimulus which, in its own way, serves as a reminder that Jesus Christ is risen from the dead and a scholarly interpretation of what this means in the total life of man. The Easter season is an appropriate time for writers, readers and all who have a real concern for the church, to reaffirm that the *Canadian Journal of Theology* shall seek to fulfill this essential function and be enabled to exercise its important ministry in ever-widening circles.

E.S.M.

CORRECTION

We regret a small but serious error in the printing of the Index for 1959, included in our last number. A corrected Index appears at the end of the present issue.

E.R.F.

The Incarnation and Hindu Thought

V. E. DEVADUTT

THE idea of Incarnation is not unfamiliar to Hindu thought and yet the Hindu reactions to the Christian proclamation that God was incarnate in Jesus Christ have not been sympathetic. This article is an attempt on the one hand to clarify at least partially what the Christian means by his message that God was incarnate in Jesus Christ, and on the other hand to see how the Christian may meet some of the typical reactions of the Hindu to this message. In considering these Hindu reactions we might discover that theological tensions between Christians and Hindus are in some respects similar to the theological tensions among Christian people themselves in parts of the Western world.

At the basis of the claim, which the Christian Church makes in one form or another, that Jesus Christ is God Incarnate, is an assumption that has to do with a certain basic theological division between Christianity and Hinduism. Most of the major non-Christian religions of the East, barring Islam, have tended to encourage a measure of metaphysical agnosticism at some stage in their development. Confucius refused to say much about God because he felt that, knowing so little about life here, he was not entitled to say more about life hereafter. Buddha was struck by the problem of evil in life, and to him the solution to this problem which was so empirically real had to be sought within the empirical process of existence rather than with reference to a reality that transcended this process. At any rate, metaphysical speculation seemed futile to Buddha when evil was so much a part of the process of existence here and now. Some strands of Hindu thought (we say some strands, because Hinduism is not one religious or theological position but a complex of many), while passionately affirming the existence of a transcendent reality, nevertheless have denied any possibility of knowledge of this transcendent reality.[1] This denial of knowledge (and we are using the term "knowledge" to indicate what is meant by it in some contemporary Western terminology) is based on the conviction that human intellect by its very nature is incapable of grasping anything that does not resemble the empirically given. The solution proposed with regard to any contact with ultimate reality is not through knowledge. Our contact with ultimate reality is *to be it* in an act of mystic intuition and union. The solution is therefore to be found through rejection of knowledge where the seeker and the sought stand distinguished from each other, and through attainment of a mystic state of identity between the seeker and the sought.

1. In translating the thought of one culture into the language of another culture there is always the danger of some inaccuracy, but as long as distortion is avoided the risk must be run for the purposes of communication.

While there are thus specific differences in the respective positions of the three great Eastern religions with regard to knowledge of God, there is an element which seems to be common to all of them. This common element is the conviction that intellectual speculation about ultimate reality is of little help, if not futile, while of course we have or can have no knowledge of God through sense-perception. One of the Upanishads says this unambiguously:

> There the eye goes not
> Speech goes not, nor the mind.
> We know not, we understand not
> How one would teach it.
>
> Other, indeed, is it than the known,
> And moreover above the unknown,
> —Thus have we heard of the ancients
> Who to us have explained It.[2]

Interestingly enough contemporary thinking in the West would agree with the distrust of speculative knowledge in general. Since the collapse of rationalism and idealism in the West there have been only two alternatives with regard to the question of sure knowledge, pragmatism and the scientific method. Pragmatism has had a wide influence, notably in America, but owing perhaps to the fact that it is inherently incapable of providing a long-term or stable vision of truth, and also because of the combined practical and "objective" certainty in knowledge provided by the scientific method, this latter alternative has replaced pragmatism. But the scientific method can deal only with the empirically verifiable, whatever the precise test of verifiability may be, and while many are prepared to admit that there may be a reality beyond the dimensions of that which is revealed by the scientific method, they would nevertheless insist that we can say very little about it; in fact that we can have no knowledge of it.

There is a further point at which the Hindu attitude of the type indicated earlier converges with the contemporary scientific attitude. The type of Hindu thought under consideration, while denying that we can have any knowledge of God, nevertheless recognizes that many people do claim to have a knowledge of God. Knowledge thus claimed, however, is treated as tantamount to something subjective and therefore necessarily relative.[3] But these features do not necessarily render such knowledge useless. It has a pragmatic use in that it can create relative values of individual and social worth. It would seem that some of those who swear by the scientific method, but are willing to admit that there may be a reality beyond the dimensions of that which is revealed by this method, come to a similar position to the Hindu.

2. Kena Upanishad: First Khanda, 3. Translated by R. E. Hume (London: Oxford University Press, 1921).

3. In this connection the doctrines of "Adhikari" and "Istadevata" are relevant, as is also the position of the Ramakrishna Mission that, while one may choose voluntarily either Jnana Marga or Karma Marga or Bhakti Marga, one should not criticize the ways not chosen.

Since we cannot verify or falsify anything said about this reality, all affirmations concerning it must be treated as matters of individual taste or preference. Nonetheless, even though they are relative and unverifiable, they may have some pragmatic use in creating values of individual and social worth.

It would seem that distrust of speculation concerning the nature of God is not alien to the spirit of the Bible. The Bible asks, "Canst thou by searching find out God?" Isaiah 40 seems to compare the results of speculation to unmitigated idolatry. But the point where the Bible differs from the attitude represented by the kind of Hinduism under consideration is its insistence that, because man cannot know God, it does not follow that man is thereby left helpless. The living God can himself take the initiative to make himself known to man. Hinduism, depending solely on the efforts of man and seeing the futility of man's effort to comprehend God within his intellect, solves the problem by resorting to faith in a mystic intuition of identity. In other words the biblical position and the Hindu position of the type we have been considering agree that we have no knowledge of God, but while the Bible affirms that man's dilemma is nevertheless solved in the gracious initiative that God takes to make himself known to man, Hinduism affirms that despite his dilemma man must persist till he transcends subjectivity and attains oneness with God.

The Christian position, grounded in the biblical witness, is that the Christian faith is rooted in revelation, in something "given." The doctrine of Incarnation has meaning therefore only when viewed in the light of the doctrine of revelation. The Incarnation belongs to the history of revelation; it is indeed the climax of the revelatory activity of God. This is the message of the younger churches as they confront other religions. The basic assumption behind the doctrine of Incarnation is both an acceptance and rejection of the Hindu religious epistemology. It is an acceptance of it to the extent that the Christian would agree with the Hindu that our thoughts are not God's thoughts nor our ways his ways, but it is a rejection in so far as he disagrees with the Hindu view that on this account man is left helpless until he makes the supreme sacrifice of eliminating his individual identity and existence in mystic union.

What distinguishes the Christian from the Hindu when both stand confronted by the same dilemma is also what distinguishes him from those in contemporary Western culture who, out of disillusionment on various grounds with the rationalistic-idealistic tradition, would confine all knowledge to that capable of empirical verification and treat all religious affirmations as matters of individual taste and preference. The Christian would agree in part at any rate with the empiricist's criticism of the rationalistic-idealistic tradition. The history of thought has shown that dependence on formal reason alone results in any number of systems of religious philosophy. These systems, often in conflict with one another, result from the use of differing logical criteria in the employment of formal reason in the search

after truth. The employment of differing logical criteria is possible when formal reason is used in search after truth, for what formal reason is in actuality dealing with in such a case is only its own constructions. Truths of formal reason therefore are not necessarily truths whose referent is that which is objectively true. The "god" who is the discovery of formal reason may be no more than a construct of thought and therefore an idol. The Christian differs from the empiricist, however, in affirming that, while it is true we have no knowledge of God, man is not on that account left helpless. God himself can take the initiative, and in the very denial of the knowledge of God man can be raised to a true apprehension of him. To be sure, the Christian is not arguing, but is rather affirming a faith in preference both to scepticism and to relativism.

The history of religions seems to show that if we affirm knowledge of God, we are unable to escape relativism. If we deny knowledge of God and yet affirm faith in him, the choice seems to be between faith in revelation and faith in mysticism. This is why some scientists whose very temper of mind should be against relativism, choose mysticism if they fail to take the Christian position. Even Ludwig Wittgenstein, the father of logical positivism, shows mystical tendencies in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.*

The biblical position asserts God's initiative in making his own self or nature known. Hence religion is objectively rooted and it can become a social possession. It is true there is a difference between the object of faith and religion. Even in the Christian religion there is always an empirical element and therefore it is subject to reconstruction as it is placed under the judgment of "the given"; but its essential roots are in this "given." In the case of Hinduism, on the other hand, since religion is always subjective, one should eventually transcend religion and attain to a state in which the seeker and the sought are united. Religion may be a way of life and therefore have a social reference, but subjectivity and relativity are always marks of it.

There are other types of Hinduism which would accept the Incarnation with certain conditions attached. What offends the Hindu generally is the Christian assertion that whatever we know of God is through the person and work of Jesus Christ and that therefore our redemption is somehow tied exclusively to Christ's continuing ministry. We will presently see how to interpret this claim. The Hindu lays down two alternative conditions for accepting the Incarnation. On the one hand, if the Incarnation is interpreted symbolically, he will find no offence in it. If the Incarnation is viewed as symbolizing the continual descent of God into human life, then the Christian doctrine of Incarnation thus conditioned is perfectly legitimate to the Hindu. Jesus Christ could be accepted even as unique in that the descent of God into human life is most concretely and uniquely illustrated in his life among all the religious leaders of the world. On the other hand, the general idea of Incarnation may be interpreted as proclaiming the essential oneness of

God and man in the latter's inmost spiritual depths. Such historic persons as Jesus Christ and Buddha and many others of a similar stature, who are referred to by their respective followers as "Incarnations of God," serve to illustrate this truth by the measure of freedom gained by them from material and earthly limitations and the recovery in a remarkable degree of the essential identity of God and man. To put the same point in a slightly different way, such characteristics demonstrate the degree to which these persons have gained union between the human soul and divine life, and point to the possibility of a similar achievement by all men. This second alternative is closely related to the mystical position I discussed earlier. These two positions have a remarkable resemblance to some which are taken by Christians themselves in the West; consequently, one does not know whether to treat the Hindu positions as Christian heresies or to treat similar positions in the Christian Church as instances of the Hinduisation of Christianity!

What can the Christian say to the Hindu in view of the several Hindu reactions to the Christian message concerning Jesus Christ? In the first place the Christian has to be sure of the ground on which he bases his proclamation that God was in Christ in the sense in which the doctrine of Incarnation asserts that presence. The ground is neither rational nor empirical proof. The Christian affirmation that Jesus Christ is God Incarnate is part of the fundamental affirmation that we have no knowledge of God except the knowledge which God himself gives us about his own self, or in other words that the Incarnation belongs to the history of the revelatory activity of God. Those of us who seek for rational or empirical proof for the divine nature of Jesus Christ will find the search vain. Rational proof pertains only to the correctness or incorrectness of certain formal statements which point to no existing state of affairs. Nor can one point to any accepted empirical evidence and say by virtue of it that this person called Jesus was also divine. The only evidence for Christological statements, whether of the order of high Christology or of the order of low Christology, is the witness and testimony of the early Church. You may try to prove that early Christians did not say that Jesus Christ was God Incarnate or that the overwhelming consensus of faith of these Christians was that Jesus Christ was God Incarnate. The choice of a high Christological statement or a low Christological statement on the basis of any other evidence except that of the consensus of witness on the part of the early Church is a false choice. Divinity of an intense kind or of a pale kind, divinity ontologically true or only symbolically conceived, is not capable of empirical validation—as good coffee can be, or weak coffee or symbolic coffee like Postum can be. The primary support of every Christological statement is the witness or testimony of the early Christians. Christology was the expression of the faith of early Christians. It was neither their science nor philosophy. All this is involved in the assertion that the Incarnation belongs

to the history of the revelatory activity of God. In the end the Christian can only witness to this revelation. By its very nature revelation excludes proof. The only authentication of revelation is self-authentication.

When we have said all this, however, it remains true that, practically speaking, the Christian cannot escape justifying his position theologically or even philosophically, especially when his position is questioned on these grounds. However clearly he sees the limitations of an apologetic, the Christian cannot refuse to meet honest doubt.

In the first place, as far as the younger churches are concerned, there is an area where the apologetic task and the practical task of witnessing almost merge. The Christian and the Hindu agree on the inadequacy of intellectual knowledge to inform us of religious reality. This is the point at which the conversation between the Christian and the Hindu should begin. It will involve an honest examination of the adequacy of their respective choices, namely, revelation on the one hand and mysticism on the other hand, to meet the fundamental aspirations of man. These aspirations pertain not only to our ultimate destiny but to life here and now, and life here and now is recognized both by the Hindu and Christian as at any rate partly determinative of ultimate destiny. Mysticism, however, tends to put a minimal value on the historical existence of man. Mysticism may not reject history altogether, but it finds no need for the redemption of history. Having acted in history, responsibly no doubt but with a detached spirit, man looks forward only to a respectable exit from historical existence. The Hindu's tendency to place a minimal value on history is the result of his interpretation of all privations in history as the privations essential to finitude. The mystical attitude inevitably leads to depreciation of finitude. The transcending of finitude and its limitations is redemption. The depreciation of finitude is the depreciation of one stage of life, that of historical existence, without explaining the why of this stage. On the other hand, the Christian doctrine of revelation and the consequent doctrine of the Incarnation show a more realistic attitude to history. The Christian does not depreciate finitude, since the Incarnation is the assurance that God has a supreme concern for the finite. The Christian does not depreciate history, for the Incarnation is the assurance that God values history. At the same time, the Incarnation is also a judgment, not indeed on finitude as such but upon the misuse of all the opportunities that man has even in his finite existence. The Incarnation as a judgment has a reference to history also, history as the collective story of mankind, but it is again not a judgment on history as part of the finite order but as something subjected to distortions by man's misuse of those opportunities which he has even in his finite existence. The Incarnation is thus an acceptance of finitude but a rejection of the wilful distortions to which it is subjected by man. It is an acceptance of finitude, because the Incarnation is the entry of the Infinite into the finite order; it is a rejection of its distortions, because the Cross stands central to the history of the Incarnation. The story of man is for the most part a story of sin and corrup-

tion. Human sin perpetually distorts history, but man and history can be redeemed and need to be redeemed. Man's life in the light of the Incarnation is viewed as a whole and not torn into two, one to be rejected and the other to be redeemed. The two dimensions of man's life, the historical and the supra-historical, are recognized as of equal value. Thus the Christian in his rejection of *something that arises* in the finite order has something in common with the Hindu, but unlike him he sees no necessary connection between evil and finitude itself. New impulses are now stirring India, along with other lands of Asia. The peoples of these lands used to look upon history with the eyes of spectators, but now, caught up in the tidal wave of recent historical events, they find they can no longer afford the luxury of their traditional attitude of detachment. The message of the Incarnation has a peculiar relevance to this contemporary situation, and if properly presented should have an appeal.

But Christian realism arising out of the Christian faith in the Incarnation cannot be presented merely on the thought level. It has to be lived out by the Christian. If such Christian realism is lived out, it should be a kind of authentication of the Christian claim, not in the sense of a proof or verification of it but in the sense of a witness to the power of the Incarnation.

The doctrine of Incarnation is the true basis of the Christian doctrine of vocation. The Incarnation is an event in history and a redemptive event. The Christian accepts history to act redemptively in it. To act redemptively is the Christian vocation and the Christian acts redemptively in every area of life. For example, the greatest reason for a Christian's participation in politics is the Incarnation. The redemptive vocation is not the vocation of the Christian individual alone but of the Christian community corporately. This needs a little elaboration. Man in his historical existence is a necessary participant in communal life. Any attempt on the part of an individual to withdraw himself completely from community is an unreal attempt. There are two urges native to human nature; one is for individuality and the other for community. Individuality in and by itself is nothing more than a principle of division. Man in addition to being an individual is a person, and as a person he has his roots partly in society. Influences coming from the home, school, church and other groups mould the personality of an individual, and to that extent his personality has deep social roots. If a society without real individuals is a mass, a herd, individuals apart from society are abstractions. This is the natural state of man. There are two potentially disastrous consequences of this natural state. On the one hand, the social roots of man may be severed through a culture that either encourages atomistic individualism or leads to a depersonalization of social relations, so that social relations no longer have the interpersonal dimension but are purely impersonal. In either case man suffers alienation from part of his own self—from that part of the self which lives by sharing in the life of the community—with a consequent sense of loneliness and anxiety. On the other hand, man's individuality may suffer a near elimination through the development of a mass

or totalitarian culture as an alternative to chaotic, atomistic individualism. In this case man is reduced from a person to a mere function in society. The recurring sickness of human society is due in a large measure to the failure of man to achieve a balance between the two urges innate in his nature, the urges for individuality and for community. The Church, when it is the Church, is truly a gift of God, in that the natural state of man is transmuted into a higher level in its fellowship. The Church is the community where the individual stands in a dual relationship, namely, to God and to his fellow men in this new community. His relationship to God is that which preserves the privacy and individuality of his self. An individual standing before God is truly himself and the unique object of God's love. His relationship to others in the Church's fellowship, a relationship ideally at any rate not based primarily on an identity of race, culture and social status but on the antecedent relationship to God himself, is that which creatively and redemptively preserves that part of the self which he shares with society. If, in the natural state of man's existence, atomistic individualism is pathological, its perpetuation in the Christian context makes it no less pathological. In such a case, Christianity, instead of becoming redemptive, itself becomes a pathological phenomenon. The biblical witness is that God created not only man but woman, intending thereby that man's life should be lived in the context of interpersonal relations. The biblical witness is that God called not only individuals, like Abraham and Moses, but also a nation, thereby indicating that God's purposes comprehend society as well as individuals. In other words, what we called the natural state of man is really a part of God's creation, but owing to man's sin it ends up in frightening distortions. This fallen natural state is to be redeemed and restored in a new society, the society of grace, the Church. Therefore it is permissible to say that there is no such a person as a solitary Christian. The Christian world is not an aggregate of individuals, but a world where through interpersonal relationships of a redemptive kind a community of new individuals is created. Christian redemption transcends atomistic individualism and mass society. The Church, then, is integral to the Christian's view of man's destiny, and the Christian redemptive vocation rooted in the Incarnation is both individual and corporate in character. It is only to the extent that the Church acts as a redeeming community that it lives by its vocation and witnesses to the fact and power of the Incarnation. In that sense, however—that is, in so far as the Church is the redeeming community—it can be called a continuation of the Incarnation. The redeeming mission of the Church is the sole means of authenticating for ourselves and for others the Incarnation and its power.

I said that the chief offence to the Hindu is the Christian assertion that whatever we know of God is known through the person and work of Jesus Christ, and that therefore our redemption is somehow tied exclusively to Christ's continuing ministry. If this claim is properly presented, however, it need not be an offence. The claim is not that God has not revealed himself

elsewhere and to other people, but that wherever he has revealed himself he has shown himself to be like Jesus Christ, so that Jesus Christ becomes the revealer of God wherever he is and a judgment on all idols put up by the human mind both within and outside the Church. There is thus both an uncompromising exclusivism and a broad universalism in the Christian claim. This broad universalism, however, is conditioned or limited by one thing. In the whole range of the history of man's religions, nowhere else outside the Christian tradition has a community which was either so large or so heterogeneous, racially and ethnically, built its life for so many centuries on the faith that in one person who really lived and moved among people at a particular time and in a particular place God really was incarnate. To be sure, one strand of Hinduism speaks of incarnation and believes that God entered history not once but many times. But apart from some reported incarnations of God in some non-human forms which can be dismissed without offending the Hindu as part of his religious mythology, the historicity of the human persons in whom God is said to have become incarnate is at best dubious. And so a modern Hindu scholar comments that the Hindu scriptures are not concerned with historical truth but with ideal truth, and that, when they report that God had entered history at some given time, they are not speaking of something that actually happened in the framework of space and time but of the eternal nature of God which makes him come into the human scene continually.[4]

Nevertheless it would seem to me that if we believe that the Christian claim is, not that God has not revealed himself elsewhere and to other people, but that, wherever he has revealed himself, he has shown himself to be like Christ, and that therefore he is still the revealer of God wherever he is and the judgment on all idols of the human mind both within and without the Church, then this viewpoint should give us the humility to search in other faiths and religious traditions for the movement of God's self-revelation. This does not mean and cannot mean that Christ is reduced to an idea. The *Christ-event* is the object of Christian faith and the means of men's redemption. Furthermore, to the Christian, redemption involves participation in the life of the *Christ-community*, the Church, and therefore he cannot be content merely to point to God's activity elsewhere as Christ himself reveals it. Rather, even as he rejoices in such activity of God, he can also point to the signs in other religions that authenticate his Christian claims. Furthermore, if we do this we will find much to learn and perhaps our own faith will become enriched. This possibility of enrichment will mean more to us in so far as we remember that there is a difference between revelation as an event and the religion that has developed around it. As I said earlier, even in the Christian religion there is an empirical element, arising out of racial experiences and human pride and sin. The Christian *religion* has its own idols, and if sometimes we cannot discover these idols ourselves, because we are so enamoured of them, perhaps if we are humble enough the

4. Prof. D. S. Sarma in his *Primer of Hinduism* (London: Macmillan, 1929).

Christ who is acting elsewhere and whom we can sometimes recognize as we stand even momentarily aside from our idols, may help us to see our own idolatry.

To repeat and to conclude, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that, to the Christian, revelation is primarily an act or an event and never an idea. Specifically, it is in the life, ministry, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ that the Christian sees God's decisive revelatory activity. But if the Christian Faith affirms that God is the God of all people and of all history, it would seem to follow that man cannot limit God's activity to any particular stream in history. Nonetheless, to be able to recognize God's activity at all, one has to cleave uncompromisingly to the Christ-event, for this revelation alone enables one to see the movement of God wherever it may be. In one sense, then, it is only the Christian with the eyes of his faith who can see such divine activity. Consequently, the Christian is still under the obligation to bring people to direct confrontation with Christ and to reconciliation to God in him.

Trends in Old Testament Theology

T. A. M. BARNETT

THE revival of Old Testament theology is at once an important and a dangerous phenomenon of the mid-twentieth century. On the one hand it has driven men to look for the pattern of God's dealing with Israel, using all the resources of scientific and historical research. On the other hand it has brought with it the temptation to impose a theological scheme on the Old Testament which does violence to its heterogeneous character. Even competent scholars have succumbed to the danger, but the real trouble arises in preaching. This article is an attempt to show some of the developments that have taken place, and to provide some guide to resources available to the preacher. No effort has been made at complete coverage, and in places selection has had to be arbitrary.

For history of the discipline prior to 1950 reference may be made to papers by Porteous and Dentan. The former[1] surveys the significant contributions since Davidson's *Theology of the Old Testament* (1904). He summarizes the tensions resulting from a generation of study as follows:

> There is legitimate ground for difference of opinion as to precisely where the line between Old Testament theology and dogmatic theology should be drawn. But we are not entitled to speak of a theology, if we mean no more than a history of beliefs about God which men at different times have held . . . We have come across a welcome emphasis on the fact that revelation is mediated in historical events when, through the divine-human encounter, a Word is spoken to which a response is made. This intimate response of man's whole being to God is what the Bible means by knowledge of God, and the classic record of such knowledge of God, culminating in the complete knowledge which Christ possessed, is contained in the Bible. Old Testament theology is essentially part of the critique of this knowledge and it can only be rightly undertaken from an inside point of view.[2]
>
> A theology of the Old Testament will be worthy of the attention of men today in the measure in which it keeps close to life and does not operate merely at the academic level where thought and action are apt to be divorced.[3]

Dentan[4] begins his survey with the 17th century, but the bulk of his history of the discipline is devoted to the period since 1787. In that year Gabler[5] attempted to define biblical theology and to show its relationship to systematic theology. The former must include strict exegesis of biblical passages, comparison of those passages with one another, and formulation of general

1. N. W. Porteous, "Old Testament Theology," in H. H. Rowley (Ed.), *The Old Testament and Modern Study* (Oxford, 1951), pp. 311 ff.
2. *Op. cit.*, p. 343.
3. *Op. cit.*, p. 344.
4. R. C. Dentan, *Preface to Old Testament Theology* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).
5. So far as I know Gabler's work exists only in Latin, and I have not seen a copy.

ideas from the same "without distorting [the] materials, or obliterating distinctions."

> It was Gabler who first showed that biblical and dogmatic theology are neither to be confused with each other, nor set in irreconcilable opposition, but are two clearly separable and equally necessary steps in the formulation of a Christian view of the world. This separation of function was of momentous consequence both for dogmatics and for biblical studies, and every subsequent attempt to obscure the distinction which Gabler made has resulted only in confusion in both fields.[6]

The above quotations, and the history of the subject as described by Dentan and Porteous, show that there are certain matters which remain in tension: the relationship between the history of Israel's religion and Old Testament theology; the meaning of exegesis and its function in theology; the relation between systematic theology and biblical theology; the relation of Old to New Testament; the relevance of biblical theology to modern life. There is also the problem of method in presenting Old Testament theology. It would be fallacious to say "mere" method. Careful study of the major works shows that in some way the manner of presentation is in each case dictated by the solutions the author has worked out to the various tensions—or else his solutions and his method are disharmonious.[7] For example, can Old Testament theology be fitted into the systematic theologian's categories of Theology, Anthropology, and Soteriology? Or must there be some other framework such as: God and people, God and the world, God and man? We should note at any rate that most writers endeavour to find a central, dominating theme such as covenant, holiness, God as Lord, God's Word, around which all other doctrines revolve.

The years since 1950 have not resolved any of the tensions with finality, but significant work has been done.[8] An increasing number of scholars are addressing a major part of their energies to some aspect of Old Testament theology. Sheer numbers should not blind one to the fact that historical and exegetical studies, in the strict sense, are still the corner-stone of Old Testament research. I hope I never live to see that stone broken! Some scholars are indeed opposed to anything that could remotely be called a theology of the Old Testament. In a lengthy review of Dentan's book Lachemann[9] vehemently, indeed almost querulously, appealed for the abandonment of the dangerous pursuit. "With all my imagination I cannot see what an Old Testament Theology could do that a history of the religion of the Old Testament could not do much better." More urbanely, if less cogently,

6. Dentan, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
7. See, e.g., Porteous, *op. cit.*, pp. 326, 329.
8. Developments since 1950 have also been studied in some other recent histories of exegesis. Each in its own way is valuable. The most important are: H. F. Hahn, *Old Testament in Modern Research* (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1954); E. G. Kraeling, *The Old Testament Since the Reformation* (New York: Harper, 1955); H.-J. Kraus, *Geschichte der historisch-kritischen Erforschung des alten Testaments von der Reformation bis zur Gegenwart* (Neukirchen, 1956).
9. *Journal of Bible and Religion*, XIX (1951), pp. 71–75.

Irwin[10] has registered his continuing protest against the trend. Some scholars have at least orally dismissed such opinions as those of "unreconstructed liberals," "humanists," etc.[11] This judgment misses the genuine concern of these men with careful linguistic study, detailed and painstaking exegesis, comparative methods, etc., which may be overlooked in the new enthusiasm.

The most significant works which we must consider are based squarely on careful preliminary exegesis. Undoubtedly pride of place must be given to von Rad.[12] Although the second volume is still unpublished, it is clear that the author has gone further than most of his predecessors in resolving the tension between history and theology within the Old Testament itself. He begins with a sketch of Israel's faith in Yahweh, and of the several institutions which developed over the centuries. This is a prelude, outlining the elements which must be reckoned with in a theology of the Old Testament. The history of religion looks solely at the beliefs of Israel as they unfolded in time. Von Rad is concerned with what Israel herself proclaimed about Yahweh's saving acts in history. The documents we have reveal a kerygmatic intention, and the witness of each is elucidated in turn. For some documents the Exodus is the central act, but for Deuteronomy the building of Solomon's temple is fundamental. The Chronicler makes central the foundation of the cultus, and the Messianic associations of the Davidic dynasty. On the other hand, Jeremiah and Deutero-Isaiah look for the abrogation of the faith in the Yahweh of the Exodus, since there will be new acts in place of that great event. Israel was continually refashioning her faith as Yahweh acted for her, and examining anew the acts of the past. Her history is therefore a constitutive element of her faith, and its representation an action of her faith.

Von Rad devotes over half of his volume to the witness of the varying traditions preserved in the Hexateuch and in the work of the Deuteronomist and Chronicler. The last section, entitled "Israel before Yahweh (Israel's answer to Yahweh)," shows that God did not choose Israel as a passive object for his will in history, but as a people who could respond to him in a personal way. It was not a unified response, for men vary in their understanding and insight. The Psalms praise Yahweh in his many-sided character. In the Wisdom literature there is a development from Israel's concept of the norm of her relationship to Yahweh. All through the Old Testament men are confronted in various ways with *sedhaqa*, "righteousness." Community and individual are tempted away from following this divine norm. The sages wrestled with the problem as posed by their times. Von Rad clearly integrates their work into the total life of Israel. The Wisdom

10. *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LXXVIII, (1959), pp. 1–12. See his earlier statement in *Journal of Religion*, XXV (1945).

11. I cannot at once lay my hands on a published opinion such as I have described, but my own ears have heard!

12. G. von Rad, *Theologie des Alten Testaments* (Muenchen: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1957).

writers are not, therefore, a separate phenomenon in Israel, but one part of the many-sided response to God.

As a description of Israel's faith this book is probably one of the most important so far. The fact that the author has already made such extensive and detailed studies of the sources heightens one's confidence in his work. It is tempting to regret that he has confined himself to description, and has not dealt with the faith we can have in what he describes, but final judgment cannot be made until the work is complete. He promises to deal in volume II with the prophetic movement, and with fundamental theological discussion of the Old Testament. An English translation of both volumes will be imperative.

In 1958 translations of two important "Theologies" appeared. The first, by Jacob,[13] is in many ways the most useful book now available in English, so far as the ideas of the Old Testament itself is concerned.[14] The author defines the theology of the Old Testament "as the systematic account of the specific religious ideas which can be found throughout the Old Testament and which form its profound unity."[15] He says further:

> A theology of the Old Testament which is founded not on certain isolated verses, but on the Old Testament as a whole, can only be a Christology, for what was revealed under the old covenant, through a long and varied history, in events, persons and institutions, is, in Christ, gathered together and brought to perfection. Such a statement does not in any way mean that we should only consider the Old Testament in the light of its fulfilment, but a perfectly objective study makes us discern already in the Old Testament the same message of the God who is present, of the God who saves and of the God who comes, which characterizes the Gospel. Unless it is based upon the principle of the unity of the two Testaments, and *a fortiori* on the internal unity of the Old Testament itself, it is not possible to speak of a theology of the Old Testament.[16]

His method of approach is soundly theocentric. It is the living God who dominates Israel's experience, revealing his many-sided character. His action is manifested through his Spirit and his Word. The world is his creation, and creation is the stage of man's life. God's greatest gift to man is life.

> Life, having its source in God, can only be a gift, yet this gift, just like God himself, is the object of choice on man's part; it is only by choosing life . . . that man truly becomes what he is.[17]

Jacob quotes with approval a statement of H. W. Robinson's that "history is the sacrament of the religion of Israel."[18] He distinguishes the "two realities," "raw facts and their interpretation." Israel retained in its recorded history only those facts which bear on God's plan of salvation. This is certainly a proper emphasis, though one wishes the author had developed

13. E. Jacob, *Theology of the Old Testament*, transl. by Heathcote and Allcock (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1958). The French edition appeared in 1955.
14. Bibliographies at the end of various sections are a very useful feature.
15. *Op. cit.*, p. 11.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 12f.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

it at greater length. A weakness of his approach is that he seems to have no integral place for Job and Ecclesiastes. It is true he gives to the Wise Men a position along with king, prophet and priest as one of the "ministries" through whom God communicated, but the praise is faint. Curiously enough, another weak spot is the lack of weight given to the covenant. Perhaps this is a reaction against Eichrodt, who made it so central to his theology.

The institutions through which God works are two-fold: human and permanent. The human instruments are the ministries mentioned above. With the qualification already made this is an excellent section. The permanent setting includes the sacred place, the cult, and the law. The final division of the book deals with sin and redemption, death and the future life, and the consummation. It is surprising that despite his Christological emphasis Jacob gives so little space to a treatment of eschatology and the Messianic kingdom.

The other work of the year[19] was originally published in Dutch in 1949, but only noticed in passing by Porteous. The treatment of the theological ideas in the Old Testament is thorough within the limits of space, and generally sound. The more significant and creative part is the "Introduction" of 125 pages, in which Vriezen examines these tensions which keep recurring in our discussion. The Old Testament is the Word of God for the Church, and the theologian meets

> men of like passions with himself, men who know that God has spoken to them, who have come to know Him in His holiness as the God of their lives, of the life of the people and of the future new world. For essentially it is these people who have come to know Him and who have heard the Word, who speak in the Old Testament.[20]

Scholarly research must take account of many things which do not directly concern the theologian. The theologian must examine the whole and the parts in the light of the Gospel. Even though subjectivity may be unavoidable, the Church must seek agreement on the meaning for itself of the Old Testament in whole and in part.

The Old Testament is the record of God's revelation, and therefore cannot be secularized by mere history of religion. The historical relations of Israel and her internal development are part of the record, but

> there was another peculiar spiritual factor, which again and again interfered decisively in the life of Israel, and . . . it was this factor that gave the Old Testament to the world.[21]
>
> The New Testament is the confirmation and the crowning of the Old. They are essentially one, but this unity can be seen in its proper perspective only when the revelation of God is admitted to be continuous and the existence of the line of historical development is recognized.[22]

19. Th. C. Vriezen, *An Outline of Old Testament Theology*, translated from the second Dutch edition of 1954 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958). Like Jacob, he includes useful bibliographies at the end of various sections.
20. *Op. cit.*, p. 10.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

At the same time Christ as Mediator brought something essentially new. The Holy Communion celebrates his mediatorship, and this fact of our experience leaves much of the Old Testament to the history of revelation. But it still has much to teach us. The spiritual structure of the Old Testament writings brings "greater, more profound truths."[23] Vriezen follows this with a discussion on the authority and use of the Old Testament in the Church. Its authority lies in its truth, *i.e.*,

> the reliability and unrestricted character of its message of salvation and life; and therefore in the existential validity of what the Bible has to say about God and man, sin and grace, life and death, the world and its creation anew.[24]

It is the authentic record of the salvation that God gave to Israel, derived from the Spirit of God through human agencies. It is the word of God, in that it "contains the testimony to the revelation of God, objective as well as subjective."[25]

These considerations lead to some remarks about exegesis and preaching. The fundamental unity of the two Testaments is in the eschatological perspective. The Kingdom of God, basic to the Old Testament eschatology, is fulfilled in Christ, but the fulfilment is in many ways incomprehensible without the Old Testament as guide. It is one of the functions of exegesis to control the excesses to which theologians and preachers alike are prone. After this discussion it is not surprising that when Vriezen outlines the basis, task and method of Old Testament theology he regards biblical theology as the link between dogmatic and historical theology.

> . . . it [biblical theology] collects the materials supplied by the Bible as it has come to understand them in the light of history, so that the dogmatician, engaged in his systematic work, may know what the points at issue in the Bible are. Old Testament theology as a branch of Biblical theology fulfills this task so far as the Old Testament is concerned.[26]

It is not primarily concerned with the history of the religion of Israel, but with the "message of the Old Testament both in itself and in its relation to the New Testament."[27]

> The confrontation with the New Testament need not always take up a prominent position or be elaborated, but in principle it is always present, even if only in the way of arranging the materials.[28]

The method cannot be fully systematic without some arbitrariness, but some system is inevitable.

Attention has been concentrated on these three works, but there have been

23. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 96. On this subject see also S. Mowinckel, *The Old Testament as the Word of God*, transl. by Bjornard (New York: Abingdon, 1959).
26. Vriezen, *op. cit.*, p. 119.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 121.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 124.

several others, which can only be noticed in chronological order. Wright[29] maintains that biblical theology is the confessional recital of the redemptive acts of God in a particular history. This *kerygma* gives unity to the Bible. His book is a semi-popular presentation of a point of view akin to that of von Rad. Van Imschoot's still unfinished *Théologie de l'Ancien Testament* I have (*mea culpa*) not yet read. From all reports it is a significant contribution to the literature from a competent Roman Catholic.[30] Though not strictly a theology, McKenzie's *Two-Edged Sword* deserves mention.[31] It is designed to acquaint literate Roman Catholics with the Old Testament, including its theology. Rowley's *Faith of Israel*[32] is a series of lectures on leading motifs in Old Testament theology. Together with his two earlier volumes [33] it is an important contribution to the current discussion. Koehler's *Theologie des Alten Testaments* has at last appeared in English.[34] Although of uneven merit it should not be overlooked.

Most recently G. A. F. Knight has contributed a book whose title, *A Christian Theology of the Old Testament*,[35] indicates its nature. The central theme of the Old Testament is "the redemptive activity of God in and through the Son, Israel." This means that a "whole" view of the meaning of the Old Testament is possible, and that the Old Testament has a message for the twentieth century in the light of the Christian revelation as a whole. The author is most stimulating and imaginative in his approach, and he writes for a wide audience. Sometimes his enthusiasm leads him to more vivid figures than strict exegesis justifies.

By no means all the work in Old Testament theology has been done in compendious syntheses such as have been described. The renewed emphasis on what Israel believed has arisen in part from the development of form-criticism and tradition-criticism.[36] The attempt to see the total life-situation (*Sitz im Leben*) of Israel's Scriptures required an examination of her beliefs, as reflected in single verses or in the whole corpus. A number of recent commentaries bear witness to this fact.[37] So also do a number of special studies of specific terms and doctrines. Word studies have always been of major importance in Old Testament research, as they are in many

29. G. E. Wright, *God Who Acts: Biblical Theology as Recital* (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 8. London: S.C.M., 1952).

30. See the review in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LXXV, (1956), p. 339 f.

31. J. L. McKenzie, *The Two-Edged Sword: An Interpretation of the Old Testament* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1956).

32. H. H. Rowley, *The Faith of Israel* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1957).

33. *The Authority of the Bible* (1949); *The Unity of the Bible* (1953).

34. L. Koehler, *Old Testament Theology*, transl. by Todd (London: Lutterworth, 1957).

35. London: S.C.M., 1959.

36. See especially Hahn, *op. cit.*, for the contribution various fields of interest have made to the rise of Old Testament theology.

37. Only a random selection need be given. The fullest, and perhaps the best, is the *Biblischer Kommentar Altes Testament*, edited by Martin Noth. Some parts of the *Interpreter's Bible* belong in this category. In more popular vein *The Torch Bible Commentaries* are indicative of the trend. Most of them are outstandingly good for the general reader. Of individual works, N. K. Gottwald's *Studies in the Book of Lamentations* (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 14. London: S.C.M., 1954) is representative.

of the "Theologies" currently appearing. The *Theologisches Woerterbuch zum Neuen Testament*[38] is a basic tool both of exegesis and of theology. In many cases Old Testament words are treated almost as fully as their New Testament counterparts.

Judged by the number of English works at least, scholars are concerned especially with the Hebrew view of man. This is probably due in part to the important work begun by Pedersen 40 years ago,[39] and in part to the exigencies of the times. As Eichrodt said in 1944, "In the tumult of our present existence the human spirit is seeking new and better ways of understanding its place and task in our time."[40] Eichrodt's little book lies outside our period, but to my knowledge it is still the best work in English devoted entirely to the Old Testament doctrine of man. Koehler's *Hebrew Man*[41] has some merits, but it is ill-proportioned, and not primarily theological. Three writers who have written on the biblical doctrine of man in various lights might be mentioned here: Rust,[42] Wright,[43] and Shedd.[44] It is probable that much more of this study of biblical doctrines, as opposed to studies of the doctrines of either Testament, will be done.

In view of the evident Christological interest in the Old Testament it is gratifying that special attention is being paid to the Messianic concept. A sound view of Old Testament thought on the subject is vital to prevent excesses in reading the New Testament back into the Old. This alone would be justification for mentioning a few important books here, even though not all of them are primarily theological. The fullest and most important is Mowinckel's *He that Cometh*.[45] Klausner's work on the messianic hope should not be overlooked.[46] A brief but useful treatise is Ringgren's *Messiah in the Old Testament*.[47] Finally there is a considerable literature dealing with aspects of the Royal Psalms, which has considerable bearing on the Messianic and eschatological thought of the Old Testament.[48]

It is clear from what has been said that the tension between exegesis and

38. Now edited by G. Friedrich. The sixth volume has just been completed. English translations have appeared from time to time of some of the articles, under the general title of *Bible Key Words* (London: A. & C. Black). These include Love, The Church, Sin, Righteousness, Gnosis, Apostleship, Basileia, Lord. The S.C.M. has published the article on Servant of the Lord as Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 20.

39. J. Pedersen, *Israel: Its Life and Culture* (Oxford and Copenhagen; Vol. I/II, 1926; Vol. III/IV, 1940). The first Danish edition appeared in 1920.

40. W. Eichrodt, *Man in the Old Testament* (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 4. London: S.C.M., 1951).

41. London, S.C.M., 1956.

42. E. C. Rust, *Nature and Man in Biblical Thought* (London: Lutterworth, 1953).

43. G. E. Wright, *The Biblical Doctrine of Man in Society* (Ecumenical Biblical Studies, No. 2. London: S.C.M., 1954).

44. R. P. Shedd, *Man in Community* (London: Epworth, 1958).

45. S. Mowinckel, *He that Cometh*, transl. by Anderson (New York: Abingdon, 1954).

46. J. Klausner, *The Messianic Idea in Israel from its beginning to the Completion of the Mishnah*, transl. by Stinespring (New York: Macmillan, 1955).

47. H. Ringgren, *The Messiah in the Old Testament* (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 18. London: S.C.M., 1956).

48. Space permits mention only of A. R. Johnson, *Sacral Kingship in Ancient Israel* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1955).

theology continues. As Barr expressed it,[49] one must accept one or both of two propositions: (1) Israel believed God had acted in history. (2) God has in fact acted in history. No one would dispute the first, nor its corollary that she interpreted her history in the light of that belief. It is difficult, sometimes impossible, to know whether the historical event can be recaptured. The acceptance of the second proposition is a matter of faith, but the historian is still left with the task of recapturing the event.

> We may return to the fundamental conviction of the Hebrew people that God is most clearly revealed in history and say that whether the revelation of God in history is seen or overlooked depends upon the seeing eye. Yet the revelation of God is not "in the eye of the beholder" but is the *datum* of history. Therefore it is important that the facts should be correctly recorded and accurately assessed.[50]

But is Krister Stendahl right in saying that when the biblical scholar has described the faith of Israel or the Church he must hand over to the theologian the question of "what all this 'means' to the Church?"[51] The difficulty is in part sheer human limitation. In order to deal with the question of what the Old Testament "means" to the Church, one must have some acquaintance with the work being done in New Testament, Church History and Systematic Theology. For example, it is difficult for me, a student of the Old Testament, to deal adequately with Barth's exegesis of 1 Kings 13,[52] or of the Creation story.[53] That he has done violence to the text I have no doubt. Bultmann[54] accuses Barth of using a body of abstract categories in his biblical exegesis, of an inadequate statement of what "history" is, and of failing to define the relation between historical event and faith. He himself demands that scientific exegesis deal with the "relevant interpretation of human existence." All of this is important to me as an exegete, a Christian, and a preacher—but I do not have the philosophical and theological competence to enter fully into the debate. On the other hand, I do not believe that this absolves me from all participation, if for no other reason than that my own unexamined presuppositions are brought out thereby. As indicated earlier, the preacher must at least come to terms with the questions raised.

In "coming to terms" it is helpful to know how the Bible has been used in the Church. At least two aspects of the subject are important here—how the Church interpreted the Old Testament, and the authority with which

49. *Canadian Journal of Theology*, III (1957), p. 145. The entire article, "The Problem of Old Testament Theology and the History of Religion," is well worth reading.

50. S. B. Frost, "History and the Bible," *Canadian Journal of Theology*, III (1957), p. 96. Cf. B. D. Napier, *From Faith to Faith* (New York: Harper, 1955). Also the symposium, "Problems in Biblical Hermeneutics," in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LXXVII (1958), pp. 18 ff.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 37. This is the problem which Fairweather discusses from the theologian's point of view in *Canadian Journal of Theology*, II (1956), pp. 65 ff.

52. *Church Dogmatics*, II, 2 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957), pp. 393 ff. Cf. Mathers, "Biblical and Systematic Theology," *Canadian Journal of Theology*, V (1959), pp. 23 f.

53. *Church Dogmatics*, III, 1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1958), *passim*.

54. "The Problem of Biblical Hermeneutics," in *Essays Philosophical and Theological* (London: S.C.M., 1955), pp. 258 ff.

it vested the Jewish Scriptures. (A further question is the extent of the Canon, but space precludes a discussion of this important point.) I do not for a moment suggest a return to the views of the Fathers regarding Scripture, but we have much to learn from them. The studies of Grant,[55] Hanson,[56] and Smalley,[57] to mention only a few, have cleared away a lot of the rubbish which has accumulated. Too often "typology" has been sneered out of court by "modern" scholars. We cannot use the method as the Fathers did, but we must understand the principles and the ends the Fathers had in view. Once we grant that the Old Testament must speak to us, we must somehow translate its images into contemporary terms. What the Old Testament said to the Fathers is part of the life-blood of their faith, and we are in some measure, however differently we may define the term, heirs of the Fathers.

There has indeed been a revival of typological exegesis. Vischer[58] was almost as thoroughgoing as any of the Fathers in his use of this method to show that every page of the Old Testament witnesses to Jesus Christ. His book has been severely handled,[59] and seems to have had few followers in the scholarly world.

The charge has often been laid that typology ignores history. The real problem is to define the canons by which typology can be applied. As Lampe points out:

> The typological method of exegesis, when properly applied, is essentially the recognition in our interpretation of Scripture of its character as the record of the continuous process of the acts of God. In the light of their climax in the Christian revelation, we can begin to discern, with the New Testament writers themselves, the pattern of that record, and, as its name implies, the function of typology is to trace that pattern from its first adumbrations in the Old Testament to its clear manifestation in the New. It is primarily a method of *historical* interpretation . . .[60]

There must be, he says later, a real correspondence between the original historical and theological situation and its later fulfilment. Mere "verbal and etymological juggling" is obnoxious. The Old Testament must be interpreted in the light of the New, not *vice versa*. The fact that workable criteria for so doing are hard to find must not inhibit the continuous search for them.

55. R. M. Grant, *The Bible in the Church* (New York: Macmillan, 1948); *The Letter and the Spirit* (London: S.P.C.K., 1957).

56. R. P. C. Hanson, *Origen's Doctrine of Tradition* (London: S.P.C.K., 1954); *Allegory and Event: A Study of the Sources and Significance of Origen's Interpretation of Scripture* (London: S.C.M., 1959).

57. B. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952).

58. W. Vischer, *Das Christuszeugnis des Alten Testaments*. This has been appearing from time to time. An early volume was translated into English as *The Witness of the Old Testament to Jesus Christ*.

59. See, e.g., Kraeling, *op. cit.*, pp. 219–226; Porteous, *op. cit.*, pp. 337–340.

60. G. W. H. Lampe, "Typological Exegesis," *Theology*, LVI (1953), p. 202. See also Lampe and Woollcombe, *Essays on Typology* (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 22. London: S.C.M., 1957). Von Rad seems to have been thinking along the lines of typology as correspondence in his article "Typologische Auslegung des Alten Testaments," *Evangelische Theologie*, 12 (1952/53), pp. 17 ff. I regret that I have not been able to survey some of the interesting studies of typology and hermeneutics which have been coming out in Germany.

In the wider field of allegory, or spiritual exegesis, some work has been done. Most recently G. Cope[61] has entered the field with a fascinating and irritating book, *Symbolism in the Bible and the Church*. The biblical part is an attempt, among other things, to interpret the Bible in terms of Jung's "archetypes." Genesis 1:26, for example, is "more than an echo of an androgynous 'parent.' Somehow the sexes are thought of as being in the likeness of a single God who has a plural name."[62] The scientific exegete throws up his hands in horror. And yet—given the Jungian world-view, which I only understand sketchily at second hand, can one sweep Cope away simply because his exegesis is faulty? In quite another connection C. S. Lewis[63] speaks of "second meanings" in the Psalter, intending to show that great writers, especially poets, often said far more than they knew. The Genesis story deals with sexuality, procreation, fertility. These are, rather obviously, still part of man's life. How does the Genesis version apply to us? Cope's method may not appeal to us—to my own way of thinking it is wrong—but he has in his own way taken the Old Testament seriously and tried to interpret it to modern conditions.

Much more restrained is E. C. Blackman, in *Biblical Interpretation*.[64] He deals with the meaning of revelation, the question of authority, then with the development of exegesis from the Rabbis to modern criticism. It is admittedly a sketch, but because it is there one reads the last chapter, on "the present trend in Biblical exposition," with the greater confidence. The author quite clearly states that after sound exegesis of the literal sense the preacher must expound the spiritual sense, and gives three examples from the Old Testament, and a number from the New. He seems to be on the right track, though he has only scratched the surface.

This discussion of the history of exegesis, typology, and preaching brings us back to the principle that all study of the Old Testament must begin with sound study of the literal sense. Though little space has been devoted to it in this essay, the bulk of the major works of Old Testament theology reviewed here are primarily concerned with the reconstruction of the faith of Israel in its many-sided manifestations. This *must* be assimilated if any wholesome study or preaching is to be done. The descriptive work does lead to questions of organization and of "meaning." Though the problems are vast, so many tools are now available that the Old Testament scriptures are open for the Church to use as they have not been for a generation or more.

61. London: S.C.M., 1959.

62. *Op. cit.*, p. 113.

63. *Reflections on the Psalms* (London: Bles, 1958), pp. 99 ff. It is sometimes said that footnotes are the repository of undigested ideas. To this category belongs my feeling that Old Testament exegesis and preaching would benefit from consideration of works by contemporary students of literature. Lewis' *Allegory of Love* (Oxford, 1936), and Dorothy L. Sayers' works on Dante come to mind. Prof. D. K. Andrews called my attention to Helen Gardner's *The Business of Criticism* (Oxford, 1959), in which the author deals with Biblical matters, including allegory, as well as with her own field of English studies.

64. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1957. See also the short studies by R. H. Fuller, *What is Liturgical Preaching?* (London: S.C.M., 1957), and J.-D. Benoit, *Liturgical Renewal* (London: S.C.M., 1958).

The Gospel According to Thomas: A Gnostic Manual

F. W. BEARE

JUST after the end of the war, in 1945 or 1946, a remarkable collection of Coptic manuscripts was discovered by some Egyptian farmers in a ruined tomb near the village of Nag-Hammadi, the ancient Chenoboskion, in Upper Egypt. They contained nearly fifty documents in thirteen books, all in the codex form (not scrolls, but quires of folded leaves), written on papyrus, most of them still in their original leather bindings. Many circumstances combined to delay publication of the new documents. First there were disputes over ownership; one of the books was brought to Switzerland and added to the Bodmer Library in Geneva, where it was given the name of the Jung Codex, in honour of the great psychologist;[1] the others came gradually into the possession of the Egyptian government and have been lodged in the famed Coptic Museum of Old Cairo, where an international team of scholars is working at them. The Suez troubles led to a long interruption in the work, and the desire of the scholars themselves to make their studies as complete as possible put off still further the actual printing of the texts.[2] So it comes that it is only in the last two or three years that these important and interesting documents have begun to be put at the disposal of learned investigators, apart from the few who have been immediately charged with preparing them for publication.

I. General Character of the Collection

It has now become apparent that this library belonged to a Gnostic sect which stemmed from the school of Valentinus, the greatest of the Gnostic theologians of the second century. He was an Alexandrian Greek who moved

1. F. L. Cross, *The Jung Codex* (London, 1955); the *editio princeps* is published under the title *Evangelium Veritatis* (Zurich, 1956), by M. Malinine, H.-Ch. Puech, and G. Quispel, with translations into French, German and English. Four missing leaves, now in the Coptic Museum in Old Cairo, have been published in photographic facsimile by Dr. Pahor Labib in *Coptic Gnostic Papyri in the Coptic Museum at Old Cairo*, Vol. I (Cairo, 1956), which also contains photographs of the Thomas manuscript.

2. Dr. W. C. Till recently remarked: "There is little hope that these texts will be published in rapid sequence unless the present idea that a detailed commentary ought to be given in the *editio princeps* is abandoned" (New Sayings of Jesus in the Recently Discovered Coptic 'Gospel of Thomas,' " *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, Vol. 31, No. 2, March 1959, p. 448, n. 3). Since then Thomas has been published in a preliminary edition—*The Gospel According to Thomas: Coptic Text established and translated*, by A. Guillamont, H.-Ch. Puech, G. Quispel, W. Till and the late Yassah 'abd al Masih (Leiden and New York, 1959). Philip has been presented in a German translation, with notes, in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung* for January, 1959. Dr. Till himself promises an early edition of the Cairo pages of the Gospel of Truth in *Orientalia*.

to Rome about the middle of the century; he appears to have remained in the communion of the church until several years later. Until now, he has been known to us chiefly through the medium of his catholic opponents, especially St. Irenaeus, the great bishop of Lyons; but some writings of his disciples have long been available and there are a few citations from his own works in Clement of Alexandria and Hippolytus. The new texts will greatly increase our knowledge of his school and of its characteristic doctrines, and enable us to depict more clearly the theological struggles of the church of the second century.

II. Three New Gospels

Of the documents that have been published up to the present time, three bear the name of Gospel. First came the *Gospel of Truth* (part of the Jung Codex), then the *Gospel according to Thomas*, and most recently the *Gospel according to Philip*. Thomas consists wholly of *logia*—sayings attributed to Jesus, and sometimes little dialogues between Jesus and other people—Thomas, Matthew, Simon Peter, Salome, Mary (Magdalene), his disciples, and occasionally an indeterminate "he" or "they." The others are quite different in character; they do not profess to report words of Jesus, except incidentally, but are enunciations and expositions of Gnostic doctrines, offered as the true understanding of the Christian faith. What they actually teach is an esoteric theosophy, the "Gnosis (that is, knowledge) falsely so-called" against which we are warned by a contemporary Christian teacher writing in the name of Paul (I Tim. 6:20). The basic teaching of Thomas is no different, but it is presented as "the secret words which the Living Jesus spoke," with the assurance that "whoever finds the understanding of these words will not taste death." In fact, a great part of the book consists of authentic sayings of Jesus. Nearly half of them are paralleled in our own Gospels, from which indeed they may have been derived; and it is possible that some of the others may be genuine sayings of our Lord which have not been preserved in the canonical Gospels—they must be considered on their merits. But whether authentic or not, all the sayings are employed here in the service of the Gnostic doctrine.

III. General Features of the Gospel of Thomas

It is highly significant that in this Gospel, Jesus never acts. He is the Revealer, but he makes his revelation wholly by words. Now it is fundamental to the whole concept of divine revelation as given to us in the Bible that God reveals himself above all in action; "the mighty *acts* of the Lord" are the theme of the whole Old Testament, and the Jesus who speaks to us in the Gospels is not just a Voice proclaiming hidden truths, but a man of action, who "went about doing good, and healing all that were under the

tyranny of the devil" (Acts 10:38).[3] But the Jesus of the Gnostics is not a man of action. In fact, he is not a man at all. He is a heavenly Aeon or Emanation of divinity, who is neither born nor crucified—he has no real union with the human appearance in which men have seen him. The revelation which he brings is not given through the medium of a truly human life, lived in the particular human circumstances of Galilee, Jerusalem and Judaea of the early first century. Even the words, which are all that remain of his revelation, are not the words which he spoke in public, but "secret words" which he delivered to his disciples and which are known and understood only in the privileged circles of Thomas and his friends.

The Logia in Thomas, then, are not embedded in a narrative or related to a ministry of love and power. They are not even arranged in any kind of order. They are self-contained units, each standing by itself, without any connection with what follows or what has gone before. It is perhaps significant that the materials which have parallels in the Synoptic tradition never stand in the same order in Thomas as in Mark or Matthew or Luke. He has, for instance, all seven of the parables which are given in Matthew 13; but if we number these in the Matthaean order, we find that in Thomas the numbers would run as follows: 7, 1, 3, 2, 4, 6, 5—and they are not collected, but spread over a wide area, from Logion 8 (The Fishnet) to Logion 109 (The Hidden Treasure). We might add, also, that just as Jesus never acts, in this Gospel, so none of his words embody a call to action on the part of his disciples; there is nothing remotely resembling the call to take up the cross and follow Jesus, to love your neighbour, or even to pray. Thomas, indeed, seems to be opposed to prayer and fasting and giving of alms. The knowledge of the truth has no issue in works of piety and charity.

IV. Date of the Gospel of Thomas

The manuscript which contains Thomas cannot be dated with certainty; competent specialists place it as early as the third century and as late as the sixth. The translation into Coptic will of course have been made somewhat earlier. The main question, however, is the date of the Greek original. The editors are inclined to think that it may have been compiled as early as A.D. 140; in any case, it cannot be much later than the middle of the second century. The significance of this early dating lies in the fact that there were still floating oral traditions of Jesus which had not been embodied in documents, and this means that we must envisage the possibility that Thomas drew part or all of his material from oral tradition, or that what he drew from documents may have been modified by independently-transmitted oral versions with which he was acquainted. The problem of determining the sources of this Gospel is accordingly very complex. In part, the author (or

3. Cf. the profoundly true remark of Austin Farrer: "God's revelation is not what anyone says, even though the speaker be Jesus himself. It is a power, a fact, active in the world, and compelling recognition" (*St. Matthew and St. Mark*, London, 1954, p. 10).

compiler) seems to have made use of other apocryphal gospels, especially the *Gospel according to the Hebrews* and the *Gospel according to the Egyptians*; for some of his *Logia* coincide with the wording of citations from these Gospels or correspond to remarks about them which we find in the early Fathers. In part, he seems to have drawn upon our canonical Gospels, especially Matthew and Luke; and it is possible that all of his *Logia* which are represented by parallels in the Synoptics are derived from them, however differently they may be framed and arranged—"Thomas" himself may be responsible for the recasting. In part, he makes use of materials which are not found elsewhere; and in every case, we must try to determine whether he has invented them himself or whether they may possibly be fragments of an oral tradition; and there is always the possibility that genuine sayings survived in oral tradition as late as the middle of the second century. Questions such as these cannot be easily or hastily answered; they will call for patient investigation and strenuous debate. It has already been shown that there are some interesting points of contact between the Logia of Thomas and the form in which sayings of Jesus are cited in the Clementine literature;[4] and other byways of ancient Christian writings will have to be explored diligently in the search of kindred relationships.

V. Personalia of the Logia

(1) THOMAS

The book opens with the sentence: "These are the secret words which the Living Jesus spoke and Didymus Judas Thomas wrote." Here we might remark that the Gnostic sects generally claimed to possess a tradition of secret teaching which Jesus had communicated to one or other of his disciples, and which had then been preserved by an elite group but was unknown to the *doctrina publica* of the church. Against this, the catholic Fathers argued that the apostolic tradition was not secret in the first place, and that it was absurd to suppose that the apostles would have withheld an esoteric doctrine from their legitimate successors, the bishops, while they committed it to the obscure founders of the Gnostic schools. But the author of this Gospel is not content with a general theory of secret doctrines. For him, there are some doctrines which are still more secret and may not even be uttered. According to Logion 13, Jesus asked his disciples to say what he was like. Simon Peter compared him to a righteous angel, and Matthew to a philosopher; but Thomas affirmed that his mouth would be unable to express any such comparison. This answer was evidently taken as a mark of superior spiritual discernment, for Jesus now declared: "I am not your Master, for you have drunk, you have become intoxicated from the bubbling spring which I have meted out." The thought is probably that Thomas no longer needs a Master, for he has the source of knowledge within himself;

4. G. Quispel, "L'Évangile selon Thomas et les Clémentines," *Vigiliae Christianae*, Vol. XII, No. 4 (December, 1958), pp. 181–196).

intoxication is here probably a figure for the highest spiritual ecstasy, the mystical participation in the divine nature. With that, Jesus took Thomas aside and spoke three words to him. Afterwards, the others asked Thomas what Jesus had said, but he refused to tell them; for, said he, "If I tell you . . . , you will take up stones and stone me; and fire will come from the stones and burn you up." Perhaps there is an echo here of St. Paul's words about his visions and revelations of the Lord, when he "was caught up into Paradise, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not permissible for a man to utter" (II Cor. 12:4). We are inclined to believe that the whole scene is a deliberately reconstructed version of the episode of the Messianic Confession at Caesarea (Mark 8:27–30). For the Gnostics, Jesus was not the Jewish Messiah, and the confession of the disciples must needs be cast in a quite different form; it is in keeping with Gnostic ways of thought that it should be veiled in mystery. Even the refusal of Thomas to tell what he has heard may be suggested by the words of Mark 8:30: "He charged them to say nothing about him."

Thomas is a considerable name in apocryphal literature. There is an infancy gospel, quite different in character from this Gnostic work, which is also known as the "Gospel of Thomas,"[5] and there is a Syrian book of the "Acts of Thomas,"[6] which even uses the double name "Judas Thomas" found in our text—the name "Didymus," which is joined with them, is simply the Greek equivalent of the Semitic name Thomas, which means "Twin." There is, of course, no reason to suppose that the Apostle Thomas had the remotest connection with any of these books, which were produced long after his death. The author has simply adopted an apostolic name to give authority to his work. A speculative interest in Thomas is already evident in the Fourth Gospel (John 11:16; 14:5; and especially the resurrection-story of John 20: 24–29); the name Didymus may itself have awakened this legend-creating interest, which was ultimately to credit Thomas with the evangelization of India. In the Acts of Thomas, the source of this legend, Thomas is the twin brother of Jesus.

(2) SIMON PETER

The Prince of the Apostles plays a relatively slight role in the Gospel of Thomas, being mentioned in only two logia. Yet some trace of the tradition of his primacy is retained even in Logion 13 (discussed above), in that he is the first of the disciples to speak; and again, in the last logion of the book (No. 114), he seems to act as spokesman for the whole company of disciples in questioning the presence of Mary Magdalene (see below). There is an apocryphal *Gospel according to Peter*, which survives only in fragments.

(3) MATTHEW

Matthew is mentioned only in Logion 13, but merely as a foil to Thomas. Another apocryphal Gospel was put out under his name.

5. M. R. James, *The Apocryphal New Testament* (Oxford, 1924), pp. 49–70.
6. K. Lake and J. de Zwaan, "Acts (Apocryphal), 5. The Acts of Thomas," in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Apostolic Church*, Vol. I, p. 37.

(4) MARY MAGDALENE

Mary is introduced twice in this Gospel, by her personal name alone; it is from other Gnostic works that we know that it is she, and not any other Mary, who is meant. She has an astonishing place in Gnostic speculation. In the Gospel of Philip she appears several times, and is called the "companion" or "partner" or "associate" (*koinōnos*—the Greek word is transliterated) of Jesus, and Jesus speaks much of his love for her, and of kissing her. There may be in all this a parallel to the pattern of Simon of Samaria, one of the earliest of the Gnostic teachers, who is said to have gone about with a prostitute of Tyre whom he called *Ennoia* ("Thought" or "Mind"), teaching people that she was a heavenly essence who had fallen into the defiling mire of this world, and had been redeemed by him.[7] The Mary Magdalene of the Gospels, the woman out of whom Jesus was said to have cast seven devils, was a natural candidate to play a like partner to the Gnostic Jesus.

Mary comes before us first in Logion 21, but only to put the question to Jesus: "What are thy disciples like?" In reply, he gives the parable of the Children in a Field, of which we shall have more to say later. More striking is the thought of Logion 114. Here Peter proposes that she should be dismissed from the company, on the ground that women are not worthy of the Life. To this Jesus answers that he will transform her into a male, so that she may become a "living spirit" like the others; and he adds the strange saying: "For every woman who makes herself male will enter the Kingdom of Heaven." With this we may compare a saying attributed to Jesus in the Gospel according to the Hebrews: "I am come to destroy the works of the female." Perhaps there were some who took this as a variant of the saying in the First Epistle of John, that "the Son of God was manifested that he might destroy the works of the devil." More seriously, it is clear that sayings like this reflect the asceticism, the demand for total abstinence from sexual relations, which characterized some of these sects.[8] Others, we may remark in passing, took the opposite course of permitting and even of advocating unbridled license.

(5) SALOME

Salome, like Mary, is a favourite figure among the Gnostics, who sometimes present her as the midwife of the Nativity. She appears only once in our Gospel, in Logion 61, where she says to Jesus: "Who are you, man, and whose son are you? You took your place upon my bench and ate from my table." To this she receives an enigmatic answer, and responds: "I am thy disciple." This Salome does not suggest the daughter of Herodias, the charming dancing-girl who asked for the head of John the Baptist, but the Salome who is mentioned in the canonical gospels as one of the three who

7. Justin Martyr, *First Apology*, i. 26; see the article "Simon Magus," by J. E. Roberts, in Hastings' *DAC*, Vol. II, pp. 493 ff. The Hymn of her redemption is translated (from Irenaeus) by R. M. Grant, in *Gnosticism and Early Christianity* (New York: 1959), pp. 76f.

8. See, for instance, the *Acts of Thomas*, c. vi; and the warnings in the Pastorals against sects which forbid marriage (I Tim. 4:3).

were last at the Cross and first at the Tomb (Mark 15:40 and 16:1). By the harmonization of these verses with John 19:25 and Matthew 27:56, she was identified as the sister of St. Mary the Virgin and the mother of the sons of Zebedee. All this rather suggests that the canonical gospels themselves already show indications of Christian speculation about Salome; at any rate, they provide in her a figure made to order for Gnostic allegorizing.

VI. The Parables in Thomas

The new Gospel contains fourteen parables. Eleven of these are known to us from the Synoptic tradition; three are otherwise unknown.

A. parables of the synoptic tradition

The eleven parables which are represented also in one or more of the Synoptic Gospels are sometimes given in Thomas with little significant change of form, sometimes even in a form that appears simpler and more primitive than that which they have assumed in the Synoptic tradition.

The Parable of the Sower (Logion 9) is a good instance. Here the picture is even simpler than in Mark 4:3–8, which is the source of the parallel versions in Matthew and Luke. The new Coptic text actually confirms the conjecture made by several scholars, that the phrase "by the wayside" (Gk. *para tēn hodon*) is a mistranslation of the Aramaic used by Jesus, which meant "on the road."[9] The Aramaic phrase *'al 'urha* is ambiguous, and susceptible of either translation. Now Justin Martyr, who writes about A.D. 150, quotes the Greek text in the form *eis tēn hodon*—"in, that is, upon the road"—the form that lies behind our Coptic text. It has been held that this is evidence to indicate that our parable was independently translated into Greek from the Aramaic.[10] There is at least a possibility that Thomas has here drawn upon a line of Syrian oral transmission independent of the Greek Gospels.

The Parable of the Slighted Invitation (Logion 64) is another which is simpler in structure than either of the parallel versions. The comparison here is particularly interesting, in that it is generally recognized that both Matthew and Luke give this parable in forms that have undergone substantial transformation in the course of transmission by word of mouth.[11] In Matthew (22:2–14), the story tells of a king who prepares a marriage-feast for his son; when the guests treat his invitation with disdain, and attack and even kill the servants whom he sends to carry it, he calls out his army and destroys the city and kills the murderous citizens; then he sends messengers out into the highways to invite everyone they meet to come to the wedding.

9. J. Wellhausen, *Das Evangelium Marci*, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1909), *ad loc.*; J. Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus*, tr. S. H. Hooke (London, 1958), p. 10, n. 4.

10 G. Quispel, "The Gospel of Thomas and the New Testament," in *Vigiliae Christianae*, Vol. XI, No. 4 (December, 1957), pp. 201–2.

11. See my own article, "The Parable of the Guests at the Banquet," in *The Joy of Study: Papers . . . to Honor F. C. Grant*, ed. S. E. Johnson (New York, 1951), pp. 1–14.

But among the guests, he sees one that has not put on a wedding-garment, and orders him to be thrown out. In Luke (14:16–24), there is no king, no wedding-feast, no war and massacre. It it a man with only one servant, who issues invitations for a dinner-party at his home. When the guests refuse at the last moment, he sends his servant into the streets and lanes of the city to invite the beggars—the poor, the blind, the crippled; and since there are still empty seats at the dining-table, he sends his servant out again to call in more strangers from the highways and hedges of the countryside. In Thomas, it is a man who invites "guest-friends"; and they all refuse, with one excuse or another. The host then sends his servant out into the roadways to invite everyone that he meets; and the parable concludes with the saying: "Tradesmen and merchants shall not enter the places of my Father." It is manifest that the structure of the parable in Thomas is much simpler than in either Matthew and Luke. It lacks the king with his retinue of servants which we find in Matthew; it lacks the double invitation, which Matthew offers as an allegory of the double rejection of God's messengers by Israel—first the prophets, then the apostles; it lacks the slaughter of the murderous citizens and the burning of the city, which in Matthew is an allegory of the fall of Jerusalem to the Romans, regarded by the early Christians as a punishment for the rejection of Christ and the persecution of his church; it lacks the Matthaean supplement of the expulsion of the improperly-clothed guest. At the same time, it lacks the Lucan extension of the invitation, first to the poor of the city, then to the wayfarers outside the walls, which in Luke is an allegory of the calling of publicans and sinners into the kingdom after the priests and the Pharisees have refused the invitation, and the subsequent expansion of the gospel into Gentile lands. Apart from the closing sentence, the parable in Thomas represents precisely what modern scholars would generally regard as the original form created by Jesus. The closing saying is itself probably a distorted reminiscence of the text which Jesus quoted to the money-changers in the Temple: "Make not my Father's house a house of merchandise" (John 2:16—not in the Synoptics).

Other parables, however, are given with radical changes, which have certainly been made deliberately, in order to transform them more explicitly into vehicles of Gnostic teaching. Here we must walk circumspectly, for it is now agreed by nearly all scholars that even in the canonical gospels, the parables of Jesus have been adapted to serve teaching purposes for which they were not designed. Professor Joachim Jeremias of Göttingen, in his great study of *The Parables of Jesus* (transl. S. H. Hooke, London, 1958), has distinguished seven "principles of transformation" which the parables have undergone in the usage of the church, by embellishment in detail, by application to a different audience, by a shift from eschatological warning to moral exhortation, by allegorizing, by fusing one parable with another, and so forth; and he has shown how very difficult and delicate a task it is to remove a parable from the setting in which the evangelists have placed it, in relation to the situation of their own time, and to reconstruct the setting

in which Jesus uttered it in the first place—which often gives it a very different point. The Gnostics, we must admit, were not without good ecclesiastical precedent for taking liberties with the parables to make them vehicles of their own teaching. Let us remark in passing that we have here an indisputable demonstration that the Scriptures, even the Gospels themselves, are not to be separated from the life of the church. The parables of the canonical gospels are not self-explanatory, but require to be interpreted by "the analogy of faith," that is, in terms of the wide tradition of teaching preserved and developed by the church; just as truly as the parables of this Gnostic gospel require to be interpreted in relation to the essential tenets of Gnosticism.

The Parable of the Fishnet (Logion 8) offers a good illustration. In our canonical gospels, it occurs only in Matthew (13:47–50), and is generally regarded as one of those which has already been reshaped into an allegory. T. W. Manson,[12] for instance, suggests (following R. Otto) that as Jesus delivered it, it consisted only of the first sentence: "the kingdom of heaven is like a net that was cast into the sea and gathered fish of every kind." "In the parable," he remarks, "the fishing presumably represents missionary work (cf. Mk. 1:17); but it is very curious missionary work which wins people only in order to reject them immediately they are won." He takes it that "the original parable has nothing to do with good and bad Christians. It has to do with the fact that just as a net collects fish of many different species, so the preaching of the Kingdom brings in men of many different sorts and conditions, men from all levels of society and of all degrees of culture, and so on." But in the course of oral transmission, or perhaps in the editing of Matthew himself, the parable has been transmuted into a warning that not all who enter the church will attain final salvation—unworthy and unfaithful Christians will be cast out. This point is made explicit in the interpretation which is given in verses 49–50; but the interpretation does not in fact fit the parable. In the parable it is the fishermen—that is, presumably, the missionaries themselves—who sort the fish as soon as they are caught, and cast out the bad (although the call is to sinners!—how then can they be turned away as soon as they have responded to the call?). In the interpretation, it is the angels of God who make the separation at the end of the age.

In Thomas, the parable takes on a surprisingly different form and has a quite different point. Here it reads: "The Man is like a wise fisherman who cast his net into the sea. He drew it up from the sea full of small fish. Among them he found a large, good fish. That wise fisherman, he threw all the small fish back into the sea; he chose the large fish without regret."

We observe that this is no longer a parable of the Kingdom of heaven at all. "The Man" would probably have been rendered "the Son of Man" by the translators who stand behind the Synoptics; these are alternative renderings of the one Aramaic phrase *bar-nasha*, which means literally "son of man," but has ordinarily the sense simply of "man." It would follow that the parable does not speak of the missionary activity of the disciples,

12. *The Sayings of Jesus* (London, 1949), pp. 198 f.

which draws all sorts and condition of men into the Kingdom; but of the redeeming action of Jesus himself, which consists simply of selecting the elite few who are worthy of salvation. For to the Gnostics, the Gospel was not a word of power for the salvation of sinners, but a revelation of hidden truth for a select handful of mankind who were truly "spiritual" and did not really need redemption in the sense of the forgiveness of sins. Several of the other Synoptic parables are distorted in some degree, though the particular point is not often clear.

B. NON-SYNOPTIC PARABLES

Thomas gives us three parables which are not found in any form in the canonical Gospels. The most interesting of these, and the only one that may be regarded as a version of a genuine parable of Jesus, is that of Logion 97, which we might call the Parable of the Broken Jar. In it, the Kingdom (of the Father) is compared to a woman carrying a jar of meal. While she is still on the road, the handle of the jar breaks and the meal begins to pour out, but she does not notice it; so it came that when she reached home, she found her jar empty. I would not venture to guess what this parable meant to Thomas and his friends, or what it might have been intended to illustrate in the teaching of Jesus, if in some form it does go back to him.

The Parable of Killing a Mighty Man (Logion 98) may have some relation to the general picture of the overthrow of Satan which is a recurrent theme in our Gospels—though in them it is the "binding" of the strong man, or the "casting out" of the prince of this world, not his killing (Mark 3:27 and parallels; John 12:31).

In Logion 21, in response to a question put by Mary, Jesus compares his disciples to children in a field that is not their own. When the owners come and demand that they restore the field, they "take off their clothes before them . . . to give back their field to them." This is perhaps an illustration of the doctrine that the true disciple must have no use for the world or the things of the world. There is, of course, an orthodox Christian doctrine of rejection of the world. "Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him" (I John 2:15). But in the Christian context, "the world" has a different meaning—it means the ordered (or disordered) society of human relationships in its alienation from God and hostility to him. But for the Christian, the material universe is not evil: it is God's creation, and it is basically good. To the Gnostic, on the other hand, the material universe is not the creation of the "living Father" revealed by Jesus, but of an inferior deity, who is the God of the Old Testament, the God of the Jews, and even the God of Justice; but has nothing to do with the God of love, the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. This fundamental dualism of matter and spirit pervades all Gnostic teaching.

The writer hopes to offer further comments on this new Gospel in a

subsequent article. What is written here will be sufficient, however, to expose the absurdity of suggestions that this is a "fifth Gospel," as if it were in any way worthy of comparison with the great quartet which established themselves in the esteem of the Christian church before the end of the second century, in open competition with Thomas and many other heretical Gospels. There is a possibility that critical research and debate may establish that Thomas preserves some few sentences which may reasonably be regarded as sayings of Jesus, hitherto unknown; and there is good ground to expect that form-critical study, by comparing the Synoptic elements in Thomas with their parallels in Matthew, Mark and Luke, will be able to discern more clearly than ever the manner in which the tradition about Jesus has been modified in the history of its transmission.[13] But it would be sheer delusion to imagine that any substantial increase in our scanty knowledge of the Jesus of History will ever be gained from Thomas or from any of the new Gnostic documents.[14]

13. Some of the sayings of this Gospel were already known in the Greek, from some papyrus fragments found at Oxyrhynchus in 1897 and 1903 by an expedition of the Egyptian Exploration Society headed by two Oxford scholars, B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt. They gave rise at the time to a quite extensive literature, and some of them have been discussed recently, in relation to the question of authenticity and also to their proper interpretation, by Joachim Jeremias, in his little book *Unknown Sayings of Jesus* (transl. R. H. Fuller; London, 1958). Much of his discussion will require revision in the light of the new discoveries.

14. A general commentary on Thomas is offered in *The Secret Sayings of Jesus* by R. M. Grant, D. N. Freedman, and W. R. Schoedel (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1960).

Psalm 139: An Exposition

S. B. FROST

I

LORD, thou hast searched me and known me." Part of the price we pay for living in this twentieth century is that even the classic devotional passages present their intellectual problems to us. If we are to gain the leisure of mind in which to ponder these writings profitably we must first face the problems and reach an intellectually honest answer. Only then can we banish our reservations and surrender wholly to the direction of wise men of religion, whether their writings be in scripture or without.

"Lord, thou hast searched me and known me." We view the passage with some perturbation. The psalmist dwells with happy wonder on the intimate and detailed character of God's knowledge of his outer and inner life. Can we still share his faith that God knows each one of us as intimately as that? The universe has in our generation become a strange and unfamiliar place. The nightmare world of science-fiction is rapidly becoming the stark reality with which we must learn to live. The astronomer tells us that our earth is but one planet in the solar system, which lies in the outer areas of a great belt of stars, containing thousands, probably millions of suns such as ours, all with their attendant planets. This great disc of flaming worlds, naively called by us "The Milky Way," appears itself to lie in the outer suburbs of a vastly larger universe, which we know contains untold myriads of galaxies, systems, and nebulae; and the chance that none of their planets are habitable is so remote as to be negligible. If inhabitable, then they are probably inhabited. If space-travel becomes a reality in the next generation or so, as it surely must, then our children and grandchildren are going to explore a universe full of unpredictable phenomena.

This new concept of the universe does not, however, make it any harder to believe in God. What it does is force us to try to conceive the grandeur of God afresh. If the God in whom we have hitherto believed is outdated by such astronomical phenomena, then clearly the terms in which we conceived him are far too small, and we must humbly revise all our thinking. We must reckon seriously with what we have always paid theological lip-service to: our inability to encompass the infinity of God. Because the Johannine tradition is that Jesus said, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father," we assume that we know all about God; but scripture recognizes that even after we have seen the light of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, there is still a great deal that remains hidden. It was Karl Barth who said that all revelation is christological, not scripture, and some of that hidden mystery is revealed, from time to time, for his creation

continues to declare the glory of God to those who have eyes to see. We theologians need to be respectful to the astronomer and his fellow scientists, for it is they who in our generation are the prime guardians of the doctrine of *Deus Absconditus*, and who bring us from time to time further knowledge.

It is also they who come to our aid in our present devotional exercises. We are not here concerned to argue theological theses for their own sake, but only to clear away our inhibitions before we enter on an understanding of the psalm as a religious document. Our hesitation is whether we can honestly say, "Lord, thou hast searched me and known me." In such a vast universe can any one individual claim the particular attention of the God who has such multiple and immense concerns? Is there not something too ludicrous, even for religious faith, in turning from the contemplation of such a universe as the astronomer shows this to be, and saying, "And the God who keeps it all in being has a personal concern for *me*"? The scientist assures us that it is not at all ludicrous. He insists that this is a universe, not a multiverse. The same forces which operate on the great nebulae also determine the structure of the atom. The wisdom which planned the solar system gives the same attention to the construction of each and every snowflake. If we think that the God of the outer spaces cannot have an individual knowledge of the millions of men and women on this planet, and possibly an individual knowledge of untold creatures on other planets also, then once again our understanding of God is too small. We are presuming that God is fenced about by our limitations. The human mind can only have one main object of attention at any one moment. Human love can only be given in any personal and individual sense to a relatively few persons. But we must beware of imposing such human inabilities on God. He can comprehend all things simultaneously. He can rule this vast universe and at the same time germinate a single seed. The wonders of his works are revealed by the telescope, but they also are disclosed by the microscope. The God of the universe is one very likely to be concerned with the lives of individuals.

There is a human analogy which may also be helpful. In our families, the only child is often seriously disturbed by discovering that he must share his parents' attention with a new-born brother. But he soon learns that while the attention is divided, the love is not. Love is not subject to mathematical laws, whereby two can only have half of what one alone would enjoy. Each child in a large family receives his parents' whole love. If we consider that on other planets, other creatures may share in God's attention; or if we recall that our planet is swarming with millions of men and women, hidden in the jungle of the Amazon, exposed on the steppes of Siberia or crowded in the cities of Europe; even so we can still confidently assert with the psalmist that God has a personal, particular, intimate knowledge of each one of us. Each can say "Lord, thou hast searched *me* and known *me*."

And now—our arguments ended—we can observe that it is not surprising they led where they did, for the religious man is by his own experience

compelled to make this affirmation. One of the basic facts of religious experience is that the individual is deeply aware of the particular and providential care which envelopes him. "Yahweh is my shepherd, I shall not want," avers another psalmist; and Jesus said, "Your heavenly Father knows you have need of all these things." Such a confidence is the holy ground on which the religious man kneels to pray. Like Naaman's two mules' burthen of Yahweh's soil, it gives him a *locus orandi.* But deprive him of the conviction that God knows him, individually, personally, by name, and you have taken away the very ground of prayer from under him and he cannot pray. We must then begin where the psalmist begins, or we cannot begin at all.

> O Lord, thou hast searched me and known me!
>
> Thou knowest when I sit down and when I rise up;
> thou discernest my thoughts from afar.
>
> Thou searchest out my path and my lying down,
> and art acquainted with all my ways.
>
> Even before a word is on my tongue,
> lo, O Lord, thou knowest it altogether.
>
> Thou dost beset me behind and before,
> and layest thy hand upon me.
>
> Such knowledge is too wonderful for me;
> it is high, I cannot attain it.

If this then is the kind of God with whom we have to do, and if this is the kind of knowledge which he has of us, then the whole universe is but the palm of his hand, and in every place and in every experience he is "closer to us than breathing, nearer than hands or feet." An interior sensitivity to his presence is built into us as radar is built into a ship, giving it awareness of iceberg and shore and a sense of direction on the darkest nights and in densest fog. Thus whether the circumstances be those of space or of time, we never find a limit beyond which his presence is not made evident to us.

We can, if we will, turn the poetical metaphors of the psalmist into sheer literalisms. Many of us have in fact done so. We climbed thirty, forty thousand feet over the great Atlantic, and we were aware of his presence in the plane as on the ground. We have gone a mile underground into a coal-mine, and found that our prayer for protection was as natural and confident as on the surface. We have taken the wings of the morning and have been swept in less than twelve hours from the very heart of Western civilization to stand quite alone on a bush airfield, surrounded only by the inpenetrable African forest, and waiting to face we knew not what—but though all familiar things were altered and the very sun had acquired a new and violent character, nevertheless the God to whom we turned for reassurance had not changed. Although familiar surroundings, loved ones, and all

that we held dear had been left far behind us in our flight, he had not removed. With him, there is neither near nor far but only presence.

Or, more significantly in these days when height and depth and distance no longer retain their former meaning, we can translate the metaphors of the psalm out of space and into time, for time not only retains its old significance but for our generation is becoming daily more meaningful. There is the time of the solar system and there is the time of the universe; there is the time of a nation and there is the time of a soul. There is both *chronos* and *kairos*. Of these we are here concerned with the time of the soul, and especially of those moments when *chronos* is heightened and intensified into *kairos*; that is, when some inner development of the personality relates itself to some meaningful coincidence of external event and together they build up for the individual into an experience in which time loses its successiveness and becomes endowed with a permanence which gives it an eternal quality. Such moments come but rarely, but they are unforgettable. We recall those highest and holiest moments of human love, when sun and moon and earth stood still; we view again that scene of awesome beauty, when only the poetry of Wordsworth could begin to suffice; we hear again that music of the "Eroica" which reached down to make vibrant our inmost being; we remember that moment of achievement when after long years of endeavour the thing was done—the printed book was in our hands, the house was built and paid for, the professional qualification was ours. As we look back, we see that what lifted that moment out of successiveness and into eternity was that in that experience he had drawn very near. "If I ascend to heaven, thou art there!"

There are those other moments. We relive that fragment of time when surrounded by gowned figures we lay isolated on the operating table, looking up at that immense dark eye which soon would glare down upon those disclosed secrets of our own body which we ourselves can never know, and in that moment of unprotected loneliness, we were aware as the darkness descended that it as the shadow of his wing. The moment of bereavement, the moment of disillusionment, the moment of sinfulness recognized for the first time, these were not abysmal for all their awful depth, because even there the uplift of his hand was perceptible, and we said, "underneath are the everlasting arms!" "If I make my bed in Sheol, thou art there." God knows us, and we know him—everywhere!

> Whither shall I go from thy Spirit?
> Or whither shall I flee from thy presence?
>
> If I ascend to heaven, thou art there!
> If I make my bed in Sheol, thou art there!
>
> If I take the wings of the morning
> and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea,
>
> even there thy hand shall lead me,
> and thy right hand shall hold me.

Even so, the psalmist knows that in our foolishness we have often tried to evade God. Like our father before us, we have tried impulsively to hide from him in the garden of life, or like the poet we have over a long period made a serious and grim business of running away from him.

> I fled Him down the nights and down the days,
> I fled Him down the arches of the years,
> I fled Him down the labyrinthine ways
> Of my own mind. . . .
> From those strong Feet that followed, followed after.[1]

Some of us fled because we feared that to know God, to be aware of his presence in every experience, would debar us from life's more exhilarating phenomena. We disliked his discipline, his morality, his "Mrs. Grundyism," and so we ran away and hid in good spirits and gaiety and jazz. But not the most insistent drumming can drown that still small voice, which asks "where are you, Adam? What is this far country, famine-stricken and friend-barren, in which I find you?"

> All which thy child's mistake
> Fancies as lost I have stored for thee at home.
> Rise, clasp My hand and come!

For others of us, it was our sense of shame which drove us to hide from the Holy One. However competent and successful we might seem to the world, and however assured to our friends, we knew that we had failed our own ideal and also knew full well that that ideal itself fell far short of the glory of God. Saints and mystics there might occasionally be among the millions of the human race, and for them there were doubtless spiritual adventures and personal achievements—but not for lesser mortals such as we. So we turned from religion to social betterment and we joined service clubs and community associations and became busy do-gooders; or perhaps, turned cynics, we set out steadily to make money. But neither good works nor getting ahead ever quite filled out the loneliness within. We remained disconcertingly aware of God, and we were never sure when some chance beauty or some moral challenge might not bring him home to us again. Not even the dark shadows of our self-distrust could wholly hide from us the thought of the high and the holy and the transcendently beautiful. The veiled truth breaks forth, ever and anon, to dazzle and bewilder us, as the lightning brilliantly discloses the whole night sky. There is no way of escaping him.

> If I say, "Let only darkness cover me,
> and the light about me be night,"
>
> even the darkness is not dark to thee,
> the night is bright as the day;
> for darkness is as light with thee.

1. Francis Thompson, "The Hound of Heaven."

II

Our psalmist has so far asserted two fundamental propositions. The first is that God knows me personally (vv. 1–6). The second is that I know God, inescapably (vv. 7–10). He presents these as elemental facts of man's experience—not of man as church-going, disciplined and instructed, *vir religiosus*, but of man as *homo capax dei*, natural man with his unnatural, unique capacity for being aware of God. What strange relationship is this, of a Creator who knows his creature, and of a creature who uncannily knows his Creator?

It is in the light of this relationship that the psalmist now looks at the wonder of his own being. There he also sees reflected the surpassing wonder of God. This is no mere "higher anthropomorphism," though we have long since recognized that this is the one source left to us from which to draw our theological thought-forms. We call God Father, we speak of him as personal, we ascribe to him understanding, purpose, love, because we know of no other categories in which to begin to express him. The *analogia parentis* is the only possible one, as the Church acknowledged when she deserted the metaphysical terms of the Logos-christology to return to the filial metaphors of scripture. All this is true, but what the psalmist is saying is something rather different. It is said that a cathedral once had a chancel roof so fine and so rare that no eye could grasp its elaborate pattern except when the baptismal font was filled, and its waters reflected the roof in their circle, and there one could see the whole design in its simple symmetry. Thus, too, in the wonder of his own being the psalmist sees reflected the surpassing wonder of God. He is saying: "He knows me, and I know him. Then in the strange miracle of myself the junior, fallible, human partner, lies a clue to the divine partner, to the ineffable mystery of God himself. Since I am in relationship of mutual knowing with him, I must be in some measure a revelation of his Being." "I am fearfully and wonderfully made" is an inspired mistranslation and "Thou art fearful and wonderful" is an equally inspired emendation, and together they express both aspects of the psalmist's thought.

He contemplates the wonder of his intricate physical being. The sheer skill required to compose so complex a creature as the psalmist knows himself to be argues for the close attention and regard which God must have given to the task. As the designer of an advanced machine has an unrivalled knowledge of its intricate complexity, born of the hours when he hung over the drawings, studied the performance of the sectional working-models, and slowly assembled the prototype, so even more the Creator of this harmoniously-articulated living organism knows his creature through and through.[2] From the fertilized ovum to the mature man, the Creator has carefully watched his whole development, and in the complexity of the

2. In v. 14 RSV has departed from MT pointing (reading *yādhaʿtā* for *yodhaʿath*). I think this is right in view of the psalm as a whole, but the change should have been noted in the margin.

creature and in the Creator's knowledge of his handiwork the ineffable wonder of the Divine Knower is reflected.

The psalmist is, however, aware of himself as something more than a physical organism. "The days that were formed for me" were all thought out and provided for, so that he commenced not merely upon a physical but also upon a spiritual development of maturing experience. He was created to be one who has "days," the successive moments of experience which build up into memory and character and become personality; he was designed to be one who could look back and forward in time, and who could gaze around him by virtue of that self-awareness which enabled him to make the fundamental distinction of self and not-self. It was this, too, which enabled him to look up and distinguish between the human "I" and the divine "Thou." It was this that enabled him to know God, and be known of him. "How precious to me are thy purposes (*rē 'eykhā*), O God." The psalmist lives a planned and providential life, because his Creator has thought it all out for him. The totality, the final end of the divine concern for him, is indeed beyond his reckoning!

But one thought is insistent. We have to remember that this is an Old Testament saint, for whom orthodoxy decreed that Yahweh had no further interest in men when death had overtaken them. But religion is often more far-sighted than theology, and conviction often runs deeper than orthodox opinion. The psalmist cannot think that any power or experience can destroy this relationship of mutual knowing. He phrases it obscurely because it is a new realization, which has long been maturing in the depths of his thought and now rises explosively to the surface: "When I awake, I am still with thee!" For all who have encountered it, the experience of knowing God and being known of him is the strongest argument that physical death is not the end but a beginning. The God who can stoop down to enter into this relationship of mutual knowing surely could not be content, simply because of the phenomena of death, to unknow his known-one. The religious man is persuaded that neither life nor death nor any other power can dissolve this relationship of divine-human knowing.

Here then is the mirror, the physical and spiritual wonder of man from conception to the eternity that beckons beyond the grave, and therein the mystery of God is reflected:

> For thou didst form my inward parts,
> thou didst knit me together in my mother's womb.
>
> I praise thee, for thou art fearful and wonderful.
> Wonderful are thy works! Thou knowest me right well;
>
> my frame was not hidden from thee, when I was being made in secret,
> intricately wrought in the depths of the earth.
>
> Thy eyes beheld my unformed substance;
> in thy book were written, every one of them,

the days that were formed for me,
when as yet there was none of them.

How precious to me are thy thoughts, O God!
How vast is the sum of them!

If I would count them, they are more than the sand.
When I awake, I am still with thee.

III

But as the knowledge of God is no purely academic exercise of intellection, the mere cognitive act of grasping the concept "God," but is rather a personal relationship of a demanding I-Thou quality, so too the reception of that relationship or its denial is not simply a matter of inconsequential opinion; it is rather the existential choice. A man chooses to know God, and through him a providential universe, and a kindly discipline of moral challenge; or on the other hand, he chooses not to know God, and thereby lives in an environment at best indifferent to his welfare, and devoid of moral values and responsibilities. Making the latter choice, the only considerations a man observes are those that serve his own appetites or his instinct for self-preservation. He is in fact the masterless outlaw of the bad lands of existence. Between him and the man who accepts the ultimate values of right and wrong there is a great gulf fixed. It is the ancient demarcation between the Sown and the Unsown, the separation of the unobligated Bedu, whose only defence is his ability to survive, and the feudal tenant, who has his place in an ordered existence, and is well aware both of the protection his master affords him and of the obligations laid in return upon him. It is the clash of the wilderness and the civilized community.[3]

Our psalmist recognizes this fundamental separation of mankind. He knows the division of the truly free from the lawless, the distinction between those who know God and accept his rule, and those who live in the wilderness and know no law. He asks that the difference between these two may always be clear to him. We miss any missionary zeal to win the wayward and the lost, but we do him an injustice if we impute to him any personal vindictiveness. He is not primarily seeking anyone's death, but is asking that basic issues of right and wrong may be made clear and that right be

3. Because there are tyrannies, and there is a servility born of fear, we have sometimes been misled into thinking of masterlessness as freedom, and of the liberty without which man is no longer man as constituted by the absence of obligations. The untrammelled life of the desert has been exalted at the expense of the land-tied serf. But this is to confuse the issues. A man with no concept of an ordered cosmos, wherein he has his accepted place, is the lawless man, the enemy of society. His apparent freedom is in fact caprice, and his seeming liberty merely a will to survive. Community life begets obligations, and it is only in responding to such obligations that personality can develop. All art has its discipline, and no great music can be composed in disregard of fundamental principles. Freedom lies not in being undisciplined but in having a right discipline freely chosen. The immigrant to the City of God is truly a free man.

vindicated. Above all he asks that he himself may never be in any doubt where he stands. He knows God, and God knows him! Let this always determine his choice! He is in effect saying with Joshua: "Choose this day whom you will serve . . . but as for me and my house, we will serve the Lord!"

> O that thou wouldst slay the wicked, O God,
> and that men of blood would depart from me,
>
> men who maliciously defy thee,
> who lift themselves up against thee for evil!
>
> Do I not hate them that hate thee, O Lord?
> And do I not loathe them that rise up against thee?
>
> I hate them with perfect hatred;
> I count them my enemies.

IV

And now the psalmist's thought comes full circle. "Lord, thou hast searched me and known me. . . . Search me, O God, and know my heart!" You have known me, but now go on to know me, ever more thoroughly!

The whole psalm, as we can now see, is a variation on the theme of knowing. The Hebrew word has an even fuller range of meaning than the English. The lower levels are the ordinary acts of cognition, as when David realized (knew) that Saul was plotting to kill him (I Sam. 23:9), and the meaning can rise to "have insight, discern, evaluate between," as when the woman of Tekoah tells David he has angelic wisdom "to discern (know) all things that are on the earth," that is, he is not misled by appearances but can get to the heart of the matter. But its distinctive quality emerges not in the process of knowing facts but in that of knowing persons. Jehu tells his fellow-captains concerning Elisha's emissary, "You know the fellow and his talk," meaning an understanding of that type of person, not a personal acquaintance with him. For this latter there has to be a mutual relationship, and this involves an element of decision. You may give yourself to such a knowing, or withhold yourself from it. Thus to know someone in this more personal sense means that you have distinguished him from your more general acquaintance, and "to know" means in such circumstances "to choose." God said of Abraham, "I know him"(Gen. 18:19), and to Jeremiah, "Before I formed you in the womb I knew you" (Jer. 1:5), and to Israel, "You only have I known of all the families in the earth" (Amos 3:2). In each case the translation should employ the verb "to choose." To enter deeply into this kind of relationship means the dropping of the barriers of your own personality and an exploration of the inner life of the other. Thus "to know" is used of the intimacy of husband and wife. "Lord, thou hast searched me and known me. . . . Search me, O God, and know my heart!" It is the authentic language of love. What we have in this psalm

is indeed a love-poem, free of all eroticism, but genuinely irradiated with the joy that comes from deep affection, warmly given and satisfyingly received.

> Search me, O God, and know my heart!
> Try me and know my thoughts!
>
> And see if there be any wicked way in me,
> and lead me in the way everlasting!

This then is the thought of the psalm: "God knows me, intimately, personally. And I know him, everywhere, inescapably. In the wonder of what he has created me to be, I also see the surpassing wonder of what he is. His knowing me is infinite, and my knowledge of him cannot be ended, not even by death. There are some who refuse to know him. May I always recognize them for the enemies they are! But I know him, and he knows me! Lord, know me more and more!" The poem has come to end where it began.

But there is one thing more to be said, only half-glimpsed perhaps by the psalmist, but fully expressed by St. Paul in the other great biblical poem of love. The last words refer to "the way everlasting," *bʾdherekh ʿolām*. It is, as the RSV marginal reference reminds us, the ancient, the familiar, the well-trodden way, the way of discipline, the way of obedience and of that happy service which is perfect freedom. But as the psalmist has already hinted it is also a new way, a way of eternity, *ʿolām*, a way unexplored, a way which begins on the further side of the sleep which we call death. It is therefore a way leading into the awakening dawn of new experiences. For eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man to conceive what awaits us in that way. But we can be sure that it leads to further enjoyments of knowing God. For here we see him as in a mirror darkly, but there face to face. Here we know only in part, but then we shall go on to know *as we have been known*. For now there remains only faith and hope and love, and the greatest of all things is that knowledge of God which is love.

Resurgent Religion

R. M. BENNETT

I

ANYONE who knows anything about world affairs accepts the fact that there is a resurgence of non-Christian religions. Most of our missionary leaders, for example, are not only aware of this resurgence, but also find in it a cause for deep concern. As a real factor in the life both of the churches and of the nations where the churches find themselves, it is the driving force in Christian Study Centres in Tokio, in the New Territories just outside Hong Kong, in Colombo, Ceylon, in Bangalore, India, in Lahore, Pakistan, and in other places. Some of the best scholarly work done to date on resurgent religions has been produced in these centres, and we should note that a good deal of it has been done by non-Anglo-Saxons and from a standpoint not seriously influenced by the teachings of Augustine or of the Reformers. Anyone who really wants to understand this important feature of the modern religious world will do well to study the literature emanating from these centres.

Whether the rank and file of the Christian churches in India, Ceylon, Burma, Pakistan, Japan, the Middle East, and North Africa have given thought to the immediate implications of the resurgence of non-Christian religions for their own life and mission is another question. Most of us are hesitant when it comes to facing what may be unpleasant. There is little indication that the Church in general, and its theological colleges in particular, have been willing to face the challenge of the new situation created by revitalized non-Christian religion. Indeed, it could readily be argued that there are more signs of awareness of the problem in our own secular colleges than in the circles concerned with theological education. Unless we change this situation soon we shall have a clergy and people who are illiterate as far as other religions are concerned, and that at a time when followers of other religions are pressing in upon us and our life from all sides as an overwhelming majority—that is to say, within the next twenty years.

In this year of grace 1960, the sheer geographical fact of distance has come to mean much less than it did even ten or fifteen years ago. What takes place on the borders of Jordan and Israel, or along the cease-fire line between North and South Korea, not only has an immediate effect on those areas, but also can easily affect all of us in all countries of the world. By the same token, such moral problems as the issue of segregation or *apartheid* can no longer be seen merely in a local setting; on the contrary,

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decisions made in one country arouse speedy reactions in every country in the world—more especially, of course, in the countries that make up the great land-mass of Africa and Asia.

To state that the Asian and African countries are undergoing a revolution is an understatement. Old colonial boundaries have been struck away and new nations are now appearing, which do not always follow the old pattern of colonial days. A marked degree of anti-Western feeling is apparent even in the satellite countries of Asia. Nationalism vents itself in a patriotism as real as anything that has been known in Poland, or Italy, or Ireland. Even countries like Thailand, China, and Japan are experiencing a revolution as great as anything that has been seen in India and Burma, or even greater. In every country of Asia, and in an increasing number in Africa—and therefore in the whole Middle East as well as in North Africa —resurgent religion and national pride go hand in hand to produce what can only be called ardent patriotism. Politically we must expect an even greater intensification of the spirit of nationalism in Africa than we have known in the past few years—a growth that will probably reach its peak within two years.

As Christian people interested in both the political and the spiritual aspects of this problem, we should ask ourselves just what our own mental reactions really are. Many of us were brought up on what might almost be called the doctrine that the Christian faith is perfect light, while all other religion is darkness. Moreover, most of us who are now between forty-five and sixty years old were conditioned by the great enthusiasms of the Student Volunteer Movement. Dr. Robert E. Speer, Dr. Sherwood Eddy, and Dr. John R. Mott were our spiritual heroes, and their enthusiasms were contagious. "The evangelization of this world in this generation" was their slogan and ours too. Even as late as the end of the Second World War many of us—including this writer—felt that most of the great historic religions had suffered a mortal blow and might reasonably be expected to collapse. Certainly we were convinced that if we had both the material and the human resources available for immediate forward movement, not only would the Christian faith gain the ascendency, but also the ancient religions, like the walls of the city of Jericho, would come tumbling down, provided only that we walked around them the requisite seven times and blew our trumpets as directed. The blowing of the trumpets certainly has been achieved, and probably we have walked around the walls even more than the requisite seven times—yet not only have the walls not tumbled down, but they might even be said to have become higher, wider, and stronger. Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism no longer seem to stand as isolated fortresses; on the contrary, they have become missionary religions. They are no longer on the defensive, but have definitely taken the offensive. We are compelled to recognize them for what they are—the faiths by which millions live—and the millions are increasing. Frankly we have as yet failed to make any real impact on any of these religions in terms of numbers. For

most of us this is a cause of deep disappointment, and a reason for not a little deep heart-searching.

II

We may profitably take a closer look at some of the particular areas concerned.

1. THE ARAB WORLD

Our preoccupation with the task of keeping our oil supplies intact and under our control has not helped to make us aware of the tremendous awakening of all Arabic countries. It is easy to dismiss the troubles that impinge on us as communist-inspired, and for many this remains a stock answer. But any attempt to understand an awakened Arabic world that omits to take into account an awakened Islamic religious consciousness is doomed to failure before it starts. Certainly Arab national unity poses a problem for Islam, which has always thought of itself in terms of political unity, and the contradictory claims of Brigadier Kassem on the one side and Colonel Nasser on the other, both appealing in the name of religion, do puzzle the devout of Islam, but the loyalties thus reawakened are overriding the political divisions and giving great strength to all Arabic appeals for national self-expression.

Today Islam is the fastest growing religion in all Africa. It is strengthening its hold in Asia. In Africa Muslim converts outnumber the converts to the Christian faith. Muslims have no missionary organization, no missionary secretary, no professional leadership of any size. They do not have a paid priesthood. In practice their priesthood is a priesthood of believers, and they are proud that their believers form a real brotherhood. Neither racial nor colour restrictions are permitted within it, and economic status entitles no man to a special seat among the faithful at prayers. The mosque is the meeting place of all Islamic mankind. Islam is one of the most active religions in the world. While natural increase does account for a good proportion of the increase in its numbers in recent years, we of the Christian faith would do well to remember that Islam is promoted by its merchants, its traders, its artisans, its barbers and its washermen—yes, even by its mendicants.

2. RESURGENT HINDUISM

In 1947 the independent Republic of India was formed within the Commonwealth. By her Constitution India was officially declared to be a religiously neutral state. Implementation of that ideal has been difficult, simply because in the minds of the vast majority of her people the majority religion, Hinduism, is equated with historic and national culture. India's leaders are sincerely committed to a policy of religious freedom, which includes the right to propagate one's own religion. This should not,

however, blind us to the strength of a revived Hinduism in India. I want to illustrate this with a few examples, taken from my own experience, which could be multiplied many times over. About two years ago, in the city where we were living on the east coast of India, India's Vice-President, Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, addressed a large public meeting. This meeting was held in a large palm-leafed shelter known as a "pandal," and the temperature was well over 100 degrees. About three thousand people attended the meeting which lasted for almost two hours. Dr. Radhakrishnan took as his text the New Testament verse, "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone. . . ." Following the best Christian homiletical tradition, and in a marvellously convincing way, he went on to point out to his largely Hindu audience that unless Hinduism was willing to be buried in the ground with all its undesirable accretions, its caste-system, its snobbery, and its many outmoded practices, it could never attain to its divinely-inspired mission—that of bringing its wonderful message, first to all India, and then to the world. Only thus could mankind be saved from a destruction of its own making. Shortly before this occasion, my wife and I were visiting a small town built around the hydro-electric station at Jog Falls in Mysore. I had been invited to address a small group of Telugu Christians who had come to live there. As I was being conducted to the meeting by an Indian Christian brother, we passed the local cinema. There was no parking space left around it, or near it, and a great crowd was making its way into the building. I asked my guide what picture was showing. He replied that no picture was being shown, but that Dr. ——— (one of Mysore's best known lawyers and newspaper editors, with a doctorate from an overseas university) was in town to give a philosophical lecture. His theme was "The Cultural Glories of Hinduism," and as far as I could see there were few Hindus in that area who were not attending. In India, the radio system is patterned after the B.B.C., and is government-owned, but no daily program ever begins without a morning prayer period—almost invariably Hindu—and almost all the programs are slanted to some extent towards Hindu religious thought. No public work is ever begun or opened without a religious ceremony. No ship is launched, no new steam-locomotive set on the tracks, and no bridge built, without an overt and planned act of Hindu worship.

In the face of modern science Hinduism has proved more flexible than Christianity. It has moulded itself so adeptly that the teachings of modern science do not appear in opposition to Hinduism but rather seem to be its natural outcome. Certainly atheism as such is a rare phenomenon in India, though religious agnosticism may be common. Religious expression is as visible as ever, and is fully adapted to modern living. For example, a bus driver—whether of an old and rickety model, or of one of the most recent chrome-plated monsters—will first smear the bonnet of the bus with sandalwood paste and then stand in front of his vehicle in an act of devotion before he begins his day's work. Similarly, the highly skilled technician

handling a great modern mechanical wonder will go through some form of religious exercise on many occasions in the course of his work. To a Hindu, far from being incongruous, this is a reasonable and perfectly normal procedure. I am not aware of similar thoughts on the part of most bus drivers in our own country, or of similar practices among technicians.

Hinduism, with all its variety, has no central organization. Indeed its glory is that it is not an organization in any sense of the word, but a way of life. As such it may be freer than highly organized religions to adapt itself where the conditions indicate. For instance, although Hinduism has not been known for its congregational type of worship, in recent years congregational worship, which the whole family may attend (and the whole neighbourhood hear through loud-speakers) has become quite common. Ashrams, normally considered to be places of "retreat," are becoming centres of "out-going." The "guru" and his disciples no longer consider that the people must come to them, but realize that they must go out to the people. Training of Hindu "sadhus" as religious expositors is not unknown, and "preaching missions" to Hindus are frequently held throughout the country.

It would not be correct, however, to depict all this as a liberalizing movement. In some cases exactly the opposite is true, and there are signs of a hardening that may be far more lasting than the liberalizing influences. Movements such as the Mahasabha, the Raja Swaya Sevak Sangh, the Arya Samaj, and many others, are all strict right-wing movements, which contain the seeds of a religious autocracy, and show signs of a reversion to the observance of some of the strictest tenets of Hinduism. Nonetheless, whatever form its revival may take, we cannot overlook the fact that Hinduism is more alive today than it has been in living memory, and that in its renascent form it is more appealing than ever.

3. RESURGENT BUDDHISM

In 1956–57 the twenty-fifth centenary of the birth of Siddartha Gautama —"Buddha," or the Enlightened One—was celebrated in many countries. In Eastern lands it was referred to as Buddha Jayanti. In Rangoon there was a meeting of the Great Council of the Buddhists (of the Theravada or Hinayana tradition), which had last met some twelve centuries before. The purpose of the Great Council was to re-study the recorded teachings of Lord Buddha, and to check them for accuracy and examine them in the light of current teaching. In this they sought to see Buddhism in the setting of a badly disorganized, frightened, and war-torn world, threatened with utter destruction through atomic war. For some six months the leaders of the Council met in meditation, study, and prayer. The fact that this assembly was held in a man-made cave of great proportions, built by the Burmese government at considerable expense, is not without significance. To say the least, the Council was one of the most important conclaves of the twentieth century—however little coverage it may have received in Western newspapers.

Living as we were in India we were able to see something of the observance of the festival from nearby, and later to visit the Council centre in Rangoon. One of the most significant incidents of the Jayanti celebrations took place during the visit of the President of China to India, when he visited the Buddhist Temple together with Dr. Radhakrishnan, and the two men paid their respects in the giving of the traditional scarves and worshipped together. Somewhat later my wife and I went to one of the exhibitions of Buddhist art which were organized by the Government of India and visited by hundreds of thousands of Indians and other Asians and by a handful of Westerners like ourselves. One object of the exercise seems to have been to show that Buddhism was an outgrowth or a variant of Hinduism, which delivered itself of a great, world-moulding message that travelled as far as Japan in the East and Greece in the West, yet returned to the bosom of its mother to be accepted as part of India's great mass of truth. But behind this objective there was a stronger motive—the desire to present the life of Lord Buddha in graphic art. This presentation concerned itself with such details of the story of Gautama as the annunciation to his mother; the painless birth; the standing still of the animals of the forest and the quiet of the birds of the heavens at this miraculous (or at least notable) event; the dedication in the temple; the temptation in the jungle; the "enlightenment," or transfiguration; the feeding of the poor and healing of the sick; the Buddha's suffering for mankind, and his final appearance to his disciples and ascension into heaven. (Something of this sort is found in more permanent form in many Buddhist temples, such as the clean and very beautiful Buddhist temple at Galle Face in Colombo, Ceylon.) In addition to this great pictorial exhibition, there were many exhibits of Buddhist art and culture, some of them of great value and irreplaceable. Thailand, Burma, Ceylon, the British Museum, and the Smithsonian Institution all sent contributions; but the contribution of China—impressive, well displayed, and worth a fortune—was the most notable. It was accompanied by a small brochure, well prepared and illustrated, on the Government of China's work in restoring Buddhist temples and shrines that had fallen into disrepair.

Buddhism has revived. In Burma it is the state religion. In Ceylon it is militant, and its right-wing monks, often devoted to left-wing politics, bring heavy pressure to bear upon their government. In Thailand it is the age-old state religion, constantly refurbished. In Saigon, Vietnam, with American monetary assistance, it has built one of the loveliest of all its modern temples. In Japan Buddhism is perhaps most active in a reappearance of the sect known as "Zen."

From Buddhism as a whole comes a seemingly united pronouncement: The religion of the West has failed to bring peace to man; only the message of the Buddha can save mankind from the destruction of its own making. To this end Buddhists are committed to sending forth missionaries—to the West as well as to the East and to the islands of the sea. Further the Thera-

vada school has undertaken the preparation of a concise Buddhist Bible to give guidance and counsel to its missionaries in their task.

III

Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism are all reviving. If space permitted, one could speak of revival in Sikhism, and of a new feeling of strength in Jainism. All this can, of course, be explained away to some extent, by the assertion that this is simply the renascence which we as Christian nations experienced about four hundred years ago and which is now catching up with the rest of the world. This may be a partial explanation, but it is far from being the whole story.

It would be of value for us as Westerners to recall that religion plays a very important part in the lives of the Asian people—a much greater part than it does for us at this stage of our development. At birth and death, and at all intermediary stages, religion has its accepted role. Actively acknowledged from morning to night, and intricately woven into an understanding of the stars by night, religion plays a vital part in the lives of the Asian peoples. That is why religious revival cannot be separated either from cultural revival or from its political accompaniment. In the case of Islam, this political link is strengthened by what we might call the attitude of Muslims, which always sees religion in a political setting.

It is in this context that we should consider the definite reasons for revival of religion in Asia today. While a detailed study of these would fill a volume, for our purposes we can reduce them to four. (i) First and foremost, there is the encounter of non-Christian religions with the Christian missionary enterprise. Missionary Christianity has influenced all three religions at their very heart, by challenging them to take a very close look at themselves in the setting of a fast-changing world. (ii) A positive influence has been exerted by the lives of national leaders like Thakin Nu, Mahatma Gandhi, and the modern Islamic poets (to name only a few). (iii) Attachment to traditional religion has been deepened by the desire for, or achievement of, political freedom. (iv) The revival of national culture and language has had a similar effect.

From these causes stem two very obvious results: (i) the birth or re-birth of a missionary spirit and impulse, and an emphasis upon the global aspect of the particular religion; (ii) efforts within each religious tradition to catch up with the modern world and the new problems which must be faced, and to prove both to friend and to stranger that the religion's characteristic message can bring peace out of chaos.

IV

We must now go on to a brief review of some of the more serious consequences of the resurgence of non-Christian religions for the Christian

churches. In the first place, I should like to note certain implications of this resurgence for the life and work of the "younger churches."

(i) For one thing, these churches, wherever they are, must learn (and learn soon) to stand on their own feet, relying only on the great resources found in Christ. They must be able to show to their own people that the religion of Jesus Christ is not a Western belief that must inevitably denationalize them, but that on the contrary it is a faith which meets the needs of all men everywhere and makes them better citizens of their own countries than they could otherwise be.

(ii) Secondly, the new situation demands a very different pattern of Christian extension (not to say, existence) from our present system. It may well be that conditions will develop under which all connections with the West will be cut off (as in the case of China today), and that the only remaining link will be the spiritual tie of prayer.

(iii) Thirdly, the new situation will most certainly lead to a drawing together of the members of the many different churches now to be found in Asia and Africa. Most of these divisions were not created by them, but were exported by us. Frequently they continue because of influences from denominational headquarters thousands of miles away, exerted through control of funds, and critical of the younger churches' actions. Minorities all over the world are drawing together. The Christian churches in Asia and Africa are also drawing together and will continue so to do. Even "Faith Missionary" societies are drawing themselves into closer fellowships and following lines of co-operative action.

While the resurgence of non-Christian religions is most immediately significant for the Christian churches growing in the native soil of these great religions, it also raises profound issues for the Christian people of the West. The more urgent of these should be spelled out, at least summarily.

(i) In the midst of a world divided by chaos and fear, much of it of our own making, and in the face of resurgent religion, a divided Christendom has little relevance.

(ii) We should do well to examine the teaching of our own Scriptures in such significant statements as the assertion, "Other sheep I have, which are not of this fold" (John 10:16), or the words of Peter to Cornelius: "Truly I perceive that God shows no partiality, but in every nation any one who fears him and does what is right is acceptable to him" (Acts 10:34). We need to re-examine our understanding of the doctrine of God the Creator, and to ask how he has worked out his plan in other days, in other places, and among other people.

(iii) Most of all perhaps, we need to re-examine our understanding of the work of God the Holy Spirit. It would probably be agreed by Christians of all shades of opinion that God the Holy Spirit is God at work in the hearts and lives of men. The Holy Spirit of God is the initiator of every good thought, every impulse to holiness, every good deed. The Holy Spirit is God

at work in the universe fighting against sin. Should we not be prepared, then, to take the logical step of saying that if Hinduism cleans up its temples and removes what it now considers to be indecent, if Hinduism draws men together in a worship that now lays a heavy emphasis upon the ethical and moral, this is also his work? If it is not his work, then who is doing it? Is our faith able to see God at work in the revival and resurgence of non-Christian religions? Or at least are we prepared to see in this revival the judgment of God upon our own indifference, lethargy, and inadequacy of effort?

(iv) We must realize further that in this age of modern communication and mobility of peoples our own actions as people who are known to be Christians have an immense effect upon our testimony to the Kingdom. There is much in our national behaviour and customs that stands squarely across the way where the Gospel should have free passage.

(v) Has all this nothing to say about Christian missionary education and theological education? A whole generation of students now going through our colleges and soon to influence the life of our churches has been conditioned by the writings of Toynbee and Radhakrishnan—to say nothing of the mass of publications on non-Christian religions now readily and cheaply obtainable in any bookstore. To such a generation will the exportation of the Christian religion be either desirable or justifiable? The very notion of a Christian world mission could easily appear presumptuous. As for theological collegs, unless we incorporate into our teaching a real and practical emphasis upon non-Christian religions and their relation to the Christian faith we shall have a clergy which, because it is illiterate in this most important field, will be utterly incapable of giving a necessary leadership at a time when the real confrontation with non-Christian religions must take place. At least as much emphasis must be given in our theological training to other religions as we give to Plato and Socrates (to say nothing of a whole host of their successors). In other words, the teaching in our theological colleges must be re-orientated so that we see ourselves as a missionary people, able not only to give a reason for the faith which is within us, but also to show how this faith is the fulfilment of the greatest and deepest desires of all mankind.

(vi) What have we to say about the modern missionary organization of the Church? Much of our organization seems to exist simply for the sake of perpetuating itself. Much of our money and manpower is dedicated to maintaining the *status quo*. There is no really imaginative program on our books anywhere in the world. We feel happy if we can "hold our own." How much of this is due to our having become weighed down by our missionary machinery? We might note, for example, that terrible contradiction in terms, the "Mission Station." Mission implies mobility; station means standing still. The "Foreign Mission Society" seems dedicated—often against its will—to turning wheels that move so very slowly, if they move

at all. This inertia can only mean that we have failed to grasp the meaning of "mission" in the light of New Testament teaching. We set up a dichotomy between "the Church," meaning us at the centre, who send, and the "Mission," meaning organizations set up to achieve a particular purpose, customarily in some place other than "here," and usually in foreign lands—and dominated by the idea that the people "there" are simply to receive. We cling to this idea until all our thinking about other people and other nations is unconsciously ruled by it. But to maintain this very old (and perhaps once valid) dichotomy is exceedingly dangerous. It is not built on the New Testament, for there the younger churches send their gifts to the older Church in Jerusalem, and Paul never writes about "foreign missions." Nor do the great teachers of the Christian faith through history. "Foreign Mission" is a very modern term. The Scriptures refer to the "Churches," not to "Missions." In so far as we cling to this idea, we assume that we must continue to be the pioneers and set up the new work, and imply that the primary duty of the younger churches is to become established. Thus we deprive the younger churches of the joy and the growth that comes through fulfilling the duty of every Christian to share in "mission" —in the compulsive urge of communicating the Gospel. One of the dangerous results of this obsolete policy has been that we have made our "mission" work and the extension of the Gospel dependent upon our money and our personnel; consequently, if any international crisis prevents the free movement of either, our whole program is thrown into disorder.

(vii) Today more North American Christians are living abroad than ever before. Coming from this continent, whether they like it or not they are looked upon as Christians. Their living testimony to the presence of the living God, or alternatively their display of crass materialism, is recorded every day of their sojourn among other peoples. If Islam has developed a missionary consciousness among Muslims as a whole, are we not capable of doing the same for our people (even tourists) who go overseas? To do so requires conviction, training and discipline, as well as sentiment. Communism now equips all its technicians and representatives in any sphere with a detailed and intensive course on the land, culture, and religion of the people among whom they will be working. Often this training is more severe than our preparation of professional missionaries. How can we dare to fall behind?

The attempt to spread the Gospel through professional agencies has clearly been a failure, when viewed against the great unfinished task. Time is *not* on our side. Is God forcing us to realize that the missionary task is the vocation of all Christians? It he forcing us to abandon our ecclesiastical fortresses, whether they be in the West or in the East, and compelling us to see not only that we must be more mobile and flexible, but also that barriers of geography can no longer be considered important, or denominational precedent an essential criterion? It might well be that the very

survival of Christianity depended on our response to these questions. Even more important than the quest for survival, however, is the choice between obedience and disobedience to the recognized will of God. "We are all called," it has been well said, "to be missionaries of the Gospel of Christ, whether our journey be long or short; the missionary frontier runs through every land where there are men and women who are without Christ. The real frontier is unbelief." Acceptance of this truth as an integral part of our theology and our teaching could revolutionize the whole Church.

Book Reviews

Myth, Ritual, and Kingship: Essays on the Theory and Practice of Kingship in the Ancient Near East and in Israel. Edited by S. H. Hooke, Oxford: Clarendon Press (Toronto: Oxford University Press), 1958. Pp. xi, 308. $5.25.

Every Old Testament scholar knows the phrase "Myth and Ritual," thanks to the enterprise of S. H. Hooke. This term first gained currency when he edited the volume of essays, *Myth and Ritual* (1933). Two years later he edited a further volume of essays on the same general topic under the title, *The Labyrinth*. Instead of a second edition of the first book, a totally new volume of essays is now given us. The editor is the only contributor to the new volume who wrote in the old. His own essay comes at the beginning and answers criticisms of the Myth and Ritual thesis. The next four essays are by specialists in the non-Hebrew spheres: Sidney Smith writes on Mesopotamia, H. W. Fairman on Egypt, O. R. Gurney on the Hittites, and R. De Langhe on the Ras Shamra texts. Three essays by Old Testament scholars deal with Hebrew aspects of the theme: G. Widengren on "Early Hebrew Myths and Their Interpretation," A. R. Johnson on "Hebrew Conceptions of Kingship," and H. H. Rowley on "Ritual and the Hebrew Prophets." The volume is rounded off with a critical examination of the Myth and Ritual position by S. G. F. Brandon, Professor of Comparative Religion in Manchester.

By definition Hooke's thesis is that myth can only be understood as part of the ritual in which it was recited, but in practice it goes much farther. It affirms that the cultures of the ancient Near East shared a common pattern of such rituals, in particular a New Year festival in which ritual dramas were enacted, including: (*a*) the death and resurrection of the god, (*b*) a triumph in battle of the god over his enemies, and (*c*) a sacred marriage. As the king is considered the most important participant in these rites the present volume deals particularly with kingship.

The symposium form in which the book is offered presents an excellent opportunity of seeing the strengths and weaknesses of Hooke's thesis. The contributors have been given freedom to take sides in the issue or to abstain. The four essays on Israel's neighbours provide the Old Testament scholar with very useful summaries of material, much of which is otherwise only available to specialists in the particular disciplines. Nevertheless, one comes away from them with the feeling that, however great their interest, they offer little or nothing that directly proves the Myth and Ritual position. Sidney Smith indeed frankly admits that he is "completely without conviction" on

this issue (p. 71). Of the essays by Old Testament specialists, Rowley discusses very sanely the connections, or separation, of cult and prophets without, however, taking sides in the Myth and Ritual issue. A. R. Johnson gives a useful and competent survey of Hebrew kingship in general and states his conviction that at the autumnal festival in Jerusalem under the kings a celebration of Yahweh's original victory over the primaeval sea did take place. Widengren seems to come nearest to the editor's viewpoint, though his essay is more taken up with the search for traces of myths, especially in the poetic books of the Old Testament, than with reconstructing the New Year festival.

The last essay, the critical review, is certainly the most challenging. Brandon argues that the foundations of the Myth and Ritual position have never been properly laid, and that the alleged pattern does not in fact receive any adequate attestation in the Egyptian and Mesopotamian sources where it is alleged to occur. It is insisted that if such a pattern existed it should be possible to explain it as due either to diffusion from a centre, or to independent creations in similar circumstances. Adherents of the Myth and Ritual school tend to assume diffusion, but have not clearly stated which centre the ideas were diffused from, and such diffusion, according to Brandon, is extremely improbable, as an esoteric theology is not easily borrowed. The readers of the preceding essays will probably find themselves in sympathy with much of the critical survey.

Where then do we stand? It cannot be doubted that the questions raised are of first rate importance. Whether one approaches the Old Testament as a scientific scholar or as a practical Christian theologian it is no small matter to ascertain the extent of the dependence of the Hebrews' religion on a common Near Eastern background. The difficulty is that no one person can have adequate knowledge in all the fields involved. As an Assyriologist the reviewer must take exception to the use made of certain Mesopotamian data. The idea of the dying-rising god as part of the annual festival depends very largely on alleged Babylonian parallels. Writing in *Myth and Ritual* as the expert in Mesopotamian religion, C. J. Gadd argued:

> Yet there can be no reasonable doubt that Bel did die and rise again; the course of the Tammuz-story requires it, the stage-tower at Babylon was undoubtedly regarded for some purposes as 'the grave of Bel', most positively of all it is attested by the fragments of a commentary which purports to reveal the inner meaning of certain dramatic acts which were performed in the course of the New Year Festival [p. 58].

However, the death and resurrection of Tammuz was not celebrated in a New Year festival, and the curious mention of "Bel's tomb" in the Greek geographer Strabo[1] is not supported in any native source. The real evidence, as Gadd admits, came from this so-called commentary. This is a very mysterious text in the Assyrian dialect, first published under the title

1. *Geography*, Vol. 16, No. 1, p. 5.

"Proverbs."[2] In the volume under review Sidney Smith refers more cautiously to it (p. 40f.), but nowhere in the book is it stated that in 1955 W. von Soden published a much improved edition under the title, "Is there Evidence that the Babylonians Believed in Marduk's Resurrection?"[3] One certain result of this new study is that no passage in this text affirms or implies the death of Marduk, still less his resurrection. Also there is nothing in the text to compel the view that it comments on the New Year festival. Von Soden very plausibly takes it as a theological account of Sennacherib's destruction of Babylon in 689 B.C. If there is no evidence of a dying-rising god in any Mesopotamian New Year festival, what validity has the pattern derived from this misunderstanding?

Cultural borrowing in the ancient Near East is a complicated field, and generalizations are usually misleading oversimplifications. Babylonian civilization certainly influenced Syria and Palestine in, for example, the use of cuneiform tablets, but the reverse influence also occurred. The Babylonian *Gilgamesh Epic* incorporates the concept of the Sumero-Babylonian pantheon residing on mount Hermon in the Lebanon range,[4] a completely Canaanite idea. This is easily explained, as the founders of the First Dynasty of Babylon, under which the Babylonian *Gilgamesh Epic* was composed, enterered Mesopotamia from the Syrian desert, and, as their personal names betray, were related to the Canaanites. Curiously a fragment of this epic has been found at Megiddo.[5] This movement back and forth of ideas and written literature suggests that Professor Brandon may have underestimated the possibility of cultural borrowing.

An aspect of Myth and Ritual from which more results have so far accrued is the study of passages of the Old Testament which have the marks of Canaanite mythology. The Ras Shamra tablets have signally confirmed the correctness of this approach in principle. In practice one necessary caution seems to have been neglected. The meanings of words are not static. To take an illustration, the name *Yahweh* meant the God of Israel to the writers of the Old Testament. To writers of the New Testament *Kyrios* in these same passages often meant the Son of God. To the scholastics of the mediaeval church *Dominus* in these passages meant God the Son. In Canaanite myth *bn ilm* refers to the assembly of the gods, but what is the guarantee that *bᵉnê ha' ᵉlōhîm* in Hebrew, even in a similar context, had the same meaning? This is in no way intended as a denial of Canaanite myths in the Old Testament, at least in traces and allusions, but this question has to be faced if serious results are wanted.

The field of Old Testament study which has been opened up by the

2. E. Ebeling, *Keilschrifttexte aus Assur*, Vol. I, No. 143.
3. In *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*, Vol. 51, pp. 130–166: "Gibt es ein Zeugnis, das die Babylonier an Marduks Wiederauferstehung glaubten?" See also *ibid.*, Vol. 52, pp. 224–234.
4. Th. Bauer, *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. XVI, pp. 254ff.
5. This is not yet published, but it is quoted in the article referred to in the preceding footnote.

Myth and Ritual thesis is wide and important. Like a true pioneer, Hooke has blazed a trail and shown what awaits exploitation. While we may not feel that his main thesis is yet established, no one can deny that more study on these questions is much needed so that ultimately truth will prevail. In the meantime symposia of the kind under review air these problems and indicate the present state of research.

W. G. Lambert

Dept. of Near Eastern Studies
University College, Toronto

Westminster Introductions to the Books of the Bible. Prepared by the editors of *The Westminster Study Edition of the Holy Bible.* Philadelphia: The Westminster Press (Toronto: The Ryerson Press), 1958. Pp. 224. $3.75.

This book is another in the very valuable Westminster Aids to the Study of the Scriptures. It presents in a separate volume the general articles on the Bible and the introductions to each of the biblical books contained originally in *The Westminster Study Edition of the Holy Bible.* The list of editors and contributors includes the names of many recognized scholars in the fields of biblical and theological study; and this is in itself a high commendation of the book. It is "the desire of the editors to give to the whole Christian Church some share in the gains that the new knowledge and the new methods have made available" in the field of biblical studies, while setting "the Bible and the study of the Bible within the framework of God's redeeming work in Christ."

The general introductory articles deal with such subjects as the following: the formation of the canon; the transmission of the biblical text in its main versions; the history of the biblical period; the Christian church as the new Israel; the essential features of the Gospel. Throughout there is an emphasis upon the Bible as the record of God's revelation of His redemptive purpose; and this purpose is described as the basic unity amid all the diversity of the literary types in both Testaments.

The introductions to the individual books of the Bible set forth very concisely historical background, generally accepted results of literary and historical criticism, and the dominant theme of the particular book in the total story of God's redemptive purpose. With the help of these introductions one will be able to embark upon an intelligent reading of the books of the Bible.

Several items, however, may be singled out for comment. For example, one notices the preference for the traditional position regarding both the sequence of the reformers Ezra and Nehemiah, and the locale of the early prophecies and the authenticity of the latter chapters of Ezekiel. One must

confess to some reservations here. Again, even though one appreciates the serious limitations of space, it is disappointing that there is not even a paragraph outlining the cultic approach to the study of the Psalms which owes so much to the work of Gunkel and Mowinckel. Again, the reader who is not able to supply the obvious omission in the following statement: "The first complete English Bible was that of Miles Coverdale, printed probably at Zurich, Switzerland, in 1535" (p. 19), will be somewhat confused after having just read on the preceding page: "The first complete rendering of the Bible into English was made from the Vulgate by John Wycliffe about 1382–1383."

However, these and other similar points which might be mentioned will not detract greatly from the merit of the book. It may with confidence be highly recommended to the general Bible reader who wishes to increase his understanding of "literature's greatest monument", the record of what and how God has spoken.

R. F. Schnell

St. Andrew's College
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

The New Testament Text of St. Ambrose. By R. W. Muncey. London: Cambridge University Press (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada), 1959. Pp. lxxviii, 119. $5.50.

Readers of the English version of the New Testament can easily become interested in the early Wycliffe and Tyndale efforts, although these do not help us much in the history of the text. The primary task of textual criticism is to recover exactly what the original author wrote. It is rather different in the case of Latin translations, however. Prior to St Jerome's *Vulgate* (late fourth century) there were in existence old Latin versions, as well as citations in such Fathers as Tertullian and Cyprian; and even Tertullian may have used such old translations from the Greek. The western church and its theology have been profoundly affected by the production of the Latin Version, of course, and Pierre de Labriolle has called it "one of the principal factors of our Western civilisation" (*Latin Christianity*, 1924, p. 46). The volume before us has nothing to say of this aspect of the subject, but it is this sort of thing that sells books on textual criticism!

The Roman church was largely Greek-speaking until about A.D. 250, but some scholars think that Latin was coming into use about the time of Tatian or bishop Victor, in the last quarter of the second century. Nevertheless, the ultimate origin of the Latin translation may have been in Syria, for many variants agree with the Old Syriac; or it may have been in a North African milieu like Carthage, which had strong Semitic connexions. Vööbus speaks of "the surprising richness of forms in the Old Latin texts" (*Early Versions*

of the New Testament, 1954, p. 45), and this allies them with Hort's so-called "Western" type. Casey too has indicated "the complexity of the textual problem" posed by the Old Latin (*Manuscript Studies*, ed. Parvis and Wikgren, 1950, pp. 77f.). Hort himself classified the materials into (*a*) African: Cyprian's quotations, codices Bobiensis, Palatinus, and others; (*b*) European: d (the Latin side of Codex Bezae), codices Veronensis, Vercellensis, and others; and (*c*) the Italian, used in Augustine's Gospel quotations. Nowadays this third category is highly suspect. Ambrose of Milan enters the picture as a Latin Father of the fourth century before the *Vulgate* (his dates are *ca.* 335 to 397). He was a powerful political figure, one of the outstanding preachers of the Church and Augustine's "master," an unoriginal theologian who leaned to Eastern scholars rather than Italian or North African, and an exponent of Origen's allegorical method of exegesis.

In the volume before us we have all the N.T. quotations of Ambrose gathered in pages 1 to 119, with careful footnotes to draw attention to the usual Greek readings or to significant variations in other Latin versions. Five years were spent by the author in assembling this material, and his exhibit will be very helpful to textual critics and historians. The first half of the book describes the characteristics of these quotations, interesting points of syntax and vocabulary, Grecisms, and the like; and it discusses their accuracy as renderings. Linguistic evidence is cited which seems to show that Ambrose has a mixture of what are regarded as typically "African" and typically "European" forms. According to Mr. Muncey, Ambrose is usually accurate. His quotations agree either with the ordinary Greek reading or with some Latin MS authority (Bezan d, or Veronensis, for example), but he seems to have made no really systematic use of the manuscripts at hand. An all too brief account is given of the important work of Rolando and Cariglione, who maintain that like Augustine Ambrose used a European and Italian text-type, at least in the Gospel of St John. Muncey's assembly of the Ambrosian quotations should enable students to assess more accurately the type found in other parts of the N.T.

A few errors may be noted: "nubunt" for nubent, p. xiii; "Keridethi" for Koridethi, p. xlvi; "Philipp." for Phil., p. liii. The first sentence at the top of p. lxvi has gone astray. Alford's distinction between *agapān* and *philein* (the former of reverential and divine love, the latter of human affection), is quoted with approval on p. lix; but it will not hold water, in spite of Latin *diligere* and *amare* as respective equivalents.

The volume is number four in the New Series of *Texts and Studies*, edited by C. H. Dodd, and it is a worthy addition. But I do wish more had been done to make it exciting to the average student and the parish minister. It is pretty dull stuff!

George Johnston

McGill University
Montreal

Moral Values in the Ancient World. By JOHN FERGUSON. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. (Toronto: Ryerson Press), 1958. Pp. 256. $4.25.

THIS IS a useful book, based on unusually wide reading. It opens with two brief chapters on "The Homeric Age" (where the notions of *nemesis*, *aidos*, *moira* or *aisa*, *themis* and *dike* are discussed) and "The Values of Early Greek Society"; these chapters are preliminary to a full discussion of the Socratic and post-Socratic interest in the conduct of life and the search, which the author there discerns, for a single principle of conduct. After a rather lengthy treatment of the theory, if one may so call it, of the Cardinal Virtues, Professor Ferguson allots separate chapters to the topics of friendship (ably meeting the need of such a summary in English), *eros*, *philanthropia*, *homonoia* and the Hellenistic situation in general, ethically dominated by the concept of "autarchy." There are two chapters on Roman ideals; in so small a space it seems a pity that so much attention is given to the "Imperial Virtues"—were they really supposed (p. 192) "to lay down the spirit which should stir through the whole of society" rather than the imperial bureaucracy? Contrast H. Mattingly, *Roman Imperial Civilisation*, p. 53: "Victory belongs to the Emperor; she, with valour, is part of the *imperatoria virtus* which, as Tacitus reminds us, should not be allowed to a subject." The author concludes with "The Contribution of Judaism" and with Christian *agape*, in the latter of which he finds the single ethical principle the ancient world had sought.

What is not so satisfactory, particularly in the conclusion of the book, is the author's proceeding to preach a sermon for the present day on the assumption that men's minds in general are still occupied with the same search, and that therefore Christians who steadfastly adhere to the ideal of *agape* have the same opportunity to "bring hope and purpose to the modern world as their predecessors did nineteen centuries ago" (in the ethically-preoccupied Hellenistic age). The hard fact must be faced that there was then an unquestioned belief, today largely obliterated, in the fundamental importance of moral questions. Alas, in general estimation today it is what a man does, not what he is, that counts. Not on one side only of the "Iron Curtain" does the Chinese Communists' motto prevail: "Productivity is the key to happiness." What the present-day Christian must face is not "Morals without Religion" (p. 10), it is—for the first time in history—a climate of thought *without* prevalent moral concern of any kind. Such a concluding thesis as Professor Ferguson's should surely take the difference and the difficulty into account.

The methods of academic inquiry should influence the sermon, not *vice versa*. This book is a little less persuasive under both heads through failing to keep this rule in view. (C. N. Cochrane's *Christianity and Classical Culture*, a work of greater scope, by contrast succeeds rhetorically, and is tremendously exciting, because of its obviously rigorous intellectual discipline.) Minor faults of this book are missing references, lack of a list of

abbreviations (e.g., those standing for epigraphical publications, with some of which young students will hardly be familiar), some poor indexing and a few inadequately-founded statements (on p. 27 Plato's debt to Hindu thought "appears to me certain"; on p. 29 this is taken as proved). "The scholastic sin of 'superbia' " (p. 13) ought surely to be "the Augustinian sin." Catullian *pietas* is misrepresented, in my opinion. On p. 173, for "Catullus's" read "Catulus's." Pp. 36–37 contain some observations on Aristotle's doctrine of the Mean which should be entertained with caution. "The concern of the mean is with fitness" may mislead. "Relatively to us" must surely be interpreted as "relatively to our circumstances and our nature," and the mean is not after all the ultimate principle by which we determine virtuous action (which obviates Kant's criticism), nor even "a matter of practical application." But these are non-typical flaws in a thoughtful and very readable book which adequately fills for the average student a gap in the range of available handbooks explaining ancient thought and its emergence in action.

D. F. S. Thomson

Department of Classics
University College, Toronto

The Mass and the English Reformers. By C. W. Dugmore. London, Toronto: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1958. Pp. xiv, 262. $5.75.

It requires a great deal of courage to undertake an analysis of eucharistic controversy in the sixteenth century. Unfortunately, Dugmore's courage, amply displayed in the writing of this monograph, cannot prevent the end result from being deeply disappointing.

The source of disappointment does not lie in the superficial defects of this work. As regards the publishers, it should be said that while this book is a handsome piece of printing, complete with excellent illustrations, it is a pity that money could not be found to provide the book with a proper bibliography. As regards its contents, the author has an annoying penchant for inserting into the text snippets from French scholars which are often more puzzling than informative. When using quotations from Latin sources, Dugmore sometimes presents these in translation, sometimes not, leaving the reader to translate as best he may. He also has an unhappy facility for transforming a much needed summary into a tissue of generalizations which are at best only half-truths. In the Middle Ages, we are told, the eschatological dimension of the Eucharist was lost; the ministry of the Church ceased to be a "function" and became a "caste"; dialectic replaced symbolism "with a consequent devaluation of symbols," Aquinas and the *Adoro te* or *Pange, lingua*, notwithstanding; the emergence of "clericalism" may be traced to the growth of papal power which brought with it "a new emphasis on . . . the idea that the Church can and ought to lay down articles of

faith which are upheld by the *magisterium* of an infallible Church" (p. 24). In his hot pursuit of that cherished Anglican vision of a Patristic Age *sine macula*, the truth of these hasty generalizations does not seem to have troubled Dugmore. The inevitable result is that whatever went wrong with the Catholic tradition during the fifteen centuries prior to the Reformation is invariably attributed to the Middle Ages. Above all, his comments on the medieval Papacy often show that the blinkers worn by the English Reformers, who saw the accursed institution in every "corruption" and "accretion," are still being used. In one passage, we advance from the usual observations on the value and the dangers of medieval devotion to the Sacrament to the rather bewildering opinion that the Papacy "exploited" these unwholesome developments in medieval eucharistic faith and practice for financial gain and that therefore it is not surprising that anti-papalism was the first sign of the Reformation in England. Such argumentation, dwelling as it does in the twilight world of half-truth and fantasy, does not become the historical monograph.

Yet all these are but particular examples of those weaknesses which characterize almost any monograph, and criticism of them is therefore peripheral. Far more serious matters lie to hand. Dugmore's argument is that the English Reformers, in their teaching about the Mass, were far more independent of the Continental Reformers than is generally supposed, and, indeed, that their chief source of inspiration was certain doctrines which had been elaborated during the Patristic Age but which had been "suppressed" by the Catholic Church and the Papacy during the Middle Ages. With a rigour worthy of the Marxist historian, Dugmore has imposed his thesis on the eucharistic teaching of the Fathers and the Reformers. Despite his manifest learning and scholarship, the results are far from satisfying.

With regard to the Fathers, it is well known that the general patristic elucidation of the eucharistic mystery revolved around two poles: (1) that the consecrated elements are the body and blood of Jesus Christ incarnate; (2) that the consecrated elements are, empirically speaking, bread and wine. Is the problem resolved by the doctrine of a eucharistic metabolism which guarantees the sacramental presence of Christ's actual body and blood under the veil of bread and wine (Cyril of Jerusalem, the Cappadocian Fathers and Ambrose, working on views expressed by earlier writers such as Justin, Ignatius and Irenaeus)? Or it is more accurate to regard the consecrated elements as efficacious signs for faith of Christ's actual body (Tertullian, Cyprian and Augustine)? Most writers embraced both solutions. Yet what the Fathers unite, Dugmore tends to separate. The two strands of Patristic thought are isolated one from another with the result that the first becomes more "realist" and the second more "spiritual" than they actually were. Augustine is closer to Ambrose than Dugmore describes.

The suspicions of the reader are further aroused when Dugmore tells us that the basic idea in Patristic teaching about the eucharistic sacrifice was

"the offering of the prayers and praises of the Church and of the gifts of bread and wine," and that it was Ambrose and Augustine who laid fresh emphasis "on the memorial aspect of the eucharistic sacrifice: Christ Himself is the one sacrifice, which the sacrifice of the liturgy can bring only to mind and set forth, while its fruits are received in Communion" (p. 59). This is Dugmore's summary of the fully developed doctrine of eucharistic sacrifice in the Fathers, and it is quite inadequate. Cyprian's theory of eucharistic sacrifice is well known (Epistle 63), and his work is little more than an expansion of the utterances of Tertullian and other early writers. Surprisingly enough, Dugmore makes little of the Early Church's doctrine of anamnesis, e.g., Tertullian's application of the word *repraesentare* to the Eucharist in the sense of "making present." From reading Dugmore, the student would be hard put to learn that the doctrine of an identity between the eucharistic sacrifice and the unique historical sacrifice of Jesus Christ is to be found embedded at the roots of the Christian tradition.

Yet the purpose of these partial interpretations is not clear until we arrive at Part Two, which deals with the English Reformation. Here, it must be said, there are many excellent things, e.g., the comparison of the Prayer Book of 1552 with the continental "Zwinglian" liturgies and the excellent exposition of Martyr's *discourse . . . concernynge the Sacrament of the Lordes supper*. Yet the main line of the argument fails to convince. That the English Reformers knew and used the Fathers means little by itself. It can be significant only if it can be shown that the Continental Reformers did not. That the Continental Reformers did know their Fathers is something by and large ignored by Dugmore. Or again, Dugmore does not raise the question of just how well Cranmer and his colleagues in reform understood the Fathers. The compilation of quotations in commonplace books for the purposes of controversy means nothing. What Dugmore does not really investigate is the question whether or not what Cranmer means was what the Fathers meant. Any analysis of this would require some consideration of the similarity or difference between Cranmer's philosophical presuppositions and those of his Patristic authorities. It would require a comparison of the understanding, by Cranmer and by the Fathers respectively, of redemption, of justification, and of those other fundamental theological problems, whose solution tends to determine what a theologian will think about the Eucharist and the Presence. Yet Dugmore passes over these questions. In the end, we are forced to conclude that he has been mesmerized by his thesis. To a considerable degree, he has yielded to the temptation of "adjusting" certain elements in the eucharistic teaching of the Fathers in the direction of the English Reformers, and the latter, for their part, have been unduly detached from their relations with their continental brethren and made to assume Patristic garb. Thus full justice is done neither to the Fathers, nor to the Continental Reformers, nor to Cranmer and his brethren.

However, despite these serious faults, Dugmore's work should receive the

fullest attention. It is hoped that it will provoke controversy, for controversy stimulates research. Perhaps in the near future we shall see the publication of a more balanced interpretation of the source and inspiration of eucharistic teaching in England in the sixteenth century. For the present, however, *caveat lector.*

John Gordon Rowe

Huron College
University of Western Ontario, London

Human Culture and the Holy: Essays on the True, the Good and the Beautiful. By J. Pelikan. London, S.C.M. Press (Toronto: The Ryerson Press), 1959. Pp. ix, 172. $3.00. (First published by the Muhlenberg Press, 1955 under the title *Fools for Christ.*)

Given the names of Kierkegaard, St. Paul, Dostoevsky, Luther, Nietzsche and J. S. Bach, how should we link them in a unifying theme? Dr. Pelikan, in this unusual and stimulating book, uses them to illustrate his contention that the Holy cannot be equated with value, be it Absolute Truth, Highest Good or Ultimate Beauty: "all of them were drawn to an equation of the Holy with human value, but all came to realize . . . that God cannot be domesticated in a value."

Gnosticism, scholasticism, eighteenth-century rationalism, the Hegelians, all testify to the persistence of an intellectualism which identifies the Holy with the True. Kierkegaard attacked intellectualism chiefly because it attempted to lay down terms to God, assuming that "where intelligence, training or rationality were lacking God most certainly would not reveal himself." For him knowledge of God was primarily knowledge by God, "personal communion into which God called him by knowing him in Christ." St. Paul, as Chapter II insists, had long ago discovered this. He found Truth neither in Greek rationalism nor in Jewish law, but in Christ; not a truth which man strives for and possesses, but the Truth which takes possession of man; not a truth to supplement other truths, but the Truth which gives meaning to all other truth; Truth to be held and enjoyed not in secret, but in the Church.

Moralism which would identify the Holy with the Good has also been persistent in Western thought, as Kant, Fichte and Ritschl show. Although inclined to moralism by family circumstances and religious background, Dostoevsky saw that sin is a religious rather than a moral fact, and that the Holy is a different dimension from the Moral. Characters in his novels, especially Raskolnikov and Ivan Karamazov, illustrate this. Luther next bears witness that the Holy creates its own distinctive category of the Good. Moralism seeks the Good in man's own efforts. But for Luther Holiness belongs to God alone, who confers it on whom he pleases. Man must despair of "self-goodness" and accept "God-goodness."

Western thought has also attempted to identify the Holy with the Beauti-

ful. Influenced by Wagner, Nietzsche first argued that the soul could never be satisfied by the conventional values of rationalism and moralism, but only by the discovery of the Beautiful. But in the end the Beautiful must also go the way of Truth and Goodness. The goal of man's striving is the superman, whose pleasure is the sole criterion of value; before him the Beautiful has no validity. Yet the Holy is not thus eliminated. It stands above human values, laying an absolute claim upon men. Nietzsche's tortured mind concluded that, if the superman is to appear, the Holy must die.

Chapter VI turns to the possibility of a positive relation between the Holy and the Beautiful. In J. S. Bach Dr. Pelikan finds one who "refused . . . to follow the Beautiful for its own sake, be it ever so enlightened," but "found in his service to the Holy a new and more profound conception of the Beautiful as well." The Holy comes to men by the Word of God through Christ, evoking the total activity of the human spirit in praise. In the wide-ranging *freedom* of his music Bach expresses the praise of the eternal God, in its *form* the praise of the God who limited himself in the Incarnation.

Dr. Pelikan is evidently more sympathetic towards "aestheticism" than towards "intellectualism," which receives some hard knocks. He is hardly fair to scholasticism in saying (p. 13) "the doctrine of the analogy of being saw God as one being among the entire series of beings making up the universe," or in his interpretation of the scholastic doctrine of grace: "the claim was put that if a man did as much as lay within him, God would inevitably supply the necessary additional grace" (p. 87); "it had made grace a supernatural *quidditas* of moralistically conceived merit" (p. 90).

All who have read Rudolf Otto will agree with Dr. Pelikan's main thesis. The case is argued convincingly, but not without occasional exaggeration. The suggestion frequently recurs that it takes a madman to recognize the uniqueness of the Holy: "It took a madman who did not have to care about the consequences to make that danger [viz., of the equation of the Holy and the True] clear" (p. 26); "Dostoevsky may have been mad, but for just that reason he saw through the mask of moralism covering the identification of the Holy and the Good" (p. 82). And it is a little startling to find Nietzsche styled "a fool for Christ" (p. 143) on the ground that his madness showed him that the Holy is not identical with the Beautiful. Is it only the unbalanced mind which can know the Holy? This implication is to some extent corrected by Pelikan's treatment of St. Paul, Luther and Bach who, one is pleased to learn (p. ix), were not "insane in the clinical sense of the word."

An enterprising book, containing many illuminating things, and to be commended both for a well-sustained argument and for its lucid studies of the six chosen "fools for Christ."

Eric G. Jay

Montreal Diocesan Theological College
Montreal

Language and Christian Belief. By JOHN WILSON. London, Toronto: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1958. Pp. xvi, 136. $2.00.

THIS is another of the growing number of books devoted to the examination of religious statements and beliefs from the point of view of contemporary analytical philosophy. This type of philosophy, in spite of many disclaimers, still tends to assume that a statement can only be meaningful, in the sense of factually informative, if there is some method of empirical verification or falsification which is relevant to it. Since religious statements do not appear to meet this test, analytical philosophers usually exclude them from the category of informative sentences and explain them as expressive or emotive, or as disguised exhortations, and so on.

The main theses of the present book are (a) that religious statements are intended to be factual and to give information, not about the natural but about the supernatural world, and (b) that there is a method of verification relevant to such statements and that this kind of verification is found in religious experience. In other words, the author is an empiricist in religion, and holds that the essential test of the meaningfulness and truth of religious beliefs is a reference to religious experience. This position is argued persuasively in the first two chapters.

The remainder of the book is devoted to an examination of certain Christian beliefs from this point of view. The author goes beyond the rather elementary religious statements to which most analytical philosophers have so far confined themselves. In less than seventy pages, he covers the Doctrine of the Trinity, the Sacraments, Sin and Judgment, as well as the old favourites, Free Will and Immortality.

The brevity of the treatment of these weighty questions is indicative of a certain superficiality, which is perhaps a result of the naïveté of the author's general theological position. To suppose that religious statements can be verified by reference to religious experience in the same way that empirical statements can be tested by reference to sense-experience, suggests that religious statements are "about" the supernatural in the same way that empirical statements are about the natural world. This implies a crude supernaturalism which conceives of God as a supernatural being in the sense of an additional, if divine, being among other beings, superior to, but existing on the same scale as, other objects. This kind of objectification belongs properly to a primitive stage in theology, beyond which, unfortunately, many theologians have not yet proceeded.

It should be said, in conclusion, that the author deserves the credit due to a pioneer. He has tacked some of the most serious problems facing contemporary theology and, if he is not always successful in finding the answers, he at least asks the right questions.

D. R. G. OWEN

Trinity College
Toronto

The Freedom of the Will. By Austin Farrer. London: Adam and Charles Black (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada), 1958. Pp. xiv, 315. $5.50.

Problems about freedom of the will arise in a great variety of philosophical contexts—wherever, indeed, any form of human activity is the subject of inquiry—and it is not just the same set of questions which are asked about freedom in all these contexts. A single work devoted to bringing this multiplicity of subjects and debates under one comprehensive view would be of the greatest philosophical importance, and it has been brilliantly undertaken in Dr. Farrer's Gifford Lectures. Do we now have a new theory taking its place alongside other celebrated theories about freedom of the will? That would, I think, be the wrong thing to look for. A formal theory about something is not the usual outcome of the vigorous hand-to-hand fighting of conversation and debate, even when one of the sides claims in the end a complete victory over the other. That kind of activity is what we have in these lectures. The opponent is an extremely subtle and thoroughly skilful determinist, endowed by the author with the highest degree of morale and staying power, who is met wherever he chooses to take up his ground. He can be said to be beaten when all his misconceptions are at last destroyed. This highly mobile method of encounter is well suited to the author's aims. "Our whole endeavour, in the present inquiry, is," he says, "to correct our language about what is called free will." That is what most Oxford philosophers are concerned with doing to our language, but something more than clarification would seem to be required of a Gifford Lecturer, who must ultimately be concerned with rational theology, which is a branch of speculative philosophy or metaphysics. These lectures are intended to be the preliminary work for such speculative philosophy, and they conclude at the point where it can begin. Here is the concluding paragraph of the lectures, which indicates the importance which the author, very justly, attributes to the kind of inquiry he has undertaken:

> Will, action, the creative moment in man, is the only object of consideration which opens a dimension of metaphysical depth, or promises to let through a single ray of uncreated light. Here alone we find a power of making anything to be or not to be, and it is this that raises all the questions of theistic philosophy; leading us to ask, whether there is not such a power underlying all things, not merely the things we make to be; leading us to ask, whether our own creative power is underivative, or whether it does not spring continually out of a deper source of will, the wellspring of the world; leading us to ask, how nearly analogous that prime creative will would be, to the secondary form of volition we ourselves possess and exercise. Here are questions which to formulate shortly, as we have just formulated them, is but to clothe them in stale metaphor; questions which we have not opened in this book, and will not open now. But to evoke them is to see what an importance attaches to the preliminary work which, however inadequately, we have undertaken; the work of clearing obstacles from the serious contemplation of any will whatsoever, whether human

or divine; and even, perhaps, of casting some positive light on that human will, from which alone the divine can be conjectured.

If men look within themselves for the image of God, they are confronted with the problem, what aspect of human nature provides this image? If it is man's will, then is it the will of man the creator and artist, as some have thought, or is it, perhaps, the self-legislating will of the moral agent, as others have thought? The former is cosmologically more interesting and fruitful, but philosophers have generally taken the virtuous man more seriously than the artist. Dr. Farrer seeks to assimilate the free moral agent to the free creator, and to do so he must get rid of the Kantian conception of free moral action as self-legislation. The notion of self-legislation, he argues, is an ill-fitting metaphor carried over from civil administration, where legislation properly belongs, and made to apply to conscience, where it does not belong. He makes rather certain that the metaphor will fit badly by giving to civil law a radically utilitarian and positivistic interpretation. Unfortunately, however—and it is this reader's only regret—the superb dialectical skill with which he endowed his determinist opponents is denied to those who have argued for the moral basis of law, and who have not considered that morality is the historical offspring of law, which rises above its humble parentage. They have not regarded responsibilities and claims as the creatures of positive law, but as the reason for such law. And until the issue has been as fully debated with them as the other issues have been debated with the determinists, I have no certainty that we end up with the conception of the moral agent as an inventor or creator, no matter how novel or unique the situation in which he makes his decision.

Robert McRae

Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto

The Ghana Assembly of the International Missionary Council, 28th Dec. 1957 to 8th Jan. 1958: Selected Papers, with an Essay on the Role of the I.M.C. Ed. by R. K. Orchard. London: Edinburgh House Press, and distributed by Friendship Press, New York, 1958. Pp. 240. $3.25.

This meeting of the International Missionary Council (I.M.C.) unlike its predecessors, proved to be largely administrative—mainly concerned with integration with the World Council of Churches (W.C.C.). There were however also some selected preparatory papers on continuing missionary issues, papers submitted to the Assembly itself, addresses delivered at Ghana, all these by recognized authorities in their fields. Of course there were debate in plenary sessions, group discussion and reports on the same, the latter summarized for the convenience of delegates. This material will repay study by those directly responsible for missionary policy or engaged in missionary service.

However, this particular meeting of the I.M.C. is likely to go down in missionary history on the I.M.C.-W.C.C. integration issue. For the treatment of this important problem the Ghana Assembly was handicapped in several respects. The meeting was not as representative as former gatherings of the I.M.C., particularly on the lay, distaff and youth sides. Perhaps this was inevitable, in view of inadequate accommodation and the business in hand, but it was unfortunate. Nationals, except Chinese, were well represented and vocal. Procedure suffered, owing to the concurrent tragedy in the family of the General Secretary and the fact that Dr. Ranson was being transferred to the directorship of the Theological Fund, while his prospective successor, Bishop Lesslie Newbigin, was not present.

Under these circumstances approval in principle was given, with some expressed misgivings, and the plan of the I.M.C.-W.C.C. Joint Committee was referred to the constituent Councils of the I.M.C. and the member Communions of the W.C.C. for study, suggestions, revision and final decision by 1961.

It is to be hoped that full use will be made of the time allowed for such study, for there are important issues to be safeguarded as well as valuable opportunities to be taken advantage of. The latter include the recognition of Mission as an integral feature of the life and work of the W.C.C., and the elimination of overlapping. This obtains particularly in the area of Inter-Church Aid, long a missionary function but increasingly a W.C.C. activity, and not entirely of an emergency nature. On the other hand, there will be at least temporary loss in the defection of some missionary conferences and councils which include conservative missionary societies, and these groups are increasingly active and important.

Since the prospective merger of the two bodies is likely to have far-reaching influence on the Christian Mission in the years ahead, it is fortunate that Editor Ronald K. Orchard, London Secretary of the I.M.C., has included an essay by Erik W. Nielsen, retiring Research Secretary of the I.M.C., entitled "The Role of the I.M.C., Some Reflections on the Nature and Task of the I.M.C. in the Present Situation."

Chapter V is not just a summary of the Ghana Report, though there are references to it. Mr. Nielsen approaches his task modestly but courageously, evading no important issue, not even the "Why" of Mission today. Groundwork is laid in a review of I.M.C. and pre-I.M.C. missionary history for perspective. One wishes that this section could be read by all within the present constituency of the I.M.C. and many without that fellowship, for the clarification and challenge it contains.

"Some Ghana Reflections" represent the essayist's reactions to the Assembly papers, addresses and discussions, and constitutes a keen critique of the same.

"The I.M.C. and the Ecumenical Movement" brings one into the heart of the I.M.C.-W.C.C. integration issue, not omitting "organizational intricacies to be worked out," which are numerous and formidable. There

are the differing bases—conciliar and non-theological in the case of the I.M.C., confessional and theological in the case of the W.C.C., with relationship to national or regional councils of Churches and with World Confessional bodies somehow to be worked out. However, the need of the W.C.C. to make the Christian Mission a major concern can no longer be avoided. And Faith and Order studies are essential to the so-called Younger Churches, however the so-called Older Churches may evade the issue involved.

As for "the Role of the I.M.C.," assuming that "all technical intricacies involved in differences in constitutions and organizational structures" are worked out, "everything that the two organizations stand for will have to be preserved and continued in a new form."

That last phrase "in a new form" represents a real challenge. It involves much more than the addition of a Commission and a Department of World Mission and Evangelism to the present W.C.C. structure. It means Evangelism as a central concern, and Mission as a vital aspect of the nature and calling of the Churches within the W.C.C. This could result in a new day for the Christian Mission—hitherto peripheral, an elective, a woman's concern, a matter of missions to this group or that area, but not the outreach of the entire congregation to the whole man, to the entire world, to the end of time.

L. S. Albright

Canadian School of Missions
Toronto

The Christian Teacher: His faith and his responsibilities in higher education. By Perry LeFevre. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1958. Pp. 176. $2.75.

In this challenging little book the author emphasizes the important role of the Christian teacher. It is time someone did. Our society has inherited standards and values of an educational system which was based on Christian spiritual values. But society in its concern to be "fair" and "democratic" has all but cut our present educational system off from the Christian source of its standards and values. Much teaching has lost its Christian motivation and many teachers have lost their sense of mission.

Now society with a multitude of urgent concerns desires a strong purposeful educational system. Many are concerned about lack of motivation, alarming delinquency, selfish waste of ability, and ask of education a moral and spiritual focus which seems to be lacking.

Gradually society will realize its predicament and will turn to Christian institutions for an answer to its impasse. More Christian teachers in more Christian institutions must do more serious thinking regarding their significant ministry. Here is where this little book speaks out with a fresh message.

The author sees the role of the Christian teacher as a significant Christian

ministry. He sees the Christian teacher choosing his vocation with a clear sense of call. He defines that call clearly and interprets its meaning in the light of the subjects the teacher teaches, the students he educates and the methods he uses, even in the light of the God he professes. The author writes from a wide field of experience and interest and he does not hesitate to raise a question or take a stand. His stand will be admired even when his position is argued, and the net result in every case will be more thinking, discussion, rethinking and dedication.

In this book the author digs below the surface to point out what he feels is the significant contribution of the Christian teacher. He finds there a vital role, a ministry which he isolates and emphasizes. He sees this ministry of the Christian teacher as vital irrespective of the subject with which the teacher works. In fact he refers to the humanities, the social sciences and the natural sciences as examples, and suggests the witness which a Christian teacher may make as he follows his vocation within these disciplines. The author admits that much study needs to be done to set forth the Christian teacher's witness in each discipline. He takes a brief glance at the obstacles and ploughs right ahead with admirable abandon. This will bring forth varying reactions among his readers but apparently that is what he hopes for and feels is needed.

In addition to the author's bold concept of the Christian teacher's role in teaching the various disciplines he has an appreciation of method and of varying factors relating to the student-learning situation, and a thought provoking theological interpretation of teacher-student-God relationships.

This whole book is intriguingly controversial. It almost argues with itself. Every reader will find something to agree with and something to challenge, from its interpretation of the human predicament to its description of the teacher's task as counsellor. The book is unified by a freshness of approach, a refreshing appreciation of the educational field and a bold interpretation of the Christian's place in it.

In a period when we are taking a new look at education and rebuilding our Christian educational institutions, and are increasingly aware of the vocation and the ministry of the layman, this book should play a helpful role in pointing our Christian teachers to a vital ministry.

W. F. Clarke

Prairie Christian Training Centre
Fort Qu'Appelle, Saskatchewan

Royal Sacrament: The Preacher and His Message. By Ronald A. Ward. London: Marshall, Morgan and Scott (Toronto: Evangelical Publishers), 1958. Pp. 192. 12/6.

Preaching means many things to many preachers—witness the average Church Page in a Saturday issue of any Canadian daily. But this book

emphasizes fundamentals and therefore demands a reading and a place on the shelves of the libraries of theological colleges and parish ministers, and on the bibliography of homiletics classes. For here in theory and in practical demonstration is preaching in all its moods.

This is a magnificent approach to an old subject, and approached at its source—the preacher himself. It has long been my own belief that you can not "learn the art of preaching" without beginning with the vehicle of communication, namely, the man himself. Professor Ward has an excellent chapter on "The Preacher and his daily life." "The photographer's shop window in Chancery Lane, with its enlargement of a photograph of an ordinary typewritten envelope, revealing on its larger scale the very hairs of the typewriter ribbon which still cling to the letters typed on the paper, tells us afresh that 'Christ may be magnified in my body' (Phil. 1:20), so that some detail of that Perfect Life which has hitherto escaped the notice of men may, through my poor life and witness, be magnified and seen" (pp. 93 ff.).

In the opening chapter on "Preaching," Professor Ward proceeds to vindicate the title of the book, *Royal Sacrament*, and states: "It is interesting to notice how preaching corresponds with the definition of a sacrament. It is an outward and visible sign, first of all. The words uttered are outward. They are sensuous, addressed to the senses. Not visible, indeed, but audible. If it is insisted that there must be that which is visible, then we may answer that the words are not conveyed by, say, a hidden gramophone record, but by a visible preacher. It is also a sign of an inward and spiritual grace: the living Christ is received through this ministry. And can we refuse to believe that we preach because our Lord ordained it so? St. Matthew 28:19–20 seems to combine these elements beautifully" (p. 24).

Professor Ward next discusses in a provocative and compelling manner a preacher's theology, his Greek Testament, Synoptic parallels, the Sermon on the Mount, preaching the Epistles from the Gospels, and general literature. These resources are treated with skill and with a fine assessment of relative value. The final chapter, "The Training of the Preacher," is by far one of the best things I have ever read on this subject. Professor Ward makes a fine distinction between a theological college, a university, a church and a school of vocational training.

The language of this book is simple, clear and effective, so that the meaning is conveyed without being obscured by attention to words and style. However, upon deliberate examination, one becomes aware of the excellence of the language and style, and of the richness of apt illustrations. This is the thoughtful presentation of a man who is deeply concerned, not with the mechanics of preaching but with the content of preaching, and who is highly competent to make such a presentation.

C. Ritchie Bell

Presbyterian College
Montreal

Pastoral Prayers through the Year: An Anthology by Contemporary Leaders and Teachers of American Protestantism. Compiled and edited by R. L. Eddy. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons (Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders & Co. Ltd.), 1959. Pp. 191. $4.00.

This book, sponsored by the Congregational Commission on Evangelism, has been compiled as an anthology to aid the pastor in preparing his own ministry of prayer. The editor has collected some eighty-five examples of Pastoral Prayers from the compositions of American Free-Churchmen, introducing them with a brief essay on the place and purpose of the Pastoral Prayer in public worship. The collection affords an interesting insight into a contemporary liturgical movement and raises once more the fascinating question of the value of "free," as opposed to "set," prayers. Unfortunately this issue is dealt with only obliquely in the brief introduction, and in such a way as to satisfy neither the Conformist nor the Nonconformist. The editor graciously acknowledges that the Anglican and Roman liturgies are "a traditional vehicle in which each worshiper may let his own thanksgivings and petitions ride" (p. 15), but immediately adds that this has never been adequate for other Christians who have "sought to acquaint themselves at first hand with the Deity, in Emerson's phrase" (*ibid.*). While this judgment explains the rise of the custom of the Long, Free or General Prayer in Nonconformist worship (the "Pastoral Prayer" of the title) it unfairly suggests that "set" prayers are necessarily *second-hand* vehicles for true worship. It is therefore all the more surprising to find that the editor, having thus spoken, proposes to replace one set of pre-composed prayers with another, namely those pre-composed by the pastor himself. "A prayer written in tranquillity saves for the time of offering it all the energies of the minister's mind to insure best that it will stir and lift the hearts of the hearers because thus it has become their prayer too" (p. 24). Thus we are invited to compare these contemporary compositions with the great liturgical traditions, that they may commend or condemn themselves in living worship.

The prayers composed by ministers engaged in pastoral work are, on the whole, remarkably traditional in form and content, though sometimes given to circumlocution and embellishment to the detriment of their biblical emphasis. Remembering the remark of Justin Martyr concerning Jesus, "Brief and pregnant were his sayings," one wonders why his disciples cannot model themselves upon him and his pattern prayer. However, when we turn to the compositions of the seminarians, we find ourselves in a rather more startling world of *avant-garde* liturgiology in which felicity and brevity have been sacrificed on the altar of Realism.

> O Living God, as we come into Thy presence this morning, we are deeply awed by Thy constancy, Thy quiet patience, Thy reticence, Thy hiddenness, the unfathomed and unfathomable abyss of Thy inscrutable being. We bow down before the historic disclosure of Thy heart in Jesus Christ who lived in our world and in a distinct and measurable period of time and in an identifiable patch of this earth [p. 43].

O Heavenly Father, we come. We come stooped and weary from all of the luggage with which we seem determined to travel: our claimful selves; our restless longing to be in different places than we are; to be doing different things than we are; to be different persons than we are: different wives and husbands, different parents, different children, different neighbors than we are. Yet although we stagger with these painful weights we carry, nevertheless we come. . . .

Open the inward eyes of our souls, O Lord, that we may recognize that the longing to be other than we are as husband, as wife, as parent, as son, as daughter is an authentic response to Thine own prior drawing [p. 49].

Prayers such as these, one would hope, would not be used even after correcting the pomposity of the first and the repetitive solecisms of the second. Whatever the author of Revelation had in mind when he spoke of the prayers of the saints as golden bowls of incense filling heaven with their fragrance, it was surely not the offering of this kind of pseudo-poetic realism: "Our Father, fresh from the world with the smell of life upon us, we make an act of prayer in the silence of this place" (p. 76).

Fortunately this is not the whole. The larger portion of this interesting book is offered as a serious contribution to the study of good congregational prayer in the twentieth century. In so doing, it demonstrates how to pray at least as clearly as how not to pray.

RONALD REEVE

St. John's College
Durham, England

Editorial

FROM CLASSROOM TO PULPIT

WITH this issue of the *Journal* we greet a new generation of clergymen graduated from our Canadian theological colleges. They have each completed a course of study carefully designed by their churches and their teachers to equip them for their calling. They have attended lectures and have participated in seminars to learn the techniques of biblical interpretation, the heritage of the Christian faith, and contemporary issues in theology. They have also been instructed in the art of preaching, the responsibilities of a pastor, and other aspects of so-called Practical Theology. Now they have been sent out into the Church to shepherd the faithful and into the world to proclaim the unsearchable riches of the Gospel.

Usually the experience of being suddenly cast adrift in the work of a parish creates a feeling of inadequacy for the actual tasks that confront the young graduate. This inadequacy is first felt in dealing with concrete problems of pastoral supervision and church administration. The complaint is often heard that the colleges have failed to provide sufficient training in the practical aspects of the ministry. However, there are many things which the young clergyman can only learn through experience. Classroom instruction in the daily practice of the ministry can only achieve partial success, for its relevance often does not become apparent except in concrete situations. Even field work or a summer mission field does not totally prepare a student for his first charge, for there is a subtle difference between the relationship of a student and that of a minister to his congregation. The former is recognized as a student appointed for a brief period only, and his foibles are often condoned or overlooked; not so with the graduate who is to serve his parish for a number of years and who is expected to display mature judgment in act and word.

For someone thrust into a parish where new situations are as unexpected and varied as the individuality of the men and women who create them, no case book or rule of thumb can provide all the answers. The ongoing life of the Church is, however, a common responsibility shared with the young graduate by bishops, presbyteries and more experienced colleagues. The wise young ordinand will early seek their counsel and will certainly avoid the fatal error of regarding himself as a *prima donna* who cannot take advice.

Yet, in spite of the urgent demands of practical problems, the greatest challenge to the young minister will come in an area where he may sense no difficulty at all. It will be the problem of utilizing what he has so recently learned about the Bible, church history, and Christian thought in his

sermons. It is not being suggested that he should regale his congregation with the intricacies of pentateuchal criticism or the dangers of Apollinarianism. But these things should inform his preaching, and the sad fact is that too often they do not. One of the serious temptations the young preacher will face is to leave off the rigorous discipline of biblical criticism and preach ideas suggested by the words of the English text. Another temptation will be to treat theology as the hobby of the specialist and so of no concern to the layman. To yield to such temptations would limit preaching to the small range of ideas assimilated during student days or to allow it to conform to the prevailing temper of the times.

This is not good enough for the present age. The lives and outlook of people today are undergoing a reorientation at least as radical as that preceding the Reformation. To read a journal such as *Scientific American* is a salutary and sometimes disturbing experience for the contemporary theologian. Just as the views of Galileo and Copernicus and the discovery of new peoples in the antipodes and the Americas unknown to earlier Christian anthropologists called for a reassessment of earlier theology, so modern views of the nature of the universe and of life, including the possibility of life on other planets, mean that the story of salvation must be seen in a new perspective. The rapid political developments of our day, with the rising power and influence of non-Christian peoples, are creating an entirely new climate for the Church, different from that which existed when Christendom was almost synonymous with western civilization or when the development of colonialism was paralleled by the expansion of Christian missions. In some ways, Christianity is once again becoming a minority religion as it was before the time of Constantine.

In such an age it is not enough for the preacher simply to continue the routine of the past. He must discover for himself and for his people the relevance of the biblical message for the new age. And he must instruct laymen in the basic theology of Christianity in such a way that they can clearly distinguish it from popular contemporary ideologies. In this task a knowledge of great theologians such as Augustine and Luther who performed similar functions in their day is an indispensable guide. In other words, the young minister of 1960 must make a conscious effort to utilize his theological education in his preaching. More than ever it is important that he should be a practising biblical critic and theologian if he is to provide leadership for his people in the exciting ministry that lies ahead.

D. K. A.

The One Foundation of Christian Ethics

J. ARTHUR BOORMAN

ONE of the perennial problems confronting Christianity is the relation of ethics to faith. Thirty years ago the late Dean Inge wrote, "The storm-centre of religious controversy in post-war Europe and America is, it seems to me, the relation of the Gospel of Christ to problems of conduct. If the authority of Christ were rejected in this field, what would be left of Christianity would not be worth quarrelling over."[1] The gloomy Dean could scarcely have foreseen the conditions of the present day which give his words prophetic urgency. In the face of ethical problems, the solution to which is literally a matter of life-and-death, it is particularly important that we understand the relation of the Gospel of Christ to those problems. It is the lack of such understanding which accounts for the tragic fact that the voices raised in the name of Christian ethics are frequently confusing and even in conflict with one another. The crux of the difficulty, I believe, is a failure to acknowledge the truth, for Christian ethics, that "no other foundation can anyone lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ" (I Cor. 3:11). The one foundation of Christian ethics is the Christian faith. The following examination of three different schemes of ethics will point out that the fallacy in each is the assumption that some other foundation is necessary in order to make the Christian faith relevant to the ethical problems of human life.

I

The theology of Thomas Aquinas is generally regarded as the great medieval synthesis in which Greek, and particularly Aristotelian, philosophy provided the framework for the interpretation of the Christian faith. But Thomism involves not only synthesis but syncretism, that is, Christianity undergoes a serious modification through its union with Greek philosophy for the sake of mutual consistency. The ethical system of St. Thomas is a two-storey structure which is largely Aristotelian on the first level and Biblical on the second. Accordingly, the cardinal virtues are separated from the theological, and moral precepts distinguished from evangelical counsels. And although the Greek virtues and precepts are "baptized," that is, they are "infused together with charity,"[2] the whole scheme is a highly organized system of prudential ethics which bears little fundamental resemblance to the ethics of the New Testament. Scripture provides no warrant for a

1. W. R. Inge, *Christian Ethics and Modern Problems* (London, 1930), p. 4.
2. *Summa Theologia,* II–II, Q. 62, art. ii. Also, "Theological virtues are specifically distinct from virtues moral and intellectual." Q. 65, art. iii.

distinction between the ordinary Christian and "the religious"; all men are bound by the radical requirements of *agape*-love which St. Thomas elaborates as "evangelical counsels." The idea of a "nicely calculated less and more" suggests a legalism which is foreign to the ethical demands of the Gospel. George Thomas calls attention to this primary defect in Thomism when he states: "Aquinas does not recognize that the 'precepts' of Jesus do not constitute a 'new law,' but are simply illustrations of what God's absolute will requires of members of his Kingdom. Consequently, he does not see the radicalism of the ethics of the New Testament."[3]

The Thomistic ethical system is rooted not in the Gospel but in natural or moral law, that is, in the affirmation of "common and indemonstrable principles" which are apprehended by man's natural reason.[4] The crucial question here is well expressed by Paul Ramsey: "By what is Christian ethics to be distinguished from generally valid natural morality, if some theory of natural law becomes an authentic part and to any degree the *primary* foundation of Christian morality?"[5] Many students of Protestant ethics acknowledge the validity of "natural law" within the context of general revelation; indeed, its relevance is a question of particular urgency today, when nations must either discover some basis of common international law and order or face annihilation. At present, however, there is little agreement as to the place of such a concept in any scheme of Christian ethics. In any case, it is evident that an ethic based upon natural law tends to become stultified and obsolete, as in its application to birth control or in the idea of a "just war." The cause of Christianity was strengthened in the thirteenth century through the remarkable syncretism of Thomas Aquinas. But the continuing acceptance of his ethics in a large area of Christian thought is regrettable, insofar as Thomism misinterprets the Christian ethic by assuming that it may be based on a foundation other than the Christian faith.

II

Classical Protestantism has generally been critical of Thomism for what it regards as an unwarranted optimism concerning the capability of human reason to apprehend the moral law. In this respect, one of the outspoken prophets of neo-protestantism is Reinhold Niebuhr. Dr. Niebuhr has rendered a service to Christian ethics by re-emphasizing the gravity of human sin, and by warning against an easy application of the love ethic of the New Testament to the problems of society. He has persistently called attention to "the problem of compromise, the problem of creating and maintaining tentative harmonies of life in the world in terms of the possibilities of the human situation."[6] On the other hand, he has been critical of every scheme

3. *Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy* (New York, 1955), p. 114.
4. *Op. cit.*, II–II, Q. 91, art. iii.
5. *Basic Christian Ethics* (New York, 1950), p. 86.
6. *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* (New York, 1935), p. 59.

of prudential ethics, and continues to insist upon the necessity of bringing tentative achievements "under the criticism of the ultimate ideal."[7] But Niebuhr's severest criticism has been reserved for what he terms the "naive utopianism" of the Social Gospel and the "moralistic pietism" of American liberalism. The extent to which such phrases have become watchwords in contemporary social ethics is evidence of Niebuhr's widespread influence. For example, E. L. Long, Jr., re-echoes Niebuhr's criticism of the proponents of the Social Gospel in these words: "They took the ultimate norm of Christian love as equivalent to a practical program of action, . . . [trusting] that Christian love could be translated into social reality without a process of compromise."[8] The validity of this criticism will be considered later. Niebuhr's own compromise, however, makes the norm of love altogether impracticable in the realm of social and political activity. Indeed, it is doubtful whether his positive suggestions for a social ethic are compatible with the Gospel at all.

The key to Niebuhr's interpretation of the relation of politics to justice is contained in his affirmation that "In the field of collective behaviour, the force of egoistic passion is so strong that the *only* harmonies possible are those which manage to neutralize this force through balances of power. . . ."[9] This is a constant refrain in all Niebuhr's utterances concerning social, economic, political and international affairs, as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., points out. The latter quotes Niebuhr as saying, "An uneasy balance of power would seem to become the highest goal to which society could aspire." And Schlesinger comments, "On the level of strategy the balance of power in one form or another . . . remains still . . . Niebuhr's answer to the problem of achieving a tolerable society."[10] Niebuhr admits the necessity of submitting every proposal to the judgment of Christian love, but denies that a realistic form of justice is attainable on the basis of such love. In this he fails to acknowledge fully the redemptive possibilities of the Gospel or its ethical application. In other words, Niebuhr recognizes Christ as Judge but not as Saviour of men in any collective, social sense. His "realism" prevents him from regarding the Christian hope in other than eschatological terms; the hope of achieving more than a tolerable society based on uneasy balances of power is apparently naive and utopian!

Niebuhr came to accept a "balance of power" strategy as a reaction against the "easy optimism" of American Christianity, which failed to combat the injustices arising from the domination of the economic life of society by industrial magnates and increasingly powerful corporations. Seeking a realistic approach to the problems of unemployment in a time of economic depression, he was deeply influenced by the dialectial philosophy of Marxism. John Bennett, commenting on Niebuhr's social ethics, states:

7. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
8. *Conscience and Compromise* (Philadelphia, 1954), p. 28.
9. *Op. cit.*, p. 140; emphasis mine.
10. C. W. Kegley & R. W. Bretall eds., *Reinhold Niebuhr, His Religious, Social and Political Thought* (New York, 1956), p. 137.

"He used Marxism to criticize the sentimentality of liberalism. He does not expect 'the conception of love, held by oligarchs of a civilization, to qualify or challenge the power which they hold.' This leads him to accept the class struggle as diagnosis and as strategy with few qualifications."[11] The other major influence upon Niebuhr's ethical thought was American pragmatism. Critical as he has often been of Dewey and his school, his own ethics have become increasingly prudential and pragmatic. So Schlesinger observes:

> . . . Niebuhr came to intellectual maturity under the influence both of the Social Gospel and of pragmatism. But where Dewey and the social passion had agreed on the fundamentals of social strategy, Niebuhr . . . began to detect a difference between what he called the "prophet" and the "statesman"—the one committed to God, the other to the sinful world. The ethic of Jesus and the dictates of pragmatic wisdom, instead of coinciding, seemed almost at times—and necessarily so—to point in opposite directions.[12]

Although Niebuhr has forsaken his early socialism and has become a bitter critic of the pacifism he once espoused, he has consistently maintained his emphasis upon "checks and balances" of power and power groups as the key to social justice. He has frequently indicted Christianity for holding "political theories which are not able to cope with the problem of establishing a relative justice in society through the strategic use of coercion, conflict and balances of power."[13] This is an astonishing criticism of Christianity. How Niebuhr can make such an observation can only be understood by recognizing his separation of the Christian life from its faith; and his emphatic denial that "the way of the Cross" is practicable from a social point of view. A recent statement makes this quite explicit:

> It must be noted that the distinctively Christian theory of grace and redemption does not find place in a social ethic because it is a question whether nations, races and other groups have direct access to God and can repent and have newness of life in the sense that individuals do.[14]

From a theological point of view, the conditions Niebuhr imposes here upon the operation of divine grace and redemption are open to serious question. It appears evident that in his preoccupation with the judgmental side of the Gospel, he minimizes its redemptive nature. He denies as unrealistic the New Testament affirmation that *love is power* (Rom. 1:16; 12:21; I Cor. 1:23–24); but are not the Cross and Resurrection shorn of their ethical significance for men in such a denial?

Niebuhr's theory of "power politics" is also open to criticism from a sociological point of view. Although power is an instrument for the preserva-

11. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 132. See also Eduard Heimann, "Niebuhr's Pragmatic Conservatism" in *Union Seminary Quarterly Review*, Vol. XI, No. 4.
13. *Op. cit.*, p. 131.
14. Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Problem of a Protestant Social Ethic" in *Union Seminary Quarterly Review*, Vol. XV, No. 1.

tion of order in a state, the basis of order is not compulsion but consent.[15] Moreover, there is little sociological support for the idea that international order can be maintained for long by the balancing of sovereign powers.[16] On the other hand, there is a good deal of evidence that a "tolerable society" has been achieved through strategies other than the manipulation of power, that the power of God to redeem men and their societies has been exercised through devoted men and the *koinonia*, rather than through the kind of power structures which Niebuhr considers indispensable.[17] In his discussion of Christian social strategy, Niebuhr seems to overlook the creative possibilities of Christian leadership, personal and corporate witness, or organized social action in behalf of justice, economic assistance or international reconciliation. As this paper is a discussion of the foundation rather than the methods of Christian ethics, extensive evidence of the way in which divine grace and redemptive activity have apparently been operative in society would be out of place. By way of example, however, the political leadership and activity of William Wilberforce and his associates in the abolition of the slave trade might be cited, or the influence of the Wesleys upon the English industrial revolution.

Deserved tribute has been paid to Reinhold Niebuhr for his contribution to contemporary Christian ethics. His warnings have had a salutary effect upon many forms of complacency and self-satisfaction, and have exposed the inadequacy of a too optimistic view of man or society. But those who believe in the wholeness of the Christian faith and its relevance to all the affairs of men must raise serious questions about Niebuhr's social ethics. Looking for realistic strategies with which to meet the social and political problems of his day, Niebuhr found his answer in Marxism and pragmatism rather than in the Christian faith. In the name of pragmatic realism he advocates a foreign policy which, supported by coercive power of great magnitude, could well prove disastrous. The sheer "unrealism" of such a policy is made evident by the certain knowledge that the exercise of ultimate power available today would exterminate most of the human race. Yet if the historical evidence is valid, the prospect of thwarting the use of power by a show or balancing of power is very dim indeed. One can only marvel at the dialectical skill of a man who can persuade himself and others that such "power politics" and its terrible possibilities are even remotely related to the one foundation of Christian ethics, which is Christ a loving Saviour.

III

A third scheme of ethics which exemplifies another attempt to express

15. E.g., "Essential as are the services of socialized force they have also very decided limits, and even within these limits force is normally effective because it is conjoined with profounder expressons of the human will."—R. M. MacIver, *Society* (New York, 1941), p. 343.

16. ". . . countless historical evidences that in international relations preparation for war has begotten war."—*Ibid.*, p. 344.

17. Cf. Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Abridgement of Volumes I–VI by D. C. Somervell (New York, 1946), Chapter XX.

the Christian faith in relevant terms is Moral Re-Armament, formerly known as the Oxford Group Movement. This movement is a vital form of that "individualistic pietism" against which Reinhold Niebuhr often inveighs. It is preoccupied with the same ethical problems that concern Niebuhr, labour-management relations, international affairs, etc. But its strategy is individualistic rather than social; it seeks to change men, and especially *key* men. Niebuhr's ethic, we suggested, is largely divorced from the Christian faith, so far as it concerns itself with social problems. Yet Niebuhr is prepared not only to admit but to insist upon the fundamental importance of doctrine for Christian ethics. Moral Re-Armament, on the other hand, stresses the primacy of personal morality to the neglect of faith and doctrine. Niebuhr contends that Christian absolutes are "always a little absurd," but this absurdity is the core of the Moral Re-Armament program, with its four "absolutes," honesty, purity, unselfishness, and love.

This "ideology," as it calls itself, is essentially so simple and uncomplicated that it requires little elaboration. Its contrast with the "realism" of Niebuhr may be illustrated by a newspaper article commenting on two conferences held simultaneously in May, 1954, in Switzerland, the Big Power Conference at Geneva and the World Assembly for Moral Re-Armament at Caux. "At best, all that can come out of Geneva is a compromise which can moderate deadly passions for a time without curing the fundamental differences. In Caux, hatred is not appeased but actually overcome."[18] This face-to-face overcoming of differences is one of the major strategies of Moral Re-Armament.

The devotees of Moral Re-Armament make much of the fact that it is essentially an ideology in which all men can come together. The Right Reverend George West, former Bishop of Rangoon, writes: "The first thing that struck me about the World Assembly at Mackinac was the people who came. These included Catholics, pagans and Protestants, men of every faith and men of no faith." And he adds, "I saw that Christianity lived out fully is an ideology."[19] The precise meaning given to "ideology" is not clear; but it appears that some kind of levelling takes place if Catholics, pagans and Protestants are all united in a common ideology. Perfect morality is taken to be the expression or embodiment of perfect faith, but this, apparently, does not mean the Christian faith. The lowest common denominator, or as the devotee regards it, the highest common factor, which unites believer and infidel is personal acceptance of the four "absolutes." Absence of doctrine does not mean, however, that there are no religious elements in the ideology. But the religious ideas are expressed in a non-christian form, which adherents of other religions may accept without difficulty: life-changing through sharing (confession to another), surrender to God, restitution to all who have been wronged, and guidance.[20] This, with the four "abso-

18. R. C. Mowat ed., *Report on Moral Re-Armament* (London, 1955), p. 146.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 182.
20. The Layman with a Notebook, *What is the Oxford Group?* (London, 1933), pp. 8–9.

lutes," comprises the essential formulation of the ideology—a much more satisfactory ethical scheme, from the stand-point of simplicity, than Niebuhr's, with its ambiguities, complexities and ironies!

There are certain techniques peculiar to Moral Re-Armament which distinguish it from traditional forms of pietism. Methods of modern salesmanship and propaganda of various kinds are employed.[21] The presentation of the ideology in dramatic form has been widely successful; indeed, the "success" psychology of advertising is used with considerable finesse. "Testimonials" are impressive, particularly from the "top men," with whom the Moral Re-Armament effort begins and upon whom it concentrates. The theory behind this effort is that if you win the top or key men, it is easier to impress and change the others—a technique which has proved remarkably successful in current professional fund-raising programs. It is also claimed, with justification, that the affairs of men are most vitally influenced and affected by those in places of importance. In this age of depersonalization and "the organization man," recognition of the value of persons is most desirable. At the same time, we do well to recall that Jesus' disciples could hardly have been called "top" men in terms of position or prestige. Criticism has also been directed against the "slickness" of some of the Moral Re-Armament propaganda.[22]

Our interest in Moral Re-Armament, however, is to weigh its importance as an ethical system, focusing particular attention upon its relation to the Christian faith. It has already been suggested that reconciliation between different points of view is achieved by some "common denominator" principle, which men of any faith or of no faith can all accept. That principle may be expressed in the assumption that everyone can be changed, guided and good! Moral Re-Armament's insistence upon the primacy of personal reformation undoubtedly has its roots in the Christian doctrine of regeneration. But according to the Christian faith, regeneration is a response to divine revelation and grace proffered to the individual through the incarnate and living Christ. Without disputing the claim that "men of every faith and men of no faith" are "changed," we must raise a question as to the nature and results of such changes, if the redeeming work of the Saviour Christ is minimized. Likewise, the Church as the body of Christ and the fellowship of Christian believers plays a very minor role in the ethical strategy of Moral Re-Armament.

A question related to the doctrines of Christ and the Church must also be raised in connection with Moral Re-Armament's naive idea of guidance.

21. Recently, the propaganda of Moral Re-Armament has concentrated on an anti-communist crusade which parallels the efforts of "Spiritual Mobilization," and in milder form, the now waning "McCarthyism"; they all see sinister influences behind any attempts at rapprochement with Communism—recognition of Red China, increased trade, exchange of visitors, etc. Cf. *Ideology and Co-existence*, circulated very widely on this continent.

22. Dr. Buchman says, for example, that "pray" means Powerful Radiograms Always Yours, and "Jesus" means Just Exactly Suits Us Sinners. Cited by Horton Davies, *Christian Deviations* (London, 1954), p. 102.

If the guidance of God were as direct and dependable as the adherents of this ideology apparently assume, why should the Incarnation be necessary at all? A Muslim's "guidance" as to what constitutes absolute purity in marriage, for example, will likely be quite different from that which a Christian ordinarily considers purity. Do men know with assurance what absolute honesty, purity, unselfishness or love require? Or knowing, can they hope to fulfil such requirements? The basic doctrinal weakness of Moral Re-Armament is its failure to acknowledge the Second Person of the Trinity as well as the Third.

Moral Re-Armament, like Thomism, errs in making the Christian ethic into a set of rules. As Alexander Miller points out, the absolute of Christianity, is "an absolute loyalty and not an absolute principle" or set of principles.[23] The absolute love of which the Christian speaks is not a rule of life nor a law of ethical behaviour; rather, it is God himself making available his grace, in response to which men learn to love one another. Christian ethical requirements arise from the demand of divine love apprehended by faith. Faith and love precede obedience; or rather, love is the expression of obedience. "In us, as in God, Love must proceed from the Word."[24] In so far as the Christian ethic is thus derivative, it is not essentially a system of morality at all, and the assertion that there is no such thing as Christian ethics is correct in this respect. We must make a distinction, however, between the fundamental basis of Christian ethics and its particular application to a given problem or situation. The difficult but crucial issue is not whether, but how, the Christian gospel becomes relevant to the urgent social problems which any ethic must consider.

IV

Through the critical examination of three very different ethical schemes, we have tried to point out the weaknesses and inadequacies of Christian ethics which are not rooted in the Christian faith. The cornerstone of all Christian morality must be neither less nor other than the saving activity of God revealed in Jesus Christ. In other words, the norm of Christian ethics is *agape*-love, which in its vertical dimension describes the sacrificial, redeeming love of God, and horizontally, the response of men to that divine love in *all* their human relationships. Such a norm does not rule out, but supersedes, an ethic based on natural law. It affirms the saving activity of a living Christ, the operation of the Spirit of grace and truth, not only in individuals, but in groups and in the larger associations of men. Dr. Niebuhr's denial that the Christian doctrine of grace and redemption has any place in social ethics means, in effect, that Christianity is reduced to the individualistic pietism he so pointedly deplores! Moreover, a prudential ethic—a reduction of social strategy to "the art of the possible"—sets

23. *The Renewal of Man* (New York, 1955), p. 94.
24. Jacques and Raissa Maritain, *Prayer and Intelligence*, quoted by Erik Routley, *The Church and Music* (London, 1950), p. 217.

human limitations upon the boundless possibilities of God's saving activity, which is present as well as past, if the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is to be taken seriously. A living Christ is much more than mere example; he is the life, as well as the way and the truth,—life which is not bounded by the limitations of individual persons.

It is necessary, however, to suggest how the redemptive ethic based on the Gospel becomes realistic, relevant and responsible, if we reject the "compromises" examined above. It has been suggested, in effect, that strategies cannot be divorced from the norm, that works cannot be separated from faith, that means cannot ignore ends. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the Christian ethic, ultimately expressed and determined by Christian love, becomes responsible to the extent that it is considerate of possible consequences. It is in this particular respect that the Christian's openness to new truth and new insights based upon the experiences of men becomes important. This does not mean that Christian social ethics must become a calculating or prudential morality, as Dr. Niebuhr, in his quest for a responsible ethic, concludes. A profound understanding of Christ's crucifixion will not allow us to require assurance that the love ethic will "work" before we are willing to apply it; although we cannot dismiss lightly the truth in Paul's injunction: "Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good" (Rom. 12:21). To deny the creative possibilities of grace, operating through social as well as personal expressions of love, is a serious distortion of Christian truth.

Nevertheless Dr. Niebuhr has reminded us that to act responsibly the Christian must be "as wise as a serpent"; a foolish scorn of consequences cannot be regarded as an intelligent or fully devoted expression of *agape*-love. That is why love must go beyond its source in the Christian faith in order to be true to itself. The widest possible examination of relevant human insight and experience is necessary to test the wisdom of an intended expression of love. Love is still love if some possible consequences are overlooked; it is not love if possible adverse consequences are negligently or wilfully overlooked.

The Bible is particularly important for Christian ethics, not only because it provides a unique record of "the Word" from which love must proceed, but also as the supreme account of the experiences of men who responded to that Word. The Bible is not a handbook of Christian ethics, as many have supposed. Neither the Decalogue, nor the prophetic affirmations of righteousness, nor the moral injunctions of Paul—not even the precepts of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount—can be regarded as the absolute norms or fundamental consideration of Christian ethics. What *is* basic is that "the Word became flesh and dwelt among us" (John 1:14), and that "God's love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has been given to us" (Rom. 5:5); that is, in Christ men are given both the norm and the power to attain it. Christ's life, his teachings, his death and resurrection, taken together, provide the meaning of love, divine and

human. This is not to regard the Sermon on the Mount or any other Biblical teaching as irrelevant. Far from it. These must be taken seriously but not literally as evidence of what love requires, rather than as specific rules of behaviour which would constitute the basis of a new legalism. They help to provide content or to suggest the manner in which the Christian expresses his faith ethically, but they are not, in themselves, of the essence. For the Christian, being is more fundamental than doing; and for the "new being" in Christ, love is the fulfilling of the law.

Dispensing with rules does not relieve the Christian of moral obligation, nor free him from responsibility for the ethical problems of organized society. The application of the love ethic to society does not result in utopian anarchism, as Leo Tolstoy supposed.[25] The claims of love, springing from the perfect love of God, are absolute. But the expression of love is particular; what love requires is never known in detail or absolutely in advance of any situation. Consequently, the Christian must seek to discover the most adequate expressions of the Christian life which may be possible in his society at any given time. This means that the Christian ethic must be "teachable," to use Paul Ramsey's term,[26] so far as its particular content is concerned. The Bible is the "primary teacher" in this respect. Likewise, the Christian Church, as guardian of the faith and community of the faithful, must play a unique role in teaching the ethical requirements of the divine Word. But Christian ethics, if it is truly "teachable," must also be willing to examine non-christian ideas of morality; the experiences of men recorded in history, the insights of moral philosophy, and the ethics of other religions may all offer valid suggestions as to what love may require.[27]

Christians are obliged to listen, for example, to both the Christian Albert Schweitzer and the atheist Bertrand Russell, with regard to the problems of nuclear weapons and the "cold war." The proposals of either or both of these men may be "more Christian" than the moralism of Moral-Rearmament, the realism of Reinhold Niebuhr, or the legalism of Thomas Aquinas. In the light of possible consequences, love may demand a suspension of the testing of nuclear weapons and unilateral disarmament, rather than the stockpiling of weapons to maintain an uneasy balance of power. It may even be necessary to renounce all war, even "just war," although the advocate of such a radical proposal must be prepared to consider whether submission to tyranny is preferable to violence in the present instance. Responsible Christian concern must take all such possibilities into account. But the love by which every consideration is judged is also redemptive; new possibilities and creative alternatives to old solutions must constantly be sought and expressed.

25. Tolstoy would have ruled out the punishment of criminals by courts of law, or the use of force in any form by the state. Cf. *A Confession and What I Believe*, Chapters II & VI.

26. *Op. cit.*, p. 79.

27. Contrast Emil Brunner: "Does the Christian faith give the answer, the only answer, and the whole answer to the ethical question?" His reply is a decisive "Yes!"—*The Divine Imperative* (London, 1937), p. 51.

The application of the love ethic to social and political problems has often been rejected on the basis of the aphorism: "Politics is the art of the possible." Those who, like Thomas Aquinas and Reinhold Niebuhr, come to that conclusioin, do so because of a mistaken understanding of the Christian ethic as an expression of the Christian faith. On the other hand, moralistic pietism, as exemplified by Moral Re-Armament, also fails to recognize the social relevance of that ethic by interpreting its strategy too narrowly in terms of individual activity. At the same time, Christian love would be no more than a utopian ideal if it proposed strategies which took no heed of "the possible." But an ethic founded upon the Christian faith will place on "the possible" no limits which are suggested by human experience alone. Jesus expressed the only limit when he told his disciples: "You must be perfect , as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matthew 5:48). And he stated the basic nature and ground of obligation in human relationships in similar, unlimited terms: "Love your enemies . . . *so that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven*" (Matthew 5:44–45). This is both the foundation and the ultimate consideration of Christian ethics, not simply because it is Jesus' teaching, but because it is the supreme ethical expression of the faith in life, which Christ himself embodied. That they may be sons of their heavenly Father, men have been given a Redeemer; but they must also learn to love even as he loved, who in his own Person is the one foundation of Christian ethics. "No other foundation can anyone lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ."

Human Population Pressures and Birth Control

DAVID J. McCALLION

THE world's human population and its explosive increase has become a subject of world-wide concern to biologists, sociologists, statesmen and theologians. There is general agreement that a problem exists but a great deal of controversy as to what, if anything, should be done about it.

The statistics of population growth are well-known and have been made widely available, not least through frequent reference to them in the public press. Unfortunately, they are so staggering as to be meaningless without reflection. It is almost unbelievable that more than 50,000 individuals are added to the world's population every twenty-four hours.[1] This is a net gain. Sir Charles Darwin has frequently stated that, at the present rate of increase, in a hundred years there will barely be standing-room on the land surfaces of the earth for the population. Dr. H. L. Geisert, sociologist of George Washington University, has predicted that by A.D. 2000 the world's human population will be 6,300,000,000 (or about double the present population).

The first acceptable estimate of the world's total population is for A.D. 1650. It is a fairly reliable guess that some 545,000,000 people inhabited the earth at that time.[2] Prior to 1650, the earth's human population gained only very slowly in numbers through the centuries. In the following three centuries to 1950 there was a four-fold increase to 2,400,000,000.[3] The population of India, according to the 1951 census, was 356,829,485. This was a 12.5% increase in the ten years from 1941.[4] The population of the United States of America increased by 2,900,000 during 1956. There were 4,200,000 births or 25.1 per 1,000 of population for that year, and the birth-rate has exceeded 24 per 1,000 for eleven years. Infant mortality has been low at about 26.2 deaths per 1,000 live births. Mortality for the total population was 9.4 deaths per 1,000 of population. The increase in population in the U.S.A. is of the order of 1.7% annually; in Canada it is almost 3.0%.[5] The life expectancy at birth has steadily increased from 34 years in 1879 to 70.2 years in 1956, and continues to increase.[6] The number of

1. J. R. Bodet, quoted from A. Stone, "Present day international trends in family planning," *Annals of the N.Y. Acad. of Sciences*, 54 (1952), 769–75.
2. H. F. Dorn, "The effect of public health developments upon population growth," *ibid.*, 742–49.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Statistical Bulletin, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., December, 1956. The following figures are from the same source.
5. *Ibid.*, December, 1957; December, 1958.
6. *Ibid.*, September, 1957.

persons added to the human population in the past century exceeds the total accumulated number of persons during the entire previous history of the human race.

While the earth's population is rapidly approaching astronomical numbers the world's natural resources are dwindling, despite the wonderful claims made for "the great untapped resources of the wildernesses of the world." During the past century there has been an unprecedented drain upon the world's natural resources. Whereas there was an "inexhaustible" supply of minerals, including gas, oil and metals, two generations ago, they are rapidly approaching the vanishing point today. This means, for example, the use of poorer and poorer ores at higher and higher costs of extraction to supply the world's increasing demand for metals. The drain upon the "renewable" resources of soil, water and forests has also been prodigious. It is certainly apropos, then, to demand: What is the relationship between people and provender?

Unfortunately there is no uniformity of opinion on the potential resources of the earth. Thus, the situation has been misrepresented or misunderstood by many scientists, politicians and others. In 1952 the International Congress of Applied and Pure Chemistry maintained that only pessimists believe that a population problem exists. Many agricultural chemists claim that the world supply of food could be increased tremendously by agricultural methods now known. Application of what is now known, even without further resarch, could produce enough food to supply 4,000,000,000 persons. The implication is that science has the solution to the problem of the world's food supply, so that there is no need for concern.

The truth is that no magic barrel exists that never becomes empty. These wonderful harvests have not been produced, and ifs and buts will not produce them. Even if it were true that the world could feed four billion people, what of the other third of the six billion inhabitants the present rate of increase would give it by A.D. 2000? The basic necessities, essential for life for the vast numbers of the hungry and the naked, have not appeared and are not likely to do so. The realities of human existence cannot be faced by wishful thinking. Nor can they be faced by arguing that the multitudes do have a subsistence diet, monotonous though it may be.

Dr. L. I. Dublin, of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, had been misled by regional considerations in the U.S.A. when he said: "The recent bumper crop of children and increasing number of aged present challenging problems to many communities throughout the country. These problems can be resolved constructively through our great productive capacity, the vitality of our people, and our democratic way of life." This may apply in some regions of the U.S.A. but it does not supply an ever increasing world population, faced with ever decreasing goods and resources.

The inescapable fact remains that two-thirds of the world's population lack even the basic necessities of life. Two out of ever three persons on the face of the earth barely exist. With a population now in excess of three

billion the world production of food is about 900 million tons annually.[7] This is totally inadequate to supply the ideal 3,000 calories per person per day. Only 25% of the world's population have more than 2,750 calories per day; 20% have between 2,750 and 2,250; 55% have less than 2,000 calories per day. The average in the United States is 3,100 calories, while in India the average is 1,640 calories.

J. R. Bodet, addressing the Unesco Conference as long ago as 1950, said that the question of food and people was the gravest international problem of the time from the long-term point of view. But the problem has to do, not only with food alone, but also with other commodities, as well as with space. The greatest peril to human existence is uncontrolled population increase. The problem is far more urgent than that of radioactive fallout, of the development of guided missiles, or of space travel and space exploration. It is not merely a challenge to scientific ingenuity to increase food supplies; there are just too many people for the resources.

Over 100 years ago the Rev. T. R. Malthus (1766–1834) warned that population tends to multiply faster than its means of subsistence can be made to do, so that unless population increase is restrained, poverty is inevitable.[8] We must now realize that the time has come (indeed that it came a long time ago) for us to reach decisions concerning the stabilization of human population. We can no longer sustain even the notion that industrialization of backward countries will alleviate the situation. Sir Charles Darwin and others have frequently pointed out that social welfare and education of increasing masses use up the wealth that might accelerate industrialization. Population control is the sole remaining solution.

The science of population studies is a highly specialized branch of biology and no exhaustive examination of it is possible here. It is, however, well worth a brief examination of the factors which have brought about the phenomenal increase in human population.

Human fertility (like all animal fertility) is strikingly excessive. Until recent times there has been an almost equally high mortality rate. An examination of cemetery records in Toronto[9] revealed that just a hundred years ago half of all the deaths recorded were of children under the age of five years. There is no lack of supporting statistics on infant mortality in earlier times. Human population increases have always been checked by war, famine and disease. Leaving war out of account, we may note for example, that 201 famines have been reported in the British Isles between A.D. 10 and the great potato famine of 1846–47. Disease has been no less important than famine in population control. Populations have frequently been decimated by the black plague, influenza, cholera and other epidemics. In the twen-

7. J. G. Harrar, "Food, Science and People," *Trans. of the N.Y. Acad. of Sciences*, 20 (1958), 263–77.

8. Cf. T. R. Malthus, *An Essay on the Principles of Population* (9th ed., London, 1888).

9. A class exercise conducted by Prof. J. B. Falls in the Department of Zoology, University of Toronto.

tieth century medicine has achieved a phenomenal control over disease. Sanitation and epidemic control preserve the lives even of the very poor, even in densely crowded areas. Such has been our preoccupation with preserving life that we have failed to appreciate the dangers of its superabundance.

We now stand face to face with population increases which will surely defeat all efforts to sustain the advances in living standards that full health and happiness require. What these standards are was admirably stated at the Lambeth Conference of Anglican bishops in 1958:

> The Conference, recognizing that there is a world-wide need for decent and suitable housing, records the belief that every married couple should have adequate privacy and shelter, for the better bringing up of the family as well as for the benefit of its own married life; and that national and local government share fully with private enterprise the community's obligation to meet this need.[10]

We need only extend this to cover other basic resources for it to become apparent that such standards are quite impossible of achievement for a rapidly increasing world population.

It may be contended that the problem should be considered at the purely biological level. All living organisms must adapt themselves to their environment if they are to survive at all, either as individuals or as a race. The survival of the fit and their continued reproduction and selection constitute a primary biological principle. Many more individuals are born than can survive. Changes in survival rate are reflected in reproductive rates. Thus, a reasonably stable population results which is further stabilized by environmental control. If there is a trend to overpopulation it is relieved by lowered reproductive rates, by increased mortality rates or by migration. Migration, however, is seldom the solution to overpopulation. Stable populations result from a mortality rate which equals or approximates the natality rate.

Unlike other organisms, man has learned to modify, and in large measure to control, his environment. The sources of man's increasing control over his environment have been the exploration and exploitation of new land masses, the accompanying expansion of commerce, the discovery and improvement of technical processes, and the control of disease by sanitation, preventive medicine and chemotherapy. These advances in human welfare have upset the delicate balance between natality and mortality.

We are now faced with the problem of how to make the advantages of public health and good medicine, now accessible only to a small minority, available to all people, while, at the same time, preserving a balance between reproduction and mortality, so that the benefits are not nullified by a galloping increase in numbers.

We arrive at last at the basic question: How can we control human population increase? We have learned to control, or at least modify, many natural phenomena. We have not yet discovered how to evade the conse-

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We arrive at last at the basic question: How can we control human population increase? We have learned to control, or at least modify, many natural phenomena. We have not yet discovered how to evade the conse-

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quences of biological laws. No species has ever been able to multiply without limit. The natural checks on rapid increase are high mortality and/or low fertility. To state the point as simply as possible, the rate of population increase is a function of two factors, natality and mortality. A decrease in mortality without a similar decrease in natality results in a positive rate of population increase. Man is unique among biological organisms in that he can choose to regulate his population increase. The choice must be made immediately, for the situation is desperate.

Now that we have effected decreases in infant mortality and extended the life expectancy of man, it would be illogical to think of withdrawing these benefits in order to limit population. The only logical means of controlling population increase is birth control. This implies contraception. In the past many peoples have attempted to control fertility by means of sexual taboos, abortion and infanticide. Among Western Europeans birth control by contraception has restrained population growth to relatively limited gains. The great masses of people have, however, been unable to control their fertility effectively. For both moral and medical reasons, it is clear that abortion is not the solution to the problem. Abortion is cumbersome, expensive, and dangerous even when performed by skilled surgeons. It is not within the scope of the present discussion to consider the various aspects of the morality and legality of abortion. Therapeutic abortion is a matter which patient and doctor must resolve within the framework of medical ethics and of the faith and conscientious convictions of the persons involved.

It is worth noting in passing, however, that even in North America many women have turned to abortion as a means of controlling fertility. It is well-known that the majority of abortions, legal and illegal, are sought by married women who already have several children. Indeed, this raises sociological problems of a very serious nature, since the number of abortions is phenomenally high.

There is no lack of contraceptive knowledge at the present time, and it increases with advancing research into the nature of human fertility and with practical research on means of contraception. Essentially, contraception means a method or methods by which sperms are prevented from reaching (and thereby prevented from fertilizing) the ovum. Surgical sterilization is the surest way to achieve this end. The male can be sterilized by tying and cutting the vas deferens. This procedure is permanent, but has no effect upon the maleness of the individual. It can be carried out quickly and effectively without discomfort or hospitalization. Sterilization of the female requires more extensive surgery and hospitalization. There are several ways of accomplishing it, and in most cases fertility can be restored by corrective surgery.

Chemical contraception includes the use of spermicides with or without a mechanical barrier in the vagina. Other chemicals have been developed which prevent ovulation in the female. These permit ovulation to return when the chemical is withdrawn. Many such drugs produce undesirable

side-effects, but continued research can be expected to improve them and to discover still others.

The Government of India has already decided to provide surgical facilities in state hospitals, as a means of controlling population growth by the sterilization of males. This was announced by Health Minister Kamarkar early in 1959. The secretary of India's Atomic Energy Commission has stated that his country's problem is so vast that no tangible results could be obtained by propaganda or by large-scale free distribution of contraceptives. Governments of other nations, including Japan, have taken similar stands. The great difficulty is that it requires considerable intelligence and some little knowledge to use chemical contraceptives effectively. Eventually, as indicated above, an effective and otherwise harmless substance that can be mixed with food will be developed.

The purpose of all of the foregoing discussion is to emphasize the urgency of the problem of population increase on the one hand and on the other to establish the fact that effective contraceptive information, sufficiently simple to be used even by illiterate masses, is the only answer to the problem. The final question then becomes: What should our attitude be towards this solution—that is, towards large scale control of birth by contraception?

It is patently impossible to consider the possible attitudes of the world's many religions. At the same time it has to be realized that we face a world problem, not a regional one. Attitudes towards contraception are, however, influenced in a large measure by Christian teaching, particularly since any information or financial assistance must come from western Europe and North America.

To many faiths the question of birth control is not a religious question. As with the biologist, it is simply a question of survival. Representatives of the Jewish faith (for example, Rabbi Abraham Feinberg) have supported and urged a program of birth control to check the world's population growth. Similarly, church leaders among the various Protestant groups are in favour of birth control, at least in overpopulated countries. Individuals in these groups have made statements indicating their appreciation of the distressing problem of population, but urging various degrees of caution in the use of contraception.

The attitude of the Anglican Communion can be deduced from these statements of the Lambeth Conference of bishops in 1958.

> The Conference believes that the responsibility for deciding upon the number and frequency of children has been laid by God upon the consciences of parents *everywhere*: that this planning, *in such ways as are mutually acceptable to husband and wife in Christian conscience*, is a right and important factor in Christian family life and should be the result of positive choice before God. Such responsible parenthood, built on obedience to *all* the duties of marriage, requires a wise stewardship of the resources and abilities of the family as well as a thoughtful consideration of the varying *population needs and problems of society* and the claims of future generations.[11]

11. Lambeth Conference, 1958, Resolution 115; italics mine.

It is already evident from this resolution that the Anglican communion officially sanctions the use of contraceptives as a means to limiting population, but we may also note that the Archbishop of Canterbury has affirmed, in *Canterbury Diocesan Notes*, that the Anglican and Episcopal Churches have formally favoured artificial birth control. Such use, however, is subject to the recognition that it is wrong to marry with the deliberate intent of not having *any* children and thus avoiding part of the responsibility of Christian marriage.

The Roman Catholic Church has always taken a firm stand against any kind of birth control as a crime against natural law. It is unfortunate that frequent statements, appearing in the public press and attributed to either lay or clerical members of that faith, have only tended to becloud the issue. A few examples will suffice. The Most Reverend Joseph Heenan, Archbishop of Liverpool, is reported to have said that the Church would not object to a birth control pill if it did not infringe the law of God. Since it would inevitably do so (see argument below) it could never be acceptable. Solicitor-General Balcer and Mines Minister Comptois, Roman Catholic laymen in the Federal Cabinet, have been reported as favouring the dissemination of birth control information to underdeveloped countries. Such press reports of a controversial issue only tend to obscure the facts in the public mind.

The Roman Catholic Church fully admits the problems of population pressures. It will not, however, allow that population may be controlled by "unnatural" means, but firmly opposes mechanical methods of birth control. This church maintains that an equitable distribution of the world's resources will provide a partial solution to the problem. Further, it holds that there is a time factor involved and that industrialization, later marriages, advanced education, and other social factors will provide natural checks on population during the next half-century. Within God's divine plan, a solution will appear in these ways. This optimistic view is unwarranted. It has already been argued above that such ideas cannot be supported by the biological facts. The world's total potential productivity will not support an unlimited population, and it is not likely that any effective natural checks on population increase will appear.

Population is "naturally" controlled by disease and starvation, coupled with low fertility. It is not necessary to extend this argument to cover excessive fertility, the prodigious production of eggs, sperm and young which do not survive. It suffices to point out that what we mean by "natural" is what we find in nature. One writer has discussed the term "unnatural" in this way.[12] The progenitors of the birds we know had feathers to keep them warm. At a later stage of evolutionary emergence, wings were used for flight. In terms of their original use, this new use was no doubt "unnatural." By learning how to defer early death and to make conception voluntary,

12. R. C. Cook, "Social and biological factors in human fertility," *Annals of the N.Y. Acad. of Sciences*, 54 (1952), 750–59.

mankind, whether it likes it or not, has behaved in a most "unnatural" manner. In human terms, then, any deliberate attempt to prevent conception is unnatural, in that it does not occur in nature. This includes total abstinence from intercourse as well as abstinence during the fertile period, which is the basis of the rhythm method of birth control. Whether we recognize it or not, the fact is that man's survival is increasingly determined by his social and political acts.

The subjection to law of all of the phenomena of life in all its forms is, for the biologist, an act of nature; for the theologian it is a product of divine wisdom, and thus a dogmatic principle. All things are subject to the natural law, which is the reflection of the eternal plan of divine wisdom in the reason of man, or a participation by man in the eternal law.

The position of the Roman Catholic Church is that under natural law contraception in all its forms is a grave crime. It is an injury to God, for it defeats the ends of marriage and degrades it to the level of mere pleasure. It is an injury to society, because the human race is endangered when marriage is abused; this kind of abuse tends to race suicide, since it depopulates the nation by an act of its own people. It is an injury to the family, largely because of the indulgence possible within a small family. Finally, it is an injury to the individual, in that it is a perversion of the sexual act from its specific end to that of passing gratification. There are many arguments derived from the above which may be strongly urged against Neo-Malthusian and other similar arguments for birth control.

It is argued in moral theology, however, that birth control is lawful with reference to its *end*, that is, limitation of the number and spacing of the arrival of offspring. But it is only lawful with reference to its *means* when they are continence or abstinence, and not onanism or the use of chemical or mechanical devices. This leaves as the only lawful means of family limitation the deliberate avoidance of conception by the restriction of intercourse to the naturally sterile periods of the female menstrual cycle. This method has not received the unqualified approval of the Roman Catholic Church; rather, its adoption is subject to need and spiritual guidance.

The rhythm method of birth control is perhaps the least reliable of all methods, and on a world wide scale it would not be applicable at all. The method assumes a high degree of regularity in the menstrual cycle from month to month. Unusual exertion or stress can affect the time of ovulation, and so can minor variations in general health. The use of this method requires the intelligence to understand the significance of the menstrual cycle and the ability to count and keep records—something that illiterates are unable to do.

It is clear from the above statements that the Roman Catholic Church can approve the rhythm method of birth control, because this method uses only the natural means that God has placed at man's disposal. It is equally obvious that it cannot approve the use even of a drug or "pill" that will inhibit ovulation. Such a drug is not biologically different in its action from

spermicides, even though it may be argued that preventing an egg from forming is of a different order than killing sperm already formed.

It should be argued, however, that whatever method of birth control is used the *intent* is always the same, that is to have intercourse and at the same time prevent conception. If there is a moral issue involved it is in the intent and not in the method. If avoiding conception is immoral, then any method of doing so is wrong. The Church recognizes that sexuality in man has other ends than reproduction, since it permits marriage between sterile persons, and does not condemn intercourse either when pregnancy is known to have occurred or after the menopause, although in both cases it cannot serve the primary purpose for which it exists.

The argument against contraception on the ground that it tends to depopulate the world cannot be supported, since in part it is a stable population that must be achieved if all men are to enjoy the health and welfare that God intended them to have.

Finally, the greatest good must surely be considered in the interpretation of moral law. In 1936, in his encyclical on chaste and Christian marriage, Pope Pius XI said in part: "Nor are those considered as acting against nature who use their marital rights in the proper manner though on account of natural reasons . . . new life cannot be brought forth. For in matrimony . . . there are also secondary ends such as . . . the cultivation of mutual love." A very natural reason supports the conviction that new life cannot be brought forth in unlimited numbers: there are too many of us relative to the world's resources. Why then cannot the moral problem be resolved in such a way that contraception may be applied effectively to population control? We have already imposed upon nature by affecting human mortality rates. We must affect the natality rates to maintain a relatively stable population. Society will suffer otherwise. Whatever is to be done must be done now.

We are left with a serious issue. We are faced with a problem that must be solved at the purely biological level. And yet, we cannot urge its solution by acts judged to be immoral by a large segment of the population. Mgr. T. B. Fulton, Chancellor of the Archdiocese of Toronto, has already classed any such procedure as an "affront to the conscience of at least half of the population of Canada." It can only be hoped, then, that the next "ecumenical council" of the Roman Church will give very serious consideration to the urgent question of the dissemination of contraceptive information to underdeveloped countries.

Religious Opinion in the Prose Letters of John Donne

IAN SOWTON

WHEN John Donne, Dean of St. Paul's, died in 1631 he was perhaps the most famous preacher in England. He was, says Izaak Walton,

> A Preacher in earnest; weeping sometimes for his Auditory, sometimes with them: always preaching to himself, like an Angel from a cloud, but in none; carrying some, as St. Paul was, to Heaven in holy raptures, and inciting others by a sacred Art and Courtship to amend their lives; here picturing a vice so as to make it ugly to those that practised it; and a vertue so, as to make it be beloved even by those that lov'd it not; and all this with a most particular grace and an unexpressible addition of comeliness.[1]

Donne had also achieved literary fame enough to have fathered a "metaphysical school" of poetry and to be regarded by Ben Jonson as the "first poet in the world in some things."[2] Preacher and Poet: this double public image of Donne is neatly put in the best known elegy on him, that of Thomas Carew:

> Here lies a King, that rul'd as he saw fit
> The universall Monarchy of wit;
> Here lie two Flamens, and both those, the best,
> Apollo's first, at last, the true Gods Priest.

Donne is known, as he should be, chiefly in his poems and sermons. In the poems, most of which were circulated only in private, manuscript form, Donne was his most intense, witty, and intricate self. They manifest an introspective habit of the closest, subtlest, and most personal kind. Although they have all the restless wit and intensity of the poems, the sermons are for general consumption and edification. In them sounds Donne's public, hortatory voice. His poems are some of the most personal documents ever composed; his sermons are the record of an important and much-admired public figure. But the simple-minded opposition of Jack Donne of the *Songs and Sonets* to Dean Donne of the sermons is a thing of the past. Especially in fundamental habits of mind and expression there was a good deal of the Dean in Jack Donne and of Jack in the Dean.

Donne's letters are not so well known.[3] The majority of those surviving

1. Izaak Walton, *Lives* (Oxford World's Classics), p. 49.
2. See *Ben Jonson's Conversations with William Drummond of Hawthornden*, ed. R. F. Patterson (London: Blackie & Son, 1923), p. 11.
3. There is not yet a definitive edition of the letters. The chief collections are to be found in Edmund Gosse's *The Life and Letters of John Donne*, 2 vols. (London: William Heinemann, 1899); C. F. Merrill's edition of Donne's *Letters to Severall Persons of Honour* (New York: Sturgis & Walton Co., 1910), first collected and edited by John Donne, Jr., in 1651; *John Donne: Complete Poetry and Selected Prose*,

are to close friends; they are intimate and informal in tone and range from early to late in his career. They therefore provide a corrective to extreme, over-simple views of Donne—all the more because they are not self-conscious performances either in the personal, lyrical sense of the poems or in the public, oratorical sense of the sermons. The letters confirm the double image of Donne, both Jack and Dean, and in so doing they fill it in and stabilize it against extremes. This essay will show by implication how the letters perform just such a function; but more directly, its purpose is to fill in, from the letters, what we already know of Donne's opinions on a variety of religious matters. I should refer the reader particularly to Helen Gardner's Introduction to her edition of Donne's *Divine Poems* (Oxford, 1952) and to Chapter IV of Evelyn Simpson's *A Study of the Prose Works of John Donne* (2nd ed., Oxford, 1948); this article offers a series of gleanings from Donne's letters which confirm and elaborate slightly the findings of these two excellent scholars. The general technique of this essay will be as far as possible to let the letters speak for themselves. The Elizabethan and Jacobean context of religious policy and controversy will be taken as understood.

At all stages in his career religious issues were very obviously of extreme interest to Donne. This is as true of the years when he was a young student-lawyer about town—"not dissolute, but very neat"—before he was committed to either Anglicanism or Roman Catholicism, as it is for his years as the Dean of St. Paul's. We should then rightfully expect Donne's letters, early and late, to say a good deal about this interest of his. In his public pieces such as the sermons a man in Donne's position would have a public responsibility to balance nicely between orthodoxy of opinion and originality of expression. The fact that James I fancied himself a theologian made matters all the more ticklish for the Dean of St. Paul's, especially in regard to what was currently orthodox. As a matter of fact, Donne's sermons did get him into trouble, although very briefly, once with James and once with Charles.[4] But in his letters to friends Donne was obliged to be neither so careful nor so arresting. It is useless to expect from these letters a consistent theological system. They discuss matters on the level of personal opinion and temperamental preference. The exceptions to this are the few formal, consolatory letters and those carefully composed epistles to great men and potential patrons in which occur religious sentiments of one kind or another.

In Donne's day the Church of England was heavily engaged on two fronts

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ed. John Hayward (London: Nonesuch Press, 1949); *A Collection of Letters, Made by Sr. Tobie Mathews. Kt.*, ed. John Donne, Jr. (London, 1660); *The Losely Manuscripts*, ed. A. J. Kempe (London: John Murray, 1836), pp. 321–47; E. M. Simpson, *A Study of the Prose Works of John Donne*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), Chap. XII. Donne's authorship of some of the letters reprinted by Mrs. Simpson is under dispute.

4. See Walton's *Lives*, 42–3. Donne's extreme surprise at Charles' behaviour is shown in a note to his friend Ker:

Freely to you I say, I would I were a little more guilty: Onely mine innocency makes me afraid. I hoped for the King's approbation heretofore in many of my sermons; and I have had it. But yesterday I cam very near looking for thanks; for in my life. I was never in any one peece, so studious of his service.

of political-religious controversy against the Roman Catholics and the Dissenters. Donne was minutely versed in these controversies. As shown by his own *Pseudo-Martyr* (1910), his researches on behalf of Dean Morton[5] had grounded him well in the matter and manner of contemporary religious polemics. Familiarity with the Scholastics was an essential instrument of anti-Roman polemics and Donne had a complete command of the Scholastics too. All this is confirmed by a letter he wrote to Goodyer[6] from Paris in 1611/12. Here Donne mentions a notable Sorbonist, Dr. Richer, who had written a book "against the Popes jurisdiction, about three months since."[7] This book, *De ecclesiastica et politica potestate*, was very notorious and Donne informs Goodyer that it was censured both by the French secular authorities and by the clergy, among whom were a number of Richer's fellow Sorbonists. The point is that Donne is already thoroughly familiar with Richer's very recent book and is also prepared to appeal in detail from it to the Scholastics, for he writes:

> . . . yet against this censure, and against three or four which have opposed Richer in print, he meditates an answer. Before it should come forth I desired to speak with him, for I had said to some of the Sorbonists of his party, that there was no proposition in his Book, which I could not shew in Catholique authors of 300 years: . . . (Merrill, xlii, 112).[8]

This was a bold claim to have made, and it is a pity that Richer continued to put Donne off, or if he did finally grant him an interview, that we have no record of it. The letters also bear ample witness to Donne's reading in other branches of Divinity, yielding, as they do, a wide range of references that include Church history, Spanish divines, Averroes, St. Thomas, and Church Fathers such as Jerome and Augustine.

In the letters Donne speaks several times about the nature of the soul.[9] In terms of Renaissance psychology, Donne inclines toward the Platonic organization of soul and body, with the mind as a sort of disputed area between them. Donne may be called a neo-Platonist, though not in the strictest sense, for he does not regard the body and its senses merely as the means by which to ascend to the contemplation of the essentially good and beautiful.

5. Thomas Morton (1564–1659), Bishop of Durham (1632–1659), had a considerable reputation as a controversialist against Roman Catholicism. His most important books were *Apologia catholica* (1605) and *A Catholic Appeale* (1609). Donne seems to have worked with Morton for a while as a kind of research-assistant and secretary.

6. Henry Goodyer was a member of the minor gentry. He was one of Donne's closest friends and by far his most voluminous correspondent.

7. Richer (1559–1631) was principal of Cardinal Le Moine College and Syndic of the University of Paris. The publication of *De ecclesiastica et politica potestate* was the climax of a long running battle with the Jesuits over university policy and the relation of the Gallican Church to the Papacy. Richer was bested in this quarrel, being censured by the bishops of the Province of Sens and compelled to resign his Syndicate in 1612.

8. The reference is to Merrill's edition of *Letters to Severall Persons of Honour* (cf. n. 3 *supra*). Roman numerals stand for the letter number, Arabic numerals for the page number. Many of Donne's letters are undated. In the references which follow, dates are given only if we know them or can make a reasonably accurate guess.

9. For a good discussion of Donne's thought on the soul, and especially on the state of the soul after death, see Helen Gardner, *op. cit.*, xliii–xlvii and Appendix A.

The opinion of the relation of soul to body in his famous poem "The Extasie" is confirmed exactly in a letter to Goodyer:

Our nature is Meteorique, we respect (because we partake so) both earth and heaven, for as our bodies glorified shall be capable of spirituall joy, so our souls demerged into those bodies, are allowed to partake earthly pleasure. Our soul is not sent hither, only to go back again: we have some errand to do here: nor is it sent into prison, because it comes innocent: and he which sent it, is just (Merrill, xvii, 40. 1612?).

It is true that in a mood of "severer contemplation" Donne writes to Goodyer,

As I have much quenched my senses, and disused my body from pleasure, and so tried how I can indure to be mine own grave, so I try now how I can suffer a prison. And since it is but to build one wall more about our soul, she is still in her own Center, how many circumferences soever fortune or our own perversnesse cast about her. I would I could as well intreat her to go out, as she knows wither to go (Nonesuch, XII, 458, c. 1609).[10]

It is also true that Donne came more and more self-consciously to discipline and mortify his body in the discharge of his ghostly duties. But he regarded his body not only as his soul's instrument, but also as its partner. It was not the soul's prison, but rather the shape, or home, in which the soul had to realize, not its earthly penalty, but its earthly duty. Moreover, the soul being spiritual, and having those supreme capacities of reflecting upon itself[11] and of sympathetic recognition of another soul,[12] enjoys a potential independence of its earthbound and material body.

In another letter discussion about the soul brings Donne to consider the vexed question of "how the soul begun in us."[13] He has serious criticisms to level at both the chief doctrines of the origin of the soul, which are propagation from parents and infusion from God. He does not decide between them in this letter, although elsewhere he speaks of the soul being created when infused and infused when created, thus seeming to range himself on the side of infusion from God. But the point here is not only which doctrine Donne prefers. He is also complaining about two things: first, about unessential theological notions that have come to assume disproportionate importance as the subjects of doctrinal controversy. Hence he remarks that though it is the soul's happiness in the next life that really matters, "Christian Religion . . . hath been content to accept any way which hath been obtruded, how this soul begun in us." Since, however, the subject has managed to make itself of extreme if disproportionate interest Donne complains, in the second

10. The reference is to Hayward's edition of Donne (cf. n. 3 *supra*). Roman numerals refer to the letter number, Arabic numerals to the page number. Since Hayward had access to much more recent and accurate Donne scholarship than either Merrill or Gosse, I use his reprints of the letters whenever possible in preference to the other two.

11. I.e., *actum reflexum*. See Merrill, vi, 11.

12. See the beginning of "The Extasie", and also Letter 27 in Mrs. Simpson's collection.

13. Merrill, vi, 14–6.

place, that the weaknesses in both doctrines have long demanded a rigorous examination that so far has not been forthcoming:

In both which opinions there appear such infirmities as it is time to look for a better: . . . there is yet therefore no opinion in Philosophy, nor Divinity, so well established as constrains us to beleeve, both that the soul is immortall, and that every particular man hath such a soul: which since out of the great mercy of our God we do constantly beleeve, I am ashamed that we do not also know it by searching farther: But as sometimes we had rather beleeve a Travellers lie then go to disprove him, so men rather cleave to these ways then seek new: yet because I have meditated therein, I will shortly acquaint you with what I think . . .[14] (Merrill, vi, 14–5, 16. 1607?).

This is not the only letter in which Donne complains about the quality of contemporary religious thought and writing. Goodyer had once left with Donne a copy of Barlow's *An Answer to a Catholic Englishman* (1609), and Donne's criticism of it was scathing:[15]

It hath refreshed, and given new justice to my ordinary complaint, That the Divines of these times, are become meer Advocates, as though Religion were a temporall inheritance. . . . They write for Religion, without it, . . . and in the mean time, I will adventure to say to you, without inserting one unnecessary word, that the book is full of falsifications in words, and in sense, and of falsehoods in matter of fact, and of inconsequent and unscholarlike arguings, and of relinquishing the King, in many points of defence, and of contradiction of himself, and of dangerous and suspected Doctrine in Divinitie, and of silly ridiculous triflings, and of extreme flatteries, and of neglecting better and more obvious answers, and of letting slip some enormous advantages which the other gave and he spies not (Merrill, lii, 138, 140–1. 1609?).

Closely allied to this dissatisfaction with contemporary theological thought is Donne's lasting suspicion of all forms of doctrinal exaggeration. Some notions, he thinks, may be helpful and interesting, or even extremely important, which are not vital to belief or necessary to salvation:

. . . in some cases to some men counsels become precepts, and though not immediately from God, yet very roundly and quickly from his Church, (as selling and dividing goods in the first time, continence in the Romane Church, and order and decencie in ours) . . . (Merrill, xxx, 75–76. 1607?).

Such cases are not worth intemperate dispute, and when they arise, reason and moderation must be the deciding issues. Orderly and decent conduct of church affairs is the natural result of consultation with reason.[16] In all this

14. In *Letters to Severall Persons of Honour* this letter is addressed to Sir T. Lucy but it is almost certainly to Goodyer. (See R. E. Bennett's two articles on the letters in *Philological Quarterly*, XIX (1940), 66–78 and *PMLA*, LVI (1941), 120–40). As far as I know we have no other letter in which Donne does further acquaint Goodyer with his opinion in this matter.

15. In fairness to the theological thought of the time it should be noted that Barlow was very far from being one of its best representatives.

16. In questions of Church discipline and conduct Donne of course appeals to the New Testament Epistles, but I am not sure whether he would regard them as precept "immediately from God" or as counsels come "roundly and quickly from his Church."

Donne is following Hooker and anticipating Browne, who wrote in the *Religio Medici*,

I condemne not all things in the Councell of Trent nor approve all in the synod of Dort. In briefe, where the Scripture is silent, the Church is my Text; where that speakes, 'tis but my Comment; where there is a joynt silence of both, I borrow not the rules of my Religion from Rome or Geneva, but the dictates of my owne reason (I, v.).

Donne's idea of prayer, and of the whole notion of communion with God, rests firmly upon the motion of God in His grace toward us, especially as it is evident in the Incarnation.[17] It does not rest at all upon any motion of ours towards God:

Though therefore some extreme contemplative philosophers have thought itt to be the highest degree of reverence which man could use towards God to abstaine from outward sacrifices and from verball prayer, because nothinge but our purest thoughts, before they are mingled with any affections and passions, can have any proportion to God or gett within any distance of him, yett they errd, because they thought we went to God in these actions when indeed God comes to us (Nonesuch, XV, 462. 1610).

Donne is strongly protestant in this matter. We are infected and unworthy of a hearing with God. The dignity of our motions of repentance and contrition lies not in our offering them, but in God's accepting them:[18]

Yea words which are our subtillest and delicatest outward creatures, being composed of thoughts and breath, are so muddie, so thick, that our thoughts themselves are so, because (except at the first rising) they are ever leavened with passions and affections: And that advantage of nearer familiarity with God, which the act of incarnation gave us, is grounded upon Gods assuming us, not our going to him. (Merrill, xxxvi, 95)

From this he goes on to the matter of fixed devotions, which should be spent rather in praise and thanksgiving than in petition and prayer. Prayers in general should be short, "though God can neither be surprised nor besieged, . . . for, after in the beginning we have well intreated God to hearken, we speak no more to him."

The letters also show Donne much exercised over the correspondence between the ideal form of belief and the outward ethical form of behaviour.[19]

Religion is Christianity, which being too spirituall to be seen by us, doth therefore take an apparent body of good life and works, so salvation requires an honest Christian[20] (Merrill, xi, 25–6).

17. For a further discussion of Donne on prayer see Simpson, *op. cit.*, 92–3.
18. See Merrill, xxxii, 82.
19. This is implied in his very use of the word "religion," which sometimes seems to be a synonym for Christianity and sometimes to stand for the outward forms of belief in differentiation from "Christianity" as the inward belief itself. The letters certainly complement Gardner's assertion (*op. cit.*, xix) that "in his sermons [Donne] is far more remarkable as a moral than as a dogmatic theologian, and on mystical theology he has almost nothing to say."
20. In this same letter Donne goes on to warn Goodyer not so much against "those who are in other clothes then we" as against those who "are not onely naked, without any fashion of such garments, but have neither the body of Religion, which is moral honestly [*sic*], and sociable faithfulness, nor the soul, Christianity."

The Christian is under an extra obligation to make his outward actions adequate to his inward convictions. The man who is already morally strong and ethically responsible, and who weds this strength to his beliefs—that man will be a superior Christian:

All our moralities are but our outworks, our Christianity is our Citadel; a man who considers duty but the dignity of his being a man, is not easily beat from his outworks, but from his Christianity never . . . (Nonesuch, XXV, 474. 1622).

Of all the religious matters discussed in the letters, perhaps the most interesting are those of conscience and toleration.[21] Donne feels that it is more important not to go against one's conscience and to be charitable of the beliefs of others, than to be always disputing over the truth to which various consciences are holding various people:

Their [the Spaniards'] autors in Divinity, though they do not show us the best way to heaven, yet they thinke they doe: And so, though they say not true, yet they do not ly, because they speake their Conscience. And since in charity, I beleeve so of them, for their Divinity, In Civility I beleeve it too, for Civill matters, that therein also they meane as they say . . . (Nonesuch, XXVII, 479. 1623).

Once the conscience has assented to what is true for the individual, it is certainly right for him to hold to his truth, even though, from someone else's point of view, he is in error:

. . . yet, as in some cases to some men counsels become precepts, and though not immediately from God, yet very roundly and quickly from his Church, . . . so to me who can do nothing else, it seems to binde my conscience to write; and it is a sin to doe against the conscience, though that erre (Merrill, xxx, 75–6).

It is hard to escape the conclusion that, in this sense, the truth was for Donne a relative matter. For the individual, however, the truth is not relative. This kind of double perspective is expressed by Donne as a young man in his *Satyre III*, which chiefly attacks false attitudes to religion. According to this poem family environment, learning, decisive action, and close inquiry should all collaborate to help the individual climb her steep hill and win to a view of Truth. But "the truth which thou hast found" may be, from someone else's vantage point among the crags and steeps, a total or partial error. Both searchers must keep the truth they have found. Once two or more people arrive in sight of Truth, she will appear more or less different to each one. From this point of view, the truth is relative. The necessity of striking a balance between a suitable toleration and a firm adherence to one's own truth is very well put in a letter to Goodyer:

. . . yet let me be bold to fear, that that sound true opinion, that in all Christian professions there is way to salvation (which I think you think) may have been

21. On Donne's toleration and the related matters of his Anglicanism and feelings about the Roman Church, see especially Gardner, *op. cit.*, xviii–xxi, and Simpson, *op. cit.*, 98–104.

so incommodiously or intempestively sometimes uttered by you; or else your having friends equally near you of all the impressions of Religion, may have testified such an indifferency, as hath occasioned some to further such inclinations, as they have mistaken to be in you. . . . And when you descend to satisfie all men in your own religion, or to excuse others to al, you prostitute your self and your understanding, though not a prey, yet a mark, and a hope, and a subject, for every sophister in Religion to work on (Nonesuch, XXI, 467–8, 469. 1615?).

This view of conscience and of truth is the basis of Donne's religious tolerance. He was peculiarly fitted by circumstance, inclination, and ability, to achieve his remarkably tolerant attitude. He had been brought up a Roman Catholic; he was naturally averse to schism and disorder. Having studied massively in Divinity, and having doubted wisely, he found his truth in the Church of England and kept it there. But to him the Anglican Church was merely a reformed wing of the holy Catholic Church. There was to him fundamentally only one Church—one Body of Christ being plagued by dissension among its parts. This is shown very clearly in a note to Ker, written in 1627, after a slight cloud of the king's disfavour had safely blown over. "My tenets," he writes, "are always for the preservation of the Religion I was born in, and the peace of the State, and the rectifying of the Conscience." Obviously Donne is referring here to the universal Catholic Church as the religion he was born in. He explicitly identifies both the Roman and Anglican communions as parts of the same Church universal:

I will not, nor need you, compare the Religions. The channels of Gods mercies run through both fields; they are sister teats of his graces, yet both diseased and infected, but not both alike (Nonesuch, XXI, 468).

In writing to a Roman Catholic friend of his Donne says,

That we differ in our wayes, I hope we pardon one another. Men go to China, both by the Straights, and by the Cape. I never mis-interpreted your way; nor suffered it to be so, wheresoever I found it in discourse. For I was sure, you took not up your Religion upon trust, but payed ready money for it, and at a high Rate (*Tobie Mathew Collection*, 68–9).[22]

The effectual charity and tolerance displayed here also extends the other way to include the dissenting wing of the Church. Temperamentally, Donne was perhaps nearer to the Roman Catholics than to the Presbyterians and Lutherans, but he did not in the least discount these as members of the Church universal, or their establishments as "channels of Gods mercies":

You know I never fettered nor imprisoned the word Religion; not straightning it Frierly . . . nor immuring it in a Rome, or a Wittemburg, or a Geneva; they are all virtuall beams of one Sun, and wheresoever they finde clay hearts, they harden them, and moulder them into dust; and they entender and mollifie waxen (Merrill, xi, 25).

Donne's love of toleration, Catholic unity, and orderliness is most sharply

22. The numerals in this reference (cf. n. 3 *supra*) refer to the page numbers. The correspondent of this letter may well have been Tobie Mathew himself.

offended by the divisions within the English Church itself. In a letter to Goodyer of 1608, he remarks on the conversion from the Church of England to Rome of Hugh Broughton, a great Hebraist of the time who was also notable as a controversialist against the Jews. Donne is here concerned less about the fact that Anglicanism has lost a good man to Romanism, than he is about the interbodily strife within the English Church. This strife not only drives men from the English Church but also leaves neglected much more important causes such as the conversion of the Jews:

. . . you shall see in that course of opposing the Jews, he will produce worthy things: and our Church will perchance blush to have lost a Souldier fit for that great battell; and to cherish onely those single Duellisms, between Rome and England, or that more single, and almost self-homicide, between the unconformed Ministers, and Bishops (Nonesuch, X, 453. c. 1608).

Notwithstanding his tolerance, love of order, and mistrust of schism, Donne could be strongly critical of both Roman Catholicism and extremes of Protestantism. In the same letter to Goodyer that described the controversy in the Gallican Church over Dr. Richer, there is a good illustration of both Donne's hatred of schism and his adverse criticism of the Roman Church. At this point he is discussing yet another occasion for controversy within the French Church:

I doe (I thank God) naturally and heartily abhorre all schism in Religion so much, as, I protest, I am sorry to find this appearance of schism amongst our adversaries the Sorbonists; for I had rather they had held together, to have made a head against the usurpations of the Ro[man] Church, then that their disuniting should so enfeeble them, as the Parliament should be left alone to stand against those tyrannies (Merrill, xlii, 113–4).

In the midst of his criticism Donne is quite discriminating. He does not, for instance, think highly of the general run of French Roman Catholics, but this does not lead him into any blanket condemnation of all adherents to Rome:

And that which affects them as much, as any of these affronts done to the swordmen, is a danger, Servin, the King's Attorney. He is a Catholic, but a French Catholic, and, Sir, French papistry is but like French velvet—a pretty slack Religion, that would soon wear out, and not of the three-piled papistry of Italy and Spain (Gosse, I, 288).[23]

Elsewhere, charity and criticism mingle in Donne's reference to the Schoolmen as the "best of ill Divines."[24]

The common Protestant opinion that the Roman Church catered to the senses at the expense of reason was shared, to some extent, by Donne.

And it is as imperfect which is taught by that religion w^{ch} is most accomodate to sense (I dare not say to reason (though it have appearance of that too)

23. I use Gosse, who was in some respects a very careless editor, only when the letter in question is available neither in Nonesuch nor in Merrill.
24. Simpson, Letter 25, p. 236.

because none may doubt but that that religion is certainly best, which is reasonablest) That all mankinde hath one protecting Angel; All Christians one other, all English one other, all of one Corporation and every civill coagulation or society one other; and every man one other (Merrill, xvii, 38).

It is a little hard to sympathize with Donne's opinion here since the whole scholastic past, if nothing else, is one great monument to reason and the rational method.

Another fairly typical Protestant criticism that Donne makes is aimed against the complexities and accumulations of doctrine which seem to defeat the good effects to exaltation of the "Roman profession":

. . . so the Roman profession seems to exhale, and refine our wills from earthly Dr[e]gs, and Lees, more then the Reformed, and so seems to bring us nearer heaven; but then that carries heaven farther from us, by making us pass so many Courts, and Offices of Saints in this life, in all our petitions, and lying in a painfull prison in the next, during the pleasure not of him to whom we go, and who must be our Judge, but of them from whom we come, who know not our case (Nonesuch, XXI, 468–9).

This letter also contains a flash that lights up his opinion of what are to him the two extremes of Romanism and Protestantism. "This I have feared," he writes, "because heretofore the inobedient Puritans, and now the over obedient Papists attempt you." The inobedience of the Puritans implies, to a man of Donne's convictions and tastes, dissension, schism, and disorder, while the over obedience of the Papists implies a lack of reason and wise doubting, which results in the perpetuation of error. The Puritans were temperamentally as well as doctrinally unsatisfactory from Donne's middle-of-the-road point of view. He shared the common Anglican opinion, developed again very much later by Swift, for instance, in his *Tale of a Tub*, that in external matters such as form, ritual, and Church government, the Puritans were completely over-reformed. Such an opinion is complemented in passages like the following from Donne's *Satyre III*:

> Crantz to such brave Loves will not be inthrall'd,
> But loves her onely, who at Geneva is call'd
> Religion, plaine, simple, sullen, yong,
> Contemptuous, yet unhansome; As among
> Lecherous humors, there is one that judges
> No wenches wholsome, but course country drudges (11. 49–54).

In *Ignatius his Conclave*, like a boulder braving the torrent of anti-Roman satire, there stands this brief sharp criticism of over-zealous Protestantism:

. . . in the Church of God, some men proceeded so farre in that Reformation, that they endevoured to draw out, not onely all the peccant and dangerous humours, but all her beautie, and exteriour grace and Ornament, and even her vitall spirits, with her corrupt bloud, and so induce a leannesse, and il-favourednes upon her, . . . (Nonesuch, 388–9).[25]

25. The general context of this passage is as follows: Machiavelli, newly arrived in Hell, has just put forward his claims to preference, and here Ignatius Loyola is presenting a rebuttal of these claims in a long speech to Lucifer.

In all these things: his tolerance, hatred of schism, emphasis upon reason, assurance of the rightness of the *via media*, and broad but critical sympathy with what he regards as religious extremes, Donne reminds one of Browne, who loved "to use the civility of my knee, my hat, and hand," who thought that "Every man is not a proper Champion for Truth,"[26] and who, as we have already seen, emphasized the dictates of his reason in matters of religion.

The consideration of the whole question of religious toleration brings us to the oecumenical quality of Donne's thought.[27] He would have been right at home, by temperament and by studied opinion, in the contemporary revival of interest in oecumenicity. His phrases that describe the parts of the universal Church as "virtuall beams of one Sun" and "sister teats of his graces," are physical and material metaphors, emphasizing that to him Christian unity is more than a matter of theoretical, mystical oneness. There is also an effective existential unity in which all members of the Body participate, no matter how diversified:

> You know, we say in the Schools, that Grace destroys not Nature: we may say too, that forms of Religion destroy not moralitie, nor civill offices. . . . It is some degree of an union to be united in a serious meditation of God, and to make any religion the rule of our actions (*Tobie Mathew Collection*, 337).

Thus this letter, written to a Roman Catholic, Tobie Mathew, indicates the double unity, essential and existential, of all believers, regardless of their denomination. We are essentially one as natural creatures under the influence of Grace, and united in serious meditation of God in whatever form; and we should also be outwardly one, in practical, ethical terms, by the common obligation to Christian action. We must be indivisibly united in the Christian conduct of "civill offices."

The opposite fault to a limited and ineffectual doctrine of mystical unity is an overemphasis upon material manifestations of unity, and a corresponding anxiety about the lack of them. Such a fault tends to underestimate the importance, and miss the reality, of the essential unity of the Body. It also tends toward a preoccupation with the existential situation at the expense of essential beliefs. Donne is careful to maintain the balance, or the compromise, between the two kinds of Christian unity. The result is that he can maintain a realistic attitude towards oecumenicity; he takes full account of both spiritual and temporal reality, of mystical unity and its material and ethical correlatives.

> I know (as I begun) I speak to you who cannot be scandalized, and that neither measure Religion (as it is now called) by Unitie, nor suspect Unity, for these interruptions. . . . God himselfe, who only is one, seems to have eternally delighted, with a disunion of persons. Those whose active function it is, must endevour this unity in Religion: and we at our lay Altars . . . must beg it of [God]: but we must take heed of making misconclusions upon the want of it:

26. From *Religio Medici*, I, v and vi respectively.

27. Although she does not mention it specifically, Mrs. Simpson makes some very just remarks pertinent to Donne's oecumenicity. See *op. cit.*, pp. 108 and 111.

for, whether the Maior and Aldermen fall out, (as with us and the Puritans; Bishops against Priests) or the Commoners voyces differ who is Maior, and who Aldermen, or what their Jurisdiction, (as with the Bishop of Rome, or whosoever) yet it is still one Corporation (Merrill, lii, 141–2).

The Corporation is as real, in its own way, as the members of whom it consists. Through them it has a genuine existential impact and in it, though they fall out and divide among themselves, they have a real and continuing order of unity.

The New Testament Today

JOHN B. CORSTON

THE New Testament field stretches before today's inquiring traveller like a vast prairie of erudite specialization. This article will attempt to follow some of the trails that lead in such diverse directions across the wide and varied landscape. It professes neither to provide detailed chart or tested compass, nor to furnish an inclusive catalogue of recent publications. Its purpose will be amply realized if readers are led to explore for themselves this mysteriously rich and fascinating terrain.

The bearing of the Dead Sea Scrolls on New Testament study continues to evoke widespread popular interest and profund scholarly concern. Krister Stendahl's notable symposium, *The Scrolls and the New Testament* (1957), assembled an imposing series of fourteen scholarly articles in answer to Edmund Wilson's groundless allegations that biblical interpreters were avoiding the challenge of the Scrolls. At times the writers contradict one another, and they advance tentative conclusions which have since been revealed as inconclusive. Some of the discussion has been made obsolete by more recent discoveries. But these pioneer studies of the mid-fifties have solid significance. Stendahl's own provocative introduction stresses the urgent eschatology shared by both Qumran and Christian communities as constituting genuine common ground between them. He asserts that the clearest difference between Qumran and the New Testament lies in the "degree of anticipation" which characterized the latter. Sherman E. Johnson discusses the Qumran Manual of Discipline as related to the Jerusalem church of Acts. He believes that such parallels as communal sharing, biblical interpretation and community discipline may be especially significant. He suggests that adherents of the Qumran sect, living in Jerusalem as a conventicle, separated geographically from their religious centre, may from time to time have joined the Christian church, with resultant influence on the life of their new fellowship.

Early extravagent and sensational deductions from the content and implications of the Scrolls, publicized so widely by Edmund Wilson and J. M. Allegro, cannot be supported by documentary evidence. The assumptions of Dupont-Sommer that the Galilean teacher is "an astonishing reincarnation of the Teacher of Righteousness" are simply assumptions. The inference of J. M. Allegro that the Teacher of Righteousness was crucified is simply an inference on quite inadequate grounds. It is clear that the Qumran community did not think of the Teacher as Messiah; he was not crucified; his return was to herald the Messiah's coming. It is through the profoundly wise and scholarly guidance of Millar Burrows, Frank Moore Cross and

F. F. Bruce that the true significance of the Scrolls clearly emerges. The Scrolls are then seen as enriching our understanding of Judaism in the period in which Christianity arose. It is altogether to be expected, these scholars say, that many relationships should exist between the Scrolls and the New Testament. The Church might naturally adopt Qumran phraseology and practices, just as, for example, it adopted and appropriated some of the organization and worship of the Synagogue, investing all with a new meaning in the name of Christ. It should surely therefore occasion no surprise if the ideas and language of the New Testament appear in the Scrolls also. Both Scrolls and Gospels belong to first century Palestine and may, as W. F. Albright puts it, "have drawn from a common reservoir of terminology and ideas." Indeed, the Qumran community is coming to be regarded as one of many similar Jewish groups which flourished at the beginning of the Christian era. Along with official Judaism these formed the soil in which Christianity was rooted and in which it developed.

The Nag-Hammadi documents have been largely overshadowed by the Dead Sea Scrolls. Yet these thirteen papyrus volumes, discovered in 1945 in a ruined tomb in an Egyptian cliffside by peasants, shed new light on an obscure area of early Christian history. For these are original Gnostic writings, adding measurable treasure to our previous scanty store of fragments of actual Gnostic remains. In them we may see what Gnosticism meant to a Gnostic. Much of our knowledge of Gnosticism has been derived from ecclesiastical opponents who considered it a baneful menace to the Gospel and the Church. This "hearsay" information is frequently piecemeal and tantalizingly inadequate. For example, Irenaeus refers to a "Gospel of Truth" written at Rome by Valentinus, and used by his followers. Now in the Nag-Hammadi Jung Codex, according to Dr. W. C. Van Unnik of Utrecht, we confront for the first time this long-lost Gnostic writing. It appears to be a sermon or meditation, rather than a Gospel which sets forth a life of Jesus. In it we see how the Christian faith was understood in the ferment of the second century, and "how an influential teacher preached at Rome . . . side by side with such men as Hermas and Justin Martyr." It is based on the canonical New Testament, and is a meditation on the Father's self-revelation to the Son and to mankind. Its doctrine is orthodox, except that we do not find the biblical concept of God, Creator and Father, or of human sin.

The *Gospel of Thomas*, also included among the Nag-Hammadi discoveries, has recently attracted great interest, particularly in the light of Oscar Cullmann's verdict on it as being of even greater significance than the Dead Sea Scrolls to students of the first three Gospels and their literary sources (*The Gospel According to Thomas*, translated by A. Guillaumont, H. Puech, et al., Leiden and New York, 1959). This writing has no relation to the apocryphal Gospel of Thomas, long known for its fantastic stories of miraculous performances of Jesus as a child. The Nag-Hammadi Gospel of Thomas is a collection of "sayings of Jesus," over 100 in number. Some of

these are parallel to sayings of Jesus in the canonical Gospels. It is possible that in this collection we shall discover genuine words of Jesus hitherto unknown. It seems certain that this document will add to our knowledge of the development of the Gospel tradition, for in it we see how the words of Jesus were understood and interpreted within a heretical Christian sect. Most scholars consider Thomas to be a Gnostic recension or perversion of the authentic Gospel tradition. It is not a "fifth Gospel." It adds nothing to our knowledge of the life and work of Jesus, or of his death and resurrection. It does not discuss doctrine. But the views of the writer himself are quite apparent. He professes to possess esoteric knowledge, "secret words of the living Jesus." He disparages fasting, almsgiving, dietary laws, and even prayer! He asserts that all differences, even that between the sexes, must disappear. All of this has a familiar Gnostic ring, but when Thomas gives his version of parables such as the Sower, the Rich Fool, or the Leaven in the Meal the canonical Gospel tradition is unmistakably evident. The "saying of Jesus" which begins: "I took my stand in the midst of the world. . . . I found them all drunk, I found none of them athirst" is strikingly parallel to the similar saying in the Oxyrhynchus Papyri. It is at least a possibility that some genuine *Agrapha* of Jesus may emerge from this collection.

R. McL. Wilson's *The Gnostic Problem* (London, 1958) presents the first full-scale study of the subject to appear in English for many years. He says little about the *Gospel of Thomas*, but he agrees with Van Unnik regarding the Valentinian origin of the *Gospel of Truth*. Dr. Wilson's particular study is the relationship between Gnosticism and Hellenistic Judaism. He concludes that Judaism was a contributory source to the origin and development of Gnosticism. It was in "the syncretistic environment of the Diaspora" that Gnosticism arose, and in the wider sense it is evident that there was a pre-Christian Jewish Gnosticism. But the latter is not so much a system as "a tendency of accommodation to an environment," as was Christian Gnosticism later.

Rudolf Bultmann's "demythologizing" has become widely familiar, and needs only to be stated in barest outline here. He begins with the assumption that something has to be done with the mythology of the Bible because contemporary scientific thought cannot accept the New Testament cosmology. Contemporary man is completely outside the world of Jewish eschatology and apocalyptic and demon possession and a "three-decker universe." Nor should modern man be asked to accept this mythical view of the world, because there is nothing specifically Christian in it as such. But whereas old-fashioned liberalism would eliminate the mythological, Bultmann proposes to interpret it existentially. Only as man confronts Jesus Christ as Saviour in the Kerygma will he become a present reality. The research of the historian is not the avenue of approach through which Jesus Christ is to be encountered today.

A host of critics have understandably assailed Bultmann from many angles, although there is almost universal agreement that he is completely

right in his plea that the New Testament must be translated into terms intelligible to modern man. Schniewind, Lohmeyer, Thielicke, Schumann and Austin Farrer enter into theological debate with him in H. W. Bartsch's important book *Kerygma and Myth* (London, 1957) translated by R. H. Fuller. Father L. Malevez in *The Christian Message and Myth* (London, 1958) sees Bultmann as "seeking for a position midway between faith and rationalism, between the theology of revelation and liberal theology: it is an illusory enterprise." Ian Henderson in his *Myth in the New Testament* (London, 1952) expounds Bultmann's position with sympathy and clarity. He asserts that Bultmann's reason for rejecting the mythological is that it does not do justice to the supernatural, to the eschatological fact of Jesus Christ. But he takes issue with Bultmann's unwillingness to go behind the testimony of the New Testament witnesses: "there must have been something about the actual Jesus at the time at which He was on earth to make the New Testament witnesses summon men to decide for or against Him." Burton H. Throckmorton (*The New Testament and Mythology*, Philadelphia, 1959), the most recent contender to enter the lists, finds fault with Bultmann's consistent individualism, which causes him to eliminate a large part of the very *kerygma* on which he rests his case by failing to grasp the all-important New Testament theme of *koinonia*, the fellowship of believers.

Bultmann's scepticism regarding the possibility of writing a life of the historical Jesus is the natural outcome of his unwillingness to go behind the *kerygma* to search for historical evidences of its truth. British scholars such as Vincent Taylor and C. H. Dodd have consistently refused to admit this historical vacuum, and have defended the authenticity of the fundamental outline of the life and ministry of Jesus as found in Mark and the Synoptic tradition. In his notable trilogy, *The Names of Jesus*, *The Life and Ministry of Jesus*, and *The Person of Christ in New Testament Teaching* (London, 1953–1958) Vincent Taylor affirms unequivocally the possibility of writing a life of Christ. He uses the Markan outline as a framework, recognizing that "it is a sketch with many gaps" and that the Markan outline is much less continuous than was formerly supposed. Nevertheless it gives "a convincing summary of the life of Jesus." The luxuriant typology of Austin Farrer describes the Gospel of Mark as the symbolic structure of a numerically minded author. The detailed "liturgicism" of Archbishop Carrington maintains that Mark was written to correspond with a very early Christian lectionary based upon the Hebrew calendar. But C. F. D. Moule, in his article, "The Intention of the Evangelists" (in *New Testament Essays, Studies in Memory of T. W. Manson*, Manchester, 1959), contends that the actual account of what happened in the ministry of Jesus is a vital element in evangelism, and that the Synoptic Gospels give such an account. The use of the Gospels in worship was primarily instructional, testifying to the conviction which early Christians shared "that their faith stood or fell with the sober facts of a story and that it was vital to maintain the unbroken tradition of these facts."

Yet the search continues for a pattern other than a biographical outline behind the present Gospel narratives. David Daube in his article, "The Earliest Structure of the Gospels" (*New Testament Studies*, 5 [October 1959]), suggests that the Passover eve discourses were the main factor which determined the earliest pattern of the Gospels. Pre-Christian parts of the Haggadah ("proclamation," "interpretation"), a small work which gives the Passover eve liturgy as this evolved and was redacted through the centuries, show that four questions were raised in the Passover eve exposition of the Exodus. The four questions in which Jesus is involved in Mark 12:1–37 represent these four types with surprising and thought-provoking fidelity. The questions are: (1) law, tribute to Caesar; (2) mockery, the widow of seven; (3) simple piety, the first commandment; (4) contradictions, the Messiah, David's son and Lord. Further, in the Haggadah the Passover eve questions are asked by four different youths; a wise son, a wicked son, a son of simple piety, and a son who does not know how to ask, and for whom the father or master himself has to open the discourse. Daube believes that this is an instance of a narrative concerning Jesus which was formulated at a Christian Passover eve celebration in the first decades after the Crucifixion. But the fact that this Christian exposition is modelled on the Passover eve liturgy does not diminish its historical value. It is the selection and grouping of the material that is primarily derived from the liturgy, and "there is no justification for doubting on this ground the happenings and sayings recorded."

George Ogg in *Novum Testamentum* (January, 1959) presents and assays the learned thesis of Mlle. A. Jaubert that the events of Holy Week involve the institution of the Last Supper on Tuesday, the arrest of Jesus late on Tuesday night, and the trial extending from Wednesday to Friday. Mlle. Jaubert maintains that Jesus and his disciples adhered to an ancient sacerdotal calendar which was also used by the writer of the *Book of Jubilees* in the second century B.C. According to this calendar the year contained 364 days, or 52 weeks. Further, every year began on the same day of the week, and every annual festival whose date was determined by a month-date always occurred on the same day of the week. In this calendar scheme Nisan 14 always fell on a Tuesday. The patristic text *Didascalia Apostolorum* is adduced by Mlle. Jaubert as evidence that this calendar arrangement was recognized in some circles in the early church. A major claim for her proposed chronology is Mlle. Jaubert's contention that the many events included within the trial of Jesus cannot be crowded into the brief interval of the second half of one night and the morning of the following day. Dr. Ogg quotes R. H. Connolly, the Oxford editor of the *Didascalia Apostolorum*, who finds the Holy Week chronology of this writing to be an invention the main end of which is "to defend, or establish, the practice of a six days' fast before Easter." Dr. Ogg considers that Mlle. Jaubert has failed to show convincingly that this embodies a tradition which can be traced back to the apostolic age. Of her argument as a whole he says: "It does not appear to

provide any real resolution of the difficulties which . . . the Gospel narratives of Passion Week present."

James M. Robinson enters upon a "post-Bultmannian" encounter with the problem of the historicity of Jesus in his *A New Quest of the Historical Jesus* (London, 1959). He aligns himself with pupils of Bultmann who have been pursuing this new "quest" since 1953, with their master's approval! Ernst Käsemann, for example, argues that something *can* be known about the historical Jesus, and that we must urgently seek to discover this and work it out "if we do not wish ultimately to find ourselves committed to a mythological Lord." But the "new quest" will not proceed forward from the point where the earlier "quest" of Schweitzer left off. Historicism is not enough, because the deeper level of "Jesus of Nazareth as he actually was" could not be comprehended by "the reconstruction of his biography by means of objective historical method." Historical Biblical scholars have all too often "absolutized" their method of objectivity into a permanent avoidance of existential encounter with history. But the historical Jesus confronts us with existential decision just as the *kerygma* does. Here, Dr. Robinson believes, lies the possibility of a synthesis between the *kerygma* and the historical Jesus. The *kerygma* in calling for a total encounter with the person of Jesus corresponds to the call for existential decision which Jesus presented to men, and thus it is evident that "the *kerygma* continues Jesus' message." For Jesus himself both looked forward to the final divine intervention and also looked back to God's act of intervention in history, on which Jesus' own ministry was based. Thus Jesus understood his own existence as based upon a historical situation which was decisively characterized by the saving intervention of God. This divine intervention causes him to act "by the finger of God." This became the Easter revelation, the saving event upon which Christianity was built.

The Fourth Gospel, so far from constituting an isolated phenomenon within primitive Christianity, is seen by Oscar Cullmann as standing in close relationship to the Qumran community, to nonconformist Judaism in general, and to the thought of Stephen and of the writer of Hebrews. Such is the argument of Dr. Cullmann in an article in French in *New Testament Studies*, 5 (April, 1959), in two studies in *The Expository Times* (October and November, 1959), and in his contribution to Stendahl's *The Scrolls and the New Testament*. Opposition to the Jerusalem temple and its worship is the common factor shared by these varied religious groups. The Fourth Gospel seems to present a type of Christianity which is different from that which we encounter either in the Synoptics or in the letters of Paul. But Johannine Christianity is no late Hellenistic development. Rather, it goes back to Palestine and is related to nonconformist Judaism as this is exemplified in the Qumran community. Similarly the type of Christianity represented by Stephen and the Hellenists originated in Palestine in nonconformist Judaism. This is why Stephen and his partisans, as distinguished from the other Christians of Jerusalem, were persecuted by the Jews. Stephen pro-

claimed that the divine presence is not bound to the temple. His associates, ejected from Jerusalem, went to Samaria to preach to those who had also rejected the temple cultus of Jerusalem. The Fourth Gospel has a particular interest in Samaria in the matter of Samaritan worship, which involves this opposition to the temple. Thus the whole conversation between Jesus and the Samaritan woman in John 4 is concerned with the question of worship. In this discourse the Christological theme is dominant, as everywhere in the Fourth Gospel, and the final affirmation is that the divine presence, which had until now been bound to the temple of Jerusalem, is from now on visible in the person of Jesus Christ, in the word made flesh. So Christ takes the place of the Temple, and in the events of the life of Jesus the Fourth Evangelist sees this idea realized. This spiritualization of the Temple worship, says Cullmann, is exactly what the Hellenist missionaries who went to Samaria must have preached. Cullmann's highly original and significant proposition thus involves the definition of the Hellenists as a nonconformist group within Judaism, representing syncretistic tendencies. The identification of the Hellenists is, however, still a profoundly controversial question. David Noel Freedman, for instance, in the *Journal of Biblical Literature* (December, 1959) suggests that they were originally the hated "Hellenizers" of early Maccabean times, which would explain the "bitter animosity" between them and the orthodox Jews which is discernible in the Fourth Gospel and in Stephen's speech. M. Simon in *St. Stephen and the Hellenists* (1958) affirms that the Hellenists were really a radical reforming "gentilistic" party within Judaism. Other interpretations are given by C. F. D. Moule in his article, "Once More, Who Were the Hellenists?" (*Expository Times*, January, 1959).

Studies in the book of Acts continue to emphasize its theological aim rather than its biographical content. It may even appear that St. Luke the historian, in the words of Alan Richardson, "has turned out to be a highly allusive and symbolical rabbinic theologian who stylizes history in order to convey his profound insight into the meaning and truth of the Gospel." In the April, 1959, issue of *Interpretation*, which is devoted to studies in Acts, Bo Reicke describes the book as "an account of what the risen Lord did for his church *through* the Apostles." The chief concerns of Acts are Christology and Ecclesiology. The Ecclesiology of Acts is related to history, and presented in the form of history, but actually means interpretation of history. But the historical narrative of Acts is invaluable as being "the only information available on the earliest development of the word and the church." Further, Luke's personal interpretation of the historical facts has supplied us with "a piece of ecclesiology which is an indispensable completion of what is taught about the church in the New Testament epistles." In the same issue Albert C. Winn, while regarding Acts as accurate history in many striking details, yet sees its primary purpose as the recording of certain first century events as they were theologically understood. Since theological interpretation is encountered everywhere in the Bible we should not be surprised to find that

this occurs in our primary record of the early church. F. F. Bruce contributes an excellent review of commentaries on Acts in English.

Alan Richardson's *An Introduction to the Theology of the New Testament* (London, 1959) is described by the author as "a deliberate attempt to articulate coherently" the meaning of the New Testament as a whole. New Testament theology is "the framing of an hypothesis in the light of all available techniques of New Testament scholarship." The hypothesis which this book consistently sets forth is that "Jesus himself first suggested that revolutionary reinterpretation of the Old Testament scheme of salvation which we find in the New Testament." Only through the insight of Christian faith is a proper understanding of Christian origins or of New Testament history possible. The apostolic witness to the Lordship of Christ and to his resurrection "makes better sense of the historical evidence than any other hypothesis." The underlying unity of the New Testament is assumed throughout, and the variety of expression among the writers is perhaps not sufficiently recognized. The sixteen chapters of this book form richly rewarding theological studies on themes such as Faith and Hearing, the Holy Spirit, the Israel of God, the Apostolic and Priestly Ministry, the Theology of Baptism and the Eucharistic Theology of the New Testament. Typology sometimes leads Richardson to rather exuberant assumptions. Is Jesus' passing through Jericho really a parallel to Joshua's entrance into that city? Was the dove at Jesus' baptism really foreshadowed by the dove released from Noah's ark? Inferences of this sort recall Austin Farrer, whose typology has evidently influenced Richardson.

Did Paul the apostle to the Gentiles stand in contrast to the particularism of the Jerusalem church and of Jewish Christianity? Was the original cleavage between Jewish and Gentile Christians of such a deep-seated nature that all attempts to bridge the gap were finally destined to prove fruitless? Did Paul's rediscovery of the universalism of Jesus put him out of line with the primitive church which refused to approve his message? Johannes Munck in his *Paul and the Salvation of Mankind* (London, 1959) asserts that the positive answers to these questions, which students of the New Testament have generally assumed, go back to Baur and the Tübingen school. Baur's thesis was that primitive Christianity was dominated by the contrast between Paul and Jerusalem. Thus the controversial passages in Paul's letters have been played up, and his opponents have been pictured as Judaizers connected with the church at Jerusalem. According to Munck no such group ever existed. But instead of asking Paul himself about Jerusalem and his opponents, his readers usually fit his own words into the picture of him that they have already formed for themselves out of secondary sources, especially Acts. Thus secondary sources are allowed to invalidate primary ones. When Paul's letters are released from this traditional exposition, which goes back to the Tübingen school, the Judaizing opponents in Galatians are seen to be Gentile Christians. There was no Judaizing in the church at Corinth, and there were no factions. The Roman church, like all the Pauline

churches, was purely Gentile Christian. In Acts the outpouring of the Holy Spirit means the salvation of Israel. No conflict existed between Jewish Christianity and Paul because "the latter felt that he himself was a Jew, that Christianity was the true Judaism, and that the Church was the true Israel." Paul makes no distinction between Judaism and Christianity, as we do. Munck's book, described on the dust cover as "a radical re-examination of the assumptions on which Pauline studies have largely been built for over a century," appears to resemble other European theological attempts to secure a painless reconciliation between Judaism and Christianity.

Among many excellent New Testament commentaries of recent appearance F. W. Beare's *Philippians* (London, 1959) evokes in a special way Canadian admiration and gratitude. Of particular interest is Dr. Beare's interpretation of the Kenoticism of the hymn in Phil. 2:5–11 in terms of "Russian spirituality." The Russian saints did not seek, as Western theologians did, to base a theory of the incarnation on this passage. Rather they held forth the ideal of the Christian life as the imitation of the Christ who in voluntary self-abasement undertook the lowliness of our humanity. This ideal of the literal imitation of Christ in his poverty and humiliation on earth permanently moulded the mentality of the Russian people, and has imposed itself even on Russian atheism.

As this survey is itself surveyed, the particular area that seems to call insistently for further exploration is the profoundly significant relationship between the history of Jesus and the faith of the earliest church. The activity of God in the earthly life of Jesus of Nazareth must be the ultimate bed-rock of New Testament affirmation. The constant study of the factual reality of Jesus and his message is more than an interesting historical exercise; such study must have a constant relevance for the Christian faith unless that faith is ultimately to be defined in Docetic terms. The Kerygma in all its inclusiveness can never take the place of the historical Jesus and his message. The gospel that Jesus himself preached precedes the Kerygma that the primitive community proclaimed. The Kerygma refers back constantly from itself to the history of Jesus that precedes it. So the good news of Jesus and the faith in Jesus proclaimed by the early church cannot be separated from one another. In the first sentence of his *New Testament Theology* Bultmann says that the message of Jesus "belongs to the presuppositions of the theology of the New Testament rather than to that theology itself." But the message of Jesus can be nothing less than *the* presupposition of all the subsequent Kerygma. Herein alone can the ultimate authority of the proclamation of the Gospel find its source and its validity.

The Old Testament and Some Aspects of New Testament Christology

A. J. B. HIGGINS

THE present study is intended to be an entirely objective examination of the origin of what may be called the "Son Christologies" in the NT—Son of David, Son of God, the Son—as seen against the background of the OT. These Christologies are of the greater interest in that they are held by some to have originated in the mind of the founder of Christianity himself. How far this may be true, and in what sense, it is the purpose of this paper to re-examine. The Son of Man, while not the subject of special and separate study here, belongs to another category of what may be called "intercessory" or "sacrificial" Christologies—the Servant of the Lord, the High Priest—and it serves as the focus of the Christologies to be discussed in this paper.

SON OF DAVID

Although the title Son of David does not itself appear in the OT, there are many passages which testify to Jewish belief that the Messiah would be of Davidic descent,[1] an expectation which was in full vigour shortly before and at the time of the rise of Christianity.[2] It is true that of the Synoptic Gospels it is in Matthew that the term is commonest.[3] Otherwise it is used only in the Bartimaeus story (Mark 10:47f.; cf. Matt. 20:30f.; Luke 18:38f.). But the tradition of Davidic descent is not confined to such references. More important than Acts 13:22f. ("of this man's [David's] seed God has brought to Israel according to his promise a saviour, Jesus") are Rom. 1:3f.

> concerning his Son, who was born of the seed of David according to the flesh, declared Son of God in power according to the spirit of holiness through his resurrection from the dead, Jesus Christ

and II Tim. 2:8

> Remember Jesus Christ risen from the dead, of the seed of David.

Both these passages read like adaptations of an early creed. The tradition of Jesus' Davidic descent was current, then, before Paul wrote to the Roman church in the fifties. Although not prominent, it survived until the end of the first century, not only in II Tim. 2:8, but in the Jewish Christian elabora-

1. Ps. 89:3f.; 132:11f.; Isa. 9:6f.; 11:1; Jer. 23:5; 33:15, 17; Hos. 3:5; Amos 9:11f.
2. Cf. Pss. Sol. 17:23; John 7:42 (Mic. 5:2).
3. Matt. 1:1; 9:27; 12:23; 15:22; 21:9, 15.

tions of the idea of Davidic sonship in the Apocalypse (3:7; 5:5; 22:15), and beyond.[4]

It is very difficult to accept the view that the passage about to be discussed was the creation of the Hellenistic church.[5] Whether the Son of David Christology is the creation of the Palestinian community or of Jesus himself is the real question, the answer to which depends on the view adopted of Mark 12:35–36 (cf. Matt. 22:41–45; Lk. 20:41–44):

> And Jesus answered and said, as he taught in the temple, How do the scribes say that the Messiah is the son of David? David himself said in the Holy Spirit,
> The Lord said to my Lord, Sit at my right hand
> Until I put thine enemies under thy feet.
> David himself calls him Lord, and how is he his son?

Even if this passage records an actual historical incident, in which Jesus points out that Messiahship depends on higher considerations than Davidic ancestry,[6] it does not follow that Davidic ancestry is being denied, though it is certainly not being asserted. The real difficulty often urged against this passage as being anything else than a community formation is the use of Ps. 110:1. That this verse of the psalm was widely used in the early church is clear both from the quotations of it in Acts 2:34f. and Heb. 1:13, and from allusions to it in Mark 16:19; Acts 7:56; Rom. 8:34; I Cor. 15:25; Eph. 1:20; Col. 3:1; Heb. 1:3; 8:1; 10:12; 12:2; I Pet. 3:22. A recent writer[7] has asked whether, in the pericope with which we are concerned, Jesus, on the view that he took care to conceal his Messiahship from all but his closest followers, would have ventured to defend it openly against Jewish opponents. This is an acute observation. But it is difficult to take him seriously when he later remarks[8] that the passage appears to be a defence of Jesus' Messiahship on the part of the church, based on a common acknowledgement of his non-Davidic descent. It must, therefore, it is argued, be earlier than Paul's assertion of Jesus' Davidic descent in Rom. 1:3. When may this hypothetical *volte-face*, from conviction of non-Davidic lineage to the strongly-attested belief in Davidic descent, be conjectured to have taken place? There is a strange reluctance in some quarters to allow the possibility that not only the primitive Christian community but its founder may occasionally have quoted the Jewish scriptures. The allusive nature of the saying, if it expresses the doctrinal belief of the church, is in striking contrast to the unmistakable clarity of early preaching and teaching, while it is in accord with the idiom of Jesus himself (cf. Luke 7:22f.).[9] The conclusion up to this point is that the citation of the psalm is here rightly attributed to

4. Barn. 12:10; Ign. *Eph.* 18:2; 20:2; *Rom.* 7:3; *Smyrn* 1:1; *Trall.* 9:1.
5. According to this view the purpose of Mark 12:35–7 would be to demonstrate that Jesus was not so much Son of David as Son of God, R. Bultmann, *Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition* (4th edn., 1958), p. 146.
6. T. W. Manson, *The Teaching of Jesus* (2nd edn., 1935), p. 266, n. 2.
7. J. Knox, *The Death of Christ* (1958), p. 41.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
9. V. Taylor, *The Gospel according to St. Mark* (1955), p. 493; O. Cullmann, *The Christology of the New Testament* (E.T., 1959), p. 131f.

Jesus, and that the wide use of it in the community tradition was first suggested by this fact.

It is not, I think, irrelevant here to call attention to the reply of Jesus to the high priest's question whether he was the Messiah. "I am, and you shall see the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of power and coming with the clouds of heaven" (Mark 14:62).[10] Since this answer combines Dan. 7:13 and Ps. 110:1, the Messiah's session at God's right hand in Ps. 110:1 is described in terms of the Son of Man. The Son of Man intrudes itself into another Messianic concept. Is not the same intrusion to be assumed in Mark 12:35–7? In Mark 14:62 Jesus declares that it is as the Son of Man, and not as the [Son of David-] Messiah, that he will fulfil Ps. 110:1. The upshot is that if the authenticity of Mark 14:62 is accepted, that of Mark 12:35–7 must also be accepted. That he is Son of David Jesus does not deny, but he implies that the psalm will find its fulfilment in him as the Son of Man.[11]

SON OF GOD

A Hellenistic origin is unlikely because of the early appearance of this Christology in the Pauline epistles. The most important instances are I Thess. 1:10 (very early fifties) and Rom. 1:4 (from a pre-Pauline liturgical formula). Is the Son of God Christology a creation of the early Palestinian church, or is it derived from its founder? Can a decision be reached on the basis of the OT background? In the OT, apart from angels as sons of God (Gen. 6:2; Job 1:6; 38:7), both Israel (Ex. 4:22f.; Isa. 1:2; Hos. 11:1), and the king are called God's son (II Sam. 7:14; Ps. 2:7; 89:26f.). The question at first sight virtually amounts to a decision as to whether Ps. 2:7 was first regarded by Jesus as expressing his filial consciousness. If so, it would be natural to explain the Son of God Christology as derived ultimately from him. The alternative would be that the Palestinian church seized upon the psalm and from it, or with its help, evolved the Christology, for there appears to be no certain example of the use of Son of God as a Messianic title in pre-Christian Judaism which might have lain ready to hand.[12] Yet it

10. We are not here concerned with the strongly attested variant "Thou sayest that I am."

11. It is significant that the Lukan parallel (22:69) retains the fusion of the two concepts, while omitting the coming with the clouds. This omission is characteristic of the third evangelist's tendency to tone down apocalyptic ideas; he reports the session, but not the descent of the Son of Man. That it *is* a matter of descent and not of ascent, as it is now fashionable to believe (e.g., T. F. Glasson, *The Second Advent* [1945], pp. 63–8; J. A. T. Robinson, *Jesus and His Coming* [1957], p. 45), is confirmed by the fact that the coming with the clouds, omitted by Luke, is subsequent to the sitting at God's right hand; so rightly G. R. Beasley-Murray, *Jesus and the Future* (1954), p. 259; *A Commentary on Mark Thirteen* (1957), pp. 90f.

It is, perhaps, worth adding that, on turning to Bultmann, *op. cit.*, p. 145, after completing this paper, I discovered that he concedes the possibility "dass der in Mk 12, 35–37 vorschwebende Gegensatz zum 'Davidsohn' in her Tat der 'Menschensohn' ist." Jesus could then have uttered these words, but of course, in Bultmann's view, with no reference to *himself* as Son of Man; cf. E. Lohmeyer, *Das Evangelium des Markus* (1954), pp. 262f.

12. Cf. G. Dalman, *The Words of Jesus* (1902), pp. 272, 275; C. H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel* (1953), p. 253; S. Mowinckel, *He That Cometh* (1956), pp. 293f., 368; O. Cullmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 279ff. Prof. D. N. Freedman, however, in a private communication from Jerusalem, kindly informs me that the (Davidic) Messiah is called the Son of God in unpublished Qumran material.

might have been expected that the Messiah, like the king, should occasionally be so called, in view of the fact that the Messianic hope arose out of the expectation of the fulfilment of the unrealized ideals of kingship.[13]

Right in the forefront, therefore, as a point of departure, stands Ps. 2:7: "Thou art my son, today I have begotten thee." Like Ps. 110:1, it was current in early Christian use, for it is quoted in Acts 13:33; Heb. 1:5; 5:5. Nor was this the only part of the psalm to be quoted. In Acts 4:25f. its first two verses are quoted as fulfilled in the hostility of Gentiles and Jews and of Herod and Pilate against Jesus, and in Rev. 12:5 and 19:15 its ninth verse is utilized in the manner of the Psalms of Solomon to illustrate the vengeance which the Messiah will wreak upon his enemies. Whether this Christian use of Psalm 2 is due entirely to the creativity of the church or to the known use of its seventh verse by Jesus himself, may turn out to be not the vital question as regards the genesis of the Son of God Christology. There is no evidence that he made any use of the psalm apart from verse seven, and even this is uncertain.

The voice at the baptism, "Thou art my beloved Son, in thee I am well pleased" (Mark 1:11; cf. Matt. 3:17; Luke 3:22), is customarily regarded as containing allusions to both Ps. 2:7 and Isa. 42:1 ("Behold my servant, whom I uphold, my chosen, in whom my soul delights"). The view, however, has been advanced, that only the latter passage is echoed, that *huios mou* in Mark 1:11 represents *pais mou* in Isa. 42:1, and that this clarification of the Hebrew took place on Hellenistic soil before Mark took over the tradition. This transition, it is urged, might indeed have been facilitated by reminiscence of Ps. 2:7, the second stage being the explicit quotation of the LXX version of this verse of the psalm in the "Western" text of Luke 3:22 ("Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee").[14] According to this view, Ps. 2:7 is an excellent illustration of the creative role of the OT in the development of NT Christology.[15] This view, however, labours under the disadvantage of removing from Palestinian to Hellenistic soil the possible influence of Ps. 2:7 as a factor in the emergence of the Son of God Christology. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile this with the early appearance of this Christology in Paul.

The view that Isa. 42:1 alone is at the basis of Mark 1:11 would gain some support if the original reading in John 1:34 were *ho eklektos*; but it is by no means certain, despite its age, that this is the original text.[16] It seems far more likely that the evangelist, who concludes his Gospel by stating that its purpose was to inspire belief in Jesus as the Son of God (20:31), should in its opening scenes record the forerunner John the Baptist as testifying to

13. Cf. R. Bultmann, *Theology of the Old Testament* I (1952), p. 50.

14. W. Zimmerli and J. Jeremias, *The Servant of God* (1957), p. 81.

15. Cf. also the conclusions drawn from acceptance of the variant reading *eklektos* (for *huios*) in John 1:34, which is attested by Papyrus 5, Codex Sinaiticus (*primo manu*), the Curetonian and Sinaitic Syriac, an Old Latin ms. (e), and St. Ambrose; see the discussion of J. Jeremias, *op. cit.*, p. 61, n. 261, and p. 82; and O. Cullmann, *op. cit.*, p. 66, n. 3.

16. It may be remarked that the substitution of *huios* for *eklektos*, even if the latter is accepted as the true text, may not be anything more than a mere scribal alteration, all too easy for a copyist familiar with the Son of God title in the Fourth Gospel.

the Son of God. There is, therefore, much to be said in favour of the opinion that the usual text of John 1:34 independently confirms the Son of God Christology in Mark 1:11, expressed in terms of Ps. 2:7.

It is widely (though not unanimously) held that Son of Man was the self-designation of Jesus; but Son of God can hardly have been a self-designation at all. Even if the voice he heard at his baptism reflects his consciousness of sonship, this affords no more proof that he spoke of himself as the Son of God than does the temptation narrative in Q (Matt. 4:3, 6; Luke 4:3, 9). It is not in the Synoptics (apart from Matt. 27:43) but in the Fourth Gospel that Jesus calls himself the Son of God, implicitly in 5:25, 9:35 (variant reading), 11:4, and explicitly only in 10:36. But it is as "the Son" that the Johannine Jesus is characteristically depicted as referring to himself.[17] There is no doubt that in the Fourth Gospel "the Son" is entirely interpretative. The same is true of the few Synoptic occurrences of this term. Mark has only one example: "But of that day or hour no one knows, not even the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the Father" (13:32, cf. Matt. 24:36). It can be conceded that, so far as limitation of Jesus' knowledge of the end is concerned, there can be little or no doubt of the genuineness of this logion. But this admission of ignorance on the part of Jesus has been reframed in an interpretative manner so as to represent him as calling himself the Son,[18] quite in the Johannine style. This means that the interpretative use of "the Son" in the Johannine Gospel (16 times) and Epistles (8 times) already lay ready to hand in earlier tradition. This is confirmed by the Q logion in Matt. 11:27 (cf. Luke 10:22): "All things have been delivered to me by my Father, and no one knows the Son except the Father, nor does any one know the Father except the Son and any one to whom the Son wishes to reveal him." It is hackneyed to call this saying, in the words of K. A. von Hase, "a meteor from the Johannine heaven" (cf. John 3:35; 17:2).[19] There is no need to doubt its substantial genuineness,[20] but as with Mark 13:32, the Son Christology has determined its form in the tradition. Both sayings prove the pre-Johannine existence of this interpretative Christological title. The factor which has operated on the formulation of these Synoptic logia is the same one which produced the numerous instances of "the Son" in the Johannine circle, namely, the movement towards a Trinitarian theology which is expressed in the formula in Matt 28:19, where the nations are to be baptized in the three-fold name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

Son of Man, whichever view is adopted as to its use by Jesus as a self-designation, at least already existed and lay ready to hand as a title in apocalyptic circles. The same cannot be said of "the Son." It has been noted

17. 3:17, 35f.; 5:19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26; 6:40; 8:36; 14:13; 17:1.

18. It is, therefore, unnecessary to suppose, with the editors of *The Beginnings of Christianity*, I (1920), p. 396, and R. P. Casey ("The Earliest Christologies," *JTS*, n.s., 9 [1958], p. 267), that "the Son" here stands for "the Son of Man."

19. Quoted by Cullmann, *op. cit.*, p. 286, n.2.

20. As is done by, among others, Dibelius, Bultmann, and Bousset; see V. Taylor, *The Names of Jesus* (1953), p. 63.

already that the pre-Christian use of Son of God as a Messianic name is open to doubt. When it comes to "the Son" the doubts become formidable indeed, for there is obviously no pre-NT precedent at all for its employment as a self-designation. I therefore find it impossible to agree with Dr. Vincent Taylor when he calls "the Son" Jesus' self-designation.[21] Elsewhere he writes that "it is clear that, according to our earliest sources, Q and Mark, Jesus spoke of Himself as 'the Son' (Mk. i:11, xiii:32, Lk. x:22 = Mt. xi:27). . . It is a fact of importance that, if the genuineness of these sayings is accepted, Sonship has a dominical basis."[22] But important though these sayings are, they are not the real evidence for Sonship. Having dealt with Mark 13:32 and the Q logion, we are left with the quotation of Ps. 2:7 in Mark 1:11, which displays a Son of God Christology associated with the quotation. To say that the Son of God Christology here exhibited is a creation of the Palestinian church is not tantamount to calling it a *creatio ex nihilo*. The dominical basis of the Son of God Christology does not rest on the authenticity of Mark 13:32, or of Matt. 11:27, or even of Mark 1:11. The genesis of the Christology does not depend on supposed self-descriptions of Jesus as Son of God, much less as "the Son," for which the evidence is tenuous in the extreme. The root is his consciousness of a special relationship to God as Abba, Father[23] (Mark 14:36; cf. Luke 11:2). It was this which led the Palestinian community to call their Lord the Son of God and the Son.[24] Ps. 2:7, as used in the baptism narrative (and also in that of the transfiguration, Mark 9:7, and parallels), was a potent, if secondary, factor in this process.

We have noted an intrusion of the Son of Man concept into that of the Davidic Messiah in the thought of Jesus. There appears to be a similar intrusion of this concept into that of the Son of God in the mind of the author of Hebrews in the catena of OT quotations in the first two chapters. That "intrusion" is again the correct term is justified by the prominence in Hebrews of the Son of God Christology (1:8; 4:14; 6:6; 7:3; 10:29). Ps. 2:7 is quoted twice, in 1:5 (followed by II Sam. 7:14) and in 5:5. The former quotation is introduced by the question, "To which of the angels did he ever say?" In 2:5f. we read:

> For it was not to angels that God subjected the world to come, of which we speak. But someone testified somewhere,
>
> What is man that thou art mindful of him,
> or the son of man that thou visitest him?

21. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
22. *The Person of Christ in New Testament Teaching* (1958), p.149.
23. On "Abba," see T. W. Manson, *The Sayings of Jesus* (1949), p. 168; V. Taylor, *The Person of Christ in New Testament Teaching* (1958), pp. 176–80; cf. O. Cullmann, *op. cit.*, p. 289.
24. R. P. Casey, *op. cit.*, p. 267, concludes that the expression "Son of God" must be "a product of early Gentile Christian usage," on the ground that in Aramaic-speaking circles "*bara* [the Son] by itself would convey no meaning at all and *bar alaha* [the Son of God] would suggest an angel." But given the Christology, the Palestinian community was surely not incapable of expressing it by attaching new and deeper meanings to familiar terms.

The following verses make it clear that the author, in quoting Psalm 8, has in mind a Son of Man Christology, for the promise of sovereignty held out to man has been fulfilled in Jesus as the Son of Man. The second quotation is followed at once by Ps. 110:4.

So also Christ did not glorify himself to be made a high priest, but it was he who said to him,

Thou art my Son, today I have begotten thee,

as he says also in another place,

Thou art a priest for ever after the order of Melchizedek.

The result is, on the one hand, the intrusion of the Son of Man into the Son of God concept; on the other, the association of the idea of the Son of God with that of the High Priest. The importance of this association for our present purpose lies in the close affinities between the ideas of the Son of Man and the High Priest, and the possible source of the application to Jesus of Ps. 110:4.

In later Judaism certain figures, whose relationship to the apocalyptic Son of Man is somewhat obscure and need not concern us here, perform priestly functions. Enoch in Jub. 4:25 "burnt the incense of the sanctuary";[25] in II En. he performs mediatorial functions; in III En. the figure (Enoch-) Metatron occupies a throne of his own as "the Prince of the Presence" (xlviiiC 7), and in the Talmud intercedes in heaven for Israel.[26] The idea of a heavenly intercessor would not, therefore, appear novel or revolutionary to Jews. Is this, perhaps, partly the explanation of the sudden introduction, with no preamble, of the notion of the Christian Messiah as "a merciful and faithful high priest" in Heb. 2:17? On the other hand, Ps. 110:4 is not applied in Judaism to the Messiah.[27] That the *idea* of a Priest-Messiah was not unknown to Judaism is proved by the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* and by the Qumran literature; but the NT conception is radically different and basically independent. It is, therefore, not enough simply to say that the writer of Hebrews was familiar with the (Jewish) idea, and desired to apply it to Jesus.

At what point are we to seek Christian origination? C. H. Dodd holds that the author of Hebrews himself is an innovator in his use of Ps. 110:4 (Heb. 5:6; 6:20; 7:17, 21), though "his argument rests upon secure grounds if he could count upon the general acceptance of the hundred-and-tenth psalm as being, in its entirety, a testimony to Christ."[28] But other NT books seem to reflect the same belief, though without recourse to this psalm. In John 17:19 Jesus "sanctifies" himself as both priest and sacrifice. Other possible allusions to the idea are Rom. 5:2; Eph. 2:18; 5:2; I Pet. 2:24; 3:18; I John 2:1. The possibility of a Johannine origin for the conception[29] remains open, as does the suggestion of T. W. Manson that Hebrews, so far

25. See H. Odeberg, 'Ενωχ, *TWNT*, 2 (1935), p. 554.
26. Bab. T., *Chagiga* 15a.
27. Cf. my article "Priest and Messiah", *VT*, 3 (1953), p. 324f.
28. *According to the Scriptures* (1952), p. 104.
29. Cf. O. Cullmann, *op. cit.*, p. 105, on Spicq's suggestion to this effect.

from being original, is anticipated by Rom. 3:21–6.[30] W. Manson went so far as to suggest that Ps. 110:4, "Thou art a priest for ever," belonged to a primitive confession.[31] Without regarding this as anything more than a guess, the suddenness with which Jesus is called "a merciful and faithful high priest" in Heb. 2:17 at least gives the impression that the conception was not unfamiliar in Christian circles. The observation that other places in the NT outside Hebrews appear to reflect the same idea without using the term priest or high priest suggests that it was not based on Ps. 110:4. The author of Hebrews elaborates for the purpose of his argument a belief which was taken for granted, that the declaration in this verse did in fact refer to Jesus, since the psalm as a whole, and particularly verse 1, was held to do so. But can we go back further than this? If the doctrine of the high priesthood of Jesus is traceable independently of Psalm 110, what is its ultimate source?

I have elsewhere stated the opinion that the origin of this Christology is to be found "in speculations set in motion by the belief in the exaltation of the risen Messiah to the heavenly world."[32] I should now wish to modify that opinion, and the nature of the modification is best indicated by the substitution of "Son of Man" for "risen Messiah."

In discussing the Son of David and the Son of God we have seen that Christologies which might appear at first sight to have arisen from Christian interpretation of passages from the psalms, turn out on closer examination to go back to Jesus himself. But the results are not exactly the same. The conclusion was reached, on the one hand, that Son of David in Christian use is due to Jesus' own borrowing from Ps. 110:1 and to the fact of his Davidic descent; on the other, that the Christologies expressed in the related titles Son of God and the Son, although community creations hastened by Messianic application of Ps. 2:7, are fully justified by, and gain impulse from, the special relationship which Jesus believed he enjoyed with God as Father.

The question of the origin of the High Priest Christology has, as we have seen, received varying answers. To these must be added Cullmann's argument[33] from the use by Jesus of Ps. 110:1 in Mark 14:62, that he may have viewed his own mission as a fulfilment of the true priesthood. Cullmann's thesis is as follows. In Mark 14:62, Jesus links together the Son of Man of Dan. 7 and the Messiah's session at God's right hand in Ps. 110:1. " 'Sitting at the right hand' is inseparably connected with the thought of the priest-king 'after the order of Melchizedek.' " To the Jewish High Priest before him Jesus replies that he will be not an earthly Messiah, but the heavenly Son of Man, not an earthly but the heavenly High Priest. Just as before the earthly ruler Pontius Pilate he declares that his kingdom is not of this

30. "ΙΛΑΣΤΗΡΙΟΝ," *JTS*, 46 (1945), pp. 1–10; *Ministry and Priesthood* (1958), p. 48, n. 16.
31. *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (1951), pp. 54, 108.
32. "Priest and Messiah," *VT*, 3 (1953), p. 336.
33. *Op. cit.*, p. 88.

world (John 18:36), so before the earthly High Priest he shows that his priesthood is of an entirely different order. This is an ingenious but unconvincing case as stated by Cullmann. Nevertheless, although Cullmann lays the main emphasis on the close connection between the sitting at God's right hand and the Melchizedekian priesthood, he does also equate the ideas of the Son of Man and the High Priest, and it is *here* that we may seek a solution, but in the sense that it is as Son of Man in his role as *intercessor*, rather than specifically as a priest, that Jesus envisaged his heavenly role. There is no Synoptic evidence that Jesus viewed the work of the Son of Man as in any way priestly. When he is reported as associating Dan. 7:13 with another passage, it is with the *first* verse of Psalm 110 that the association is made (Mark 14:62; Matt. 19:28; 25:31), not with the fourth. Although the author of Hebrews was to do so,[34] Jesus did not, so far as we know, associate these two parts of the psalm. Cullmann, therefore, reads into Mark 14:62 what is not there.

Although it is not very prominent, evidence is not totally lacking that Jesus viewed the role of the Son of Man as that of an intercessor or mediator. "Every one who confesses me before men, the Son of Man also will confess before the angels of God" (Luke 12:8; cf. Matt. 10:32). Would not intercession have been included by him among the functions of the Son of Man? In the *Similitudes of Enoch* the Son of Man is the judge of the wicked and the champion of the righteous. To him is given "the sum of judgement" (69:27; cf. John 5:22, 27), and this includes an assessment of righteousness (62:3); the Elect One "shall choose the righteous and holy" from among the resurrected ones (51:2). The Son of Man exercises all the prerogatives of the Lord of Spirits in condemnation and acquittal. Jesus, too, claimed that the Son of Man would act as judge, but *in relation to God as Father*, whose representative he is (Matt. 25:31ff.; Mark 8:38, cf. Matt. 16:27, Luke 9:26). This means that the intercession of the Son of Man may be inferred from the Synoptic records. The Son of Man is not said to "stand before" God, which is the regular expression for priestly intercession (*'amadh liph' nē* YHWH, *stēnai enantion* [*enanti, pro prosōpou*] *Kyriou* —Deut. 10:8; II Chron. 29:11; Jer. 15:1; Ezek. 44:15). Is this, it might be asked, the reason why it is not used of him? This can hardly be the case, for apart from Abraham's intercession for Sodom (Gen. 18:22), the same language is used by the prophets to describe their intercessory function (I Kings 17:1; 18:15; II Kings 3:14; 5:16; Jer. 18:20). Moreover, both Moses and Samuel, while performing priestly functions (Jer. 15:1) were regarded primarily as prophets (Moses—Deut. 18:15, 18; Acts 3:22; Samuel—I Chron. 9:22; 26:28; 29:29; Acts 3:24; 13:20). The Gospels depict Jesus in such a way that we must believe that he envisaged the intercessory role of the Son of Man from the prophetic rather than from the priestly point of view. If the view be correct that the Son of Man beheld by

34. This is at its clearest in Heb. 8:1; it is as High Priest that Jesus sits "at the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in heaven."

the protomartyr Stephen was standing at God's right hand as his advocate (Acts 7:56), the passage assumes quite extraordinary importance as supplying an explicit formulation of the intercessory (but not necessarily priestly) role of the Son of Man, which is all but lacking in the Synoptic tradition, and probably testifies to primitive doctrine.

The early church, therefore, had every justification for regarding its Messiah as an intercessor at God's right hand—"Christ Jesus . . . who is at the right hand of God, who also makes intercession on our behalf" (Rom. 8:34).[35] In I John 2:1f.—"We have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and he is the expiation for our sins"—the term Son of Man is not used; but the passage represents, in *hilasmos* ("expiation"), a transition from intercession or advocacy (*paraklētos*—"advocate") to *priestly* intercession and self-sacrifice, as in Heb. 7:25f.; 9:24–26. More striking is I Tim. 2:5: "There is one Mediator of God and men, *(the) Man* Christ Jesus, who gave himself a ransom for all" (*antilutron hyper pantōn*). This is a Hellenistic rewriting of the original Semitic form in Mark 10:45, viz., "*The Son of Man* came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life a ransom for many" (*lutron anti pollōn*). In the former passage the association of mediation and ransom is explicit. The Mediator is the *Man*. This comparatively late passage thus interprets a logion concerning the Son of Man, in which mediation or intercession is only implicit, by borrowing *mesitēs* ("mediator") from popular Greek speech. Moreover, "mediator of God and men" (*mesitēs theou kai anthrōpōn*) is the precise description of Michael as intercessor and high priest in the *Testament of Dan* 6:2. We are here very near to the thought in Hebrews of the High Priest who intercedes for men, having offered himself as a sacrifice (Heb. 7:25–27). If Mark 10:45 is (at least in substance) authentic, the source of this kind of thought is clear. But there is nowhere any hint that Jesus thought of the intercessory activity of the Son of Man as priestly, nor that he made any use of Ps. 110:4. It was the primitive community which did this. That the High Priest Christology was not actually based on Ps. 110:4 is shown by the appearance elsewhere in the NT of the same Christology, with no reference to the psalm; but the use of the verse was encouraged by the Christological use of the first verse of the psalm. The conclusion, therefore, would be that Ps. 110:4 did indeed encourage and support the belief in Jesus as a High Priest, but the idea itself arose from the teaching of Jesus about the Son of Man and his heavenly intercession, interpreted by the church as a priestly function.

I have spoken of the intrusion of the Son of Man concept into that of the Davidic Messiah in the thought of Jesus, and into that of the Son of God in the mind of the author of Hebrews. It may be suggested that the explanation is the use by Jesus of Son of Man as, in some sense, a self-designation. Although it was not customarily used by the church as a title for that very

35. That this statement is in all probability not Paul's own, but is derived from an earlier credal formulation, is strongly suggested by the sequence: Christ's death, resurrection, and heavenly session. For the idea of intercession in Judaism and in Christianity, cf. N. Johansson, *Parakletoi* (1940).

reason, yet its influence could not be avoided. This is clearest in the case of the High Priest idea. It is not without significance that the strongly Jewish Apocalypse actually describes the Son of Man in priestly language: "one like a son of man, clothed with a long robe and with a golden girdle round his breast."[36]

36. Rev. 1:13.

New Light on the Church of the Second Century: Gnosticism and the Coptic Papyri of Nag-Hammadi

A Review Article

F. W. BEARE

Evangelium Veritatis. Ed. by M. MALININE, H.-CH. PUECH and G. QUISPEL. Rascher: Zurich, 1956. Folio, pp. xvi + 127, 24 plates. $25.00.

The Gospel of Truth: A Valentinian Meditation on the Gospel. Translation from the Coptic and Commentary by KENDRICK GROBEL. New York: Abingdon, 1960. Pp. 206. $4.00.

The Secret Sayings of Jesus. Ed. by R. M. GRANT, D. N. FREEDMAN and W. R. SCHMOEDEL. New York: Doubleday, 1960. Pp. 206. $3.50.

The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings of Christianity. By HANS JONAS. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. Pp. xviii + 302. $8.50.

The Gnostic Problem: A study of the Relations between Hellenistic Judaism and the Gnostic Heresy. By R. McL. WILSON. London: Mowbray, 1958. Pp. xi + 274. $8.50.

Gnosticism and Early Christianity. By R. M. GRANT. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. Pp. 227. $4.50.

THE DISCOVERY of the Gnostic library of Nag-Hammadi immediately after the war is giving rise to a great revival of interest in Gnosticism, which is bound to go on increasing as more and more of the new texts are transcribed and published. Until now, we have been largely dependent for our knowledge of the Gnostic sects and their doctrines upon the hostile accounts given by their opponents, chiefly Fathers of the Church (especially Irenaeus, Tertullian [or Pseudo-Tertullian], and Epiphanius), who were often suspected of unfairness. Of their own writings, only a few minor things were extant—a *Letter of Ptolemaeus to Flora*, preserved by Epiphanius; *Excerpts from Theodotus*, made by Clement of Alexandria; bits and pieces of Heracleon's *Commentary on St. John's Gospel*, included by Origen in his own commentary; the *Pistis Sophia* and the *Books of Jeû* (decidedly inferior specimens); and some apocryphal Gospels and Acts of Apostles. Since 1955, we have also had in our hands the *Apocryphon of John*, from a Coptic papyrus in the Berlin Museum. Now the Nag-Hammadi documents are beginning to be given to the public in transcriptions and translations into

modern languages; and our materials for the study of these systems have increased enormously. It is gratifying to find that the new discoveries do not justify the suspicions of bias that were entertained concerning the accounts of the Christian Fathers; it turns out that Irenaeus in particular gives a remarkably accurate analysis of the Gnostic doctrines.

The first of the Nag-Hammadi documents to be published was the Gospel of Truth, which is of particular interest in that it has been identified by the editors—not with absolute certainty, but with reasonable plausibility —with the writing of this name mentioned by Irenaeus (*Against Heresies* III.11.9) as a composition of the Valentinians, which "they dare to entitle 'The Gospel of Truth,' though it is totally unlike those which have been handed down to us from the Apostles." Professor Grobel agrees with Professor W. C. van Unnik that the author of the work was probably Valentinus himself, who has been described as "a highly cultured person, long familiar with Plato, obsessed by the deepest religious and ethical aspirations of his time, . . . the most daring speculative mind of the second century" (quoted by Grobel, p. 16, from E. deFaye, *Gnostiques et Gnosticisme*). Like the original editors, Grobel dates the document around A.D. 150, at Rome.

The Gospel of Truth is a part of the Jung Codex, now deposited in the Jung Institute at Zurich. A preliminary sketch of its contents and estimate of its significance was given in 1955, in a little book entitled *The Jung Codex*, edited by Professor F. L. Cross of Oxford, with essays by H. C. Puech of Paris and G. Quispel and W. C. van Unnik of Utrecht. In the following year Puech and Quispel, together with M. Malinine (of the Sorbonne) brought out the *editio princeps* of the Gospel of Truth in a sumptuous volume, under the title *Evangelium Veritatis*, with photographs of the Coptic payrus text, a printed transcription in Coptic with a French version facing it, and some brief notes, followed by translations into German and into English, and indexes of the Greek and Coptic words. Grobel has at least four good reasons for bringing out his own edition. First, the Zurich edition is very expensive. Secondly, the English translation which it contains is simply barbarous; as Grobel remarks, "It is a translation of a translation—the French—with little or no reference to the Coptic, made by a translator whose mother tongue obviously was not English" (p. 29). Thirdly, the document is hardly intelligible to the ordinary reader without relatively extensive annotation such as Grobel has provided (about double the length of the text itself). Fourthly, he is able to give us renderings of four pages of the text which were missing from the Jung Codex.

The notes are acute and learned, and will afford the necessary help to the student. They are not made for casual reading. One could wish that Grobel had allowed himself a good deal more feedom in translating, for his rendering is far too literal and the device of keeping to the original, line for line, has imposed upon him a quite unnecessary handicap.

It should be said that this writing is not a "gospel" in the sense of an account of the ministry and teaching of Jesus or any part of it. It is "the Gospel of Truth" in the sense that Paul's Epistle to the Romans might be called "the Gospel of Justification." In fact, the title of the work is simply its opening words, and does not imply that it contains any part of the story of Jesus.

An account of the Gospel according to Thomas was offered to readers of the *Canadian Journal of Theology* in the April issue. Since that article was written, a new translation of the text, made by W. R. Schoedel, has appeared, with excellent notes by R. M. Grant and D. N. Freedman, under the title, *The Secret Sayings of Jesus*. This book has now appeared in England in a paperback edition (by Collins) at the astonishing price of one half-crown. This is a model of what an edition of such text for general use should be. The meaning of the sayings is illuminated by clear indications of the Gnostic doctrines which they reflect, and by a rich selection of parallel texts from other Gnostic writings.

A third Gnostic "gospel" of the same collection is still to receive its first publication in English—the Gospel according to Philip. This is not the writing cited under that title by Epiphanius (Panarion I.26.13). It is neither a collection of sayings attributed to Jesus, like the Gospel of Thomas, nor a theological meditation, like the Gospel of Truth, but a kind of *florilegium* of Gnostic sayings. The German translator divides it into 127 sections, which seldom show any connection with one another, and are of the most varied character. They exhibit an extraordinarily complex symbolism which makes much use of the language of sex: marriage, virginity, adultery, the bride and the bridegroom and the bridal-chamber. Greek words, transliterated into Coptic, provide a number of the chief themes: *Anapausis* ("Rest"); *Klēronomia* ("Inheritance"); *Anastasis* ("Resurrection"); *Topos* ("Place"); and many others. The "Archons" appear, as in other Gnostic documents, as the planetary spirits who seek to deceive man and make him their slave. It is flatly stated that "the world came into being through a transgression." Its Creator (not the Father of All, but an inferior spirit, a Demiurge) hoped to confer immortality and incorruptibility upon it, but could not do so, as he did not possess them himself. It is hoped that a short selection of the more interesting (and more intelligible) passages from this Gospel may be published in *CJT* before too long.

Hans Jonas, a student of Rudolf Bultmann's long before the War, has been known to the world of learning as an investigator of Gnosticism for a generation. He began the publication of his master-work, *Gnosis und spätantiker Geist* in 1934. Thanks to Nazi hostility, he was driven from Germany before it appeared in print, and his second volume did not come out until 1954. A third is yet to come. He has since taught at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and at Carleton College in Ottawa, and is now in New York, teaching in the New School for Social Research. He has now

given us a general account of Gnosticism, and an attempt to assess its significance in relation to early Christianity, which is at once brilliant in its learning and charming in its style. No one could fail to enjoy his translation of the "Hymn of the Pearl" (c. 5), and to appreciate his exposition of its imagery and its general significance. This is a major contribution to the study of ancient religion, and of certain important aspects of the development of thought in the ancient church. No student of early church history can afford to neglect it.

Dr. Wilson, now lecturer in New Testament in St. Andrews, has given us a study of Gnosticism which grew out of the Ph.D. dissertation offered by him to the University of Cambridge. It is restricted, as the subtitle indicates, to an examination of the relations between Gnosticism and Hellenistic Judaism. In two introductory chapters, he gives first a general survey of Diaspora Judaism and then a more detailed account of Alexandrian Judaism and of its best-known exponent, Philo. He then comes to a discussion of "Gnosticism and Christianity in New Testament Times," in which he pays attention especially to the language and thought of St. Paul. He recognizes "a close similarity between Paul's language and that of the Gnostics," but holds that "there is a fundamental difference in the idea expressed" (p. 76). Yet there is a more than merely verbal kinship between Gnostic and Christian, and it is precisely this that made Gnosticism so great a danger. "Gnosticism is not entirely foreign to Christianity," he writes, "and this fact added to the danger, since the Gnostic teachers could give a Christian colouring to their doctrines while yet employing to the full the pagan ideas which they drew from their environment. Had Gnosticism been purely pagan it would have been more easily dealt with" (p. 82f). The next two chapters treat of the earlier and later Gnosticism, respectively, always examining the nature of the conflict with Christianity. In some ways the most interesting and useful part of the book is Chapter VI, which introduces two of the new documents—the Gospel of Truth, and the Apocryphon of John. The latter is not yet available in an English translation, and Wilson's brief description will make many aware of its significance for the first time. It has been known for nearly sixty years; the Coptic text was included among a large group of Gnostic texts in the Berlin Museum; but it was never published in full until 1955, when W. Till edited it (*Texte und Untersuchungen*, No. 60), among *Die gnostischen Schriften des koptischen Papyrus Berolinensis 8502*. Now among the Nag-Hammadi papyri there are, we are told, no less than three different recensions of the book—a clear indication of the value attached to it by the Gnostics of Egypt. It professes to report a vision granted to John the son of Zebedee upon "the mountain," and great stress is laid on the esoteric character of the revelation. It is not to be made public, but to be transmitted secretly to those who are able to receive it. In substance, it stands close to the "Barbelo-Gnosticism" expounded by Irenaeus, and may itself be the source on which he drew.

This book, like that of Jonas, will be of interest not only to those who are

specially interested in Gnosticism, but to all who study the history of the second-century church, and indeed to all students of Christian origins. It makes important contributions to the whole question of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity. It must be remarked that the bibliography is unsatisfactory; it does not give sufficiently full information about the works cited; several titles are incorrectly spelled, and sometimes incorrectly given. The index leaves still more to be desired, in that it contains no reference to modern writers.

Professor Grant's book contains his six lectures which were delivered in Trinity College, Toronto, and at a large number of American universities in 1957–58, under the auspices of the Committee on the History of Religions of the American Council of Learned Societies. They are unquestionably a match for the best volumes that have appeared in the same lectureship, which includes such honourable names as Franz Cumont, A. V. Williams Jackson, and C. H. Toy. Far more limited in scope than Jonas' book, it is not inferior to it in brilliance, and the ease and flexibility of the lecture-style makes for simplicity (so far as that can be attained in the discussion of such a complex subject) and for a lucidity which triumphs over the dark and troubled mystifications of the doctrine. Dr. Grant argues that Gnosticism, far from corresponding to Harnack's estimate of it as "the acute Hellenization of Christianity," in fact originated in heterodox Judaism, as a consequence of the collapse of apocalyptic hopes in the first half of the second century, with the final blow coming through the overthrow of the revolt of Bar-Kochba. He holds that "some, at least, of the most significant early Gnostic systems have Jewish roots. . . . For all practical purposes, the Gnostics must have been ex-Jews, renegades from their religion, for they had abandoned the deity of the Creator, the binding character of the law of Moses, and the doctrine of resurrection" (p. 26). Not that he makes the reaction from Jewish apocalyptism a key to unlock all the problems; on the contrary, he explicitly admits that "we cannot insist that everything in Gnosticism can be explained in relation to Jewish apocalyptic hopes" (p. 37). By the second generation, the Gnostics were drawing upon Greek and Oriental theologies of the most varied kinds; and of course the New Testament writings were exploited from the earliest times of which we have any knowledge. "A would-be Gnostic, searching for security in a troubled and evil world, could hardly ignore the claims being made for Jesus by Christians" (p. 35). In this connection, it is interesting to note the remarks of Professor Quispel that "there would appear to be good grounds for supposing that it was from Christianity that the conception of redemption and the figure of the Redeemer were taken over into Gnosticism. A pre-Christian redeemer and an Iranian mystery of redemption perhaps never existed" (*The Jung Codex*, p. 78).

Scholarship, of course, is international; but even so the extent of international co-operation in the very first stages of the study of the new documents is far out of the ordinary. French, Dutch, Belgians, Swiss and

Americans collaborated to procure the Jung Codex in the first instance; English, Scottish and German scholars are even now participating along with Egyptians, Dutch, French and Americans in the further work of publication. Italians and Scandinavians are making important contributions. This is an indication of the interest and significance of the Nag-Hammadi papyri, and it may be anticipated that as publication continues they will receive even more attention from the learned world than has been awakened by the Dead Sea Scrolls. Certainly the Gnostic movements are of infinitely more importance in general history than the sectarians of Qumran.

Book Reviews

Early Christian Doctrines. By J. N. D. Kelly. London: Adam and Charles Black (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada), 1958. Pp. xii, 501. $5.75.

We have cause for gratitude in receiving another book from the hands of Dr. Kelly, that most pellucid of writers, author of *Early Christian Creeds* (London, 1950). His aim now is to cover the general development of doctrine from the close of the NT period to the middle of the fifth century. The *terminus ad quem* puts beyond his scope such matters as the monothelite-dyothelite controversy and the mysteries of *anhypostasia-enhypostasia.* So much of his space is given to the Christological controversies that an account of these later issues, even if only in a note, would have been helpful, but he defends his choice of the Council of Chalcedon as the limit of his treatment on the ground that it "saw the curtain drop on the Church's first great doctrinally creative period." After the first "brilliant upsurge of fresh ideas," by the sixth century "the reign of formalism and scholasticism was well under way" (p. 3).

Seven chapters out of seventeen are Trinitarian and Christological; two are soteriological; one deals with man, sin, and grace; two are ecclesiological; two cover Scripture and tradition; the Jewish-Greek-Roman background, the doctrine of the sacraments, and the Christian hope, are taken up in one chapter each. Excellent bibliographies are given at the end of each chapter. As a former student of H. R. Mackintosh, the present reviewer regrets the omission from them of his great book, *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ.* There is a quality in Mackintosh's book that Kelly does not put out of date, for Mackintosh describes not only objective doctrinal differences but also the bearing of these differences upon the personal faith of believers. Kelly's treatment is fuller and tends to remain on the objective side. It is therefore, be it confessed, drier in the reading.

The extent of the bibliographies underlines the author's purpose of providing for students an outline of the development of theology among the early Fathers, taking into account the advances made in knowledge since the publication fifty years ago of Bethune-Baker's manual, *Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine.* Regarding Sabellius, for example, "the traditional belief that he spoke of Father, Son and Spirit as three *prosopa,* in the sense of masks or outward appearances, is erroneous." The term *prosopon* implied for Sabellius separate subsistence (p. 122). This correction does not make Sabellius a full Trinitarian, but it brings him nearer orthodoxy than he has hitherto been placed (cf. Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, p. 152).

In regard to a book that covers ground trodden upon by many specialists, occasional divergence from the author's findings is only to be expected. On the Trinitarian question, for example, one would prefer to see the problem of theology otherwise described than as that of integrating with the doctrine of the One God, inherited from Judaism, the fresh data of the specifically Christian revelation (p. 87). As G. A. F. Knight has made clear (*A Biblical Approach to the Doctrine of the Trinity*), the unity of the Godhead, as conceived in Judaism, was a differentiated unity, and, on Dr. Kelly's own showing, there was little grasp of the oneness of God in the Gentile world. What the historian needs to explain is the fact that it was only through the revelation in Christ that belief in the unity of the Godhead became decisively established in men's minds (cf. I Cor. 8:5ff.; Eph. 4:3ff). The doctrine was not just "inherited." It was now finally *revealed.*

While a reader may at times prefer different nuances, he will find himself deeply indebted to Dr. Kelly for the clarity and mastery with which he makes his way through the great mass of material. The reviewer gladly acknowledges the value of the work, which he has already used as a textbook. Not the least among its many virtues to the student are the frequent cross-references to places where a matter has been already mentioned.

David W. Hay

Knox College
Toronto

The Importance of Being Human: Some Aspects of the Christian Doctrine of Man. By E. L. Mascall. New York: Columbia University Press (Toronto: Oxford University Press), 1958. Pp. x, 118. $3.50.

This series of Bampton Lectures in America deals with "Some Aspects of the Christian Doctrine of Man," as the subtitle informs us. The author is Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion at Oxford, and a noted Anglo-Catholic theologian.

The first lecture draws our attention to the scientific account of the nature of man. The author finds support for his views in the writings of Julian Huxley. Even biologically man is the crown of creation. However, "the arrival of man does not mean that the evolutionary process has come to an end. What it does mean is that it has reached a turning-point of the most novel and far-reaching kind" (p. 8). And though man is unique, he is, nevertheless, a creature, and from the theological standpoint this implies that he is dependent on a Creator.

"Body and Soul" is the title of the second lecture in which we are informed that man is a psycho-physical organism, a "unity of body and rational soul, of flesh and spirit" (p. 25). Man is neither pure spirit nor "a highly developed physical organism." Manichaean ideas, based on belief in the inherent evil of physical life, are thus ruled out of the Christian concept of man. In fact, the importance of man's bodily nature is enhanced by the biblical teaching of the resurrection of the body.

We read that "man as a rational being bears upon himself the stamp of the image of God" (p. 33). These words make explicit an underlying assumption which has Hellenic rather than biblical sources, namely, that the *imago Dei* is to be equated with man's rationality. Does not this assumption undercut the principle of body-soul unity by describing man's relationship to God in terms of soul (reason) alone? Further, is there not much more to the *imago Dei* than rationality? God is not only reason; he is even more a God of love. Calvin's description of the *Imago Dei* would seem to be more in accord with the truth about man. Calvin writes that the *imago Dei* consists "in the light of the mind, the rectitude of the heart and in the soundness of all the parts of our nature" (*Inst.*, I, xv, 4).

Lecture Three on the "Individual and Society" contains illustrations from marriage and family life which make clear the writer's contention that the individual only becomes a true person in a social context.

The themes of the next two lectures, "Nature and Supernature" and "Man Fallen," as elucidated by this writer, raise many questions for this reviewer. For example, the author quotes with approval St. Thomas' words that "grace perfects nature and does not destroy it" and that "grace presupposes nature." He then adds that "grace apart from nature is a pure abstraction; and it is for the sake of nature that grace exists" (p. 61). Does this give nature a priority over grace? It not nature the offspring of grace? Moreover, if nature has been radically vitiated, if not destroyed, by sin, how can it be perfected unless it is first made new in Christ?

We are informed at the beginning of Lecture Five that a Protestant would not leave the discussion of man's sinfulness until two-thirds of a lecture series on the nature of man had elapsed. Such a delay in dealing with sin leads us to think that Dr. Mascall has, up to this point, been treating of man's nature largely in abstraction. Man as we know him is fallen man. He is a paradox because he is made in the image of God and at the same time is recognized to be "sold under sin." As Pascal says, he is a "dethroned king."

Many questions can be raised about the author's view that evil is "an accident" (p. 76). "That is to say, it is not something proper to man, but is the result of a misfortune that has happened to him." The *imago Dei* does remind us that sin is "not proper." But do not the terms "accident" and "misfortune" contradict the writer's statement that "sin is thus, in its essence, an attempt to undo the creative act of God"? Such an "attempt" is a deliberate act of disobedience. (We assume from the context that the author equates evil with sin, or moral evil.) Surely sin is something more demonic than an "accident" or a "misfortune"? Is not man also helpless in sin and not merely "wounded" or "weakened" (p. 87; cf. Rom. 7:23)? Dr. Mascall also claims that "evil arises from sin in the angelic world" (p. 77), a statement based on one tradition which has a slender Biblical basis.

There is much more in this section which calls for discussion. However, the essential issue is the nature of sin and grace. A Protestant can approve, with Dr. Mascall, the statement from Irenaeus: "creation and redemption

are parts of a single plan" (p. 96). But apparently the Protestant stresses more than the Catholic the depth and radical meaning of sin, its heinousness before God, which calls for grace beyond our conceiving as well as our deserving. Does the Catholic view of sin and grace tend to be superficial? Is this why Barth describes the Catholic doctrine of the *analogia entis* as "an invention of the antichrist"?

The final lecture on "Man in Christ" makes us aware of the Church as Christ's Body, having a sacramental life of its own. Man is now "the Eucharistic man." Great emphasis is laid on the Sacraments, and rightly so. But there is no mention of the Word or consequently of the significance of the proclamation of the Word through preaching. The Word and the Sacraments are both necessary for the edifying of the Body of Christ.

Readers of this journal ought to give careful attention to the contents of this well-written book. It presents the Catholic doctrine of man in a clear and persuasive manner. It is because its views are so well-argued that this Protestant reviewer has raised some critical questions which, he believes, take us into the very centre of Christian theology.

R. C. Chalmers

Pine Hill Divinity Hall
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Church and State in Canadian Education: An Historical Study. By C. B. Sissons. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1959. Pp. x, 414, $6.50.

Dr. Charles Bruce Sissons, Professor Emeritus of Ancient History at Victoria College, Toronto, has celebrated his eightieth birthday by publishing a full-length analysis of the part played by the several churches, Catholic and Protestant, in the development of the educational systems of the ten provinces of Canada.

Dr. Sissons is exceedingly well qualified for his task. In 1912, he had conducted a survey of the schools in all parts of Manitoba and published in the *Toronto Globe* a series of nine articles on *The Schools of Manitoba.* In 1917 came his first book, *Bilingual Schools in Canada.* During two industrious decades, 1927–47, he wrote his *magnum opus* on *Egerton Ryerson, His Life and Letters,* and traced the steps by which that great administrator worked out a unique compromise between church and state in Upper Canada. He then proceeded, in *A History of Victoria University* (1952), to show "the happy results of a similar adjustment as applied to the federated arts colleges of the University of Toronto." In the present exercise in synthesis, he gives perspective to the problem throughout the whole of Canada, but inevitably expounds it province by province because of provincial autonomy in the field of education.

The architecture of the book is not obvious at a first glance but reveals itself to a second. The first chapter, on Ontario, gives that province pride of place and treatment, with more pages than Quebec, Nova Scotia, Alberta, Prince Edward Island and British Columbia combined. Thereafter the

author deals with the other provinces in systematic alternation between the east and the west, first with those that are adjacent (Quebec and Manitoba) and then in an order of increasing remoteness from Ontario (New Brunswick and Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia and Alberta, Prince Edward Island, British Columbia and Newfoundland).

The long opening chapter on Ontario sets the stage for the action in many provinces by stressing the significance in 1850 of a sudden shift away from liberalism on the part of Pope Pius IX. Thereafter came a rigorous ultramontane attempt to capture education and stamp out any hint of independent thinking among the faithful in all countries. As early as 1852, Bishop de Charbonnel of Toronto could denounce the common schools of Upper Canada as "a regular school of pyrrhonism, of indifferentism, of infidelity, and consequently of all vices and crimes"; while his Lenten Pastoral of 1856 declared that "Catholic electors in this country who do not use their electoral power in behalf of separate schools are guilty of mortal sin." From this use of the club, it is only a step to the implacable opposition of Archbishop Langevin of St. Boniface, condemning ten thousand little Manitobans to illiteracy, and to the inexorable pressure of the Apostolic Delegate, Monsignor Sbarretti, on Prime Minister Laurier during 1904–05. Dr. Sissons shows a much more amiable and tolerant attitude on the part of many other Catholics, especially his enlightened hero, John Sandfield Macdonald, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier himself; and is inclined to feel that after a century of stress and strain the men of our day are closer to a sane solution of a complex variable.

Perhaps only a Canadian who had visited all ten provinces could appreciate the range of variety in the provincial systems: Newfoundland, where all education is church-controlled; British Columbia, where the churches are forbidden any part in a universal secular system; Quebec, where there is complete bifurcation between Catholic and Protestant; Ontario, where there is a *modus vivendi* compounded of a hundred compromises; and many other variants in symbiosis in the other provinces.

Misprints are unhappily numerous. These include "Pubic grants" (p. 129), a "special convenant" (p. 384) and (three times) "Paul Gigejezuk" instead of "Gigejczuk" or "Gigeychuk", as the man himself spelled it when I first met him. Richard Kylie, moreover, was never "chairman of the Board of the Collegiate Institute" in Lindsay, Ontario, where my father was the Principal; although as Mayor of the town (1916–18) he played a notable part in municipal politics, and the happy blending of Catholic and Protestant in a single secondary school was an ideal state of affairs.

The only real criticism against a magistral piece of work is its very slight emphasis on certain sociological factors. A century ago, there were very few French in what is now Ontario. Today there are nearly half a million of them, chiefly in counties adjacent to their population *massif* in Quebec. This is a phenomenon unforeseen by the framers of the famous Act of 1863 and carries implications that must seem vital to a small culture-

group on a continent where it is outnumbered thirty to one. Numerous Anglo-Saxons, from Lord Durham's time down, have urged the absorption of the French into the English-speaking mass, and that threat has brought its own intense reaction. In properly stressing as the primary tragedy of separationist policies the ignorance and semi-illiteracy that they have tended to bring to a host of marginal communities, Dr. Sissons might have dilated on the close connection between high birthrates, limited natural resources and a low per capita income in determining the creation of pedagogical slums. Demography has been superimposed on church policies in the plight of many of Canada's rural areas through the years.

On the whole, the author has been commendably objective in his treatment of a highly contentious subject. As over against doctrinaire clamour in our time for all sorts of paper guarantees, Bills of Rights, and the like, he expresses a more philosophical opinion: "I am in complete agreement with John Sandfield Macdonald, the first Premier of Ontario and a Roman Catholic, in holding that the only right which a minority can properly, or safely, be given in a democracy is the right in free discussion to persuade the majority of the justice of their cause."

WATSON KIRKCONNELL

Acadia University
Wolfville, Nova Scotia

What Objections have been made to English Orders? By F. E. BRIGHTMAN. 4th ed. London: S.P.C.K. (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre), 1958. Pp. 46. $0.90.

The Elizabethan Bishops and the Civil Power. London: S.P.C.K. (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre), 1958. Pp. 20. $0.60.

The Later Medieval Doctrine of the Eucharistic Sacrifice. By B. J. KIDD. London: S.P.C.K. (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre), 1958. Pp. 104. $1.90.

THESE three brochures, first published by the Church Historical Society between 1896 and 1898, and now reprinted for the same society, all bear on the crucial controversy over Anglican Orders which marked the last decade of the nineteenth century. Their reappearance is timely enough, however, since the problem is still with us, despite the definitive pronouncement of Leo XIII in the Bull *Apostolicae Curae* (1896) and the decisive rejoinder of the English Archbishops in the Encyclical *Saepius Officio* (1897). Moreover, while fresh technicalities have appeared in certain recent statements of the Roman case against Anglican Orders, and a new atmosphere has made itself felt in Roman eucharistic theology, the issues treated in these booklets cannot be ignored in any study of the four centuries of conflict between Rome and Canterbury.

What Objections have been made to English Orders? began as a lecture by an eminent Anglican liturgical scholar. While it was written before the publication of *Apostolicae Curae*, it touches on the main contentions of the

Bull and also alludes (albeit with a certain incredulity) to one or two points which have been taken up in later Roman argument. Brightman concentrates on Matthew Parker's consecration (December 17th, 1559, at Lambeth), which, as he says has borne "the stress of the controversy," but in this context he deals succinctly with the theological as well as the historical issues. On the historical side, Brightman shows that the fact of Parker's consecration is beyond dispute and vindicates the episcopal status of the chief consecrator, Barlow. On the theological side, he argues for the real co-operation of the assistants in an episcopal consecration (significant in view of doubts raised about Barlow), defends the sufficiency of the second Edwardine Ordinal, and deals trenchantly with the question of defective "intention" (pointing out more than once that Roman orders themselves would fail the tests imposed on Anglicans). Anglicans will find here a useful brief for the defence against popular polemics.

The Elizabethan Bishops and the Civil Power is simply concerned to show that the Statute 8 Elizabeth I, cap. 1 ("An Act declaring the making and consecrating of the Archbishops and Bishops of this realm to be good, lawful and perfect"), bears on a legal rather than a canonical or sacramental point. An "Appendix" gives a somewhat abridged text.

In *The Later Medieval Doctrine of the Eucharistic Sacrifice*, a distinguished historian presents the background of Article 31 of the *Articles of Religion*—a text often used by Roman controversialists to prove the Anglican rejection of sacrifice and priesthood. Kidd argues that "Article XXXI does not, in so many words, deny the sacrifice of the Mass, but 'Missarum sacrificia,' or 'the sacrifices of Masses' " (p. 14). He supports his exegesis with evidence from earlier Anglican formularies and from Cranmer's writings, contrasted with unequivocal Lutheran denials of sacrifice, but his main effort is devoted to showing how the terms of the Anglican Article are explained by the existence in the late medieval Church of a practical system of multiplied "sacrifices of Masses," supported by a theology which differed radically from older concepts of the sacrifice of the Mass. Further, he wants to show that the continued influence of certain late medieval assumptions (notably the persistent identification of sacrifice with the destruction of a victim, which he notes in his own contemporaries) makes the Reformation critique of Roman theology still relevant. (The remaking of eucharistic theology by de la Taille, Vonier, Casel, Masure and others, which Kidd could hardly have been expected to anticipate, would no doubt be welcomed by him as evidence for the possibility of reform without rejection of the sacrifice of the Mass). It seems fair to say that Kidd's portrayal of the background of Article 31 must be accepted as established, and that the post-Reformation development of Anglican theology makes his view of the motives behind the Article plausible. His case would have been more complete if he had followed up the clue of his own comments on Vasquez (pp. 88f., 92f.), by penetrating beyond the misguided but relatively innocuous identification of sacrifice with destruction and discussing the general and more serious failure to grasp the idea

of a relative, representative, sacramental sacrifice, and had shown how this idea finds clear expression in classical Anglican writers. But what he does say must be taken very seriously.

EUGENE R. FAIRWEATHER

Trinity College
Toronto

Charles Simeon (1759–1836). Essays Written in Commemoration of his Bi-Centenary by Members of the Evangelical Fellowship for Theological Literature. Edited by A. POLLARD and M. HENNELL. London: S.P.C.K. (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre), 1959. Pp. vi, 190. $4.20.

THE LIFE and work of Charles Simeon provide a mine from which biographers and historians have drawn valuable ore for over a century. The select bibliography in the volume under review shows that in all but three decades since the death of the great Cambridge Evangelical, books have appeared dealing with his career. An edition of his *Horae Homileticae* under the title *Expository Outlines on the Whole Bible*, in twenty-one volumes, has just been published.

The seven writers of these essays, six of whom are educators, deal with various aspects of Simeon's life. The first essay, factual and unadorned, places him historically in the setting of the Evangelical Revival. The second is a first-rate exposition of his biblical views. The third, written by Ronald Reeve, a contributor to this journal, presents a thoughtful analysis of Simeon's doctrine of God. The fourth and most comprehensive essay on his Pastoral Theology shows "the kind of teaching which Simeon gave in his famous ministry of over fifty years." The fifth and sixth, brief but illuminating, treat (not uncritically) of his doctrine of the Church, and describe the pastoral ministry which he exercised. The final essay attempts to assess the influence and significance of Simeon's work, an aim which is attained with even greater success in the six-page Foreword by Canon M. A. C. Warren.

A well known caricature of Charles Simeon published immediately after his death depicts him as a plump, pompous, begowned, Pickwickian figure, with gaitered legs and a large umbrella under his arm, tripping along "on lissom, clerical, printless toe" obviously bent on some important errand. It is by no means an unkind sketch, but it does hint that there was something mildly ridiculous about him. This is not the impression the reader gains from scanning these essays, or from studying the portrait by Sir William Beechey which smiles from the frontispiece. Here is presented, albeit in shreds and patches, a picture of a dedicated, loyal, disciplined, faithful, humble, Anglican pastor and preacher; one who, although he gloried in the name Evangelical, and helped to give it the status within Anglicanism which it retains today, was essentially no partisan, but a man of integrity and balanced judgment; one who was completely bound up with the proclamation of that Word of God which he learned from a profound and life-long study of the Bible; one who deeply influenced the lives of genera-

tions of Cambridge men, imbuing them with his own devotion, training them as pastors and expository preachers when no formal institution existed to provide such training; one who through his creation of the Simeon Trust perpetuates his influence to the present day; one who, by his support of missionary endeavour, helped to create what Latourette calls the "Great Century" of Christian expansion. Simeon's mind was not original or brilliant. He was touched with the time-spirit. He had his idiosyncrasies. Yet one lays down these essays with a vast respect for the original "Sim," and a willingness to give him a high place among those makers of the English Church and Nation who ran their course in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.

A work of this kind cannot avoid overlapping, and such in fact does occur. At times the reader might wish that the members of the Evangelical Fellowship had entrusted to one of their number the writing of an up-to-date biography, presented chronologically. Yet they chose this other way, and we must be grateful to them for the manner in which they have undertaken to bring to remembrance and to praise this famous man.

THOMAS R. MILLMAN

Wycliffe College
Toronto

The Bible and Christian Education. By A. J. EBBUTT. Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1959. Pp. 46. $1.00.

THERE IS a constant need for the type of book which seeks to mediate the results of critical biblical study in such straightforward fashion that they can be absorbed and used by the ordinary layman and Christian teacher in the Church. This little book in the "Saddlebag Books" series has this purpose in mind. And one may say at once that it is good to have a competent biblical scholar occupying himself with some of the problems of Christian communication.

The author is concerned to provide for the Christian teacher and parent an interpretation of the historical-critical method as applied to the study of the Bible, somewhat similar to that which A. Victor Murray has attempted, more ambitiously, in *Education into Religion*, and his other writings.

The book is in two parts. The first part begins by offering a very brief account of other methods of biblical interpretation, literal, allegorical and typological. The brevity of these passages leads, perhaps inevitably, to the distortion of over-simplification. The impression is conveyed, for example, that all typological interpretation is simply bad; whereas it may be argued that there is a "spiritual correspondence" between the mighty acts of God in history, which justifies some forms of typology. The Pauline statement, "Christ our Passover is sacrificed for us," involves a typological interpretation of an Old Testament episode. The Christology of the Epistle to the Hebrews is heavily indebted to typology; and typology has been, and still is, legitimately used in Christian liturgy.

The historical method of approach to Bible study is examined at greater length, and is explained in a manner that would be serviceable to the layman. Unfortunately the critical-historical attitude to the Bible is so interpreted as to encourage the reader to believe that most of what cannot be rationally explained need not be taken seriously. Reason is almost made to appear the final authority, in a manner that could not be accepted by the present reviewer, nor would it be endorsed by some of the authorities quoted. One is sometimes left with the impression that the dimension of mystery and of the transcendent is removed. As C. H. Dodd has said, in *The Bible Today*, there is no possibility of by-passing historical criticism; but this is not the same thing as confining the interpretation of the Bible "within the limits of pure reason."

The concept of biblical myth is not very clearly distinguished, so as to show its valid place in the communication of revelation. Nor is the element of the miraculous in the Bible dealt with satisfactorily. "Revelation value" (p. 21) is made to depend upon a somewhat subjective criterion. And one would have to dispute certain statements, as that "Heilsgeschichte" is a "vague concept" (p. 10), and that "the idea of sinlessness is bound up with the dogma of the Virgin Birth, but perfection is an ideal to which he [Jesus] moved" (p. 24). The relation between spirit and nature needs to be more clearly distinguished than is done here (p. 22).

The plea made in Part II of the book, that the intelligent study of the Bible ought to engage the more serious attention of ministers, teachers and laymen, in order to remove the widespread biblical illiteracy from which we suffer, is a sound one; but little is said in this whole chapter that is illuminating or suggestive, or even that has not been said many times before. And stylistic infelicities, grammatical errors, and even the incorrect use of words are so frequent as to detract from the value of a book the purpose of which is educational.

James R. Guthrie

Emmanuel College
Toronto

This Incredible Thing, Evangelism. By W. G. Berry. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1959 (A Saddlebag Book). Pp. x, 32. $1.00.

This is one of the brightest little books the present reviewer has come across. It is, however, rightly full of hard sayings, for example: "The evangelism that stipulates that the good life promises heaven beyond as a reward for suffering and strife here on earth, and that therefore for this reason man would be wise to be religious, is a travesty of all sincere and honest evangelism. Anything that uses religion as a means to an end, and anything other than that men should return the love of God, anything that savours of a bargain with eternity is essentially irreligious." The book illuminates the whole way of the Christian life and highlights the difficulties which are presented to us by those who hesitate to accept our evangel. No one should read it to find rules or new methods of evangelism, but anyone who wants

to see the content of Christian experience and its relation to Christian witness in the world of affairs today, will find a study of it worthwhile.

In the first part of the book, using the Bible as a background, the author indicates the two sides of conversion, personal and social. His theme is that of William Temple, who said that it was but a half truth to state that we must convert all individuals before we can convert society. The author is concerned to inquire whether indeed "it is possible to convert a person in isolation without reference to the society in which he lives." The answer to such a question would surely indicate that evangelism and conversion are in truth incredible because they must be so deep and penetrating. Neither the evangel nor conversion is superficially emotional. Conversion, too, implies membership in the fellowship and should be a cure for sectarianism.

The main part of the booklet, therefore, rests upon the thesis that in this puzzling world our evangel must be directed to personalities who are intelligent, creative, capable of development, good, willing to trust. While each of these points is dealt with succinctly in turn, the most searching evaluation regarding our evangel lies in the last point, "willing to trust." Today, certainly, many people fall away from the Christian fellowship or will not or can not accept its challenge because they cannot believe in a God of love. The element of trust must be recognized as a necessity for the Christian. It is of the nature of our incredible gospel that those who accept it grow to believe that good *will* triumph over evil. "We see that this implies that we must live the good life not because . . . it is a paying proposition, but because of the trust that we have in the essential goodness of God. . . . Religion at its best has never been represented as a paying concern. . . . What we get out of it is a by-product of what we put into it."

W. W. Judd

National Laymen's Council
Anglican Church of Canada, Toronto

The Liturgical Renewal of the Church. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. Pp. 158. $3.25.

In reading this very interesting book, it should be remembered that it does not profess to give a complete story or evaluation of the Liturgical Revival in the Christian Church, consisting as it does of five papers which were read at a Liturgical Conference held at Madison, Wisconsin, in May 1958, sponsored by Grace Episcopal Church. Nevertheless it includes a history of the liturgical renewal by Dr. Massey Shepherd, which does full justice to the liturgical movement in the Roman Church, and a review of the Protestant worship revival in the U.S.A. by Dr. Piepkorn, which gives an interesting account of the Lutheran Liturgical Movement; it supplies numerous references to the literature of the subject for those who wish to follow it up.

Apart from Dr. Piepkorn, who is a Lutheran, the contributors are all Episcopalians. Dr. T. O. Wedel gives an introduction of a personal character, in which he suggests a special philosophical theory of the eucharist;

Bishop Lichtenberger deals with social implications in a broad and stimulating style; Dr. J. O. Patterson deals with pastoral implications, making many practical suggestions which will provoke critical discussion.

The Liturgical Movement is one of the creative movements in modern Christianity, and it is intimately associated with the Ecumenical Movement itself. It is essentially an attempt to recover the feeling for divine worship and holy order as it developed in the church from the earliest times, and to adjust the worship of the church today to its highest and most authoritative traditions. The writers are enthusiasts, and there is a tendency, perhaps, to limit the scope of their vision to their special perspectives, and to promote special liturgical programs which are in line with them.

The word liturgy is often closely conformed to the word eucharist, or too closely centred in it. The present reviewer finds it hard to accept the definition of a church as an altar with a roof over it. The Bible and the font are central features too at certain points in the liturgy; and so also is the pulpit. The primitive Lord's Day Service was a larger thing than a mass or communion, though it came to its climax at this point.

The fact is that this small book leaves us asking for more. Gospel and baptism and intercession are indeed mentioned, but only in passing. Perhaps a modern treatment of liturgy should begin with Gospel and baptism and catechising and confirmation. One would welcome an exposition of the Lutheran doctrine of the primacy of the Word of God in its relation to liturgy; of the doctrine of the communion of saints in prayer and thanksgiving; and, above all, a devout study of the Lord's Prayer as our supreme liturgical document, which would take us back to the Hebrew antecedents which provided the apostolic church with its fundamental vision of God as creator and redeemer and judge of men.

Philip Quebec

Bishopthorpe
Quebec

Out of Nazareth. By D. M. Baillie. New York: Scribner's (Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders), 1958. Pp. 211. $4.00.

Since Dr. Baillie's death in 1954 we have been fortunate to receive three books compiled from his sermons, lecture notes and addresses. This present volume contains twenty-one sermons and four addresses.

I have long since discovered how dangerous it is to recommend a book of sermons to a fellow clergyman. The sermons that help me by inspiring, informing and energizing my mind may do nothing for my brother. All one can do is to indicate whether he thinks they are good sermons and fulfil the function of a sermon.

Personally, I liked this book very much. Sermon after sermon gave me a lead and started new trains of thought. As a matter of fact I think the ordinary parish minister might find this group of sermons more helpful than those in the previous volume, *To Whom Shall We Go?*, which included a number of sermons for special occasions. These are fine if you are interested

in that particular subject, but not much help in week-by-week work. *Out of Nazareth* contains twenty-one sermons of a general character which can be helpful at any season of the year.

As we are all aware, not every preacher produces sermons that read well, while others may give us literary gems that leave us wondering if the preacher ever caught fire. Dr. Baillie's sermons are somewhere in between the two extremes. They read well, for they are simple and concise with no pretence of rhetoric. At the same time they retain something of the warmth of the man's personality. They are expository sermons in which the preacher opens the Word with care, allowing his logical presentation to reveal the truth. One of the helpful aspects of his method is that he clears away objections and difficulties at the beginning and then carefully builds up his argument. Anyone who heard these sermons would find it easy to take them home with him. Although the preacher's brother, Dr. John Baillie, says that in editing the sermons he removed some colloquialisms, there are enough left to keep the sermons popular and vital.

Another interesting feature of many of these sermons is the constant reference to young people. It is obvious that Dr. Baillie, because of his experience in college circles, was constantly aware of the problems and needs of youth.

A few of these sermons are scarcely more than outlines. For example, "The Fullness of the Gospel" is only four pages in length. Yet even here the complete framework is present, the divisions are clearly marked, and excellent illustrations included.

In the prefatory note Dr. John Baillie mentions the sermon, "The Mystery of the Trinity," and says that requests had been received for the author's fuller teaching on this subject. As a result, one of the four lectures which make up the second part of the book, is entitled "The Doctrine of the Trinity." After reading the sermon on the Trinity I was left with an unhappy feeling that Dr. Baillie had, at least for me, confused the Three Persons. I thought the doctrine of the Holy Spirit left much to be desired. I then turned to the lecture, which is a thirty page dissertation on this difficult subject. One value of including this lecture with a book of sermons is to warn the preacher of the "mystery" which lies about this great truth. I was left with a feeling that it is very difficult to deal with this doctrine without falling into one of the heresies which have been repudiated by the Church. It is the kind of doctrine which seems to demand analogical treatment, but every analogy so far discovered is tainted. I found Dr. Baillie's treatment enlightening, but discouraging to any preacher who would popularize this teaching in a twenty-minute sermon.

The other lectures are good. I specially liked "What is Dead and What is Living in Christianity?" Here we have a great scholar, aware of the modern tendency to discard parts of the Gospel as irrelevant, bringing his learning down to the ordinary reader and showing how necessary it is to hold fast to the whole Gospel.

I commend this book as a volume of good expository sermons by a fine

scholar who spoke to his own age. Young men will find the construction and method worthy of study; all of us will be stimulated and inspired.

GEORGE B. SNELL

Synod House
Toronto

Beyond Theology: The Autobiography of Edward Scribner Ames. Edited by VAN METER AMES. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 1959. Pp. xii, 223. $5.00.

I HAVE just read with deepening interest and admiration the story of the spiritual pilgrimage of Edward Scribner Ames through the mazes of American religious life.

Those of us who have had the experience of building up a new congregation in a suburb of a growing city will appreciate this writer's difficulties and accomplishments in a suburb of Chicago. But what is most interesting by far is the account he gives of his own spiritual struggles and successes. As an old-fashioned evangelical I miss the emphasis to which we are accustomed on the Person of Christ as the Son of God and our Divine Saviour and Lord. Nevertheless it is both interesting and instructive to see how much can be made of Jesus as the first of all pilgrims on the heavenly way and the greatest of all who served God in the work he did for men. To me Jesus Christ is the ever-present Saviour and Divine Lord of life and action, but I need constant warning lest I miss the significance of his life and ministry in cherishing his meaning in my own inner life and conflict.

Dr. Ames' parents were American-born and both came of Calvinistic ancestors, but his father became acquainted with the Disciples of Christ in Vermont and joined their church and became pastor of the local congregation in 1864. His son says of him that he found in the views of Alexander Campbell and other Disciple leaders a refreshing freedom from creeds and sectarianism. He became an ardent believer in union among all Christians. His father moved often from place to place in his childhood, and his ministry in a suburb of Chicago left a lasting impression on his son in his formative years. He says that in their home religion pervaded the whole of life. "After all there was genuine comfort in the plain, happy home of my childhood." This statement reminds me of a revival meeting in which the ministers present were called on to tell the story of their entrance to the Christian ministry, and in all cases but one, the crucial factor was the influence of a Christian home and parental dedication of the son to the sacred calling. What follows in this autobiography is the story of a great spiritual adventure, and we commend cordially this account of the origin of the Disciples of Christ as a new denomination to all interested in the religious movements of our time.

He gives a most interesting account of the teachers and teaching of Yale Divinity School, and as one who holds an honorary degree from that historic

institution I appreciated his estimation of its atmosphere and values. He glories in his emancipation from the historic creeds of Christendom, and then states frankly his own position on the religious issues of our time, which is a "creed" quite as definite as those which he criticizes. To me this is the most valuable point that he makes—the necessity of reaching definite conclusions on the problems now before us. Unless one believes intensely in the God whom he discovers for himself and commits his life to his faith he can do little for the moral and spiritual growth of those whom he teaches and whose actions he seeks to influence.

One can respect a strong thinker even when differing from him, and when, as in this case, your agreements are many times more than your differences, you are enriched and strengthened by studying it.

Here are two quotations:

"Our fathers would have us keep their faith, not by complimenting them in the mere adoption and teaching of their ideas, but by meeting our problems with the same originality and courage as they met theirs. It was just this courage of theirs that makes us glad to be called their sons, and at the same time makes them worthy sons of their fathers."

"Values arise out of life itself. They become religious when they are felt and known to be important to the whole of life."

In conclusion Ames expresses his own faith in these words: "It is my faith that we are all privileged to be co-workers with God in building His Kingdom of love. These values grow with use and multiply by being freely shared."

George C. Pidgeon

Toronto, Ontario

If the Churches want World Peace. By N. Hill and D. A. Lund. New York: The Macmillan Company (Toronto: Brett-Macmillan Ltd.), 1958. Pp. vii, 148. $3.00.

This book is described as an endeavour to consider "the obligations and performance of churches in this country to inspire the conduct of people and, through them, of international affairs." Both authors are tutors. Dr. Hill is Professor of International Relations at the University of Nebraska, and Dr. Lund teaches history and political science at Gustavus Adolphus College. Both are well disciplined in international affairs, but they write as "social scientists" and have refrained from "dabbling" (the word is Professor Hill's) "in the theological issues which might be raised as to the proper place of the churches in foreign affairs."

One other self-imposed principle of limitation has been operative, namely, that the enquiry should be confined to the activities of the Protestant churches in foreign affairs. "Those of the Catholic Church are carried on in a very different way."

The result is an attempt to show how the Protestant churches have very largely failed to influence foreign policy in the United States, partly because

they were incompetent in the realm of foreign affairs, and partly because the area of international relations demands a technical knowledge and skill which church leaders do not possess.

The conclusion is that the most effective influence which the churches can wield is to be the "leaven in the lump," the lump in this instance being the "body politic." They cannot take over the task of making foreign policy or of directing the affairs of the government; but they can influence and mould the people.

In spite of this conclusion, the book is largely disappointing. The very title is unfortunate. It can mean that, if the churches want peace, then certain conditions have to be fulfilled; or it may signify that the churches prate a great deal about peace, but their activities have the contrary effect. Whichever is meant, neither case is fully presented.

The two limitations which the authors have imposed upon themselves have vitiated their undertaking from the beginning. The ecclesiastical limitation, by freeing them from any discussion of the foreign policy of the Roman Catholic Church (which is also that of the Vatican State), makes any evaluation of the activities of the "Church" inadequate. The refusal to examine theological issues, by making it easy for them to talk of the "churches" and the "church" as interchangeable terms, gives their discussion a superficiality which is inexcusable.

There can be no adequate discussion of the whole problem of the contribution that can be made in the name of the Christian Church to international affairs, until a serious attempt has been made to distinguish between the Protestant and the Roman Catholic approach. The Roman Catholic political involvement in international affairs is claimed to be an act of the "Church." Is there any thought in the minds of Drs. Hill and Lund that the apostolic delegates, nuncios, papal secretaries and representatives are incompetent, unskilled in the art of diplomacy? Is this the kind of leadership which the Church should give? Is this the right way to deal with Caesar?

On these and similar questions students and authors must bring to bear the light of theological truth. No one would dream of discussing a social issue while ignoring the "social scientist." What the learned professors have attempted is to discuss the function and place of the Church in international affairs as though the Church were purely a sociological phenomenon. Their theological insensitiveness and the absence of any incisive theological critique robs their book of much of its value. This is regrettable because their study, supported by research into only one area of their enquiry, makes their volume both incomplete and inadequate. It need not have been. It could have been of far greater value to the Church and to the United States during this critical period in their common history. For this kind of discussion we shall have to await another volume.

Emlyn Davies

Yorkminster Baptist Church
Toronto

Editorial

AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PREACHER

SIR GEORGE TREVELYAN, in his *Illustrated History of England*, speaks of the English language in pre-Elizabethan England as "moving forward from strength to strength and from beauty to beauty, until it fell into the perfecting hands of the man of Stratford. Since his day," Sir George goes on, "its adaptability to exact scientific statement has increased, and its poetic and literary quality has decreased, according to the changes in the mind and life of the people who use it." It is a cold douche for popular notions of progress that the course of English speech over the past four hundred years can be thus seen, not as marking a straight advance, but as showing loss along with gain. Science demands the precision to which Sir George Trevelyan alludes, its requirement exceeding the capability of words even at their best save as they are aided by mathematical formulae. The effort of language to answer this need of science has been accompanied, if we follow Sir George, by its decline as a literary medium. Our purpose in this editorial calls for another comparison, in which language is pictured as having avenged itself of this rigour science would lay upon it, by permitting to itself orgies of licence outside of science. Science would keep words in close partnership with perceivable facts, but those not subject to science make quite other play with words and their meaning.

So it is that the formal meanings of words often have feebler incidence than their theatrical overtones or the way in which they are emotionally charged. For two generations now, speakers have talked "crisis" in fair weather and in foul, till the world has come to have the impact of "wolf" in the fable. No doubt it has served for relief of boredom through playing to natural weakness for the exciting and tragic. Politicians have abetted this devaluing of words through their bandying of epithets and their affecting to see national ruin or the thin end of tyranny in policies of their opponents which to dispassionate observation might differ little from their own. Many would feel that in the recent exchanges of the leaders of powerful states we have reached the "summit" of this verbal distortion and irresponsibility. Mr. Khrushchev brought abuse and derision full circle in his onslaughts on President Eisenhower, to meet in certain American spokesmen similar vehemence in judgments of Communism as so purely evil as to warrant claims to superior rightness in those who have set themselves against it.

Sir George Trevelyan, in the passage cited, perceives a correlation of the trends in English speech which he has specified with changes in the life and mind of the users of it. In a similar way, we would note the connection of tendencies of speech and the people's mental attitudes, paying regard to the

effect of the tendencies we have been considering upon these attitudes. To the people, the speech practices hinted at above must seem to set results before integrity of the word spoken; to make speech a tool for gaining, if need be over your rival's discomfiture, your own group or personal ends. In place of Truth commanding loyalty in its own right, standards of this other order thus creep into the common reckoning. Words, instead of being for the just expression of thought, become the servant of interest whereby men seek in aid of that interest to impose their will on events, or to induce, in hearers' and readers' thoughts, feelings and fancied wants that favour not the hearers' but their own desires and aims.

The foregoing has been written with the thought in mind that in the condition we have been describing the preacher today has a big chance. For the preacher is one who does not deflect Truth to ulterior issues, since Truth for him is the Divine Word which prospers not in something external to it but in that whereto *it* is sent (Isa. 55:11). In the office of the Word the preacher may be less or more effective; that he may be more, he learns communication and persuasion—not, however, that his art may beguile men agreeably to his self-concern or to objects he and others have concerted, but that the Word itself may find lodgment and "not return void," as is God's design for it.

Not that the preacher always honours this rule. The pulpit, as any agency that men employ, can be used for self-advantage or given over to "scheme and plan." And let partizan altercation between political groups or world statesmen be all that we have said, the *odium theologicum* of the annals of religious controversy can still give points to it. But we speak of the preacher as he properly is; and of this *odium* one can say that it now seems on the wane before a growing feeling for the irenic and the ecumenical. A communion in the unity of the Faith is reconciling deep conviction of reality in one's special spiritual heritage and acknowledgment of others' fidelity to the essential Word. All in all, by his Truth's intrinsic sufficiency, and its present acceptance as a rightful possession for all Christians, not for one as against another, the preacher in our day has a unique call and opportunity: to challenge present proclivities to ill-considered and reckless utterance with the purity of Truth, and with the purpose and purity of words in relation to it, and to teach through example a forthrightness blended with simplicity and diffidence in the enunciation of it, to an age that needs the lesson as few have done.

J.L.

Nels Ferré and Reinhold Niebuhr Discuss War

WALLACE GRAY

REINHOLD Niebuhr in his *Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic*[1] wrote: "It does seem that the unique resource of religion ought to give at least a touch of daring to the religious community and the religious leader." *A touch of daring!* That is really what this particular dialogue is about: Can a Christian display at least a touch (that is, a small but perceptible amount) of daring in confronting the vexing problem of war? If so how?

Scene One

The setting is Ferré's rather scrambled-looking study. The time is future—I don't know exactly when. Enter Ferré humming and singing enthusiastically; his voice is deep and unpredictable but admirably uninhibited and vibrant. He seems to be expecting someone; suddenly he interrupts his singing to exclaim, "I do hope Reinie won't use that word 'intolerable' this afternoon. It has such a note of finality about it, as though he meant to say, 'You'd better not try that line of argument further; you'll just look sillier and sillier if you do.' "

There is a knocking at the door, and Ferré cheerfully calls out, "Come in!"

Niebuhr enters and says, "I received your note just before I left home. Said you wanted to discuss something."

FERRÉ: Yes, I knew you were to be in the city today and hoped you would find time for a visit. Thanks for phoning me when you got in. I've been getting ready for you.

NIEBUHR (in mock alarm): That sounds ominous.

F: Not at all. I've been rethinking my pacifism.

Niebuhr eloquently withholds comment, though Ferré pauses.

F: And I've decided that I'm right after all.

N: Wonderful conclusion!

F: The strange part of it is that I find that in large measure you're right, too!

N: You'd better explain that.

F: I was reading in one of your books before you came. In it you said, "This is as good a time as any to make up my mind that I am done with

1. New York: Meridian Books, 1957, p. 131. Cited hereafter simply as *Leaves*.

the war business. . . . The time of man's ignorance God may wink at, but now He calls us all to repent. I am done with this business. I hope I can make that resolution stick."

N (quietly but with noticeable impatience): You remember the *quotation* very well. I suppose you also remember the date and title of the book in which you read the quotation?

F (enjoying himself and seemingly unaware of Niebuhr's question): Another statement in the same passage particularly appealed to me, "I am going to try to be a disciple of Christ, rather than a mere Christian, in all human relations and experiment with the potency of trust and love much more than I have in the past."

N (his poise regained): You're getting me in a very belligerent mood for the discussion of pacifism. The colossal impudence of you younger theologians! What nerve to quote the pacifist Niebuhr to the non-pacifist Niebuhr![2] Don't you realize that my works are like the Bible in that you can prove anything by quoting them? I've evolved a long way from the pacifism of 1929. In fact as early as 1932, I had made public my break with pacifism.

F: Oh, I find that I can even agree with you in your pre-pacifistic period. Then you criticized Christian ministers for donning the chaplain's uniform.[3] Much more recently I myself have written, "Under military auspices the chaplaincy is not a function of the true church. . . . If the Church with a clear stand on the whole issue of war were allowed to have men who are not part of the military machine go in to minister to the men in such areas as might be possible, ministers of Christ should be anxious to do what they could."[4]

N: You must not assume that just because my statement comes from my pre-pacifistic period I would approve it now. As a matter of fact both my statement and yours remind me of the danger of moralism and the puristic neglect of the doctrines of divine forgiveness and justification by faith. When a group of British air-force fliers in the Second World War refused to take communion because of their moral revulsion against what they had to do in the line of duty, they showed commendable sensitiveness of conscience, but they also showed what great suffering can be caused by the failure to understand justification.[5]

F: You once criticized Brunner for making justification by faith a way of escape from the sensitive conscience, and I think it only fair now for you to re-consider your own words. [Ferré takes a large volume from his shelves, searches its pages briefly, and then reads:] "Fortunately there have always been judges who have never heard of this doctrine of justification by faith and who have therefore been prompted by a sensitive

2. The passage in question is found in *Leaves*, p. 68 f.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
4. "The Christian Faith, the Church, and War," *Fellowship*, Vol. XI, No. 2 (February, 1945), p. 21.
5. Cf. *Christianity and Society*, Summer, 1943, p. 4, Editorial.

conscience to apply the law as justly as possible."[6] I would like to paraphrase this for our discussion. Fortunately there have always been Christians who have never felt excused by this doctrine and who have therefore been prompted by a sensitive conscience (and/or the Holy Spirit) to practice peacemaking as fully as possible.

N: That's good, though we still disagree on how "peacemaking" should be carried on politically and internationally. However, I must add a comment which to some extent admits the force of your criticism.

There is no area in which I feel a greater need for the doctrine of justification than with regard to my many changes on ethical and theological questions. I have been *so sure* on questions concerning which I have subsequently had to do an about-face. That is why I wrote in the 1956 preface to the paperback edition of *Leaves From the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic* (p. 8) some words which you may have overlooked:

> We are all, whatever our pretensions, the children of our day and hour. What we think of man and God, of sin and salvation, is partly prompted by the comparative comforts or discomforts in which we live. It is a very sobering reflection on the lack of transcendence of the human spirit over the flux of historical change.

Such reflection saves us from any pretensions that our ideas ultimately save either ourselves or others. We are saved by grace through faith. But I would like to confess at this point that I pressed this thought too far in my formula, "redeemed in principle but not in fact." That is inadequate because it does not describe the real sanctification which takes place when the soul turns from itself to God.[7]

F: Agreed! But going back to your earlier point, let us assume that you are a non-pacifist because of your immediate environment in time and space and that Pastor Niemöller is a pacifist because of his, isn't it at least meaningful to ask this question, "Which environment reflects most accurately man's *total* situation as of this moment—your comparatively comfortable one or his comparatively uncomfortable one?"

N: That is a meaningful question, though I doubt that either you, he, or I can answer it for sure. And I also doubt whether the contrast between comfortable and uncomfortable is as important in this connection as the contrast between living in America which has become a world power, and living in West Germany which no longer has to make so many of the ultimate political decisions; or at least where the individual citizen feels the pressure of being a pawn of other people's decisions more than the weight of his own responsibility. In 1918 I noted one effect of war on the supporters and participators: it reduced life to simple terms. Now I have decided that the horror of another possible war has again reduced life to

6. R. Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (New York: Scribner's, 1951), II, 196, n. 18.

7. Quoted, with minor changes, from Niebuhr's reply to critics in *Reinhold Niebuhr, His Religious, Social, and Political Thought*, edited by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (New York: Macmillan, 1956), p. 437. Cited hereafter as *Reinhold Niebuhr*.

too simple terms but this time for the pacifists as well as for the non-pacifists. Since you've been quoting that book so much, please give me a chance to defend myself from its own pages. [Ferré hands him the book and Niebuhr reads, inserting a couple of parenthetical comments as he goes along.]

> The modern man lives in such a complex world that one wonders how his sanity is maintained as well as it is. Every moral venture, every social situation and every practical problem involves a whole series of conflicting loyalties, and a man may never be quite sure that he is right in giving himself to the one as against the other. Shall he be just and sacrifice love? Shall he strive for beauty and do it by gaining the social privileges which destroy his sense of fellowship with the under-privileged? Shall he serve his family and neglect the state? Or be patriotic to the detriment of the great family of mankind? Shall he be diligent at the expense of the great cause in which he is interested? Shall he strive for the amenities of life and make life less robust in the process? Or shall he make courage the ultimate virtue and brush aside the virtues which a stable and therefore soft society has cultivated?
>
> Out of this mesh of conflicting claims, interests, loyalties, ideals, values and communities he is rescued by the psychology of war which gives the state [or, for the pacifist, humanity at large] at least a momentary priority over all other communities and which makes courage [or pacifism] the supreme virtue.
>
> Unfortunately, all these momentary simplifications of the complexities of life cannot be finally satisfying, because they do violence to life.[8]

F: Don't misunderstand me. When I earlier said that I had decided that both of us are right, I did not primarily have in mind your early writing. My allusion to it was partly facetious. Actually, much of your present criticism of pacifists and pacifism I find challenging and true. I do not have to go to your early writings to find that to which I can say Amen!

N: You sound almost unnaturally pacific for a pacifist. You remind me of what I said about the difficulty of being both kind and truthful. Let's assume that we shall love each other regardless of what is discussed or where we come out; surely that is a right starting point. Then let us in utter frankness tear down each other's idols.

F: I would suggest that instead of attacking each other's idols directly—one's idols are so hard to differentiate from one's self—that we examine the ideas or idols of another man.

N: Whom do you have in mind?

Ferré (picking up a copy of *The Christian Century*): Roland Bainton. He has recently written an article, "Christian Pacifism Reassessed,"[9] which touches most of the main issues.

N: Yes, I read that article a while back and am happy to debate it with you. Please lead the way.

F: To me it is significant that a responsible church historian such as Bainton

8. *Leaves*, p. 35 f.

9. *The Christian Century*, Vol. LXXV, No. 30 (July 23, 1958), pp. 847–49. Cited hereafter simply as Bainton.

would say that before the time of Constantine "No Christian writer whose work is extant condoned Christian participation in warfare."

N: It seems to me that Umphrey Lee in his book *The Historical Church and Modern Pacifism*[10] gives a sounder interpretation of the data.

F: I don't think so.

N: Well, if what you have just quoted is a fact, what is the reason for it?

F: Christians became more numerous than committed.

N: That doubtless is one reason. Another may be the way in which men who were responsible became at least nominally Christian and the way in which Christians were catapulted to positions of power and responsibility. For someone to shoulder responsibility is always necessary but also particularly tragic for the parvenu. Life is so much simpler when someone else has to be Emperor or President. One is always tempted to regard politicians and statesmen as stupid or immoral just because of the tragic dilemmas in which their power involves them. I find the scornful references to statesmen of our era distasteful (I almost said intolerable). Contemporary statesmen, with the exception of Mr. Churchill, are not very bright or great. But it is just possible that they cannot follow their critics' utopian advice because they are responsible, and not because they are stupid or lacking in scruples.[11] All this leads me to ask, Would you ever consent to serve as President?

F: Yes, apart from my Swedish birth! Bryan, as you know, resigned as Secretary of State in 1917 because he was a pacifist. I could serve as a policeman but not fight other policemen. I do not think the church has ever been "near perfect" but, for over two hundred years, she refused to accept war. But the Church always accepted civil power.[12] In other words, I'm not a "pacifist" except in the case of war. I believe in the need for constructive force.[13]

N: Nevertheless, your position means that you would be debarred either from attaining or holding office. So you can be more "Christian" than any president can ever be simply because you can't or won't bear a president's responsibility?

F: I didn't say that.

N: Nevertheless, it appears to me that your very limited concept of Christian citizenship is one of the weaknesses of your pacifist position. When the state has to exercise its admitted central function as guarantor of order, then the state is abandoned by pacifists on the ground that the Christian has a higher loyalty and code of conduct. The tension with the world is thus narrowed and over-simplified to this single issue.[14]

10. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1943. This book was reviewed favourably by Niebuhr in *Christianity and Society*, Spring, 1943, p. 39.

11. Adapted, beginning with "I find . . . ," from Niebuhr's "A Century of Cold War," *The New Leader*, August 2, 1954, p. 13. Minor revisions were made for the purposes of the dialogue.

12. From a letter to the author, dated September 2, 1959.

13. From another letter, dated December 22, 1959.

14. Quoted in part, with necessary changes, from "God Wills both Justice and Peace," by Bishop Angus Dun and Reinhold Niebuhr, *Christianity and Crisis*, Vol. XV (May 16, 1955), p. 76. Cited hereafter as Dun and Niebuhr.

Non-pacifist Christians, unlike pacifists, have no simple guide. However, they are unwilling to surrender the decision as to the justness of a particular war to the state.

F: Your reference to a just war reminds me of Bainton's comment that that concept was borrowed not from Christ or Paul but from the Greeks via Cicero.[15]

N: Perhaps the Greeks had a greater contribution to make with regard to man's horizontal or political relationships than the early Christians. Perhaps the Christian contribution has been so heavily in the direction of man's vertical relationship that the Greeks, or someone like them, must be leaned on to supplement the vertical approach. As I recall, Bainton bases part of his argument for pacifism on the Greek approach to war and peace. He must think they have something to offer.

F: He does and so do I. But he and I would dispute the appropriateness of trying to apply the "just war" concept to any wars which may become nuclear or biological—and nearly all imaginable future wars may do that.

N: I'd like to recall some words which Bishop Dun and I addressed to that argument. We pointed out that the Amsterdam statement, "War is contrary to the will of God," was approved by a predominantly non-pacifist group. We explained that those words do not mean that the aggressor and the victim are alike condemned. Degrees of guilt, we said, are not "wiped out by the increasingly catastrophic character of modern war." But our "clincher" was this: "The notion that the excessive violence of atomic warfare has ended the possibility of a just war does not stand up. . . . The consequences of a successful defense are fearful to contemplate but the consequences of a successful aggression, with tyrannical monopoly of the weapons of mass destruction, are calculated to be worse."[16]

F: Do you recall what your colleague, John C. Bennett, has said to that particular argument.

N: No.

F: To me it seems the knock-out punch: "The survivors of a nuclear war are not likely to thank us for preserving their freedom."[17]

N: Of course he's right, though it may still be our obligation to run at least a small risk of nuclear war on behalf of people who are and will be ungrateful. Our obligation is surely not determined by other people's gratitude or lack of it.

F: No, but doesn't this line of reasoning become rather paternalistic? One wonders if Uncle Sam should be renamed "Father Sam." The fact that God may not exactly will that the U.S. replace him as the judge of all the earth seems to elude some of you non-pacifists.

N: And the fact that God may have delegated even more terrible responsi-

15. Bainton, p. 849.
16. Dun and Niebuhr, p. 78.
17. *The Christian Century*, August 22, 1956, p. 572.

bility to statemen than we non-pacifists have accurately or fully described seems to have eluded some of you pacifists.

F: You have given the so-called "realistic" appraisal of the situation. Bainton, in the section of his article entitled "The Balance of Terror" (pp. 847–848), complains that the realistic appraisal is not realistic enough:

> What all this means for ourselves the realists must realize. Over two-thirds [three-fourths is nearer the figure] of our national income must go for the expenses of war—past, present and future, hot and cold. Our young men must be diverted for two years from farm, factory and office to the barracks and the armorer's forge.

I would add that "realism" too often discounts love and reason as forces which actually operate in history along with (and sometimes more effectively than) force.[18] Man is not totally evil, even in his power politics. A house built of basically bad material would collapse. History stands because its heart is not conflict but community. The claims that our rulers represent us rightly only when they are totally selfish on our behalf is a caricature of government.[19]

And, as Bainton explains, the danger of the situation encouraged by "realism" is not static. During the Second World War only 5% of the bombers got through to England, but "5% with hydrogen bombs could pulverize the islands." The best brains, therefore, if the realists are right, must be diverted to developing even more terrifying weapons and ever more expensive (and futile) plans of "defense." Look at these lines of Bainton's article.

Niebuhr silently reads:

> If atomic warfare should thus [by defense] be eliminated, it might be replaced by bacteriological warfare, and we might then emerge from our burrows and equip ourselves with hypodermics. We shall need also to inoculate our livestock and treat our fields. And if this were to succeed, then poison gas might be revived and we should revert to the goggle stage of civilization.

N: The point is that we can avoid the *use* of such weapons only if we have them and their counter-measures (if they can be found) and only if we are wise enough not to stumble into war and strong enough not to tempt the Russians to embark upon it.[20]

F: That is certainly not Bainton's point, though it may be yours. Bainton believes as I do, that nothing is gained by an ever-intensifying "balance of terror." The dilemma it creates is that even if war is temporarily averted by it, internal collapse is brought that much nearer by the attrition of the

18. N. Ferré, "Contemporary Civilization and Christianity," *Christendom*, XII (Autumn, 1947), p. 438 f.
19. N. Ferré, "The Distinctive Dimension of Christian Social Action," *Studies in Christian Social Commitment: A Christian Pacifist Symposium*, edited by John Ferguson (London: Independent Press, 1954), p. 97.
20. Cf. "A Century of Cold War," p. 14.

nation's morale and economy and by the usurpation of the very freedoms which the "defense effort" is supposedly defending. Internal problems become so hopeless that anything, even war, is for many people preferable.

N: You pacifists have regularly painted the consequences of defense too blackly. You have assumed that either war or internal collapse is bound to come with any armaments race. Thus you have oversimplified history. No event in history is the logically necessary consequence of other events in a scientifically predictable fashion. Actually, the most destructive weapons of all history—the atomic and hydrogen bombs—seem to have had as much deterrent as destructive effect.

F: The invention of gun powder did not deter wars noticeably, nor did airplanes, nor did poison gas. And has any brief period of time in world history been more filled with war or the threat of war than the last quarter-century? Weren't our weapons *big* enough yet?

N: Much of this is due more to rising nationalism and to the ambitious hopes of have-not people than to any weapons-race. I believe that today there are two facts which we overlook to our peril. One is that neither side really wants the ultimate conflict. The other is that neither side will sacrifice great strategic advantages for "the easing of tension."[21] Therefore, military power is indispensable as an *ultima ratio*, but it never can compensate for the lack of basic moral and political strength, which must be the chief weapon in any cause.[22]

F: Why do you say that? Please illustrate the effect of greater moral strength in our nation.

N: Well, for example, we are almost universally suspected of being more intent on assuring victory in a possible conflict than in avoiding it.[23] Moral and political keenness would perhaps help us allay that fearful suspicion.

F: I don't see how your "realism" is compatible with what you are saying now, but go ahead.

N: While I was speaking with a group of French friends in the early fifties, they put the reason for their and Europe's misgivings about America in succinct terms. They said, "You are building up vast armaments. Modern armaments are subject to rapid obsolescence. Your day of temptation will come in two or three years. [On the length of time they were wrong.] You will be fully armed and faced with the prospect of new taxation burdens in untold future years to replace the outmoded arms. The question is whether you have the moral resources and political maturity to resist the temptation to a preventive war in that situation."[24]

F: I believe that you have become so preoccupied with the political aspect

21. Quoted (beginning with "One") from Niebuhr's article, "Geneva: Preface and Problems," *Christianity and Crisis*, XIX (June 8, 1959), p. 79.
22. R. Niebuhr, "American Leadership," *ibid.*, XIV (October 18, 1954), p. 129.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
24. R. Niebuhr, *The Moral Implications of Loyalty to the United Nations* (Hazen Pamphlet No. 29), p. 12 (with minor changes).

of the war problem that you have neglected to push your understanding of this moral aspect deep enough. For example, the "realistic" counsel which you have given as a theologian has helped lull many to sleep in militaristic complacency and has even had repercussions in international politics as your own story bears out. You suggest that we need to build larger and larger armaments at the same time that you hope we will allay the fears of all who suspect that we intend sometime to use them! How this is to be done is a mystery, but a deeper problem concerns the morality from a Christian standpoint of involvement in such casuistry.[25]

N: I don't see the casuistry (or if I do I should prefer to call it the tragically necessary casuistry) of responsibility in contrast to the more reprehensible casuistry of irresponsibility and isolationism. One point I think Bainton makes quite well and soundly: "Let the realists therefore recognize that the course on which we are embarked bids fair if not to extinguish the species then at any rate to wreck the amenities of life" (p. 848). I recognize this as a real possibility. It is the risk we must take as a mature and powerful nation, if we are to discharge the responsibility which goes along with our new power. And I take it that no Christian would turn away from a course of action or urge others to turn away just because it "bids fair . . . to wreck the amenities of life."

F: Right! But, as Bainton says, much more disturbing than the inconvenience of protracted cold war, from the Christian point of view, is "what we are prepared to do to our enemies." "After a hundred million Americans had been killed, we would destroy a hundred million Russians in an act of massive retaliation" (p. 848).

N: We are obliged to make that threat in order that it may not have to be fulfilled.

F: Then why make the threat? Assuming the threat is not idle, Bainton correctly asks, "Can this be described as Christian behavior? 'Vengeance is mine. I will repay,' saith the Lord."

N: I had forgotten that Bainton took such a legalistic line.

F: He points out that if this is legalism, then Paul led the way in it by *quoting* these very words from the Old Testament.

N: It is Bainton's political use of an individualistic verse which fails to convince me.

F: Of course Jeremiah was urging political action when he told the Jews to surrender to the Babylonians without fighting. Are you sure he was wrong?

N: Are you sure he was right? Besides, Judah at that time was more comparable to modern Hungary than to the U.S., so perhaps he *was* right; if so, this would have precisely nothing to do with the issue at stake, namely, what U.S. policy should be.

25. Cf. Ferré's article, "Contemporary Civilization and Christianity," p. 438 f.: "The illusion that physical force—economic, political, or military—is to be equated with historic power subtly paralyzes our respect for truth and our use of it, while effectively aiding the powers of evil."

F: Except that what the Bible says about individuals cannot be completely compartmentalized away from man's social and political responsibility. Bainton reminds us that Machiavelli urged your same argument against any attempt to apply Christian ethics directly to politics.

N: That may simply mean that Machiavelli saw some things more clearly than Christians such as Bainton. Doesn't he believe in loyalty to the state as God's best instrument for the preservation of order? Is he an absolute pacifist and therefore an anarchist? And where do you stand? I thought you said we agreed on something!

F: Bainton does believe in the state and is not an absolute pacifist. Neither am I. I agree with him when he writes:

> Even the exercise of the police power requires that the gentler virtues be regarded as attitudes rather than as acts. But in the situation with which we are confronted of massive retaliation, can the gentler virtues survive even as attitudes? One may love a criminal at the same time that one restrains him from a crime. But to annihilate a hundred million people in retaliation for the annihilation of another hundred million people already dead and beyond restoration, is hard to square with love, long-suffering, gentleness and meekness, indeed even with temperance. Such sublime casuistry was not attempted by Machiavelli (p. 848).

N: I am glad you two do not take the absolute pacifist position. That *is* indefensible. But surely you do not follow Bainton in all of the rest of his statements in this quotation?

F: No, I think the Christian policeman who restrains a criminal is displaying Christian love in act as well as in attitude. Love operates with strictness, even harshness, as well as permissively and gently. Your approach has certainly helped me to accept and stress that point.

N: But aren't you disturbed about the tendency of Bainton's pacifism to limit the use of force to internal affairs? Don't criminal nations need restraint as well as criminal individuals? Isn't it casuistry of another kind to ask men to restrain gangsters but to leave it to God to restrain tyrannical nations?

F: *I* did not say that men have no responsibility to restrain such nations. Bainton, so far as I know, would not say this either without qualification. We simply raise the question as to whether one nation, namely ours, should presume to take the place of a representative world government. Of course, such a government would need to have force at its disposal and would need to use it from time to time.

N: Until we can have world government, then, you are willing to leave questions of international order to the Russians and to God? When Koreas occur or recur you would simply say: "Too bad! But such tragedies will be ironed out in heaven! We had better not interfere." And I suppose you would condemn both the U.S. for "unilateral" action in the Korean affair and the U.N. for permitting itself to be the "front" for a U.S. war. Of course, you would also have to condemn all fellow Christians who con-

curred in the acceptance of the U.N. Commission's report which branded the Communists as the aggressors. Or at least you would criticize the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches for urging support for the collective measures undertaken by the U.N. In other words, unless a police action could clearly and unambiguously conform to your utopian picture of "world government," you would have nothing to do with it. If you had been living on the frontier I suppose you would have condemned the vigilante committees as severely as the outlaws because neither had official and representative governmental sanction!

F (who has become more and more restless under this lecture): Now, now, Reinie, don't get carried away with what you *think* I might say or with what you *think* the absurd consequences of my position are! I want to clear up just one point in what you have said, the point about condemning and criticizing. If a Christian, or any other person, is convinced that more can be conserved or created by war than without it, naturally he must follow his conscience in this regard, and no one is to judge his decision, as far as his spirit goes, though we can disagree as far as the objective analysis goes.[26]

N: It's the objective analysis which, I believe, is on my side.

F: All right, let's hear some of it.

N: I notice in the article which you have there [Niebuhr takes it] that Bainton raises the realistic question well; but I do not believe he satisfactorily answers it. He explains that if we eliminate our willingness to kill a hundred million in retaliation, "there is no use threatening to do so. And if we do not threaten to do so, there is no point in being ready" (p. 848).

I think that last statement might be challenged, but the rest of the analysis stands valid without it. He continues, "And then not only our nuclear tests but our whole nuclear program must be abandoned. Whether without it there would be any point in the rest of our armaments is doubtful." He points out that though we might seek to keep a war limited by having and using only limited means, there is no guarantee that an opponent with the means to wage unlimited war would feel any compunction about doing so. Now my question to you: What then would happen if we disarmed, at least nuclearly?

F: The two possibilities are clear enough: war or peace.

N: But don't you believe that the possibility or probability of war would be heightened by our *weakness*?

F: I wouldn't want to predict. Nor am I too much concerned with what the Russians might do or any such questions. The main thing is to know that war is no solution to our problems, that there must come a new age of religious reorientation and remotivation, that we must work for world law and world rule, which is more than international law and world police. In the meantime we have to negotiate and find whatever ways we

26. This last sentence is quoted almost verbatim from Ferré's *Christianity and Society* (New York: Harper, 1950), p. 203.

can to arrive at this goal. The Church as a church should throw itself thoroughly into it, and Christians should above all believe God, who acts in history and responds to faith far beyond our understanding.[27] However, to answer the question as you put it: Perhaps Bainton is right when he suggests that "one possibility is that the Russians would follow suit" if we disarmed.

N: Such naive optimism!

F: Wait a minute! Aren't you the one who was castigating the pacifists for simplifying history? How do you non-pacifists conveniently know what is most probable when that is to your advantage in argument and yet you criticize the pacifists for warning about the dangerous consequences of the armaments race? [Ferré rushes on heatedly without waiting for an answer.] You masterfully describe the complexity of human motivation and response and yet you blandly assume or seem to assume that you know what our military weakness would lead to. I might add that you would need godlike wisdom which you have always claimed to lack, if you were to weigh all the facts so as to accurately determine whether or not we should enter a just war—whatever that might be.

N: Don't you ever run out of breath? [Both laugh, but Ferré proceeds, though more calmly.]

F: Bainton rightly asserts that no one could be sure the Russians would not disarm if we did. He writes—well, you read it for yourself beginning with "Such an . . ." in the paragraph you quoted from a minute ago.

Niebuhr (reading aloud): "Such an experiment has never been made in history. It might have astounding effects. Admittedly there is no power in weakness, but there is moral power in the voluntary renunciation of strength. If we, being able to continue our armaments program, should of our own accord render ourselves defenseless, the Russians might with relief abandon their defenses."

F: Well, what do you think?

N: I think the whole idea, first of our "rendering ourselves defenseless" and, second, of the Russians following suit is so unlikely as to hardly be worth discussing. But remember that when I say a thing is unlikely I do not mean it won't or couldn't happen. However, in this instance, Bainton's thinking is afflicted, I suspect, with the disease of "Gandhi-itis" which so many of our idealistic political and religious theorists have caught.

It seems to me that you are neglecting one small item—history. The theme of Churchill's *The Gathering Storm*, as I recall, is "How the English speaking peoples through their unwisdom, carelessness, and good nature allowed the wicked to rearm." In the preface of that book Churchill tells how Roosevelt asked what the Second World War should be called and how he (Churchill) said at once: "The Unnecessary War."

27. Quoted, with minor changes, from a letter to the author, dated December 22, 1959.

He explained that "there never was a war more easy to stop than that which has just wrecked what was left of the world from the previous struggle."

Pacifists assume that secular-minded people will always jump at the drop of a hat to intervene forcefully on behalf of the oppressed. Even if that were always true, which Churchill's statements show was not the case in one important crisis, still John Dewey's quip would provide the necessary criticism: "While the saints engage in pious introspection, burly sinners run the world."

F: I recognize that, even for me, who stand at the opposite pole from Dewey and Churchill, it would be much harder to be a conscientious objector in Finland (or in Sweden if Sweden were trying to defend Finland) than to do so in Nazi Germany—even though the consequences of conscientious objection were far more dangerous physically in Germany.

There is an existential gap here; no mere thinking can cover it. My decision is, therefore, not altogether satisfactory either to reason or to feeling. In leaving the defense of the more just state to God and to those still on the level of creation, I presuppose an order within which I can operate and for which I have not, in one respect, fought. But I must make a concrete decision and, representing the Church of God, the ground and goal of history, a community without which genuine peace can never be found, I must be true to God's revelation and redemption in the fullness of time. But history itself is now helping to fill up the gap of my position.

N: I am certain that an ethic of love which dispenses with the structures and commitments of justice is ultimately irrelevant to the collective life of man. I do not think that Gandhi has taught us anything new on this perplexing problem. He made the pretension of sainthood into an instrument of political power. That may have seemed plausible in the environment of India, but it must be ultimately intolerable anywhere.[28]

F: I wish you hadn't used that word.

N: What word?

F: "Intolerable." It makes me see red, particularly in this connection.

N: Why?

F: Your dismissal of Gandhi seems to me to be a rather bad rationalization. To say that one whose fruits of saintliness were so apparent "made the pretension of sainthood" and that his methods, though they might work in India, are "ultimately intolerable anywhere" seems to me an attempt to evade the significance of the successful application of Jesus' so-called "individual" ethic to social problems.

N: The very obviousness of Gandhi's "sainthood" is what caused me to use the word "pretension." It was *too* obvious; it almost reminds me of the Pharisees.

F: Certainly that's not your ultimate judgment to make.

N: And I didn't make it ultimately.

28. Cf. Niebuhr's "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," *Reinhold Niebuhr*, p. 450.

F: You said "*ultimately* intolerable anywhere."

N: Yes and I think I then used the word in a sense different from what you are trying to pin on me now.

F: Be that as it may, aren't you presuming to judge the inner sincerity of Gandhi? And isn't that a difficult matter to appraise by sheer objective analysis?

Niebuhr (laughing, after showing the stress of being pushed): You not only lead up to a point and make it, but you keep stabbing one with it until the blood comes. Very unpacifistic!

Ferré (also softening up a little): Why not use a good point to the maximum? I am even tempted to argue this Gandhi business a little further with you.

N: That's all right with me.

F: If you alone had influenced Martin Luther King, the Montgomery bus boycott might never have been carried off successfully and non-violently. Fortunately you did not have the sole influence on King (though you had and continue to have a lot); Gandhi furnished King with a method which worked, though he was realistic enough to realize that it might not work. This proves that non-violence can be introduced effectively into the West, into social conflict, and . . .

N (interrupting): But not into international conflict, particularly where Communists are involved. Also, "effectively" does not necessarily mean the same as "morally."

F: That's right. But I think that King's combination of morality with effectiveness does show that your polemic against the naively optimistic use of Gandhi led you to overstate the case when you said his method "must be ultimately intolerable anywhere." Perhaps you need to read King's book *Stride Toward Freedom* (New York: Harper, 1958).

N: You've gotten me way off the track.

F: Maybe you need to be on the track I've put you on! However, go ahead with what you were going to say.

N: Bainton says that if we dropped our defenses, the Russians might do likewise. Then he says, "On the other hand, they might not. They might simply sneer at our decadence and take over the world," which would tragically involve more free nations than just our own. It is this possibility which I think we must consider most seriously.

F: Bainton considers it seriously when he concludes the section you have been quoting with the words: "For a Christian to live under the Russians is not easy, but it is not impossible; and rather than train ourselves for war, we should do better to discipline ourselves for resistance to tyranny from within."

N: As Truman used to say, "That's hogwash!" There is a duty higher than the duty not to kill.

F: A duty not to be killed, I suppose.

N: No, a duty to defend the weak and innocent. That applies to nations as well as individuals and it can't be done without a willingness to kill. Do you know who would suffer first and most from a policy of massive non-resistance on our part?

F: Western Europe and England?

N: Yes, just as they did when we took so long to unite sufficiently to enter the Second World War. Furthermore, for a state to lay down its defenses is a contradiction in terms. A state by definition is an organization which at least is supposed to protect its citizenry. So morally we are bound to use our power for the defense of other weaker states just as, by nature, we are bound to use it for ourselves.

F: The answer to both needs, defense of others and self-defense, is not the perpetuation of the balance of terror between powers but an effective world government. History is pushing us rapidly beyond the time when national sovereignty is a luxury we can afford. Perhaps our only alternative to global destruction is global government.

N: For you to say that is nearly intolerable.[29]

Ferré is ready to protest but nods for Niebuhr to continue.

N: I have four questions for anyone proposing "world government" as the quick and easy solution to all our problems:

1. Has he any evidence that the nations, many of which are still celebrating their recently acquired independence, would welcome a supra-national sovereignty?

2. How does he know that the fear of American power, the envy of American wealth and the resistance of American leadership would be mitigated by a tighter constitutional arrangement? Minorities would be more threatened by the majority in one efficient organization.

3. Would not "world government" for the non-communist world destroy the present bridge between the two worlds which we have in the United Nations? Would such an eventuality really protect us against the dreaded atomic conflict?

4. How can we speak of effective world government when there is neither sufficient community nor enough organs of communication available to make election contests across national boundaries possible?[30]

Because of the negative answers required by these questions, I believe that the possibility of world government is practically nil, so you see what is left according to your posing of the problem. Your prediction is so pessimistic that I find it, I repeat, *intolerable.*

Ferré starts to respond but instead turns toward the radio which has quietly been droning away as the two men talk. A music program has just been interrupted. The men strain to catch what the announcer is saying. Ferré

29. Cf. Niebuhr's reaction to Lewis Mumford's similar statement, "A Century of Cold War," pp. 12–14.

30. These questions in a slightly different form are found in *ibid.*, p. 12 f.

reaches over and nervously twists a dial; he turns it too far so that the voice booms:

> . . . Dropped on twelve Eastern and other cities, including New York City, Washington, d.c., and Chicago. Another such bomb is expected momentarily in this area, but we shall continue broadcasting as long as possible. . . .

Scene Two

The setting for Scene Two is Heaven. Ferré and Niebuhr are still seated in an office which is remarkably similar in appearance to the other one. They seem to be waiting for something. Niebuhr listlessly runs his finger up and down the large pages of the magazine they were just discussing. Suddenly his finger comes to a stop and he speaks, but without enthusiasm.

N: Bainton was right on one thing: "To hope to make enough pacifists to stop a third conflict is fatuous."

F: I'm sorry to have to agree, but that seems true, at least as things turned out.

N: I wonder about the family.

F: So do I. Perhaps someone will let us know shortly.

A young lady who had been Ferré's secretary years earlier at Vanderbilt enters; the men rise.

Ferré exclaims: Lorine! Where in heaven's name did you come from?

Lorine: New York. I was visiting there. [Continues after a somewhat awkward silence] I have a Heavenly Word for you two. You are to prepare for glorification.

N: Oh *no*! When do we learn about our families?

L: After glorification. You can bear it better then.

F: How long does it take?

L: I don't know. I haven't been glorified myself. I got here just shortly before you did and they pressed me into service. So many have to be processed because of It.

N: Where do we go?

L: Nowhere—yet. First you are to finish your discussion.

Both men in chorus: I don't want to!

L (smiling): I'm sorry; the Heavenly Word says nothing about your wants. It just says, "Have them finish the discussion."

Exit.

N: I must say this puts things in a different light.

F: Not entirely. It will be interesting to find out what if anything happened to Russia.

N: I think I know.

F: So do I. Do you think it right?

N (jumping up and pounding on the desk): I DON'T KNOW. I DON'T

KNOW. [Subsiding somewhat as he sits down again]: Sometimes I wonder if God knows.

F: Coming back to Bainton, he says your proposal to defend the weaker states is impractical. Of course, as things turned out we were attacked directly and first (or at least not after Europe was attacked). But for sake of the argument. . . .

N (sarcastically): Yes, the argument. By all means let's get on with the argument! [Somewhat more mildly]: This is awfully trivial, don't you think?

F: It would seem from the Heavenly Word that our discussion has some importance still.

N: Yes, excuse me. You were saying . . . ?

F: For the sake of our argument, let's suppose we have heavily armed our weaker allies.

N: No need to suppose. We did just that.

F: Now the question is: Does this in any sense defend them?

N: Of course, but what does Bainton say?

F: He says, "No." "If we plant bases or troops on their soil we turn them immediately into targets" (p. 849).

N: So?

F: He continues, "The only possibility of defending them and at the same time leaving them intact would be to do nothing of a military nature on their own soil, but to resort to massive annihilation of the Russians on their own territory. And thus we are brought back again to the expedient from which we recoiled." Excuse me, I should amend—"the expedient from which Bainton and I recoiled."

N: Good grief! Are you still going to assume your pious superiority because of your pacifism? Besides, we didn't strike Russia first or because of her attack on our allies but because of her unprovoked attack on us.

F: Massive retaliation is massive retaliation.

N (pulling the hair on the back of his head): Where did they say we were? It seems almost like hell. I believe I prefer Bainton's statement about the fatuousness of making enough pacifists to avert a third conflict, to all the other things we have discussed this afternoon—or is it evening? Or what in the world is it anyway?

F: Let's call it a timeless discussion.

N: "Eternal" would be more accurate.

F (laughing with Niebuhr): I'm glad there's laughter in heaven. I didn't expect it to be of this kind though.

N: Remember, we're not glorified yet.

F: I doubt if we'll ever be at this rate. You accuse Bainton and me of unrealism, but the rest of the paragraph from which you quoted is, I think, the epitome of realism. Listen [Ferré reads]:

> One comes to the conclusion that the Christian ethic is at variance with the major part of our national policy, and we can be confident that our

national policy is not going to be revised in accord with the Christian ethic. Pacifism is not a political strategy. No nation has ever adopted it as a policy, and one may doubt that any nation ever will. The majority of the churches do not recommend it, and probably they will not. Pacifism in the time of its greatest strength in the United States and Britain—that is, in the period between the two world wars—was not sufficiently potent to avert the Second World War. If it was not strong enough then, it certainly is not strong enough now. To hope to make enough pacifists to stop a third conflict is fatuous (p. 849).

N: Amen to the whole thing!

F: Do you realize that "Amen" is the most religious word you've said since we've come up here?

N (who is so excited about the discussion once more, that he ignores the facetiousness, proceeds): I like the statement, "Pacifism is not a political strategy," even more than the last sentence.

F: Whatever led you to believe that we pacifists were promoting a political strategy?

N: Merely this whole discussion!

F: I'll admit that Bainton's emphasis on national and international affairs sounds as though he is greatly interested in the political scene. And he is, but not because he believes that pacifism at present is directly applicable to international politics.

N: Why then?

F: Because only thus can he discuss the question of what is ultimately *right*. There is some value, certainly for Christians, in determining what is right, quite apart from questions of "Will it be done?" or even "Can it be widely practised?" But also he believes as I do that "Pacifism is a witness, a worthy and much needed witness, but it is not a strategy. If a third world war is stopped it will be not because of pacifists but because of peace-minded nonpacifists. There are many of them and their hands should be strengthened." All Christians are non-participants, if not in war then at least in hate.

N (sadly): Now we are communicating—a pacifist and a nonpacifist—but it's too late.

F: Of course I would wish to fill out Bainton's discussion with the doctrine of the reconciliatory nature of the Church and the love-function of the Holy Spirit. Your theology was deficient here, I feel. God works on two levels—the level of creation as exemplified in the state and the level of redemption and reconciliation as exemplified in the true Church.[31]

I think that if you had understood the Church and the Holy Spirit better, you would have handled the question of compromise more satisfactorily. Obviously no one, pacifist or not, can divorce himself from all the evil consequences of his acts, even his good acts. Jesus' uncompromis-

31. Ferré shows the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Christian and of the Christian to creation and redemption and to such historical instruments for peace as the U.N. in his contribution to *Studies in Christian Social Commitment*, e.g., p. 105.

ing facing of the cross had as a side-effect the suicide of Judas, but we certainly shouldn't say that Jesus was guilty of murder. Pacifism as a national policy, it is true, *might* have led to the destruction of our nation even sooner than the other course did. Since that is a real possibility the pacifist should not even object to being treated as a traitor. From one viewpoint—the level of creation—he is.

N: It sounds a little martyrish to talk thus.

F: Perhaps you have forgotten how pacifists were sometimes treated. Please look at those two paragraphs from Hershberger's book:

> They were frequently roughly handled by petty officers who had little sympathy for their scruples. . . . In all the camps they were subject to ridicule and were considered fair game for any army officer or Y.M.C.A. secretary who cared to take a hand in converting them. Even some of the higher officials in some of the camps, being entirely out of sympathy with the liberal policy of the war department, permitted unnecessary abuse of the conscientious objectors, as those were called who refused to work in the camps even at noncombatant work, and usually refused to don the uniform. In Camp Funston the worst abuses prevailed, and two officers, a major and a captain, were removed for negligence in permitting rough treatment of the conscientious objectors. Some of these men were brutally handled in the guardhouse; they were bayonetted, beaten and tortured by forms of the water cure; eighteen men one night were aroused from their sleep and held under cold showers until one became hysterical. At another time a man had the hose played upon his head until he became unconscious. The war department finally was forced to interfere a short time before the armistice....
>
> In other camps similar abuse prevailed, carried on usually by under officers for the purpose of breaking down the morale of the conscientious objector, or perhaps to retaliate for his refusal to obey peremptory military orders. Men were forced to stand at attention, sometimes with outstretched arms for hours and days at a time on the sunny or cold side of their barracks, exposed to the inclemencies of the weather as well as to the jeers and taunts of their fellows until they could stand no longer; chased across the fields at top speed until they fell down exhausted, followed by their guards on motorcycles; occasionally tortured by mock trials, in which the victim was left under the impression to the very last that unless he subjected to the regulations the penalty would be death. Every conceivable device—ridicule, torture, offer of promotion, and other tempting inducements were resorted to in order to get them to give up their convictions; but with only few exceptions the religious objectors refused to compromise with their consciences.[32]

N: Yes, I had forgotten about that. But perhaps you have forgotten the suffering of enslaved peoples, or the sacrifices some men have made as soldiers in order to break the chains and still the whips of tyrants. Agape, I think, was not cancelled by the fact that such soldiers employed violence. Christian conscience could lead a soldier to give himself to the task of making human relations a little more tolerable and slightly more just.[33]

32. Guy Franklin Hershberger, *War, Peace, and Nonresistance* (Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 1946), p. 119 f.

33. See John C. Bennett's excellent article, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Social Ethics," in *Reinhold Niebuhr*. Pp. 58 and 64–71 are particularly helpful on the question of war.

F: No, I did not forget the courage or self-sacrifice of some soldiers, and I know that what hurts the pacifist the most is for him to realize that innocent people in his own country and in other countries may suffer more, at least temporarily, because of his pacifism than he does. Nevertheless, the pacifist must make an existential commitment and trust God's love to cover unintended evil side-effects or, what is more important, to take them over into his larger plan and transform them so that, while still evil as ends, they may be good as means.

N: You're getting breathless again, even in Heaven! I note with interest that you, too, fall back on the doctrine of justification. Also, you are still speaking of pacifism as though it were even in heaven a live option.

F: I should hope that in heaven peace is an especially live option!

N (ignoring the retort): While I cannot go along with your analysis and critique of me all the way, I can say that as a way of *witness* I see (now that I am in heaven) more and more advantages to the pacifist position. Perhaps if more people had borne this witness, the Church would at least have been stronger and clearer as a Christian fellowship, even if war were not averted—as I believe it would not have been.

But was the Church ever really or actually the kind of fellowship which you, Nels, have pictured?

F: Since we don't know about the heavenly Church yet, I can do no better than continue to talk as though peacemaking is still a "live option" on the earth we both know. [He opens a book.] Though it now seems too late to do much about it, I still believe what I wrote on the Church in *Christianity and Society*, p. 208:

> The Church as a total sociological institution, to be sure, is now slow and conservative. We must not pin too much hope on that body without, nevertheless, underestimating what can happen, even through it, if prophets are raised up and followed, first even by the faithful few, and then by the many. The Church is now, however, too feeble, as a whole, even to become one Church in the sense of overcoming its senseless denominational sovereignties. We must not be overoptimistic about the Church as a social and political example to a divided and dying civilization. We must, rather, find the power of fellowship, through concern for the world, borne high on faith in God.

Lorine enters and says: This way please.

Scene Three

Since Ferré and Niebuhr and the reader may not like such concrete imaginings of history and heaven as are found in the preceding pages of this dialogue, I herewith present a third scene which is not intended to supplant the second but to supplement it. What would our conversationalists say if they suddenly awoke from Scene Two as from a very realistic dream? At least what might they say about the "heavenly discourse" which I have attributed to them? Let us see.

N: I'm not sure now that I shall make any concession, in heaven or on earth, about the Church bearing a clearer witness through pacifism. Being a pacifist is perhaps beset with even more illusions than being a repentant non-pacifist.

F (fingering and opening a small book): Frank Laubach has correctly pointed out that there are two kinds of repentance. "Judas," he says, "repented and committed suicide. It would be easier for us to say our prayers and repent and continue the way we have been going until our folly results in the death of hope than to repent in *deed* and not in word only."[34]

N: But it's the choice of appropriate deeds which is the problem. I agree with Churchill who says that patience and persistent good will could have averted many wars. You and I can mutually endorse deeds of patience. But I sympathize with Churchill, which I wonder if you do, when he says with regard to the Quakers and the Sermon on the Mount, "It is not on these terms that Ministers assume their responsibility of guiding states and protecting the lives and freedom of subjects."[35]

Since we still don't know what course history is to take, the pursuit of proximate, realistic goals, such as Churchill emphasized, seems to me potentially productive of more good than your course. I might be a pacifist and call others to hear this witness if I knew that the perfect tragedy were upon us. But I do not and so I will not.

F: Perhaps you should assume the end is here (not an altogether improbable or unchristian assumption) in order that you might take a more radical course to help defer it!

To quote Bainton once more:

> But now let us return to Christianity and remind ourselves that to survive is not the chief end of man. Christianity has been called by its critics the cult of death. Certainly it is not the cult of life on [just] any terms. The realists tell us that if we are not powerful we shall be at a disadvantage. Of course we shall. When were the scrupulous not at a disadvantage in dealing with the unscrupulous? (p. 849)

Perhaps you, of all people, are too optimistic about proximate goals and limited strivings. *You* an optimist!

N: I am willing to be called an optimist if I may set the context for it in my own words.

F: I am eager to hear you describe yourself optimistically.

N: Perhaps "meliorist" describes me more accurately. William James once defined the requirements for any great moral endeavour as: (*a*) Resoluteness in the original commitment to the cause or discipline, whether it be peacemaking or something else, and (*b*) a whole series of specific acts of loyalty to give historical body to the commitment.

34. Frank C. Laubach, *Wake Up or Blow Up* (Los Angeles: Fleming H. Revell, 1951), p. 41.

35. Winston S. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), p. 320.

It seems to me that there are two types of pacifists and two types of non-pacifists. Some pacifists claim to have found a program which will usher in the Kingdom of God almost by force—what an anomalous idea! Others do not believe that history is perfectible. Menno Simons is an example. He thought of suffering love rather as a sign and symbol of the Kingdom of God, which God would have to usher in his good time. If I were a pacifist, I would be this type. It is a good thing to seek for the Kingdom of God on earth; but it is very dubious to claim to have found it. The Quakers represent pacifism too much as an evolutionary program of transforming society; the Mennonites represent it as a witness to a great commitment.[36]

F: Your analysis doesn't sound like meliorism or optimism either one.

N: But I am a non-pacifist. In non-pacifism there are these same two emphases, so, in line with James' suggestion, I try to keep my original commitment exactly in balance with my specific and quite imperfect acts of loyalty. Thus in one sense of the word I am pacifist in intention or commitment and non-pacifist in my stress on means.

F: I still don't quite see the optimism or meliorism.

N: You will, Nels, you will. We have the double duty to avoid war and to prevent the spread of communist tyranny. I believe we may be able to do both. That's optimism! To preserve a minimal bridge between ourselves and Russia requires the preservation of the United Nations organization. And to prevent the spread of tyranny we must use the U.N. and other means to relate our power to a weakened world and our prosperity to an impoverished world.

However natural the suspicions and the misinterpretations of both our friends and enemies, we cannot afford to be guilty of any act or attitude which might give them credence. Here is where we need all the moral and spiritual resources available. An atomic war is so terrible in its known and unknown consequences that no stone must be left unturned for its avoidance. The idea of a preventive war, even with known injustices as its excuse, is absurd.

I would agree with you to this extent: The occasions to which the concept of a just war can be rightly applied have become highly restricted. Consequently, the restraints imposed by the new dimensions of war underline the importance of a vigorous development of methods of peaceful change.[37]

F: Wonderful! I agree wholeheartedly.

N: I would reiterate: Nothing in history is inevitable, including the probable. So long as war has not broken out, we still have the possibility of avoiding it. Those who think that there is little difference between a cold and a hot war are either knaves or fools; for there is an obvious difference

36. This speech includes direct quotations from Niebuhr's *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, II, 177, n. 16; 177.

37. The last two sentences are quoted almost verbatim from Dun and Niebuhr, p. 78.

between a state of tension and a state of destruction and mutual annihilation.

F: Nevertheless, I believe that your emphasis upon "a whole series of specific" and prudential acts of loyalty bears witness mostly on the level of creation and not enough on the level of the Church. To me it seems to bear the stamp of secular idealism (or realism) more than the stamp of eternity.

N: You may be right. That is each man's decision to make, as you yourself have pointed out.[38] For myself I must do what I can while I can and urge others to do the same rather than wish we were doing that which might seem more heroic or perfect but which actually might be ignoring the real situation and the immediate responsibilities. I see you have my little pamphlet on the U.N. Please look at the two closing paragraphs.

Ferré reads the following silently:

> Our nation is basically committed to the principles of a cooperative world community. The real problem is whether we can give this basic commitment the body of, the flesh and blood of, our daily acts of loyalty and forbearance in the nascent community of mankind. Undoubtedly the constitutional instruments of world order must be perfected in time. But the more perfect instruments must grow out of the more perfect mutualities of daily living together.
>
> If our nation is to achieve success in this arduous and sometimes disheartening task we must not give way to the "cry-baby" theory of modern history, which regrets the trials and tumults of our era and wishes that the lot of our generation had been cast in a more pleasant century. The trials are undoubtedly great, and the insecurities and frustrations are disheartening; but the stakes are also very big and the possibilities of achievement are inspiring. They might well prompt our generation to Rupert Brooke's prayer of thanksgiving: "God be thanked who matched us with this hour."[39]

N (speaking after Ferré looks up): You see, our task is a big one. We must acquire the humility to be sufferable to our friends and the patience to outlast an unscrupulous foe.[40] So the final paradox of faith is that the Christian faith and hope will be most creative if we are not too preoccupied with its current relevance and pragmatic efficiency.[41] Perhaps there lies the truth in your criticism of my "secularism."

F: I would try to express "the truth of my criticism" somewhat more theologically. God's new order will dawn in God's time and by his power. The ethical question for Christians is: Will we now witness for or against it? Will we witness for what was, for what is, or for what will be? Which

38. Cf. N. Ferré, "The Distinctive Dimension of Christian Social Action," p. 99, where Ferré says of his pacifism: "It fails also to preserve some of the relative values which characterize the distinctive truths of the other approaches."

39. Niebuhr's last five speeches, including this quotation, have incorporated direct and indirect citations of *The Moral Implications of Loyalty to the United Nations*, pp. 7, 8 f., 13.

40. Cf. R. Niebuhr, "American Leadership," p. 130.

41. Cf. R. Niebuhr, "The Theme of Evanston," *Christianity and Crisis*, XIV (August 9, 1954), p. 111.

reality claims our allegiance? Are we called to be political realists or to be Kingdom-realists?

The early Church recognized that the fullness of time had come on the level of redemption; now we must recognize that the fullness of time has come also on the level of creation. The special challenge of our age is to renounce war while creating the positive conditions for peace.[42] Process is pushing all of us very hard, and God's purpose is pulling some of us even harder. We pacifists are somewhat like the conscientious abstainer whom the waiter asked, "Will you take your drinks at the bar or at the table?" When current events pose evil alternatives to us, we feel constrained to answer, instead of "At the bar" or "At the table" (or whatever the particular choices on a major issue), simply and humbly, "Neither."[43]

War is not primarily caused by unjust treaties or by the faulty distribution of goods. Radical causes and immediate irritations are secondary to the total evil drives that have caused wars at all times and in all systems. The only way to cure the deeper constant conflict that no peace treaty can remedy, is to change the world by the thorough diagnosis and drastic surgery of God's love. When this will be accomplished we do not know; but we do know that continuous compromise and acceptance of the ways of the world will certainly increase its malady. In the end, we are certain, there is no stronger historic force than resolute faith in a cause that is rooted in the very web of the universe. As surely as Christianity is true, so surely will history be most deeply and significantly affected by those who keep living, war or no war, as far as possible the only kind of life that can

42. Quoted (beginning with "The early Church") from N. Ferré, *Christianity and Society*, p. 208.

43. A full explication of some of these ideas in the context of process philosophy and with reference to Ferré's reinterpretation of natural law is found in his article in *Studies in Christian Social Commitment*; see especially p. 98 f. Cf. his *Christianity and Society*, Chap. VII, "The Christian Perspective on War." Ferré's use of process philosophy is not to be confused with the "inevitable progress" theories of the nineteenth century. According to Ferré the resources for mutual helpfulness or hurtfulness have dramatically accumulated through history, especially recently. But there is no inevitability about the way in which man at this time will use these resources. Thus it is too early to evaluate the amount of "progress" in history absolutely. This means that Ferré agrees with Sorokin's criticisms of progress theories which have a superficial likeness to his own process philosophy. See Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, Vol. III: *Fluctuation of Social Relationships, War, and Revolution* (New York: American Book Co., 1937), p. 360 f.: "Some have not been satisfied even with this rather long stretch of time, and have tried to prove that war has certainly been disappearing (and most assuredly does not dare to stay!) as we move from the amoeba or protozoan to the nineteenth- and twentieth-century civilization of *homo sapiens*." Cf. p. 361: "A sudden disappearance of war, with the magnitude of war unprecedented, not in its smallness, but in its greatness! One must have strange logic to see disappearance in these and other data given! . . . The present work has possibly shown that the crisis in our whole present culture is infinitely deeper and more serious and tragic than most people think. The possibility of a gigantic catastrophe, including war, is also much greater than many think. This should be understood by all who want to avoid it and to give their mind, and will, and effort to the noblest and most urgent task of its prevention or minimization." And finally, the agreement of Ferré and Sorokin is represented by Sorokin's melioristic statement: "As in the data presented there is nothing to support the claim of disappearance of war in the past, so there is nothing to support the claim, in spite of the exceptionally high figures for the twentieth century, that there has been (or will be) any steady trend toward increase in war."

ever save the world. In deep humility, and without judging our brethren in Christ who differ from us, I believe that in God's time our refusal to compromise our witness will aid in leading the whole world to that community in Christ that is our sure goal.[44]

N: While there is much in this sort of statement to which I have consistently objected, you may be surprised to learn that I believe your position has something to say to us non-pacifists.

We who allow ourselves to become engaged in war need this testimony, lest we accept the warfare of the world as normative, lest we become callous to the horror of war, and lest we forget the ambiguity of our own actions and motives and the risk we run of achieving no permanent good from this momentary anarchy in which we allow ourselves, from time to time, to become involved.[45]

F: Well, I see one thing more clearly than ever: Christianity at its best makes a difference in one's perspective, whether one is a pacifist or a non-pacifist. It challenges the "puristic" pacifist even more deeply to understand the nature of responsibility and the need for the use of force in a world like this. It challenges the "realist" at the other extreme, as you have also pointed out, to see that the danger of conflict is just as real as the danger of tyranny.

N: Or, to put it another way, "pure" idealism is equally dangerous for the militarist and for the pacifist. The "pure" idealists are always tempted to go to war against communism in the name of justice or to come to terms with it in the name of peace. The ideals of these contrasting idealists may be purer than mine. I cannot claim greater moral purity; but perhaps I may claim to possess a wisdom which is more relevant to our two-pronged predicament.[46] I realize that I am talking again about current relevance after warning just a few moments ago against preoccupation with it.[47]

F: Nevertheless, Christianity can and often does restrain both the romanticism of the pacifist and the impulsive aggressiveness of any "realist" who would set things right by the immediate use of force to use your own expressions. Even if this is all that Christianity says on the war question, which it is not, you might almost say that even this requires "a touch of daring" in one's social outlook and witness.

N: I certainly might!

44. N. Ferré, "Christianity and Compromise," *Fellowship*, VIII (April, 1942), p. 55.

45. This paragraph is quoted, with minor changes, from R. Niebuhr, *Christianity and Power Politics*, p. 31 (cited in *Reinhold Niebuhr*, p. 67).

46. Adapted, with minor changes, from R. Niebuhr, "Christianity and the Moral Law," *The Christian Century*, Vol. LXX, Pt. 2 (December 2, 1953), p. 1388.

47. Some theologians stress Niebuhr's concern for relevance as his greatest contribution, others as his greatest limitation. Ferré himself seems to recognize it as both, so that he can criticize this facet of Niebuhr's thought and yet probably appreciate it as fully as Emil Brunner, who wrote that "theology, with Niebuhr, broke into the world; theology was no longer quarantined, and men of letters, philosophers, sociologists, historians, even statesmen, began to listen" (*Reinhold Niebuhr*, p. 29).

Clio Observed: A Survey of Recent Literature in Ecclesiastical History

JOHN GORDON ROWE

THIS survey article hopes to convey information about recent publications in such a way as to persuade as many as possible to read the books for themselves. In an age of little time and even less leisure this is no easy task. Perhaps it will be helpful to begin with that area of historical studies which touches us most closely.

I. Christianity in Canada and the United States

Until quite recently, our knowledge of Canadian history advanced in bits and pieces. In some instances, this took the form of biography, e.g., T. R. Millman's studies of Jacob Mountain and Charles James Stewart. Often it pursued some particular theme: S. D. Clark, *Church and Sect in Canada* (Toronto, 1948) and W. E. Mann, *Sect, Cult and Church in Alberta* (Toronto, 1955). Now the threads of previous research have been drawn together in H. H. Walsh, *The Christian Church in Canada* (Toronto, 1956). The broad patterns of Canadian church history are before us: the rivalry between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism; the intimate connection between politics and religion which may be studied further in J. S. Moir, *Church and State in Canada West* (Toronto, 1959) and C. J. Sissons, *Church and State in Canadian Education* (Toronto, 1959); the longing for church union, induced by a medley of motives, theological and otherwise; the sectarian protest against establishments of any kind, even the Free Church variety. The publication of Walsh's work marks the coming of age of Canadian church history. When we recall the great role played by Christianity in the growth of this nation, this development may be justly described as long overdue.

In the United States, the discipline of church history, though young, waxes mightily. Gone is the old denominational history where all too often the past pandered to the prejudices of the present. In its place have come such scholarly works as J. T. Addison, *The Episcopal Church in the United States, 1789–1931* (New York, 1951), and A. R. Wentz, *A Basic History of Lutheranism in America* (Philadelphia, 1955). For the history of Presbyterianism, there is the group of interesting essays edited by G. J. Slosser, *They Seek a Country* (New York, 1955), and the document collection by

M. W. Armstrong and others, *The Presbyterian Enterprise* (Philadelphia, 1956). Most striking are *Documents of American Catholic History* (Milwaukee, 1956) and *American Catholicism* (Chicago, 1956), both by John Tracy Ellis, who projects lucidly the tremendous growth of Roman Catholicism in America during the last century. By way of a thematic approach, mention should be made of A. P. Stokes, *Church and State in the United States* (New York, 1950), or the valuable work of R. M. Miller, *American Protestantism and Social issues, 1919–1937* (Chapel Hill, 1958). However, in American church history, all roads lead ultimately to William Warren Sweet. *The American Churches, An Interpretation* (New York, 1948), the slim volume of essays, *American Culture and Religion* (Dallas, 1951), and *Religion in the Development of American Culture, 1765–1840* (New York, 1952), do much to place American Protestantism firmly within its historical setting.

After Sweet, whither? Studies in denominationalism or in the sociology of religion? New interpretations such as J. C. Brauer's attractive *Protestantism in America* (Philadelphia, 1953) or the disquieting analyses provided in W. Herberg, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew* (New York, 1955), will always be welcome. For the general reader, however, the way forward will lie in such works as W. L. Wolf, *The Almost Chosen People* (New York, 1959), a moving record of the spiritual development of Abraham Lincoln.

II. Puritanism

As a bridge between the New World and the Old, what can serve better than Puritanism? Our contemporary understanding of Puritanism stresses, first of all, its diversity. Within Puritanism we find such repellent buffoons as Hugh Peter, whose life is ably recounted in R. P. Stearns, *The Strenuous Puritan* (Urbana, Ill., 1954) as well as the noble Richard Baxter. The best of recent work on Baxter is G. F. Nuttall, *Richard Baxter and Philip Doddridge* (London, 1951). For the development of Congregationalism, the same author's *Visible Saints* (London, 1957) is indispensable. Secondly, new emphasis is placed on the mystical elements in Puritanism, and it is now quite clear that Puritanism is the rock from which Quakerism is hewn. See in this connection, Horton Davies, *The Worship of the English Puritans* (Westminster, 1948), and the splendid new edition of the *Journal* of George Fox, edited by J. L. Nickalls, with the assistance of G. F. Nuttall and H. J. Cadbury (London, 1952). Then too we have a new conception of the dynamic character of Puritanism and (dare we say it?) its catholicity. If Puritanism held to *sola scriptura* and assurance gained through conversion, it eschewed total depravity and double predestination, conjoined faith and reason, made faith a work and divine grace something to be pursued. The Puritan lived in no parson-ridden society. Rather, he was sceptical of witchcraft and devoted to science, secular music and conjugal love. Was Puritanism directly connected with the growth of capitalism and thus a stop on the

road to secularism (as suggested by Troeltsch, Weber and Tawney)? W. Schenk, in his *The Concern for Social Justice in the Puritan Revolution* (New York, 1948), is resolutely negative. On the other hand, D. B. Robertson, *The Religious Foundations of Leveller Democracy* (New York, 1951), and W. Haller, *Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution* (New York, 1955) emphasize the powerful contribution made by Puritanism in the development of liberal attitudes. Little wonder today that Puritanism's children in the eighteenth century proved to be *both* evangelicalism and rationalism. Here the works of G. R. Cragg are useful: *Puritanism in the Period of the Great Persecution, 1660–1688* (London, 1957) and *From Puritanism to the Age of Reason* (London, 1950).

Note that this powerfully optimistic movement produced at its close its own greatest critic. Perry Miller's *Jonathan Edwards* (New York, 1949) provides a sobering image of a prophet crying in an American wilderness of complacent materialism.

III. English Christianity

For Pre-Reformation England, we are fortunate to have a new survey by W. A. Pantin, *The English Church in the Fourteenth Century* (London, 1955), an excellent introduction to the world of Wycliffe, Walter Hilton *et al.* For the sixteenth century, our attention goes first to the Roman Catholic Philip Hughes, *The Reformation in England* (London, 1950–1954). This vigorous fusion of interpretation and research is marred by a lack of historical perspective, a somewhat injudicious use of sources and an almost total failure to get inside of those Englishmen who were avid in that age for reform and regeneration. As an antidote, there is always the brilliant sketch by F. M. Powicke, *The Reformation in England* (London, 1953). As for Thomas Cranmer, interest never fails. G. W. Bromiley in *Thomas Cranmer, Theologian* (London, 1956) tries not altogether successfully to convince us of the truth contained in the title. Other English Reformers have been honoured recently with good biographies: A. G. Chester and H. S. Darby on Latimer and J. G. Ridley on Nicholas Ridley. For the liturgiologist, there is the new book by C. W. Dugmore, *The Mass and the English Reformers* (London, 1958), an original work but to many unconvincing.

Beyond these, there is the great theme of the formation of Anglicanism in the face of an emergent Puritanism which could see little in the Establishment beyond an unfortunate mixture of popery and the Gospel. This process may be traced in H. C. Porter, *Reformation and Reaction in Tudor Cambridge* (London, 1958), and L. B. Smith, *Tudor Prelates and Politics* (Princeton, 1953). P. M. Dawley's *John Whitgift and the English Reformation* (London, 1954) though brief is extremely well written. An essential dimension to this great subject is revealed in C. Hill, *Economic Problems in the Church from Archbishop Whitgift to the Long Parliament* (London,

1956). For the national church after the Commonwealth, the basic study is R. Bosher, *The Making of the Restoration Settlement* (Westminster, 1951). To this should be added B. H. G. Wormald, *Clarendon; Politics, History and Religion* (London, 1951). G. Every, *The High Church Party, 1688–1718* (London, 1956), is reliable and readable. The seventeenth century offers rich scope for the biographer. M. F. Reidy and P. A. Welsby have written on Lancelot Andrewes, H. P. Thompson on Thomas Bray, Edward F. Carpenter on Thomas Sherlock, Thomas Tenison and Henry Compton, and G. V. Bennett on White Kennett. L. G. Locke's study of Tillotson (Copenhagen, 1954) is a "must" for preachers.

Will the controversy over Anglican doctrine of church and ministry in the sixteenth and seventeenth century never cease? Among the recent contributions are N. Sykes, *Old Priest and New Presbyter* (London, 1956), and the all too brief treatment in E. R. Fairweather's *Episcopacy Re-asserted* (London, 1955). In this connection, H. F. Woodhouse, *The Doctrine of the Church in Anglican Theology, 1547–1603* (London, 1954) is a useful compendium of opinions.

A special word must be reserved for Norman Sykes whose labours have done much to rescue the eighteenth century from the slanders of Evangelicals and Anglo-Catholics. His recent studies include *From Sheldon to Secker* (London, 1959) and the great biography of Archbishop Wake (London, 1957). For intellectual history, R. N. Stromberg, *Religious Liberalism in Eighteenth-Century England* (London, 1954) is a monograph of outstanding value. In the vast domain of Wesley studies, a translation from the German of the great biography of Martin Schmidt is in the offing. A. P. Whitney, *The Basis of Opposition to Methodism in England in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1951), is an excellent contribution to a delicate problem. R. M. Cameron, *The Rise of Methodism* (New York, 1954), is a good source book. F. A. Norwood, *Church Membership in the Methodist Tradition* (Nashville, 1958) is a splendid and useful study. For the subsequent effects of Methodism on British society, the many works of R. Wearmouth are essential. Other aspects of the great evangelical revival have been much studied of late, usually in the form of biographies. G. C. B. Davies, *The Early Cornish Evangelicals* (London, 1951), and L. E. Elliott-Binns, *The Early Evangelicals* (London, 1953), will serve as an introduction to what is rapidly becoming a veritable school in historical studies.

In the nineteenth century, J. C. S. Nias, *Gorham and the Bishop of Exeter* (London, 1951) and G. C. B. Davies, *Henry Phillpotts, Bishop of Exeter* (London, 1954) deal (among other things) with one of the more interesting incidents in the Oxford Movement. The biography, *Dean Church* (London, 1958), by B. A. Smith forms a pleasing introduction to the Movement's best historiographer. The best study on F. D. Maurice remains A. R. Vidler, *Witness to the Light* (New York, 1948). L. E. Elliott-Binns, *English Thought, 1860–1900: the Theological Aspect* (London, 1956) is a reliable work.

For the twentieth century, there are already many studies. Varying in quality but not in interest are the biographies of Cosmo Gordon Lang by J. G. Lockhart, William Temple by F. A. Iremonger, and Cyril Foster Garbett by C. Smyth. E. K. H. Jordan, *Free Church Unity* (London, 1956), is excellent. Even more important is J. W. Grant, *Free Churchmanship in England, 1870–1940* (London, 1955). For a general survey there is the new work by Horton Davies, *The English Free Churches* (London, 1952). A short work by E. I. Watkin, *Roman Catholicism in England from the Reformation to 1950* (London, 1957), is excellent.

IV. The Reformation: Protestant and Catholic

There is little doubt that we are weak in our understanding of the two centuries preceding the Reformation. Passing by the larger syntheses of an older generation (a new edition of Imbart de la Tour is in progress) which are now only more or less satisfactory, attention should be called to the article by W. K. Ferguson, "The Church in a Changing Age," *American Historical Review*, LIX (1953–1954). Beyond this, the reader might begin with the splendid work of G. Mollat, *Les Papes d'Avignon* (2nd ed., Paris, 1949), and W. Ullmann, *The Origins of the Great Schism in 1378* (London, 1948), the latter giving much insight into the destructive effects of nationalism in the late medieval period. From here, he might pass to that seedbed of the Reformation, Bohemia, to read F. G. Heymann, *John Zizka and the Hussite Revolution* (Princeton, 1955) and Peter Brock, *The Political and Social Doctrines of the Unity of Czech Brethren* (The Hague, 1957). Then, he might go on to the Conciliar Movement, which is receiving renewed interest. The truly superb monograph of B. Tierney, *The Foundations of the Conciliar Theory* (London, 1955), deserves a wide circle of readers, and J. Gill, *The Council of Florence* (London, 1959), is a feast of learning. As for that biblical humanism which came to such noble expression in Erasmus and others, our reader will be well advised to consult the pertinent sections of the great work of F. Hermans, *Histoire doctrinale de l'humanisme chrétien* (Tournai, 1948).

At the centre of the sixteenth century stands the figure of Luther. He is no longer the Luther who was so dear to liberalism—the apostle of modernity, liberty and individualism. He is now a paradox. The rebel against medieval religion remained a child of the Middle Ages. The prophet against a decadent ecclesiasticism became a churchman, the founder of a new scholasticism. The apostle of a purer church proved unwittingly the cat's paw of princes. What other life tells us so much about the nature of Protestantism, its grandeur and its misery? Satisfactory biographies are hard to find. R. H. Bainton, *Here I Stand* (New York, 1950), is to be preferred to R. H. Fife, *The Revolt of Martin Luther* (New York, 1957). The publication in translation of the older work of H. Boehmer, *Martin Luther: the Road to Reformation* (London, 1957), gives much insight into the changing

fashions in Luther scholarship, a phenomenon investigated by E. W. Zeeden in his *The Legacy of Luther* (London, 1954). Roman Catholic investigations of Luther are improving in delicacy of treatment and objectivity of judgement. The chapters by E. de Moreau in Volume XVI of the great Fliche-Martin-Jarry *Histoire de l'Église* (Paris, 1956) are a good example of this welcome trend.

Of the many recent studies in Luther's doctrines, only a handful may be cited. The work of Swedish scholars is presented in E. M. Carlson, *The Reinterpretation of Luther* (Philadelphia, 1948). R. Prenter, *Spiritus Creator* (Philadelphia, 1953), and G. Wingren, *Luther on Vocation* (Philadelphia, 1957), are good studies. F. E. Cranz, *An Essay on the Development of Luther's Thought on Justice, Law and Society* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), is outstanding for its lucid treatment of a difficult subject. Readers should be reminded that there is a new translation of Luther's works appearing under the direction of J. Pelikan. Perhaps as companions to these volumes one might cite E. G. Rupp, *The Righteousness of God* (London, 1953), and H. Bornkamm, *Luther's World of Thought* (St. Louis, 1958).

With Calvin, the monumental biography by E. Domergue remains in French. There is, unfortunately, no comparable treatment in English. T. H. L. Parker, *Portrait of Calvin* (London, 1954), is thin stuff. The new translation of E. Stickelberger's *Calvin* (London, 1959) provides a popular biography which is refreshingly enthusiastic. As for his teaching, A. M. Hunter, *The Teaching of Calvin* (2nd ed., London, 1950), is a poor book, and A. Dakin's *Calvinism* (London, 1940) is brief, little more. For a more extended treatment, there are the great work of F. Wendel of Strassbourg, *Calvin: sources et évolution de sa pensée religieuse* (Paris, 1950), and the comprehensive, but readable, discussion provided by W. Niesel, *The Theology of Calvin* (Philadelphia, 1956). Two studies, one by T. H. L. Parker, *Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God* (Grand Rapids, 1958), the other by E. A. Dowey, *The Knowledge of God in Calvin's Theology* (New York, 1952), deal with the crucial point in Calvin's doctrine. Paul van Buren, *Christ in Our Place* (Edinburgh, 1957), is a readable and competent study of Calvin's teaching on the Atonement. For those who like provocative writing, T. F. Torrance, *Calvin's Doctrine of Man* (Grand Rapids, 1957) is certain of effect. The list of monographs, including those by such excellent scholars as H. Quistorp and R. S. Wallace, is almost endless. Any mention of Calvin must perforce include mention of Servetus. R. H. Bainton, *Hunted Heretic* (Boston, 1953), is definitive. In this connection, one should refer to the standard work of J. Lecler, *Histoire de la tolérance au siècle de la Réforme* (Paris, 1955), and to E. M. Wilbur, *A History of Unitarianism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1945–1952). There is still no adequate edition of the *Institutes* in English. However, the *Library of Christian Classics* is devoting an entire volume to Calvin's biblical commentaries, and the result is wonderful testimony to Calvin's power in exegesis. In conclusion, there is the much discussed book by J. T. McNeill, *The History*

and Character of Calvinism (New York, 1954). For its learning and breadth of judgement there can be only praise. Yet the work rests uneasily in this reader's hands owing to a certain diffuseness and uncertainty in dealing with theological matters.

It is still not easy for the general English reader to lay hold of many satisfactory works on Zwingli. O. Farner, *Zwingli the Reformer* (New York, 1952), is a brief study by the leading authority in the field. With regard to Martin Bucer, G. J. van de Poll, *Martin Bucer's Liturgical Ideas* (Assen, 1954), shows why this great liturgical scholar was so dear to Thomas Cranmer.

A special word on Anabaptism. The old interpretation, derived from Reformed and Catholic authorities alike, was that Anabaptism was a lunatic fringe movement whose most characteristic expression was the apocalyptic horrors of Thomas Munzer and his colleagues at Münster. The unremitting labours of American Mennonite scholars and the German savants on the Täuferakten Kommission are gradually revising this picture. A good modern interpretation of Anabaptism may be found in the splendid commentary provided by George Williams of Harvard in the pertinent volume of the *Library of Christian Classics*. As regards individual works, pride of place belong to the beautiful biography by H. S. Bender, *The Life and Letters of Conrad Grebel* (Goshen, Ind., 1950), and F. Littell, *The Anabaptist Vision of the Church* (2nd ed. rev., Boston, 1958).

For works dealing with the Reformers as a whole, despite a turgid style, R. E. Davies, *The Problem of Authority in the Continental Reformers* (London, 1946), is adequate and should be read in conjunction with W. A. Mueller, *Church and State in Luther and Calvin* (Nashville, 1954) and J. K. S. Reid, *The Authority of Scripture* (New York, 1957). T. F. Torrance, *Kingdom and Church* (Edinburgh, 1956), affords a stimulating point of departure for general studies in the theology of the Reformation. W. Schwarz, *Principles and Problems of Biblical Translation* (London, 1955), is an original work on an important topic.

In the field of historical studies dealing with the Catholic Reformation, there is an intensified interest either in local history or in some of the movement's leaders. An example of the latter would be R. M. Douglas, *Jacopo Sadoleto* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959). However the chief event of late is the publication in translation of the first volume of H. Jedin, *A History of the Council of Trent* (London, 1957). The riches of this volume are many and varied. For those interested in that most characteristic of all institutions of the Catholic Reformation, the Society of Jesus, there are the many popular studies by James Brodrick. His *St. Francis Xavier* (New York, 1952) is worthy of special praise.

Many scholars continue to try their hand at short treatments of the Reformation as a whole. The works of R. H. Bainton, Norman Sykes and G. L. Mosse are reliable and complement each other. Especially attractive is the essay of E. Harris Harbison, *The Age of the Reformation* (Ithaca,

1955). On a larger scale, H. J. Grimm, *The Reformation Era, 1500–1650* (New York, 1954), is the best thing of its kind.

Sooner or later most Protestant church historians succumb to the temptation of producing a work on the significance of the Reformation for the contemporary church and world. J. S. Whale, *The Protestant Tradition* (London, 1955), for all its vigour, is weakened by a failure to keep abreast of the latest research. By way of contrast, there is W. Pauck, *The Heritage of the Reformation* (Boston, 1950), a group of distinguished essays touching upon not only the Reformation but also the subsequent history of Protestantism.

For the history of Roman Catholicism after Trent, space limits us to four works. Owen Chadwick, *From Bossuet to Newman* (London, 1957), is a much needed investigation of the idea of doctrinal development. E. N. Koenker, *The Liturgical Renaissance in the Roman Church* (Chicago, 1954), is a useful doctoral dissertation. A. R. Vidler's study of Lamennais, *Prophecy and Papacy* (London, 1954), offers much insight into one of the basic dilemmas in modern Catholicism while E. E. Y. Hales, *The Catholic Church in the Modern World* (New York, 1958), will offer food for thought on the resurgent power of the Roman Church.

V. The Middle Ages

What better introduction here than the Venerable Bede? There is a new edition in *Everyman* with an introduction by David Knowles. As a companion to this, there are many sprightly volumes of E. S. Duckett. Her latest is *Wandering Saints of the Early Middle Ages* (New York, 1959). For the friar movement in the High Middle Ages there is also a new edition of the *Little Flowers of St. Francis* in *Penguin*. R. Brooke, *Early Franciscan Government* (London, 1959), is most valuable and D. L. Douie, *Archbishop Pecham* (London, 1952), is an excellent study of a great Franciscan prelate. The same high level of scholarship adorns research into the Dominicans. W. A. Hinnebusch, *The Early English Friars Preachers* (Rome, 1951), is one of the finest monographs to appear in recent years, and the accomplished J. H. R. Moorman has contributed *The Grey Friars in Cambridge* (New York, 1952). Yet all this is mere prolegomenon to David Knowles, whose final volume in his *The Religious Orders in England* (London, 1959) has just appeared. Here is fairness, sincerity and lucidity. No romanticism mars this writing, and no polemic either. Knowles is neither Gasquet, the dubious apologist, nor G. G. Coulton, once described as the best controversialist this side of the Antichrist. "Behold, a greater than Solomon is here."

The problem of *regnum* and *sacerdotium* continues to attract the attention of the finest scholars. M. Pacaut's *Alexandre III* (Paris, 1956) fills a large gap. There is a new edition of H. X. Arquillière, *L'Augustinisme Politique* (Paris, 1955). The most recent contribution is a highly controversial study

by N. F. Cantor, *Church, Kingship and Lay Investiture in England, 1089–1135* (Princeton, 1958). The great revival in the study of canon law continues to bring forth much fruit: B. Tierney, *Medieval Poor Law* (Berkeley, Calif., 1959), and two works by W. Ullmann, *Medieval Papalism* (London, 1949) and *The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages* (London, 1955), are among the ripest and richest. For life on the parish level, G. H. Cook, *The English Medieval Parish Church* (London, 1954), and C. E. Boyd's forthright *Tithes and Parishes in Medieval Italy* (Ithaca, 1952) are illuminating to our understanding. Overshadowing all these, however, is the publication in translation of the first volume of G. Schnurrer's great work, *Church and Culture in the Middle Ages* (Paterson, N.J., 1956). For intellectual history the general reader will still find F. B. Artz, *The Mind of the Middle Ages* (2nd ed., New York, 1954) useful. Gordon Leff, *Medieval Thought*, recently published in *Penguin*, is a good survey while Ewart Lewis, *Medieval Political Ideas* (London, 1954), is an excellent collection of documents with commentary. No discussion of the Medieval Church is complete without reference to heresy. The Cathari seem to hold the centre of attention. Most easily accessible is S. Runciman, *The Medieval Manichae* (Cambridge, 1947). However, the definitive treatment remains A. Borst, *Die Katharer* (Stuttgart, 1953).

In concluding this brief survey, it is to be observed that 1954 produced many works dealing with the schism of 1054. Perhaps the most useful of these was S. Runciman, *The Eastern Schism* (London, 1955). As for the child and heir of Byzantine Christianity, the Russian Church has received increasing attention in the last generation from such writers as G. P. Fedotov, G. Vernadsky and N. Zernov. The last-named has written an excellent introduction in *The Russians and their Church* (London, 1954). To it may be added S. Bolshakoff, *Russian Nonconformity* (Philadelphia, 1950), and N. Gorodetsky, *St. Tikhon Zadonsky* (London, 1951), a work highly recommended to those interested in Russian spirituality. Books on Christianity in contemporary Russia remain as controversial as ever. See M. Spinka, *The Church in Soviet Russia* (New York, 1956).

VI. Patristics and Missions

We have deliberately left patristics and missions to the end. In no other areas of church historical studies is the current situation more removed from "Business as usual" or where the trends in current research are so fruitful for contemporary faith and practice. The increasingly tenuous connection between the Church and contemporary western civilization, the longing among all Christians for unity and for a solution to those problems of authority which plague a divided Christendom—all these urge us towards the study of the Early Church. New editions and translations appear on all sides. Of the latter, *Sources chrétiennes*, *Ancient Christian Writers* and *The Fathers of the Church* are good examples, although preference might be exercised in the above order. As regards the volumes of the *Library of*

Christian Classics, the felicity of its selections as well as the excellence of its translations and notes should make it required reading for all literate Christians. To the much used one-volume collections by H. Bettenson and T. H. Bindley may now be added E. Giles, *Documents Illustrating Papal Authority* (London, 1952), and J. Stevenson, *A New Eusebius* (London, 1957), a splendid collection of translations under a most misleading title.

J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines* (London, 1958), has replaced the earlier work by Bethune-Baker. On a much grander scale is H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956 f.). Other reliable studies on general topics are J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds* (London, 1950), R. L. P. Milburn, *Early Christian Interpretations of History* (London, 1954), and S. L. Greenslade, *Schism in the Early Church* (London, 1953).

The sixteenth centenary of Augustine's birth elicited a plethora of tributes, of which H. Marrou, *St. Augustine and His Influence Through the Ages* (New York, 1957), is a good example. R. W. Battenhouse edited *A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine* (New York, 1955), a book which will please those who think that liberal Protestant interpretations are fruitful for Augustinian exegesis. Only the highest praise can be accorded the great study by W. H. C. Frend, *The Donatist Church* (London, 1952). The fifteenth centenary of the Council of Chalcedon was also observed by the publication of many books. R. V. Sellers, *The Council of Chalcedon* (London, 1953) is a good study, but it will be overshadowed unfortunately by the three volumes of essays edited by A. Grillmeier, *Das Konzil von Chalkedon* (Würzburg, 1951–1954). Some of the essays in these volumes will take permanent rank among the finest produced by patristic scholars in this century.

For the earlier Fathers, E. F. Osborn, *The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria* (London, 1957), is a concise study. As for Origen, what better introduction could be found than the translations of the *Contra Celsum* (London, 1953) and of *Origen's Treatise on Prayer* (London, 1954) by H. Chadwick and E. G. Jay respectively? For Irenaeus, there is the monograph by G. Wingren, *Man and the Incarnation* (Edinburgh, 1959). No survey dealing with the second century can, of course, ignore the problem of the ministry. K. M. Carey edited a group of essays, *The Historic Episcopate* (London, 1954), to which E. R. Fairweather has written a reply (*supra*). The work of A. Ehrhardt, *The Apostolic Succession* (London, 1953), is distinguished by its treatment of the problem of the succession lists. For a brilliant study by a reformed divine, there can be little improvement on T. F. Torrance, *Royal Priesthood* (Edinburgh, 1955). Approaching the problem of authority from a different perspective is E. Flesseman-van Leer, *Tradition and Scripture in the Early Church* (Assen, 1954). This solid piece of research exhibits an extreme rigidity which fails to appreciate the dynamic character of the Christian tradition in the second century. At this point mention should be made of the masterly study by O. Cullman, *Peter* (Philadelphia, 1953). For those who wish to join the milling throngs digging

under St. Peter's, J. Toynbee and J. W. Perkins in their *The Shrine of St. Peter* (London, 1956) prove admirable *ciceroni*.

For the problem of church and state, S. L. Greenslade, *Church and State from Constantine to Theodosius* (London, 1954), is a brief introductory study. Even more attractive is R. M. Grant, *The Sword and the Cross* (New York, 1955). A compelling theological interpretation of the problem is offered by E. Stauffer in his *Christ and the Caesars* (London, 1955). Constantine continues to vex our understanding. Perhaps A. Alföldi has provided the answer in his *The Conversion of Constantine and Pagan Rome* (London, 1948).

The truly great problems remain: Gnosticism and the Hellenization of the Gospel. For the first, there is a magnificent bibliography to which H. Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion* (Boston, 1958) and R. McL. Wilson, *The Gnostic Problem* (London, 1958) are recent additions. For the second, to the great names of Harnack, Bauer and Bultmann we now add M. Werner for his *The Formation of Christian Dogma* (London, 1957). Many reviews, especially those issuing from English preserves of establishment and orthodoxy, were written in the withering tone reserved for that which is not only distasteful but also telling. Perverse the book certainly is, and when the end is reached we are hard put to it to decide whether we have read a "tract for the times" by a liberal Protestant theologian or rather a sincere attempt to render intelligible the dogmatic development of Christianity. Nonetheless, this inspired fantasia on the thought of the Early Church must receive the closest study. By way of opposing viewpoints, G. Dix, *Jew and Greek* (Westminster, 1953), deserves only passing notice. Utterly different is H. E. W. Turner, *The Pattern of Christian Truth* (London, 1954). This book is exquisitely written. How the cadences which conclude each chapter with the Trinitarian formula will remind the musician of the trill climaxes of a Mozart concerto! Here is a systematic attempt to prove the priority of Catholic Christianity to heresy and Gnosticism. His arguments have great power. Nevertheless, there is an apologetic tone which endows the triumphs of orthodoxy with an unhistorical inevitability.

All this is supremely important. Yet just how important is not clear to all. Philip Carrington in his *The Early Christian Church* (London, 1957) judged the problem of Hellenization to be beyond the scope of a work which runs to a thousand pages. Thus, for all its interest, his book is a bitter disappointment, all the more because it comes from a scholar whose discussion of the problem might well have been magisterial. The question which Werner and others are debating and which Carrington refused to consider is really this: What is Christianity and what is it not?

Turning to missions, the last decade has seen an almost incredible accretion of an already formidable bibliography. The denominational approach continues to be popular. R. G. Torbet, *Venture of Faith* (Philadelphia, 1955), is devoted to the activities of the American Baptists. Three volumes of W. C. Barclay's *The History of Methodist Missions* (New York, 1949–1957) have appeared. Much too has been done with societies. H. P. Thomp-

son, *Into All Lands* (London, 1951), is a reliable account of the S.P.G. H. J. Cnattinguis, *Bishops and Societies* (London, 1952), is the fascinating account of the growth within a national church of a true missionary consciousness. Best of all is N. Goodall, *A History of the London Missionary Society* (London, 1954). With regard to specific areas of missionary activity, for Africa there is the standard work of C. P. Groves, *The Planting of Christianity in Africa* (London, 1949–1955), and this work should be read in conjunction with the anthology edited by Horton Davies and R. H. W. Shepherd, *South African Missions* (London, 1954). Recent works on China and India—L. M. Outerbridge, *The Lost Churches of China* (Philadelphia, 1952), P. A. Varg, *Missionaries, Chinese and Diplomats* (Princeton, 1952), and L. W. Brown, *The Indian Christians of St. Thomas* (Cambridge, 1956)—have elicited mixed reactions but are worth reading for all that. For a general survey, E. A. Payne, *The Growth of the New World Church* (London, 1955), is satisfactory. Of special merit is K. S. Latourette, *The Christian World Mission in Our Day* (New York, 1954). This is a brief but excellent contribution in a field which this celebrated American scholar has made uniquely his own and one which reveals its author's abilities not only as a student of the past but also as a prophet of the future.

Closely allied here is the Ecumenical Movement. B. Sundkler, *The Church of South India* (London, 1954), is a fair-minded review of the developments leading to union. A readable history of the Movement as a whole is found in N. V. Hope, *One Christ, One World, One Church* (Philadelphia, 1953). R. Rouse and S. C. Neill are joint editors of *A History of the Ecumenical Movement* (Philadelphia, 1954). The essays in this volume are admittedly uneven, but the contribution made by J. T. McNeill is particularly outstanding. W. R. Hogg, *Ecumenical Foundations* (New York, 1952), is a rewarding treatment of the rise of ecumenism out of the missionary enterprise in the nineteenth century. The World Council of Churches increasingly attracts the attention of historians. G. K. A. Bell, *The Kingship of Christ*, published in *Penguin* (1954), is the best short survey available.

VII. Syntheses

Inevitably, the question arises: Where is the larger synthesis? We live in an Alexandrian age. Criticism has replaced creation. The triumphs of the Muse are often preserved in such monumental creations as the *Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Géographie Ecclésiastiques*, or the new work edited by T. Klauser, *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, to mention only two which are even now in the process of publication. Perhaps the modern historian is wary of the works which range widely (and wildly?) over the vast reaches of Christian history. Many and grievous are the dangers. R. Knox, *Enthusiasm* (New York, 1950), is an unfortunate work which tells us more of Knox than of Luther, Wesley, and Fénelon. T. M. Parker, *Christianity and the State in the Light of History* (London, 1955), avoids

all difficulties by keeping to a fairly superficial treatment. More will be gained from J. B. Morrall and S. Z. Ehler, *Church and State Through the Centuries* (London, 1954), a good collection of translations from the Roman Catholic point of view. H. R. Niebuhr and D. D. Williams edited *The Ministry in Historical Perspective* (New York, 1956); yet this is only a collection of essays. On the other hand, J. T. McNeill, *A History of the Cure of Souls* (New York, 1951), fails through lack of definition.

What is to be made of C. Dawson, *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (New York, 1950)? A truly magnificent command of the material is hampered by a failure to ask the right questions and to abide patiently the answer. What was the meaning of freedom in the Middle Ages and what were its true sources? What do we mean by "sacred" and "secular" in medieval civilization, and what was the true meaning of the tensions which marked relations between church and state in the later Middle Ages? Will secularism suffice as an answer? Or consider K. S. Latourette, *A History of Christianity* (New York, 1953). This condensation of an overwhelming amount of material into one large volume has rightly received the admiration of all, and in criticizing this work one cannot but feel impertinent. Yet wherein precisely does its value lie? As a textbook for students who will be hopelessly intimidated by the sheer mass of material, unrelieved by that vitality which comes only from an intimate knowledge of the sources? As history? Here the theological convictions of the author cannot be ignored. The great theme, the grand conviction, is indispensable in the writing of great history. However, there are convictions and convictions. Some illuminate and others blight both analysis and understanding. With Latourette, vast areas of ecclesiastical history are beyond his appreciation, with the result that his judgements are often superficial and moralistic. In short, what can a book such as this do but give a new lease on life to those pernicious survey courses, conducted *à l'Américaine*, which have been the refuge of the time-serving lecturer and have rendered church history a tedious bore in so many schools of theological learning?

Textbooks as such are not bad. J. H. Nichols, *A History of Christianity, 1650–1950* (New York, 1956), is a good volume, complete and lively in its presentation. Perhaps Latourette's *Christianity in a Revolutionary Age* (New York, 1958 f.) will escape the above criticism. Then too a Trevelyan may arise to raise church history to undreamed of heights. Failing this, it may be suggested, unfashionable though it be, that what we need is not the larger synthesis but better monographs. We need studies, limited in scope, but profound in depth, employing the historical method at its richest and yet most disciplined, utilizing at the same time all the resources of literary art in order to communicate the truth of the past to the present. How else will we come to understand that the study of history is an essential part of our equipment as Christians? How else will we learn that the final meaning of history is beyond history, that "Here is no continuing city, here is no abiding stay" (T. S. Eliot, *Murder in the Cathedral*)?

The Virgin Mary in a Reformation Theology

JAMES A. SHUEL

IT need hardly be said that the significance attributed to the Virgin Mary in Christian theology since New Testament times has found little expression in the post-Reformation Protestant tradition. In general, Protestant theologians have been prepared to leave any special recognition of Mary's place in Christian faith and devotion to the Roman Church. As a result, in the contemporary theological dialogue which has been initiated by the ecumenical movement, Protestantism finds itself not only less than faithful in its witness to early Christian theology, but also unable to offer any legitimate and convincing alternative to the unbalanced "Marianism" so widespread in contemporary Roman Catholicism. Perhaps it is time for Protestantism to consider the subject more seriously, and to formulate a position more substantial than the usual one of unconcern or unthinking disapproval. It is the purpose of this article to offer for consideration one serious Protestant attempt—that of the Reformation's great systematic theologian—to define the place that the Virgin Mary should occupy in the theology and life of the Church. No doubt modern biblical criticism has raised questions about the basic Marian texts that would not have occurred to Calvin, but my concern is not with the biblical issues as such. I merely want to ask, looking at the Reformed tradition from outside, whether its essential doctrinal principles necessarily impose on its adherents either the inhibited silence or the automatic rejection of a serious Mariology to which I have referred.

I

For the sake of a working classification, we may present Calvin's view of the Virgin Mary in terms (*a*) of her physical agency in the Incarnation, (*b*) of her moral agency as expressed in her *fiat*, and (*c*) of her relation to the life of the Church. In view of the centrality of the Incarnation in Calvin's thought, Mary's physical instrumentality in the Incarnation quite naturally receives a good deal of attention from him. Since for Calvin the reality of man's salvation depended entirely on the full reality of the Incarnation, he preached the absolute necessity of embracing the full doctrine of the Incarnation, and strongly denounced any who would imperil our salvation with something less.

In his teaching on the nature of the Incarnation and of our salvation, Calvin's first concern is to emphasize that the personal agent who effects our salvation is the eternal Son of God. In this context, Calvin sees Mary's role

as *virgin* mother as a safeguard of the truth that it is none other than the Son of God who became the Son of man. So, for example, in the *Genevan Catechism*, Calvin asks and answers:

> What do you mean by these two phrases, conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary?
>
> That he was formed in the womb of a virgin, of her substance, to be the true seed of David . . .; and that this was effected by the miraculous and secret agency of the Spirit, without male intercourse.[1]

Again, in his exposition of the Lucan account of Mary's overshadowing by the Holy Spirit, he says:

> Christ must not be born of ordinary generation . . . that he may be the "Son of God". . . . This passage not only expresses a unity of person in Christ, but at the same time points out that, in clothing himself with human flesh, Christ is the Son of God. As the name, Son of God, belonged to the divine essence of Christ from the beginning, so now it is applied unitedly to both natures, because the secret and heavenly manner of generation has separated him from the ordinary rank of men.[2]

Calvin sees the title "Mother of our Lord" as assuring us that it is none other than the Son of God who acts in man's redemption. "The name of the Son of God is given to him who is born of a virgin, and the virgin herself is called the Mother of our Lord."[3] "The name denotes a unity of person in the two natures of Christ."[4] Calvin frequently refers to Mary's agency in terms equivalent to this title, so as to emphasize the truth that it is really the Son of God whom she conceived and to whom she gave birth. "The holy Virgin has conceived the Son of God," and "carried in her womb Christ the eternal wisdom of God."[5] "Truly the fruit that she carried was the Son of God."[6] Mary "would give birth to the unique Son of God," and is therefore "the mother of the Son of God."[7] "The Son of the Virgin Mary is God; yea, the everlasting God."[8]

In one of his sermons, Calvin attributes an even more extensive significance to the title "Mother of our Lord." It witnesses to the reality of the two natures in hypostatic union and to our own inheritance in the Son's glory.

> As for what Elizabeth says: "the mother of our Lord," it is to show us that the Son of God has to such an extent been united in two natures, that is to say, that he has so conjoined the human nature that he took of ours, with his divine

1. *Catechism of the Church of Geneva* (1545), in J.K.S. Reid (ed.), *Calvin: Theological Treatises* (Library of Christian Classics, Vol. XXII, Philadelphia, 1954), p. 97.
2. *Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists, Matthew, Mark and Luke*, on Luke 1:34.
3. *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, II, xiv, 4.
4. *Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists*, on Luke 1:43.
5. *Soixante cinq Sermons de Jean Calvin sur l'Harmonie des trois Evangelistes, S. Matthieu, S. Marc, et S. Luc* (Geneva, 1562), Serm. IX (p. 141f.); *Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists*, on Luke 1:26f. Cf. also *Soixante cinq Sermons*, Serm. XXII (p. 398); XXXIII (p. 585).
6. *Ibid.*, IX (p. 146).
7. *Ibid.*, XIII (p. 210); X (p. 162); XXXIII (p. 586).
8. *The Mystery of Godliness* (Grand Rapids, 1950), p. 20.

essence, that is it but one person only. . . . If our Lord Jesus Christ had not taken a human body, or if he had possessed his divinity as separate, where would all our felicity be today? . . . [But] as he is God eternal, so also is he true man; and more so that he unites us in faith, in order that we may be made sons of God, and participants of his glory, of which he is truly heir in his human nature, and which also belongs to him by right inasmuch as he is eternal God with his Father.[9]

Calvin, then, regards the title "Mother of our Lord" and its equivalents as safeguarding the Christian witness both to the Divine Person of our Lord and to the reality of his human nature. Since man's salvation requires that the Redeemer be fully and truly human, Calvin asserts the full human reality of Mary's conception and childbearing. Christ's true humanity depends on Mary's true conception.

It is absolutely necessary to repair the disobedience of our first father Adam, and efface all our rebellions and iniquities, that he be made true man, and that he take the servant's state in order to subject himself to the Law. . . . But above all, . . . we must note where it is said that "the Virgin will conceive in her womb." Jesus Christ therefore has not been only a figure, or phantom of man, as some ancient heretics have tried to destroy his humanity to take away the whole basis of our faith. But he has been conceived. Now this conception implies that truly he was of the seed of David.

The word "conceive" is enough to set aside the dream of Marcion and Manichaeus: for it is easy to gather from it that Mary brought forth not an ethereal body or phantom, but the fruit which she had previously conceived in her womb.[10]

Again, the true nutrition involved in Mary's agency as mother is adduced by Calvin to uphold the true humanity of our Lord against the docetic views of Servetus and the Anabaptists, who held that the Virgin was but "the channel through which Christ flowed." Calvin argues:

I . . . ask whether they are not forced to admit that he was nourished to maturity in the Virgin's womb. Justly, therefore, we infer from the words of Matthew, that Christ inasmuch as he was begotten of Mary, was procreated of her seed.[11]

If Mary did not contribute a real nutrition, there is no real Redeemer; to say that "his flesh came forth from the essence of God, and was converted into Deity, reduces the eternal hypostasis of the Lord to nothing, and robs us of the Son of David, who was the promised Redeemer."[12]

The virgin-conception effected by the operation of the Holy Spirit establishes for Calvin the sinlessness of Christ's human nature, to be the ground for the regeneration of man's corrupt nature. In his catechism Calvin states the reason for such a conception:

Because human seed is wholly corrupt, it was necessary and proper that the Holy Spirit should intervene in the generation of the Son of God, that he might not be affected by this contagion, but endued with the most perfect purity.[13]

9. *Soixante cinq Sermons*, IX (p. 155f.).
10. *Ibid.*, VII (p. 104); *Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists*, on Luke 1:31.
11. *Institutes*, II, xiii, 3.
12. *Ibid.*, II, xiv, 8.
13. *Calvin: Theological Treatises*, p. 97.

And in a sermon he says:

The Virgin Mary has conceived, not in the common fashion, not according to the order of nature, but by the sacred and admirable power of God, who has wished to sanctify his unique Son from his origin and conception.[14]

Or again, in a commentary on the Lucan infancy narative:

As it was necessary that he should be real man, in order that he might expiate our sins, and vanquish death and Satan in our flesh: so it was necessary in order to his cleansing of others, that he should be freed from every "spot and blemish." Though Christ was formed of the seed of Abraham, yet he contracted no defilment from a sinful nature; for the Spirit of God kept him pure from the very commencement: and this was done not merely that he might abound in personal holiness, but chiefly that he might sanctify his own people. The manner of conception, therefore, assures us that we have a Mediator "separate from sinners."[15]

Calvin points out that the virgin-conception assures us of Christ's sinless nature, not because it involved the absence of intercourse, but because it was effected by the Holy Spirit:

We do not hold Christ to be free from all taint merely because he was born of a woman unconnected with a man, but because he was sanctified by the Spirit, so that the generation was pure and spotless, such as it would have been before man's fall.[16]

Perpetual virginity, ascribed to Mary in traditional Christian piety, though hardly a central feature of her role in the Incarnation, is conservatively treated by Calvin. The lack of any Scriptural reference seems to impose a certain reserve on his teaching. So, for example, in strongly opposing the inferences drawn by Helvidius from Matt. 1:25, he writes:

Let us rest satisfied with this, that no just and well-grounded inference can be drawn from these words of the Evangelist, as to what took place after the birth of Christ. He is called "first born"; but it is for the sole purpose of informing us that he was born of a pure virgin.[17]

Later, however, he refers in the pulpit to those who do take the words "first born" to mean that "the Virgin Mary had other children than the Son of God" as fanatics under diabolical possession,[18] and in his commentaries, each time the New Testament refers to Christ's "brethren," Calvin points out that the word is to be taken in the sense of "relatives" or "cousins."

II

When he came to deal with the Annunciation and with Mary's response, Calvin had perforce to be more cautious. With good reason he reacted vigorously against the popular Marian devotions of the late middle ages,

14. *Soixante cinq Sermons*, XXII (p. 398).
15. *Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists*, on Luke 1:35.
16. *Institutes*, II, xiii, 4.
17. *Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists*, on Matt. 1:25.
18. *Soixante cinq Sermons*, XXII (p. 400f.).

which could fearlessly confuse creature and Creator—Calvin singled out particularly the petition to Mary, "Ask the Father; command the Son" —and which tended to relegate Christ to the position of a severe judge while substituting his mother as the merciful mediator. Calvin sought to uphold the primacy of God's action in salvation, to restate more boldly man's total incapacity to initiate his salvation, and to place our salvation, and Mary's, firmly in the kindness of God who assumed man's nature that he might be man's one Redeemer and Mediator.

Thus when Calvin considers the blessedness of Mary, proclaimed by the angel and resounding from the lips of mankind through Elizabeth, he points out that this blessedness was only a result of the divine kindness; God, in choosing to honour the Virgin by making her the mother of the Redeemer, was not rewarding her for any personal merit that could have given her a prior claim upon God.

> God has found no reason in her person, to show himself so liberal in exalting her to such a degree of honour, except insomuch as she was low and contemptible. . . . She was but as someone hidden in the dust, to whom God has held out his hand, and chosen to raise.
>
> It is not necessary to look at what she merits, as she herself admonishes us when she says that God has had regard for nothing but her poverty, and that it has been by pure grace that he has chosen her.[19]

Hence all Mary's "happiness, righteousness, and life flow from the undeserved love of God; her virtues and all her excellence are nothing more than divine kindness."[20]

Calvin insists that Mary's response to the Annunciation in no way compromises God's initiative in man's salvation. Since God had chosen Mary for her role before the beginning of time, there is no possibility of her having made the initial move by offering to be the mother, and so of our salvation's seeming to depend equally on the movement of the creature and on that of the Creator. Thus, when the holy Virgin proclaims herself the handmaid of the Lord, it does not mean that she comes to him, and gives herself into his service "by her own motion," but rather that she confesses "she has been chosen by him, even before she was born, even before the creation of the world, and that she has been reserved as his."[21]

But while God alone initiates salvation and gratuitously chooses Mary to be the mother of the Saviour, Calvin allows that Mary must make a true or moral response. Her response involves her, in an analogical sense, in a co-operation with God that bears not only on her own salvation, but on that of all mankind. While she could not have prevented God from redeeming man in some other way, her free response allowed the salvation God offered her and all mankind to come into the world in the particular way it did.

Calvin brings out the reality of Mary's response in his comments on the

19. *Ibid.*, X (p. 165); VI (p. 89); cf. IX (p. 141).
20. *Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists*, on Luke 1:28.
21. *Soixante cinq Sermons*, X (p. 169).

angelic salutation. The Mary to whom the angel appeared was already such a careful observer of the works of God, that she at once perceived that the angel bore God's authority; she received the salutation with an "attentive mind," considering its object and meaning, for "it instantly occurred to her that the angel had not been sent for a trifling purpose." Further, the angel adapted his message to the prophecies which were "well known and esteemed by the godly," so as to affect "more powerfully the mind of the Virgin." Mary, now persuaded in her mind of the kindness of God, was led "to admit in the fullest manner, that she had received a message as to raising up anew the throne of David."

These are weighty expressions, "Behold the handmaid of the Lord": for she gives and devotes herself unreservedly to God, that he may freely dispose of her according to his pleasure . . . She is convinced of the power of God, follows cheerfully where he calls, trusts also in his promise, and not only expects it, but eagerly desires its accomplishment.[22]

Calvin goes on to say:

Mary was "blessed," because embracing in her heart the promise of God, she conceived and brought forth a Saviour to herself and to the whole world. . . . God offers his benefits indiscriminately to all, and faith opens its bosom to receive them; while unbelief allows them to pass away, so as not to reach us. If there had been any unbelief in Mary, that could not prevent God from accomplishing his work in any other way which he might choose. But she is called "blessed," because she received by faith the blessing offered to her, and opened up the way to God for its accomplishment; while unbelief, on the other hand, shuts the gate, and restrains his hand from working, that they who refuse the praise due to its power may not feel its saving effect.

III

While Calvin, then, insists that Mary is at one with us in a total dependence upon God for the unmerited gift of salvation, he at the same time claims for her, thanks to God's choice of her and to her acceptance of her role, a unique position as first within the Church. The divine kindness in salvation, manifested to the Church, is shown to the Church first in the person of Mary.

Let us understand that God in the person of her has wished to show us his infinite goodness, in that he has willed that his unique Son take our flesh and our nature, in order to be our brother and our flesh: and that by this means we are able to obtain the heritage of life. Besides let us learn to give such authority to the Virgin Mary as belongs: for otherwise we are not able to be assured of our salvation. It is not necessary to look for what she merits, as she herself admonishes us, in saying that God has regarded only her complete poverty, and that it has been by pure grace that he has chosen her. It suffices us that God wished to make use of her in this respect.[23]

Again, the Church's response of faith in God and of confidence in his promises is made by the Church first in the person of Mary: "Embracing

22. *Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists*, on Luke 1:29–45.
23. *Soixante cinq Sermons*, VI (p. 88f.); cf. p. 91f.

in her heart the promises of God, she conceived and brought forth a Saviour to herself and to the whole world." Calvin points out that, as Abraham was the father of the faithful, so Mary in her *fiat* now shows to the Church the faith that must be added to God's kindness towards us:

> We see . . . the instruction which is given to us by the Virgin Mary, who will be a good mistress on condition that we profit in her school as we should, that we ask it be done to us according to the word of God. . . . The Virgin Mary is to us here a mirror of the faith we must supply to our God.[24]

And the Church, if God's saving work is to be accomplished amongst us, must make the response of its prototype.

> Let us examine well the power for our edification. Let us do as the Virgin Mary, and say, Lord, that it may be done to me according to thy word, that there may be an inseparable bond between the word of God and his power, . . . and after that, that we know that it will have its effect, that it contains nothing that God may not accomplish, and that he may carry it out as seems good to him.[25]

Further, Mary's *fiat* illustrates for Calvin a principle of primary importance for his concept of the Church's ministry.

> [Mary] gives authority to the word which is announced to her by the messenger of God, not regarding him who speaks but him who has sent him. Inasmuch as Gabriel was authorized by God, and carried the message to the Virgin, she knew it was necessary that she receive his word. And this is a very useful instruction to us. For God does not descend from the sky in a visible fashion today, to assure us of his will; likewise he will not send the angels; but he uses the means that he has established in his Church, which is to raise up men who may be there as in his person, and who speak by him. . . . It is necessary to arrive at this principle, that although those who have the office and charge of teaching be similar to us, and that they be men subject to every infirmity, nevertheless that must diminish nothing from the authority of the word that they carry. . . .[26]

Calvin goes on to say that there are fanatics who, failing to understand this principle which Mary recognized, have attempted to overthrow the ministry of the Church and to rely on direct instruction from God.

Again, Calvin sees Mary as the Church's continuing prototype in the way of human response to the promises of God, in the sacramental life of the Church. Thus, for instance, he says on the Holy Communion:

> See how we must now practise this sentence. That it be done to us according to the word: that is to say, inasmuch as our Saviour Jesus Christ is given to us, that we receive him. And how? We do not understand the way; . . . but it suffices to us that God has given us his word. . . . Our Lord Jesus Christ gives as pledge of his body and of his blood a piece of bread and a drop of wine. . . . We need not regard the bread . . . nor the wine; but let the word be above everything. . . . When we have the word which our Lord Jesus pronounces, "Behold my body which is given for you; behold my blood which is shed for

24. *Ibid.*, VIII (p. 136).
25. *Ibid.*, p. 135.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 133ff.

the remission of sins"; it is necessary that from our side we obey, saying: Be it so Lord. Just as you have said, let it be done.[27]

Finally, what honour, if any, is the Church to pay to the Virgin Mary in recognition of the unique service for which God chose her? Calvin points out that there are two common faults: the one which refuses to honour those whom God has blessed, the other which gives excessive honour to such and converts them into idols. He makes it quite plain that God's choice of Mary as mother of the Redeemer, and the integral relationship of our redemption to Mary's role, require that a deliberate recognition be given to Mary by the Church. Thus he writes:

She is justly called blessed, on whom God bestowed the remarkable honour of bringing into the world his own Son, through whom she had been spiritually renewed. And at this day, the blessedness brought to us by Christ cannot be the subject of our praise, without reminding us, at the same time, of the distinguished honour which God was pleased to bestow on Mary, in making her the mother of his only begotten Son.[28]

Again, Calvin says in a sermon:

We know she must be continued to be called blessed as she said herself; . . . knowing that God has chosen her to a service so honourable and excellent, that is, to be the mother of our Saviour and Redeemer.[29]

But while the Church must continue to recall and proclaim Mary's singular blessedness, it must not forget that Mary is one of the Church, and that she owes her blessedness to its one God and Saviour. Hence we properly praise Mary when we both recognize her unique role and follow the example of her *Magnificat*.

See again how well the Virgin Mary attributes everything to the pure goodness of God, because he had done her an honour so great and excellent, that she should be the mother of his unique Son, and that she should carry in her womb the Saviour of the world. Now . . . we see how she appraises herself, which we must note well in order that we may agree with her, if we wish to render her the praises that she approves and accepts. . . . So let us now learn to praise the holy Virgin. And how? Let us concur with the Holy Spirit (*i.e.*, as he moved Mary in the *Magnificat* to recognize her singular blessedness, but to glorify God for it); and then there will be genuine praises. . . . We will esteem her as she must be esteemed, in esteeming her as the Holy Spirit teaches us; but it is also necessary that with the praise there be the imitation. . . . When we understand that the Virgin Mary is set up as an example, and confess with her that we are nothing, that we are worth nothing, and that we owe all to the pure goodness of our God, see how we will be disciples of the Virgin Mary and will show that we have well retained her doctrine. And what honour are we able to do her greater than that?[30]

It is evident from this brief survey that Calvin considered the role of the Virgin Mary to be of something more than peripheral interest to the theology

27. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
28. *Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists*, on Luke 1:42.
29. *Soixante cinq Sermons*, XXXIX (p. 694).
30. *Ibid.*, X (pp. 169ff.).

and life of the Church; he saw her motherhood as integral to the Incarnation of the Son of God, and appealed to that motherhood both to defend the integrity and to bring out the full significance of the Incarnation; in Mary he saw exemplified principles which bear directly on the whole life of the Church, and he was concerned that the Church should not fail to give proper recognition to her singular role. Calvin's treatment of Mary as a responsible human agent through whom and, in a sense, together with whom, God worked to accomplish man's salvation, has implications (not developed by Calvin himself) which bear directly on any ecumenical discussion of the sacraments and ministry. The fact that Calvin, while still reacting strongly against the Marian deviations of the communion which he had renounced, did not hesitate to give such attention to Mary's role in his writing and his preaching, lends weight to the suggestion that this theme might profitably claim more serious consideration than it ordinarily receives in contemporary Protestantism.

The Minister's Self-Discipline*

NEIL GREGOR SMITH

AT the beginning of his treatise on patience (*De Patientia*) Tertullian confessed that he was often troubled by the faults of impatience. He acknowledged that it might appear unseemly that he, a most impatient man, should undertake to extol the merits of patience. He justified his endeavour by reasoning that as an invalid may speak feelingly about the blessings of health so ordinary and fallible mortals may speak about the blessings of those virtues which they lack. It is with this justification that a minister who is painfully aware of the difficulties involved in trying to exercise self-discipline upon himself ventures to make some observations on the necessity for self-discipline in the Christian ministry.

I

When William Adams Brown was writing twenty-five years ago in *The Church Catholic and Protestant* of what Protestants could learn from Roman Catholics, one of his points was that Protestants might learn from them the necessity for discipline in the culture of the spiritual life. He noted that Protestantism set its ideals for man very high, and that it had been right in this, but that it had tended to underestimate the difficulty of achieveing the ideals and the necessity for discipline if they are to be approached at all. Roman Catholicism, on the other hand, insists that everyone needs discipline in the culture of the spiritual life, and that even the Pope should have a confessor.

> The methods used have often been crude, and Protestants have been right in rejecting them, but they have done little to fill the empty place. Wesley did something by his institution of the class leader. The Salvation Army has done something by its adoption of military methods. For the most part Protestants have assumed that prayer was a simple matter and each person could be trusted to practise it in his own way. There has been no rule to which one was asked to conform, and when a rule has been self-imposed there is no one to see whether it had in fact been obeyed. So for many Protestants prayer has become a forgotten art.[1]

Here is a problem which all of us who are Protestants know at first hand. In the use we may make of any spiritual disciplines we are free to be as strict or as easy upon ourselves as we choose and, human nature being what it is, our

*An abridgement of two lectures given at the Niagara Conference on Missionary Education (May, 1960), under the sponsorship of the Committee on Christian Education, Canadian Council of Churches.

1. William Adams Brown, *The Church Catholic and Protestant*, p. 329f.

tendency is to be easy on ourselves. A lady who left one of the larger Protestant denominations to join a Christian Science group gave, as one of her reasons, the fact that Christian Science required her to read specific portions of the Bible every day. The church she was leaving, she pointed out, did not require this of her. It is not quite an answer to this implied criticism to say that the Church she was leaving would have been delighted to see her read her Bible every day. Her point was that it was not required of her.

One of the weaknesses of traditional Protestantism has been the disproportion between the time and effort expended on securing religious conversions in the first place and the time and effort expended in providing help, nurture, and encouragement for the converts' growth in grace after they have been received. The traditional "means of grace," the reading and the preaching of the Word and the administration of the sacraments, are offered in the churches, but there is little direction given to communicant members regarding the disciplines which are necessary if these are really to be means of grace. Many Protestants assume that they can take them or leave them, and nobody seems very much concerned that so many do leave them. There is a tendency to suppose that one great act of decision and commitment is all that is necessary to assure a full-orbed Christian life, and that this decision is a step that puts us on an escalator which will lift us automatically to the heavenly places. No one would belittle the importance of a decisive act of commitment; but such a decision for discipleship commits us to the making of a whole series of decisions, which go on all through life, and which are by no means always easy to make. We Protestants have had a great deal to say about the Pauline word: "By grace ye are saved through faith." We have not had nearly as much to say about another word which is equally Pauline: "I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection, lest that by any means when I have preached to others I should be myself a castaway."

The lack of spiritual disciplines, which marks Protestantism generally, is felt acutely in the ranks of the Protestant ministry. The clergy of the Roman Catholic Church are required to read the daily offices of the Breviary. Day by day they have access to the treasures of the Psalter and a rich collection of prayers and devotional readings. The clergy of the Church of England are expected to read the offices of Morning and Evening Prayer daily, which means that they go through the Psalter once a month, and the greater part of the Bible once a year. The rest of us are left largely to our own devices. It is reported that at a denominational convention the delegates were asked to indicate the amount of time spent, on the average, in private prayer. Despite the widespread tendency towards inflation in figures given in ecclesiastical statistics, the answers indicated that the average time spent in private prayer was about three minutes daily. Like the worthy workmen of Ecclesiasticus our prayers may be in the work of our hands, but it may be suspected that the spending of so little time directly in spiritual exercises can be a serious handicap to us. Nolan B. Harmon, in his work on *Ministerial*

Ethics and Etiquette, has drawn attention to our common temptation to allow our devotional life to deteriorate:

A man's very familiarity with sacred things may breed, not contempt, but spiritual obtuseness. The Bible becomes a quarry out of which to dig texts, not a reservoir for personal spiritual refreshment. Prayer is something done for others, not for oneself. The lives of the saints, the rich devotional writings . . . of classic worthies of the past become sermonic material with which to stir others, not the heart throbs out of which life may be made: and we become—God forgive us—professional.[2]

Our Protestant churches have long expressed their desire to have the services of "a learned and godly ministry." In practice it would seem that there are more encouragements offered and more helps provided to assist us in becoming learned than to assist us in becoming godly.

II

There are penalties we pay for this neglect of spiritual discipline. The usefulness of our abilities and our learning may be short-circuited by the growth of flaws of character. In *Jane Eyre* we are told of the reactions of a parishoner to the eloquent preaching of the Rev. St. John Rivers:

The heart was thrilled, the mind astonished by the power of the preacher: neither were softened. Throughout there was a strange bitterness, an absence of consolatory gentleness. . . . Instead of feeling better, calmer, more enlightened by his discourse, I experienced an inexpressible sadness: for it seemed to me that the eloquence had sprung from a depth where there lay turbid dregs of disappointment—where moved troubled impulses of insatiate yearnings and disquieting aspirations. . . . I was sure that St. John Rivers had not yet found the peace of God that passeth understanding: he had no more found it than I had.[3]

The turbid dregs of disappointment, the resentments we have nursed, the bitterness caused by the little hurts we carry with us to our graves—all these in various combinations can impair our spiritual health and vitiate the usefulness of our ministries.

We are exposed in the Christian ministry to all the temptations which the flesh is heir to. Some take on an aggravated form because we have to meet them in solitariness. We give pastoral counselling, but there is no one to counsel us. Service in the Church often puts us in the position of competing, or appearing to compete, with our brethren. There is rivalry among us for the more desirable pastorates and for the positions of influence and power in our denominations. However sincere we may be in our desire to serve the Church of Jesus Christ and render a faithful stewardship of our gifts, few of us can claim that we are not motivated to some extent by the appeals of larger stipends and increased prestige. Daniel D. Walker, in *The Human Problems of the Minister*, suggests that like the poor who are with us always, the status-seeker is always likely to be with us in the Church.

2. Nolan B. Harmon, *Ministerial Ethics and Etiquette*, p. 46.
3. Charlotte Bronte, *Jane Eyre*, Chap. 30.

In all denominations the way in which a man assigned to a church often seems compelled to compete with his predecessor by telling what bad shape he found the records in, or how many people were glad to see the change, is embarrassing. And even denominational executives, after they have been elected, and presumably have reached the top rung of the ladder, are not free to enjoy the spiritual fellowship of a ministry untarnished by personal ambitions and the drive to stand at the top. They vie with one another for key committee assignments and membership on principal boards: intense jealousies are sometimes found among their wives, who insist on their prerogatives: they are often over-conscious of the popularity of other church leaders and they pull strings to gain additional advantages.[4]

We could lay this flattering unction to our souls that Mr. Walker was describing conditions which exist in the American church. We know too well, however, that such conditions exist in all churches. In all of them ambitious men reflect sometimes upon the necessity of cultivating the acquaintance of the right people, pulling the right strings, and playing their cards properly to get ahead in the church. This goes on even in churches which assert the parity of ministers, yet also assert in practice that some are a little more equal than others. Even in the church of the apostles there was a man named Diotrophes who wanted to have pre-eminence; and even in the company of the twelve disciples there were two who wanted the best positions in the Lord's kingdom.

We have no monopoly on this professional rivalry, with its concomitants of envy and uncharitableness. There was a proverb current among the Greeks, "Praise not to the potter another potter's pots," which suggests that the trait of professional rivalry was not unknown to the Greek potters. Sir William Osler noted its prevalence among physicians, and spoke of it as being "more disastrous than intemperance, because destructive of all mental and moral nobility." It is natural and wholesome to have an ambition to excel in work we undertake. We would be poor creatures without some such ambition. It is no solution to the problem to tell us to fling away ambition, as the sin by which the angels fell. Is it not much more wholesome to direct it, in self-discipline, into useful and constructive channels? St. Paul counselled that ambitious young cleric, Timothy, to study or, as it may be rendered, be ambitious to show himself approved unto God. To keep ambition focused on this high goal in a competitive society requires self-discipline of the highest order. When it gets out of control it appears in various unlovely forms. "The neurotic minister," wrote Stolz, "is prone to sacrifice the Christian qualities of love, service, and humility, on the altar of rivalry. If he gains power and admiration he is likely to become anxious lest he lose his gains. If he fails he feels depressed, defeated, scorned and frustrated."[5] The common ministerial faults which are pilloried so often in the portraits of ministers in fiction, and which appear so often in real life—egotism, dogmatism, intolerance, and thinly veneered selfishness—will flourish anywhere if they are not kept in check by spiritual disciplines. Even very brief

4. Daniel B. Walker, *The Human Problems of the Minister*, p. 40.
5. Karl R. Stolz, *Psychotherapy and the Church*, p. 236.

devotional exercises, consistently followed, offer help for us in our problems of self-discipline. The discipline of devotional reading of the Scriptures, where we read them not to hunt for texts or illustrations for sermons but to hear what God has to say to us; the reading of devotional classics in which men have voiced their struggles with their doubts and sought to arm themselves for their warfare; the disciplines of prayer, in all the varied forms which prayer may take—all these help to bring us face to face with objective standards by which we may evaluate our achievements and our shortcomings. Their employment brings us, for brief intervals at least, out of our spiritual isolation into a place of vision where we may see ourselves and our problems in the wider perspective of God's purposes.

III

Apart from any other values they may have, the consistent practice of spiritual disciplines helps to give poise and balance to the emotional states which affect our judgments, our utterances, and our behaviour. A pertinent biblical illustration of the consequences of being subject to such variations of mood is seen in the spiritual depression of Elijah after his contest with the prophets of Baal. He plummeted from a mood of elation to a mood of despair. In his mood of despair he abandoned his work, concluded that the cause of God was hopeless, and that life was not worth living. "It is enough!" he wailed. "Now, O Lord, take away my life, for I am not better than my fathers."

What had gone wrong? It would appear that he was suffering from a break-down of spiritual discipline. His egotism had grown to unhealthy proportions. When a man complains that he is ready to die because he is not better than his fathers, it is fair to assume that he must have thought, at one time, that he was better than his fathers. He had apparently thought that he was going to succeed where all his predecessors had failed. He may have thought that the fathers were a bit dim-witted not to have thought of staging a contest with the prophets of Baal. His own contest had come off as well as he could have hoped, but the results were disappointing. Baalism was still in business, and Jezebel had vowed to have his life. His egotism had been painfully deflated, and he had discovered that he was not, after all, better than his fathers.

It cannot be claimed that he was troubled by rivalry, or by envy of his fellow-workers. He thought he was so far out in front that he had no rivals. He was, however, in a state of spiritual isolation. He thought that he stood alone. "I, even I only, am left." In the grip of this mood of depression his whole outlook upon life and upon his work was blackened.

God ministered to his despondent servant by first prescribing food and rest. Elijah lay down and slept, and when he wakened there was a cruse of water for him, and a cake baked on the coals. There may be a suggestion here that when the prophet had a good rest and a good meal he would take

a less despondent view of the situation in which he found himself. Physical exhaustion and prolonged emotional stress can affect our powers of judgment and bring us to the point where things look blacker than they are because we have lost the courage to face them. Prophets who are tempted to join the "We've Had It" school might sometimes be well advised to have a good rest and a good meal before giving voice to dismal utterances about the decay of manners and morals in contemporary society.

When the prophet had been refreshed with food and with the sleep that is "the balm of hurt minds" and "chief nourisher in life's feast," he was summoned to go and stand upon the mount before the Lord. Here is a sound prescription for many of our moods of frustration and discouragement —to stand upon the mount before the Lord. Any spiritual discipline which brings us for even a few brief moments into the presence of God may help us to see our problems and ourselves in an altered perspective.

Then, at the end, the prophet was reminded that he was not, after all, alone: "Yet I have left me seven thousand in Israel, all the knees which have not bowed unto Baal, and every mouth which hath not kissed him." Elijah was not quite as important in the scheme of things as he had fancied himself to be when he thought that he stood alone. He was reminded that there were others who shared his faith and his concern. With one of these thousands at his side he went back to the work he had been prepared to abandon.

The regular practice of some form of spiritual discipline can have something of the same therapeutic value as this experience of Elijah. For the minister who has so often to contend with fluctuating moods and emotional strains the spiritual disciplines which open our eyes to the wonders of God's wisdom and God's patience can be an effective call to stand upon the mount before the Lord.

IV

There is, of course, difficulty in finding time for such exercises in spiritual discipline. In the pattern of our lives it may be difficult to have set times for devotional exercises, although most of us, if we were honest with ourselves, would have to admit that we could have more regularity in such practices if we were really concerned about them. Our tendency is to alternate between extremes of spiritual apathy and spiritual zeal. At one extreme, often in abject penitence for past failures, we outline for ourselves a program of devotional exercises which would require the leisure of a monastic establishment to carry out. We weary of it, or find it impossible to follow, and then go for intervals without anything. It is advisable to prescribe for ourselves a course of devotional exercises modest enough in its demands upon our time to permit us to follow it consistently. There is then a much better prospect of our disciplining ourselves to keep to the program, and to follow it through whether we like it or not.

The finding of time for devotional practices, and indeed the whole

problem of our use of time, is basically a spiritual issue, involving our stewardship of one of God's precious gifts—the gift of time. We cannot do very much about delimiting our work loads, or stretching out the time available for them, but most of us could do something towards plugging the leaks through which our time is wasted. One step towards plugging the leaks may be to cultivate the habit of intense concentration upon the task in hand. In the work of the ministry we often have many irons in the fire at the same time. Many projects have a claim upon our attention. There is a strong temptation to let our minds drift to various other projects while we have one before us. We start thinking about decisions we made yesterday, or decisions we will have to make tomorrow, and take twice as long as necessary to make up our minds about finishing the job that is before us now. Another step towards plugging the leaks is to cultivate the habit of decisiveness in our decisions. In making decisions about complicated problems there is often a wasteful procrastination about coming to a final judgment, even after all the evidence is in. While it may be a grievous fault to develop the impeuosity which leaps to decision without taking pains to collect and evaluate the evidence on which a sound decision should be made, it can also be a time-consuming fault to postpone the making of decisions because we are unable to make up our minds. We may hope that it will be easier to make up our minds tomorrow, but tomorrow will bring its own tasks. When the case of Guido was carried to the Pope in *The Ring and the Book*, the Pope realized that his judgment was to be the final one. The evidence was confusing to him, as it was to those who had tried the case in the lower courts. He was aware that he might err in his judgment, and that there could be no appeal from his judgment, but he had to make up his mind. Browning represents him as saying, after he had concluded that Guido was guilty:

> In after time,
> If some acuter wit, fresh probing, sound
> This multifarious mass of words and deeds
> Deeper, and reach through guilt to innocence,
> I shall face Guido's ghost nor blench a jot.
> God, who set me to judge thee, meted out
> So much of judging faculty, no more.
> Ask him if I was slack in use thereof.

This is a healthy-minded attitude to take towards such decisions as we have to make. We have so much of judging faculty, no more. We may make mistakes in exercising it, but it can be an even more serious fault to be slack in its use.

A final step towards avoiding waste of time is to learn to desist from re-making and re-considering decisions already made. Whether we regret them or approve of them, when our decisions have been made their consequences begin to work themselves out. As Esau discovered when he realized the value of the birthright he had thrown away, there are some decisions

whose consequences we cannot alter. For them we can find no place of repentance though we seek it earnestly, with tears. While the remembrance of such mistakes may serve a useful purpose in encouraging care and caution, it is disastrous to dissipate in regret over what happened yesterday the energies which should be given to the tasks of today. Through the careful husbanding of the time we have most of us could find room for the spiritual disciplines which can contribute to our own spiritual growth and to the usefulness of our ministries.

In addition to the devotional reading of the Bible many of us could make much more use than we do of the classic aids to devotion. The *Confessions* of St. Augustine, *The Imitation of Christ*, Jeremy Taylor's *Holy Living*, Brother Lawrence's *Practice of the Presence of God*, William Law's *Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life*, the *Letters* of Samuel Rutherford, Amiel's *Journal*, and Bunyan's *Grace Abounding* are works which have stood the tests of time and use. There are modern works like John Baillie's *Diary of Private Prayer*, and modern collections of prayers, which may be found helpful. There is enough variety in the range of such devotional guides to suit varied needs and varied tastes. *The Imitation of Christ* has gone through more editions than any other book in print, with the exception of the Bible. It was once estimated that there were fifteen hundred editions of it in existence, and it is still being reprinted. It is, as George Eliot said, "a lasting record of human needs and human consolations, the voice of a brother who, ages ago, felt, and suffered, and renounced." Another devotional work which many have found helpful is the *Private Prayers* of Lancelot Andrewes. This is a collection of prayers which makes extensive use of the devotional language of the Bible and the liturgies of the Eastern and Western churches. One of his admirers said of him that anyone who prays with Andrewes for a week will pray with him always. This may not be true of all, since God breaks not all hearts alike; but probably there will always be some for whom he will be a helpful guide in the art of prayer.

People sometimes expressed surprise that Alexander Whyte, a Presbyterian divine, studied the writings of the mystics and the devotional treasures which have come to us from all branches of Christ's Church. He not only read and studied them himself, but he urged others to read and study them. His explanation for the catholicity of his taste was that "the true catholic, as his name implies, is the well-read, the open-minded, the hospitable-hearted, the spiritually exercised evangelical." Such a man, he claimed, "belongs to all sects, and all sects belong to him."[6] The use of such aids to devotion may often tide us over those times which can come to any of us, when we do not feel great devotion ourselves, or when we can find no words with which to voice the surges of the movement of the spirit within us. In the providence of God it may be through the use of such helps that he answers the prayer which rises from us in our bewilderment, our perplexities, and our varying moods, "Lord, teach us to pray."

6. G. F. Barbour, *Life of Alexander Whyte*, p. 389.

Book Reviews

A Light to the Nations: An Introduction to the Old Testament. By Norman K. Gottwald. New York: Harper, 1959. Pp. xxiv, 615. $6.50.

This volume is not an "introduction" in the technical sense, in that it does not deal in detail with the text and the critical problems of each of the O.T. books. Rather its aim is to offer the student and the intelligent layman an overall picture of the world in which ancient Israel flourished, and a sympathetic and informed account of the religious history and the theological achievements of the pre-Christian Hebrews. The O.T. books and writers are treated in a more or less chronological fashion, the chronology being fixed by critical principles. The subject is one on which it is difficult to say something new, but the author's treatment of it is refreshing and competent, and he offers us a well-organized and readable book. The maps and charts, of which he makes considerable use, are a commendable feature of his work. In a general way this book may be compared in method, scope, and quality with B. W. Anderson's *Understanding the Old Testament* (1957).

One of Gottwald's special interests would appear to be Pentateuchal criticism (pp. 103–109, 214–233, 246–254, 334–346, 448–463), and here he champions the much maligned documentary hypothesis. While some of the points he makes are rather recondite for the general reader, the main criticism is that the author does not make clear that despite its long literary history, the Pentateuch emerged as an essential unity, and that as the Torah it presently came to dominate Jewish life and thought. Another minor criticism of this book is the small attention paid to the Psalter. While Gottwald's eleven pages for the Psalms is a more generous treatment of that subject than Anderson's two pages, in view of the importance of the Psalter in later Judaism and Christianity, it might have been discussed somewhat more fully.

If this book is reprinted a number of small inaccuracies should be corrected. On p. 53 "the church" (l. 31) should be "the Western church"; on p. 54, among the English versions of the Bible, the Bishops' Bible of 1568 should be included; on p. 55, the "American Revised" (l. 1) is usually referred to as the "American Standard Version"; on p. 69, in Chart 3, the Persian Empire dates from 559 (or 550), not from 538, and the dates 333–323 for the Macedonian Empire are rather curious, Alexander's dates being 336–323; twice on p. 77 the reference to the Roman Empire is an anachronism, for the principate as such did not commence until 27 B.C.; on p. 149 for "Jewish" (l. 36) read "Israelite," and for "Jews" (l. 38) read "Hebrews"; similarly on p. 269 for "Jews" (l. 30) read "Hebrews"; on

p. 305 for "Philistine Plain" (l. 35) read "Shephelah"; on p. 428 the dates of the Elephantine Papyri (l. 4) should be *ca.* 495–400; on p. 498 Mattathias had five sons, not four (l. 17), and the dates should be 167 and 164 (ll. 4, 26); on p. 527 "2:4" (l. 25) should be 2:4*b*; on p. 529 "five visions" (l. 34) should be "four visions."

W. Stewart McCullough

Department of Near Eastern Studies
University College, Toronto

The New Testament and Mythology. By Burton H. Throckmorton, Jr. Philadelphia: Westminster Press (Toronto: Ryerson Press), 1959. Pp. 255. $4.50.

This is a book for preachers, because it deals with a basic issue in contemporary presentation of the Gospel, Bultmann's proposal to discard the New Testament mythology. We are invited to state the truth of the Christian message or kerygma in terms of existentialism, man's self-understanding or lack of it.

Part One of the book helpfully states the Bultmann thesis and the procedure by which the Gospel is to be understood. Part Two discusses a few criticisms of Bultmann's treatment of the Crucifixion, the Resurrection, and eschatology. Included in the second part are two significant chapters on "Mythology" and "New Testament Mythology," in which the author makes it clear that Christian myths have to do with God, not merely human existence. He believes in the right use of the imagination. Myths are essential, and Christian insights must be expressed symbolically. At the same time, Throckmorton defends Bultmann against some of his more extreme critics. Part Three offers the author's own re-interpretation of eschatology, the pre-existence of the Christ, the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection; and the book ends with a thoughtful treatment of the authority of the Bible.

Bultmann believes that the cross and the resurrection, as the eschatological events, proclaim an act of God that challenges man to understand himself aright; and they do this because the preaching of the Word of God sacramentally re-presents the crucifixion. Thus I may be confronted with the revelatory event. But this limits the kerygma too severely according to our author, and it cannot do justice to the Christian belief that in and through the Cross there is a revelation of God's justice, mercy, and forgiveness; and that here too there is a proclamation of Christ's expiatory sacrifice. Bultmann really ignores the Church and the full meaning of the new life in its fellowship.

I would draw attention to the useful classification of New Testament myths in ch. VII, but I wonder if we could not agree to get rid of "mythic" and "mythical" as the adjectives from "myth" in its technical sense as a story about the divine in the human or the eternal in space and time? For these words suggest in English something that is altogether fairy-tale fantasy

and not at all "true" in the religious sense. "Mythological" should be the adjective. Again, the author constantly speaks of "Jesus' pre-existence," but this is not the Christian view: Jesus began to be only within his Mother's womb. The Logos or the Son or the Christ is pre-existent. I find it strange that Throckmorton accepts the fact of the "wrath" of God and yet denies "propitiation" of that wrath in the self-sacrifice of Jesus Christ (pp. 186, 193). He also omits to notice that the Qumran poet claims to have the inspiration of the Holy Spirit (pp. 149, 209), so that we must revise earlier notions about the disappearance of "prophecy."

On the Resurrection he says some excellent things against Bultmann (pp. 70 f., 201–206), and clarifies what is meant by the historical as distinct from the revelatory when the latter comes in and through the historical. But we are left feeling that all he can say of Easter is, "Christ was raised." All the rest is legend, to be accepted as pure myth and never to be interpreted literally. Yet he notes the new power in the believers, and the real presence of Christ in his Church; these are verifiable in experience. May we not therefore go farther, to claim that there must be an objective reality that elicited the Easter faith, and that the Resurrection "appearances" are *sui generis*? They were necessary (*a*) to communicate forgiveness to the disciples, and (*b*) to commission them anew for their Mission. Otherwise, we are left by Throckmorton in no better case than by Bultmann, and must be content to affirm that Easter was an event in the lives of the waiting disciples!

Finally, we note that for this writer the New Testament is to be taken or left as a whole (pp. 115, 141, 153), on the ground that the Church has no criterion of discrimination. Yet how did the Church determine to eliminate what is now non-canonical or apocryphal? It is not the simple thing that is asserted on p. 126: unbelief would have given a different picture, but belief has given in the New Testament "the most accurate account" we could have. For too much belief or a too credulous belief may also have been at work, and the results may remain in what is now canonical (e.g., in the virginal conception narratives and in the Matthean stories of the Resurrection). To take it all (but decline to take any of it literally!) is to negate the fruit of our modern critical and historical study of the New Testament.

The book is for preachers, indeed, but only for those who will take the trouble to enter into this difficult debate on the relation of revelation to history, of Jesus to the Christ of our sacraments and creeds, of mythology to eternal truth. We must be grateful for this book and its wrestling with these issues, for it makes a contribution of great value to our thinking.

George Johnston

McGill University
Montreal

The Memoirs Called Gospels. By G. P. Gilmour. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1959. Pp. xii, 299. $4.00.

This book has a misleading title. What is expected from it is a discussion of the sense in which the Gospels are memoirs; the case for and against the accuracy of transmission; the relation of theologizing to reminiscing; the remoulding of the Messianic concepts in the presentation of Jesus of Nazareth as their dynamic and creative fulfilment. In his preface Dr. Gilmour tells us that the book "grew out of the attempt to lecture on the gospels to university freshmen." While he offers some clarification of cryptic terms and a not unhappy survey of the teaching and career of Jesus, the total treatment is diffuse, leaving no strong impression of the meeting and handling of the great cultic and spiritual issues in Judaism in virtue of which Jesus was proclaimed Lord. Unless the freshmen's needs and capacities are even smaller than presumed, the meat provided them seems scarcely strong enough. Rather, this book would better be seen as a useful manual of reference in the hands of a senior Bible class leader; and for this purpose it should be very useful indeed.

Something which surprises, even in a book of this limited interest, is the failure to bring the fruits of the Dead Sea Scroll revelations to bear on the elucidation of the scene upon which Jesus entered, particularly since the university freshman would be aware of the claims of the discovery in the popular press at least. The work of Steinmann on John the Baptist and the Essene communities alone surely deserves some attention as bearing witness to the ferment upon which Jesus entered; but of this whole situation there is no mention. Again, the questions raised by *Formgeschichte* and the pertinent objections of the Uppsala school might be expected to provide the author with stimulating material for an apologia directed to a university constituency, where the prevailing temper is one of scepticism. Instead, this entire field is relegated to mention in the notes on the chapters at the back of the book. But perhaps the most notable failure is to bring the results of recent scholarship to bear on the great stumbling-block presented by the superficial differences between the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptic tradition. Most serious is the ignoring of the eschatological problem in its Johannine and Synoptic forms, since we have the solemn reminder of G. R. Beasley-Murray that eschatology is the chief source of puzzlement and rejection to the student of the Gospels. The author merely introduces the idea of "realized eschatology" briefly, without giving any notion of C. H. Dodd's argument for taking the Synoptic apocalyptic passages in this sense.

All in all, this is an old-fashioned book—more so than it needs to be even for a freshman audience.

B. G. M. Wood

St. John's College
Winnipeg

Jesus and the Servant: The Influence of the Servant Concept of Deutero-Isaiah in the New Testament. By MORNA D. HOOKER. London: S.P.C.K. (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre), 1959. Pp. xiii, 230. $5.50.

FOR THE Christian nothing can be of greater importance than to understand the teaching of Jesus and the implications of his death and resurrection. Any study, therefore, which throws further light on this subject will always be of very great interest for the *literati* of the Church, whether they are professedly theologians or thoughtful parish clergy or members of the intelligent laity. Miss Hooker's book, then, has something to say to all the readers of *CJT*.

Her enquiry begins by noting that Biblical scholars fall into one of two categories: those who say that the Servant-Figure of Isaiah 53 dominated and shaped the thinking of Jesus with regard to his passion, and those who deny any such influence and credit the interpretation of his death in the light of the Servant-Figure to the Hellenistic wing of the New Testament Church or (a smaller group) to Petrine influences. Miss Hooker instances among others Engnell, V. Taylor, C. R. North, J. Jeremias and R. H. Fuller as supporting the theory of Servant-influence and Jackson and Lake, F. C. Burkitt, H. J. Cadbury, W. Bousset and R. Bultmann as refusing to accept it. Obviously then this is a battle of giants, and one must wholeheartedly admire the courage with which our author refuses to be daunted by great names. Where they have assumed what they failed to prove, Miss Hooker says so, even though the scholar in question be a C. H. Dodd (p. 22) or a Vincent Taylor (p. 128).

The plan of the book is very clear. First, Miss Hooker relates the Servant Songs to their Deutero-Isaianic background, and then seeks to discover traces of their influence in the sayings of Jesus as recorded by the Synoptic Evangelists. This investigation involves a good deal of close linguistic detail and is painstakingly and honestly carried through. The influence of the Servant passages on the thinking of the N.T. Church is similarly investigated in the Fourth Gospel, the Epistles and Revelation. Miss Hooker's conclusion with regard to the former study is to be found on p. 102: "There is therefore very little in the Synoptics to support the traditional view that Jesus identified his mission with that of the Servant of the Songs: certainly there is nothing which could be accepted as proof for this view"; and at the finish of the second investigation she writes: "The second chapter of I Peter is the earliest definite proof for the full identification of Jesus with the Servant in all its Christological significance. Our study has thus revealed that there is little evidence that the Servant-Christology held any important place in Christian thought of the New Testament period" (pp. 101–102). Miss Hooker adds: "Those who maintain the traditional view that Jesus interpreted his death in terms of the vicarious sufferings of the Servant must therefore explain, not only the absence of evidence for this view in the Synoptics, but also why the Church apparently overlooked for so many

years the significance of passages which Jesus saw as the key to his Passion, and why it was only gradually that she came to make the connection between his sufferings and the Servant's vicarious atonement" (p. 102).

Miss Hooker then proceeds to examine the concept of suffering in the N.T., including the suffering of Jesus, of those who lived before him, and of his followers. Her conclusions are that the vicarious character of the sufferings of Jesus is to be found only in Matt. 26:28, Mark 10:45 and in the Epistles. In the primitive *kerygma* she finds no connection between the sufferings of Christ and the forgiveness of sins. But the Old Testament and the inter-testamental literature (which Miss Hooker rightly stresses) present a tradition concerning suffering as being the frequent lot of the righteous man who is perfectly obedient to the will of God and stress his eventual vindication. Thus that Jesus should suffer and be vindicated is "scriptural," *i.e.*, in accord with scripture teaching in the widest connotation of that phrase rather than with the exegesis of particular passages. It is also in this sense scriptural, claims our author, that the Son of Man title should be closely linked with the idea of suffering, since the very fact that in Dan. 7 and I Enoch he is a triumphant figure implies (in accordance with scripture) that he has previously been humiliated and is now vindicated. This is a strong point which we have not seen made elsewhere and which meets completely (though Miss Hooker does not make the point) Lake and Jackson's denial of suffering-prediction to Jesus since the Son of Man title is in their view purely an "apocalyptic" one. But Miss Hooker also adds that "there is no evidence that Jesus himself connected his death in particular with the forgiveness of sins" (p. 153).

In her conclusion, Miss Hooker boldly claims what some of us have been thinking for some time: that Duhm invented both "the Servant" and "the Servant problem" when he divorced the Servant Songs from their Deutero-Isaianic setting. "The present position of deadlock which has been reached in discussion of the New Testament use of the Servant theme is scarcely surprising, since the approach which presupposes the existence of a 'Servant' is fundamentally false" (p. 158). It will be seen that this is a brilliantly provocative piece of work, modestly written and with good temper but uncompromisingly frank where frankness is necessary.

The one weakness of the book is that it does not adequately face the exceedingly important question it raises with regard to the vicarious and atoning character of the death of Jesus. The last paragraph gives a hint of the very interesting line along which apparently Miss Hooker would seek an answer; but when she has achieved so much, we feel we have a right to ask for more. The author would doubtless reply that this lay outside the scope of her thesis, and this is true. But good theses often need to be expanded to make good books. However, this is a first-class piece of objective scholarship, disinterested except in a concern to lay bare the truth. As Professor C. Kingsley Barrett says in the Foreword: "I do not commit myself to every opinion she expresses, but I believe she has made out her main point. It may

be too much to hope that her arguments will meet with universal agreement; but if any dissent they encounter is to be effective, it will have to be based on evidence and reason and not upon prejudice." It is indeed a pleasure for the reviewer to see the work of a former student arrive in print with such freshness, cogency and originality.

STANLEY B. FROST

Faculty of Divinity
McGill University, Montreal

The Epistle to the Philippians (*Black's New Testament Commentaries*). By F. W. BEARE. London: Adam and Charles Black (Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd.), 1959. Pp. xii, 182. $3.25.

A SCHOLARLY one-volume commentary in English on Philippians, thoroughly abreast of modern research, is welcome indeed. Equally so is the inclusion of the work of Professor Frank Beare of Trinity College, University of Toronto, in the new series of *Black's New Testament Commentaries* under the general editorship of Dr. Henry Chadwick, Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford. It provides further evidence of the esteem in which Dr. Beare is held across the Atlantic. The high opinion of his ability entertained by American scholars had already secured the inclusion of his work on Colossians and Ephesians in the *Interpreter's Bible* several years ago.

Dr. Beare's new book takes its place in an interesting series beside those of Professor C. K. Barrett and the Rev. C. S. C. Williams, to name but two notable contributors. Its author's great asset as a New Testament scholar, eminently revealed in his stimulating commentary on I Peter, now in a well-deserved second edition, is his combination of sound scholarship with a remarkable freshness of approach. Until fairly recently Philippians has been considered generally as a literary unity, even by such discerning scholars as Martin Dibelius, Ernst Lohmeyer and Pierre Bonnard, as well as by C. H. Dodd and E. F. Scott. Dr. Beare argues persuasively that Philippians is what remains of the Apostle's Philippian correspondence. He develops E. J. Goodspeed's view that the epistle consists of two letters to arrive at the conclusion that there are three elements: a letter of thanksgiving, very nearly complete, acknowledging the gift that Epaphroditus had brought to St. Paul in prison in 4:10–20; what remains of a final letter sent with Epaphroditus when he returned to Philippi in 1:1–3:1; 4:2–9, 21–23; and a long interpolation, earlier in date than the other two letters, warning its recipients against Jewish propaganda and self-indulgence, in 3:2–4:1. The arguments adduced for this three-fold division are drawn not only from content but from language. *Chairete* in 3:1 and 4:4, for example, is translated as "farewell" in the light of Goodspeed's researches, rather than as "rejoice." *Apechō* in 4:18 is shown, from the evidence of first-century documents, to be the common term for acknowledging payments, and so interpreted. The cumulative evidence supporting the divisions leads this

reviewer at least to accept the partition as the best explanation available. Dr. Beare associates all the material with the Philippian church, accepts after close examination, as far as the "letter of thanks" and the "final letter" are concerned, the ancient hypothesis that Philippians was written from Rome during St. Paul's imprisonment, and places their date somewhere between 60 and 64. He suggests the possibility of 55 for the "interpolation." While one may easily accept these contentions for the letters associated with Epaphroditus, one cannot so readily do so concerning that of the destination of the interpolated fragment warning against Jewish propaganda and self-indulgence. According to Acts, there were insufficient Jews in Philippi to have a synagogue, and the mere fact that the interpolation is now associated with Philippian correspondence seems insufficient to support adequately a Philippian destination for it. Dr. Beare's remark on page 24, "It is impossible to arrive at any certainty about the destination of this fragment," is more consonant with the facts than is his later statement on page 102, "We must regard it as probable that our fragment likewise belongs to his correspondence with the church at Philippi."

Of individual passages one may observe that the great Christological section in 2:6–11 is considered as a Christian hymn, following Lohmeyer, but incorporated by St. Paul as the composition of a younger Gentile convert and hence not affecting the integrity of the document. There is much good sense in the exposition of "with the bishops and deacons" in 1:1, in which it is noted that, while there is no reason to consider the words as interpolated, one is not entitled to read into them in this context the significance which is theirs in later Catholic usage.

Throughout the book evidences of sound judgement and exegetical tact are not wanting. The translation of the epistle is attractive and stimulating. Nor is the *spiritualité* of the letters overlooked. But it is the quality of Dr. Beare's learning that is most impressive. He has had the advantages of an excellent classical background, including the teaching of Greek and Latin in two Canadian universities, before beginning New Testament study. He has also had opportunity to serve his apprenticeship in research on two continents, at the *Ecole des Hautes Etudes* of the University of Paris and at the University of Chicago, where he earned his doctorate, some fifteen years ago, in New Testament studies. Hence it is in a sense unfortunate that his commentary is directed, as J. B. Lightfoot's never was, to "the Greekless student and the serious general reader." It is manifestly unfair to compare it as a Biblical commentary with Professor C. K. Barrett's great work on the Fourth Gospel or Dr. Vincent Taylor's on St. Mark. Even so, the author makes considerable demands upon his serious general reader. Between a Latin dedication at the beginning and an index of Greek words at the end of the book are interspersed occasional Latin quotations from Erasmus and excellent bibliographies of recent work in French and German bearing upon the Philippian correspondence. Regrettably, in the light of recent American and European interest in the contributions of patristic exegesis, apart from

Cramer's *Catena* the patristic commentaries, not all of which are unavailable in English, are omitted in the bibliography. Dr. Beare makes, for example, only four references to Chrysostom and but one each to Theodore of Mopsuestia and Theodoret. If he is disappointing here, however, the deficiency is rectified in the admirable fifteen-page discussion of the "kenotic" Christology by his colleague, Professor E. R. Fairweather. Not only does Dr. Fairweather draw largely upon patristic and medieval learning; he underlines the values for Christological doctrine that this exegesis has preserved.

B. S. Easton appears as B. F. Easton in the General Index, a slip that should be rectified in the subsequent reprinting that this excellent commentary deserves.

J. B. Hibbitts

University of King's College
Halifax

Authority and Power in the Free Church Tradition: A Social Case Study of the American Baptist Convention. By P. M. Harrison. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. Pp. xx, 248. $5.00.

This book is by the author's assertion "a study of the American Baptist Convention as a social structure in order to discover what the Baptists mean when they insist upon allegiance to a doctrine of the church which they do not follow in actual polity" (p. 9).

To assure accurate identification it should be explained that the American Baptist Convention is the fourth largest Baptist body in the United States, with a membership of 1,500,000 persons gathered in 6,400 churches locally grouped in 34 state conventions north of the Mason and Dixon line and extending west to California. It was formed in 1950 to succeed the Northern Baptist Convention which had been in existence since 1907, when some eight independently operated national Baptist missionary societies, with history dating back to 1814, had pooled resources for co-operative effort.

The guiding doctrinal principle in organization of the new Convention was asserted to be that of "the autonomy of the local church." To assure the Baptist public that this was the case every effort was made to minimize the influence of the full-time Convention leaders. Executive officers were deprived of authority to initiate policy, this right being placed in the hands of Boards of Managers responsible to membership. Delegates to annual conventions were to be sent from local churches only, so as to preserve the principle of direct representation. No Convention legislation was to be considered binding upon any local church against its will. By these restraints upon the exercise of authority, it was believed that executive officers of the Convention would be rendered powerless to operate against the wishes of the local churches. Nonetheless, Convention leaders have gained power

sufficient to establish a bureaucracy comparable to large social structures in government and business. Contrary to the theory of their office, professional Convention executives now actually control policy-making, local churches have lost prestige, individual Baptists have lost any strong voice. Thus bishops, once renounced in full regalia, "have returned in business suits to direct affairs behind the curtain of the center stage" (p. 227).

Why this present contradiction of Baptist faith and polity? Harrison pursues three main types of analysis in quest of the answer: (1) historical, (2) sociological, and (3) remedial.

The historical analysis (Chapters I–II) is chiefly memento, but an exceedingly important reminder that the root cause of present Baptist dilemma in polity has been loss of memory of the original "Free Church" goal. At the time of their origin Baptists, like other Free Church groups, laid primary confessional stress on the "freedom of God." They wished above all things to achieve "free movement of the Holy Spirit within the churches," exempt from the control of any threatening official, magisterial or ecclesiastical. The means by which they hoped to achieve this ultimate goal were insistence upon "freedom of the individual" (soul competency) and "freedom of congregation" (autonomy of local church). The first principle assured direct approach to God, while the second seemed to offer greatest opportunity for developing individual spiritual potential. But in time the necessity of organizing associational missionary endeavour brought confusion of goal and means. Increasing emphasis on polity tended progressively to obscure the ultimate goal. Theological individualism began to displace emphasis on God's sovereignty. By the nineteenth century Baptist life became so mixed with political democracy as to place almost exclusive emphasis on sovereignty of man and local congregation. The means had displaced the goal. This development explains the present organization of the American Baptist Convention, designed on paper to eliminate the possibility of establishment of executive authority that might encroach upon the freedom of man or the local congregation.

The sociological analysis (Chapters IV–XI) brings home forcefully the price American Baptists have paid for this historical capitulation to means which prevent them from recognizing in their policy any legitimate authority above that of the local congregation. This section of the book uses as tools for research (1) Max Weber's categories of "authority," and (2) the social theories of such men as Talcott Parsons, Robert K. Merton and Marion J. Levy, Jr., who, as specialists in the logic of functional analysis, have set forth requirements a social system must meet to survive and still achieve its goals. Although the latter theories are used extensively, the main presentation falls within the framework of Weber's categories of authority: (1) traditional, (2) rational-legal, and (3) charismatic. It is shown that Baptist officials, rarely able to call upon the first two types of authority, are forced to concentrate on development of the third. For this reason they are usually chosen on the basis of compelling personality qualities and gifts, which, when

exercised, often attract the loyalty and following of others, even to the point of disregard of tradition and law. Working on this charismatic base these leaders are able to develop a "rational-pragmatic" authority which permits them inordinate power. By devices of promotion and demotion, allocations of money, personal appeal to voting strength, etc., they gain bureaucratic power to which they have no legitimate right; but since this power was never given them by the churches through legitimate channels, it cannot be taken away by formal action of the churches. Nor are these the only disadvantages that have derived from lack of legitimated authority at higher levels of polity. The constant struggle of Convention executives to gain informal power sufficient to stem anarchy has made them conservative men, more intent upon preserving the *status quo* than on risking the danger of prophetic and imaginative leadership necessary for adjusting quickly to new needs. Premium is placed on precision of operation of the existing machine, control by professional experts, speed, continuity of return, optimum return for money and labour expended, elimination of dissident voices (e.g., Fundamentalists).

In remedial analysis (Chapter XII) Harrison sees only one answer to the impasse: "When [American] Baptists recognize that authority is more than a grant to power and that it also defines and therefore limits the uses of power, they may sustain the proximate harmony which they are seeking" (p. 227). He would achieve this recognition of authority by return to some type of associational discipline, preferably a system whereby churches would send delegates to associations, and associations (not churches) delegates to annual convention. In this way the association would exercise authority over both church and convention and prevent abuses of power permitted by lack of locus of tangible authority—thus nullifying one executive's summary of the present situation: "If we leave things undefined structurally as well as theologically, we can operate the Convention pretty much as we please" (p. 84).

This is a sobering study focusing attention on the current practice of a specific Free Church, but its conclusions are applicable to all groups within this tradition which, with the passing of time, have lost sight of their original goal of securing the "freedom of God"; also to ecumenical groups, which, faced with the fundamental definitions of authority, are inclined to make expedient concessions to achieve immediate results. For all such bodies this pioneering social study should serve as handwriting on the wall, proclaiming that "legitimated authority restricts power," and conversely that "absence of formal authority breeds illegitimate power." The author has been somewhat repetitious in his presentation but for this he can be forgiven, in view of the novelty of his approach and the importance of his message.

G. P. Albaugh

McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario

Challenge and Response: Modern Ideas and Religion. Edited by R. C. Chalmers and J. A. Irving. Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1959. Pp. x, 130. $3.50.

This book is a symposium by seven leading Canadian scholars. Each in his own field has sought to respond to the challenge to religious ideas offered by certain aspects of contemporary culture. It is also a sequel to two earlier volumes, *The Heritage of Western Culture* (1952) and *The Light and the Flame* (1956), published under the joint editorship of R. C. Chalmers and John A. Irving. In this third series the editors have singled out for treatment some of the main issues of our time in the fields of archaeology, literature, education, philosophy, theology and international affairs.

Ronald J. Williams, Professor of Near Eastern Studies, University College, University of Toronto, opens with a discussion of "Archaeology and Biblical Studies." He traces the rise of modern archaeology and its development to the point where it can no longer be maintained that the earliest narratives of Genesis concerning the Patriarchs who flourished during the first half of the second millennium B.C. are of value to the historian only as a reflection of the life and thought of the period when the accounts were formulated and written down, that is to say, in the ninth and eighth centuries B.C. Here is a response to the challenging assertion that reliable history is comparatively late. Williams adduces considerable evidence to support his thesis of the reliability of the Old Testament texts. This is not undertaken, however, to prove the truth of the Bible, but rather to show that biblical literature must be placed in its true setting in the perspective of the ancient Near East. As one might expect at the present day a good deal of the discussion bears on the significance of the Qumran materials.

Northrop Frye, Principal and Professor of English, Victoria College, University of Toronto, writes on "Religion and Modern Poetry." He asserts that most of the major fallacies that untrained readers fall into arise from the confusion of poetry with direct statement. Poetry must be judged on its own ground and by is own standards. The notion that good or bad, as moral qualities, inhere in works of art is a fallacy. "A poem not being a direct statement, it can be good or bad only in its own categories" (p. 24).

Frye discusses the link between poetry and nature as established in the theory of criticism by Aristotle, and draws out some interesting implications. He sees no reason why a poet's revelation of the human world should have any kind of connection with a divine world or with any specific religious doctrine, but he also sees no reason why it should not. T. S. Eliot is discussed at some length to show how the symbolic and typological language of the Bible and the Church, which had almost disappeared out of English poetry after Milton, is now being used used again as a poetic language. In response to the criticism that a good deal of modern poetry involving religious themes is obscure, Frye would reply that the alleged obscurity disappears for readers who understand a modicum of the symbolism of Christianity.

Millar MacLure, Associate Professor of English, Victoria College, University of Toronto, treats of "The Falling Man; Variations on a Theme in Modern Fiction." His discussion of modern fiction is strikingly illustrated by numerous references to modern writers. He begins with Simenon, "for in his centre the crowd and the intellectuals meet" (p. 37). In a most ingenious manner he engages the challenge and makes his response.

"Thoughts on Education" is written by Watson Kirkconnell, President of Acadia University. This contribution to the symposium is a most able presentation of the educational situation on the North American Continent, and should be read by all North Americans who have any interest in education.

James S. Thomson, Dean Emeritus, Faculty of Divinity, McGill University, writes on "The Challenge of Existentialism," and seeks to show how existentialism has come to be a factor to contend with in modern theology. On the whole, his contribution appears to be an authentic account of the situation. With Thomson's essay I couple that of R. C. Chalmers, Professor of Systematic Theology and Philosophy of Religion, Pine Hill Divinity Hall, Halifax. The latter's contribution, entitled "Eschatology and its Cultural Relevance," is a fair account of the eschatological influence in modern theology. His thesis that the eschatological approach is one that has an appeal to modern man is, however, one that this reviewer fails to appreciate. These two specifically theological contributions give the Protestant response to the challenge with a typical bias against the Greek inheritance in Christianity.

John A. Irving, Professor of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Victoria College, University of Toronto, writes on "Ideological Differences and World Order." He winds up his discussion and the symposium with a plea for international law, a plea that must be taken seriously by all. Unfortunately Irving puts too much trust in the ability of the sociologist to solve this problem.

On the whole this is a worthwhile book written by scholars in a scholarly manner, and can be reckoned a valuable contribution to Canadian writing.

C. C. Landon

St. John's College
University of Manitoba
Winnipeg

The Degrees of Knowledge. By Jacques Maritain. Newly translated from the fourth French edition under the supervision of G. B. Phelan. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons (Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders), 1959. Pp. xix, 476. $7.50.

It goes without saying that a book which has been known and esteemed in the original French editions and in a previous translation for more than twenty years does not call for the usual kind of review. Nevertheless, the issue of a new and more accurate translation of Professor Maritain's most

ambitious work is an event of considerable importance in the world of scholarship. Not only does the publication of this new translation accord English readers a more reliable means of entry into the fundamental thought of one of the leading Thomist philosophers of this century, but it also provides an opportunity to judge the value of M. Maritain's book in the light of more recent developments in philosophy.

There can be little doubt that this new English version of *The Degrees of Knowledge* is a notable improvement upon the first translation. While that translation is by no means entirely without merit, the new one is unquestionably more exact. A comparison of the two translations with the original French reveals that the new translation consistently avoids the kind of errors which marred the first one. For example, such blunders as the rendering of Marintain's statement "*ces modifications d'ordre entatif ne sont que des conditions préréquisites à la connaissance*" as "these entitative modifications are not pre-requisite to knowledge," a mistranslation which seriously obscures the author's meaning, and which illustrates the need for great care in the translation of a philosophic work, are happily absent from the new translation. In general, it can be said that Father Phelan and his team of four translators have accomplished their task in an excellent fashion which well deserves the commendation which Professor Maritain expresses in his Foreword. Not the least of the merits of the new translation is the incorporation of the nine Appendixes which, though not included in the former translation, are an integral part of the book.

The Degrees of Knowledge is divided into two main parts which deal, respectively, with rational knowledge and with that knowledge involving faith and mystical experience, which Maritain calls suprarational knowledge. In the treatment of these topics Maritain's purpose is to show that Thomistic realism "opens the way to an exploration of the world of reflection in its very inwardness." Accordingly, he attempts to elucidate the structure of realistic knowledge by distinguishing the various kinds of knowledge open to the mind of man, by indicating the peculiar role of each and at the same time showing their essential compatibility. In addition, he has the purpose of showing the movement and *élan* of the mind which, in accordance with "that admirable law of unsatisfactoriness," carries the mind onward through the various levels of knowledge. In this, especially in the emphasis on the organic unity of Thomism, there is a pronounced Hegelian tone, but the synthesis of knowledge which Maritain propounds is far removed from that of the great German idealist. Rational knowledge, for Maritain, comprises three levels, namely, *physica*, *mathematica*, and *metaphysica*, which correspond to the three theoretical sciences recognized by Aristotle, but which Maritain arranges in a subtle and complex hierarchy in which a place is found for non-mathematical empirical science, physico-mathematics, and the Thomistic philosophy of nature. Metaphysics is the supreme science in the rational or natural order, and it achieves a knowledge of God as first cause. But metaphysics cannot attain the Divine Essence in itself. Such

knowledge is attainable only in the hierarchy of suprarational knowledge. In this hierarchy, Deity as believed is the object of theology, Deity as formally revealed is the object of faith, and Deity as seen or known quidditatively is the object of knowledge of the blessed. The highest, the supremely clear knowledge is the incommunicable knowledge of beatific vision.

It is necessary to emphasize, however, that Professor Maritain's book is not limited merely to the task of delineating the structure of a hierarchy of knowledge. While the elucidation of the degrees of knowledge is the main concern of the book, the discussion of each degree or kind of knowledge raises problems peculiar to itself. Thus, there are so many issues raised and discussed in *The Degrees of Knowledge* that it is impossible to do them justice in the short space of a review. For example, Maritain's discussion of the role of the concept in knowledge, his examination of the relation between empirical science and the Thomistic philosophy of nature, his treatment of mystical experience, his inquiry into and explanation of practical knowledge, all merit lengthy and careful study. No doubt the demand for a new and more serviceable translation of this book reflects the continuing interest in Professor Maritain's approach to these and other problems, an interest which has found expression in a growing body of literature. Accordingly, it would be improper here to attempt a judgment in detail of such topics, in isolation from this literature and from a consideration of Professor Maritain's later works which shed light on positions adopted in *The Degrees of Knowledge*. It may not be entirely unprofitable, however, to make a few general comments on the success of the book as a whole from the standpoint of certain trends in contemporary philosophy.

One of the most vigorous movements in the philosophy of the present day is that which is concerned with the understanding of science. In this endeavour much remains to be done, but honesty compels the recognition that the results so far attained in the relatively new discipline of the philosophy of science do not substantiate Professor Maritain's conclusions concerning science, the kind of knowledge it is, and its relation to philosophy. Thus, many philosophers will find it incredible that Maritain could speak of mathematics as a science concerned with "ideal quantity" while blithely ignoring the advance of mathematical logic towards the reduction of mathematics to pure logic. Others will be distressed to find theoretical physics described as knowledge of the physical real by way of "myths," in apparent disregard of the semantic investigation of the language of science. Again, some will deplore Maritain's confusion of questions concerning the presuppositions of science and questions concerning the presuppositions of scientists. Such criticisms from the point of view of later developments may seem unfair, but it is well to bear in mind that these developments had begun long before Maritain wrote his book. It may be argued that Maritain's fundamental positions can be shown to be compatible with recent achievements in the philosophy of science, but it can scarcely be denied that *The Degrees of Knowledge* does not indicate clearly how this is to be accomplished.

Perhaps the most striking shortcoming of Maritain's book, from the standpoint of contemporary philosophy, is its failure to take account of questions concerning the meaningful use of language. Maritain's Thomism is, accordingly, seriously out of touch with one of the most influential trends in contemporary thought, *viz.*, the philosophy of language. It is not an exaggeration to say that the majority of those who are sometimes called linguistic or analytical philosophers will find Maritain's treatment of knowledge pointless and obscure. Professor Maritain's tendency to use rhetorical flourishes at crucial points in his argument and his failure to clarify the meanings of many of his terms will repel those who believe that philosophy requires precision in the use of language and the recognition of explicit criteria of significance. But it would be inappropriate to press such linguistic criticisms too far. In the absence of a detailed and systematic Thomistic philosophy of language, which can deal with recognized problems on a scale comparable to that of the philosophy of language now prevalent among non-Thomist philosophers, it is difficult to know how well the principles of Thomism can survive the strictures of contemporary analytical philosophy. At the present time the possibility that Thomism can develop such a philosophy of language seems rather dim. Nevertheless, those, like the present reviewer, who are not as unsympathetic towards traditional ways of philosophizing as are the analytical philosophers, will no doubt continue to find Maritain's book a source of stimulation in spite of its shortcomings. It is a work of rich allusiveness and solid scholarship. Perhaps the divisions of knowledge explicated therein bear too much the stamp of artificiality, and possibly "unsatisfactoriness" is too vague a concept to serve as the means of explaining the reach of human cognition. But Maritain's contributions to a wide variety of problems are too suggestive to be entirely ignored.

C. W. Webb

Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto

Introduction to Religious Philosophy. By G. MacGregor. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959. Pp. xviii, 366. Paper-back, $2.95; cloth-bound, $4.50.

This book is intended to serve as a text for courses offered in college departments of religion. It is a text book, however, only in the sense that it provides material for discussion and debate under expert leadership, and not in the sense of offering a systematic philosophy of religion. All the traditional problems are explored at length, and various possible solutions are examined. The author's own views are usually apparent, but not by any means obtrusive.

The book begins by discussing the nature of religion and of religious philosophy. In the prevailing secular atmosphere of our age, it is necessary to establish the authenticity of that kind of experience and knowledge called

"religious." The author succeeds in showing that religion deserves, and in fact demands, as serious an intellectual consideration as any other field of knowledge. He then proceeds to offer an exhaustive examination of the basic conceptions of God, ranging from primitive animism to Christian theism. A long section is devoted to the traditional arguments for the existence of God, none of which is found to be satisfactory. The author's own view is that what he calls "the value-experience" is the most convincing approach to the question of God's existence.

One of the most interesting and successful sections is devoted to the problem of religious knowledge. Somewhat surprisingly, MacGregor makes considerable use of Newman's conception of the "illative sense." He also recognizes both the large place which agnosticism occupies in religious faith, and also the part that is played by psychological factors.

Two of the most important questions for religious thought have to do with immortality or human destiny and the problem of evil. Each of these is thoroughly canvassed here. The section on the mystery of evil is particularly good; no attempt is made to gloss over the difficulties inherent in any effort to reconcile the fact of evil with the goodness and omnipotence of God. The author adheres to the traditional position that the mystery of evil is related to the mystery of freedom, and he makes some helpful contributions to this view.

The final section has to do with religious language. MacGregor understands that new difficulties have been created for philosophy of religion by contemporary analytical philosophy. Theological language has its own logic and grammar, which require more extensive examination than they have hitherto received. The author offers some suggestions without much elaboration. The book concludes with an Epilogue, which is in the nature of a spiritual autobiography. A long and valuable bibliography is appended.

This book succeeds in achieving its purpose. It would undoubtedly provide an excellent basis for a college course in philosophy of religion. All the relevant questions and problems are raised and explored. The writing is fluent and attractive, and there is an abundance of cogent illustration. No prior knowledge of philosophy is assumed, but the student who makes good use of this book will begin to think like a philosopher, and will at least be made aware of the fact that religion is intellectually respectable and even exciting.

D. R. G. Owen

Trinity College
Toronto

The Wonder of The Christian Gospel. By J. M. Shaw. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1959. Pp. 143. $3.95.

Dr. J. M. Shaw taught Christian doctrine to theological students in Canada and the United States for nearly forty years, and was the esteemed Professor

of Systematic Theology and Philosophy of Religion at Queen's Theological College, Kingston, for a quarter of a century. This book is his response to the suggestion of an enthusiastic reviewer of a former work, *Christian Doctrine* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1953), that he write a statement of the Christian Faith in everyday language that the ordinary church member could understand. In attempting just this, Dr. Shaw has been eminently successful, and we owe him an unpayable debt of gratitude.

The ten chapters of this book are simply and clearly written and discuss the fundamental affirmations of Christianity with warmth, sincerity and ripe wisdom. Dr. Shaw is familiar with the latest Christian scholarship and is deeply versed in the teaching of the Reformed tradition in which many of us were brought up, but he uses no strange terminology. With the exception of two references to "Demythologizing," and an occasional Greek or Latin word which is explained by its context or in parenthesis, the text is pleasantly free from verbal difficulties to be solved only with the help of the theological "Word Book" or lexicon.

The note of "wonder, love and praise" is sounded in the stirring opening chapter on "The Individualizing Love of God," and is sustained throughout until, in the final chapter on "The Christian Consummation," it becomes a trumpet blast heralding "V-Day," Victory Day, when Christ shall reign and be "all and in all." Dr. Shaw sets "The Wonder of The Christian Gospel" over against the marvels of the physical universe revealed by modern science, in an attempt to deepen our awareness of the even greater wonders of the individualizing, redeeming love of God in Jesus Christ.

This book is written primarily for laymen but the author hopes that it will also help the preacher to proclaim the Gospel with greater joy and conviction. We believe that it will have that effect upon all preachers who are fortunate enough to read it. Few will deny that this note is sadly lacking in much modern preaching. Christianity has lost a great deal of its former radiance. Too often today's preacher definitely does not sound like the proclaimer of "good news." We need to recapture the joy of the first Christians as they marvelled at "the glorious good news" of God's redeeming grace in Jesus Christ. Dr. Shaw possesses this joy and as we read his book it is difficult not to be caught up in it. But it is the sober joy of a scholar and teacher who has tasted life's bitter-sweet in concert with his fellows, and yet finds in Siloam's cooling stream vitality for victorious living.

In every chapter of this book arresting and timely insights are to be found. Space allows us to mention only one. Dr. Shaw, writing on "The Paradox of The Incarnation" in Chapter II, pp. 26–32, states his belief that the missionary enterprise of the Christian Church is justified by the fact that Christianity is not only the "highest religion that has yet appeared in history," but is "the highest that can appear." It is "the final and absolute religion," and "a Gospel for all the world." As Peter maintains, there is "salvation in on one else" but Christ (Acts 4:12). Thus the "unrepeatable historic acts of God in Jesus Christ" are "of final and absolute significance."

Here the author takes issue with W. E. Hocking and Arnold Toynbee, both of whom anticipate the emergence of a universal religion made up of contributions from the 'higher" world religions such as Hinduism, Islam, and Buddhism. Is it really true that the ecumenical movement in its widest sense can and must involve a synthesis of the highest insights of the great world religions? Statements made recently by Sir Julian Huxley, the eminent biologist, give new pertinence to this question, and the discussion of it will be fateful for Christian missionary endeavours. Tolerance we must have, says Shaw, and we ought also to cultivate a more intelligent and informed appreciation of other religions; nevertheless Christ is "not only uniquely historical but the world's 'eternal Contemporary,' not an idea but a Person—the Living God incarnate who confronts man and 'saves' him, makes him whole and free."

Superb material for doctrinal sermons for the great Festivals of the Christian year may be found within this volume. It could be used effectively in teaching missions and with the adult catechumen class. Laymen will find that Dr. Shaw has stated the grounds for a buoyant Christian faith that can withstand the peculiar intelectual, moral, and political shocks of our day, and, hopefully labouring for Christ's sake, await with patience the unfolding of God's redemptive purpose for mankind. From the treasure house of his ripe scholarship and deep Christian experience, the author has taken things "old and new"—mostly old, perhaps, but how wonderful they are!

William Briggs

St. Andrew's United Church
Toronto

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Inclusion of a title in this list neither ensures nor precludes subsequent review in this journal.)

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